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Fisheries represent an  important resource for the South Pacific. In recognition of this, 
AClAR held a workshop in Hobart Tasmania, in March 1989 to explore possibilities 
for  a  collaborative  research  project  Representatives  from  research  and  fishery 
management  institutions  in  the  South  Pacific  region,  Australia  and  North  America 
attended. A report of  that workshop is available in ACIAR Proceedings No 26. 
The project that subsequently emerged from the workshop and follow-up discus-
sions was one titled 'Economics of  the tuna fisheries industry in Papua New Guinea'. It 
involved collaboration between the University ofTasmania  (and later the University of 
Queensland following the transfer of  Professor Campbell), the University of  New South 
Wales and the Papua New  Guinea Department of  Fisheries and Marine Resources. This 
publication presents the output of  that project 
AClAR  was  delighted with  the  spirit of cooperation that  prevailed  during the 
project and with the immediate usefulness of  some of  the results in policy making and 
negotiations  regarding  access  fees  in  Papua  New Guinea.  Thanks  are  due to the 
researchers and administrators in all participating institutions. 
While AClAR  operates in  a bilateral mode through projects between Australian 
and developing country institutions, whenever possible we seek to extend the results 
of projects to other countries. The work on international market demand for tuna  is 
already  of relevance  beyond  Papua  New  Guinea.  We  propose  to  implement 
research on tuna fisheries management in other South Pacific countries. 
Kenneth M. Menz 
Ac/AR Program Coordinator 
Economics and Farming Systems 
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This  paper provides a summary of a research program 
on  the  economics  of  Papua  New  Guinea's  tuna 
fisheries, funded by the Australian Centre for Interna-
tional Agricultural Research (ACIAR Project No. 8928). 
The  research  was  divided  into  five  general  areas: 
harvesting  costs  and  returns;  sustainability,  stock 
management  and  fishery  rents;  fisheries  law,  regula-
tions and monitoring; the processing sector; and inter-
national  tuna markets.  The research  is  described  in 
detail in the papers in this volume. This paper gives an 
overview of the research undertaken and summarises 
some of the results. 
Harvesting costs and returns 
The two areas of basic research on the supply side were 
on the costs of harvesting tuna by purse seine, longline 
and  pole-and-Iine  vessels,  and on  the  technology  of 
harvesting  tuna  by purse seine  and  longline vessels. 
The  former  work  allowed  conclusions  to  be  drawn 
about the profitability of Japanese distant water opera-
tions in  the 1980s, while the latter made it possible to 
investigate a number of issues including: the ability of 
the purse seine fleet to target species; the level of the 
economic  interaction  between  the  purse  seine  and 
longline fisheries; and the relative efficiency of U.S. and 
Japanese purse seine search  behaviour.  Results  from 
the two areas of research were combined to estimate 
rents from tuna fishing in Papua New Guinea and to 
develop  a  financial  appraisal  model  for  purse seine, 
longline, and pole-and-Iine fishing. 
The profitability of  the Japanese tuna fleets 
The  Japanese  Ministry  of  Agriculture,  Forestry  and 
Fisheries  publishes  annual  data  on  the  costs  and 
returns  of  purse  seine,  longline,  and  pole-and-Iine 
vessels in  its offshore and distant water tuna fleets. A 
sample of cost and returns data is  taken for each size 
class  of  vessel  in  each  category  and  the  sample 
averages are published. Since the published data are in 
the form of averages they do not necessarily reflect the 
economics of tuna fishing in a particular area such as 
Papua New Guinea's fishing zone. In  particular, while 
fishing  costs  might  not  be  expected  to  vary  greatly 
between  distant  water  locations,  the  returns  from 
fishing would reflect significant differences in produc-
tivity between one area and another. Thus the data are 
useful  in  providing  reasonable  estimates  of  fishing 
costs  in  an area such as Papua New Guinea,  and  a 
general picture of overall profitability. 
The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry  and Fisheries 
data for 1979-89 were analysed to calculate the costs 
and  profitability  of the  various  classes  of vessel.  In 
analysing the data, certain costs, such as licence fees or 
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the  imputed  return  on  non  fixed  assets  such  as 
goodwill, were excluded on the grounds that they repre-
sented current or capitalised  fishery  rent rather than 
fishing costs. The cost of the fixed assets was estimated 
on the basis of reported depreciation,  and using the 
average required rate of return on capital in Japanese 
industry.  Alternative  required  rates  of  return,  one 
ignoring  and  one  taking  account  of  cross  equity 
holdings, were employed but the results were similar. In 
calculating daily fishing costs the annual cost of owning 
and operating a vessel was divided  by the number of 
days fished per annum. In  this way allowance is  made 
for time spent provisioning, travelling and unloading. 
The cost estimates are average cost per fishing day 
for longliners in the SO- lOO,  100- 200, and 200-S00 
gross  registered  tonne  (GRT)  classes;  pole-and-line 
vessels in the SO-1  00, and 200-S00 GRT classes; and 
group purse seiners in the SO-lOO, and 100- 200 GRT 
classes. The published data do not include information 
about single purse seiners. As an example of the results 
obtained, Table  1.1  gives  estimates  of cost  per day 
fished in 1988-89 at current prices. 
T able 1.1.  Cost per day fished  by Japanese tuna vessels,  1988-89. 
Type  of vessel  S ize  of ve ssel  Cost per day fished 
(GRn  (V'OOO) 
Longliners  50-100  441 
100-200  654 
200-500  1017 
Pole-and-liners  50-100  470 
200-500  1002 
Group  purse seiners  50-100  1865 
100-200  2990 
The  rate of return and  economic  profit  and  loss 
calculations indicated that virtually no size or type of 
vessel  was  making  the  required  rate of return  or an 
economic profit over the period 1979- 89. It should be 
remembered  that  these results  are  based on sample 
averages and do not imply that no vessels in  the fleet 
were  making  a  profit  in  the  course of a  year, or in 
certain  fishing grounds.  The categories of vessels  for 
which  a zero or positive average economic profit was 
estimated were: medium and large longliners in 1979-
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80; large longliners in  1987-89; and small group purse 
seiners in  1979-80 and 1984-8S. These results raise 
the question of why the fleet continued to operate over 
this period. 
Vessels will  continue to operate in  the short term, 
even if they are making a loss, provided that they are 
covering  their variable  costs.  Operating under  these 
circumstances reduces the size of the economic loss. In 
the long run, however, vessels making a loss would be 
expected to leave the fishery. The reason the Japanese 
fleets continued to operate at a loss during the decade 
of the  1980s appears to be the subsidies paid by the 
government,  apparently  to  slow  down  the  pace  of 
adjustment to economic and fishing  conditions. The 
research  indicated  that,  even  if  the entire Japanese 
offshore and distant water fleet had incurred annual 
losses on the scale experienced by the average vessels 
in  the  tuna  fleets,  the  total  amount  of  assistance 
provided to the industry  was sufficient to more than 
offset these losses. This assistance made it possible for 
the tuna fleets to continue operating at a loss over an 
extended period. 
Technology of  purse seining and longlining 
The purse seine and longline tuna fisheries are multi-
.  species fisheries:  purse seiners catch  mainly skipjack 
and juvenile yellowfin, while longliners catch yellowfin, 
bigeye  albacore,  billfish  and  swordfish. Studies  were 
undertaken  to  determine  how  much  control  vessels 
fishing in Papua New Guinea in  the period  1983- 86 
had over the species composition of their catch. Using 
a revenue function  framework,  it was  found that U.S. 
purse seine vessels had targeted juvenile yellowfin tuna 
in response to changes in the price of yellowfin relative 
to skipjack, whereas Japanese vessels  had apparently 
not changed the species mix  of their catch. The U.S. 
vessels are larger and more technologically  advanced 
than the Japanese vessels and this may account for a 
difference in targeting ability. 
The catch and effort data for the Japanese longline 
fleet  operating in  Papua New  Guinea in  the  period 
1979-87 were also analysed by means of the revenue 
function  framework  to  determine  the  relationships 
among the species harvested.  It was found that small 
vessels «  1  00 GRT) used different technology to that of 
large vessels in that certain pairs of species were substi-
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one species rises, thereby inducing an increase in effort 
targeting that species, the catch of the other species 
falls.  The  substitution  relationships  were  between 
yellowfin  and albacore,  yellowfin  and  billfish,  bigeye 
and  albacore,  and  bigeye  and  swordfish.  These 
relationships may be explained by the depth  at which 
the various species are commonly found; each substi-
tute pair tends to consist of a shallow and a deep-water 
species.  No  such relationships were  detected for  the 
large vessel sample, which  accounted for  24%  of the 
longline  catch  in  Papua New  Guinea,  indicating that 
those vessels do not influence the species mix  of the 
catch in response to relative price changes. This result 
may reflect the greater depth at which the larger vessels 
typically fish. 
Financial appraisal model for tuna vessels 
The Japanese cost estimates, together with catch and 
price data, are used to generate a simulation model of 
the  financial  performance  of various  kinds  of tuna 
fishing. The model  estimates the cash flow,  payback 
period,  return on investment net present value,  and 
internal  rate  of return  for  various  sizes  of longline, 
purse seine, or pole-and-Iine vessels operating under 
specified  circumstances. The model  can  be  used  to 
conduct a sensitivity analysis of financial performance 
when inputs such as the number of trips per year, days 
fishing  per trip,  daily  catch,  and  species  prices  are 
varied.  It can  be used  by  both domestic and foreign 
investors to plan and assess tuna fishing ventures. 
As an example, the Financial Appraisal Model (FAM) 
is  used  to  assess  the  likely  performance  of a  small 
longliner  (50- 100  GRT)  operating  in  Papua  New 
Guinea's  fishing  zone.  According  to  the  analysis  of 
fishery rents discussed earlier, this size of vessel was the 
most  profitable  Japanese  longline  operation  in  the 
1980s. The results of the F  AM are not encouraging: the 
payback period is 13 years and the internal rate of return 
0.03% which is not high enough to justify investment by 
Papua New Guinea or another foreign nation. Since the 
FAM is based on Japanese costs and returns data it may 
be that some of the inputs should be adjusted to reflect 
the particular circumstances being considered. Japanese 
labour costs, for example, might be significantly higher 
than  those  in  Papua New  Guinea.  The LOTUS  123 
spreadsheet format of the model makes it easy to amend 
the inputs as required. 
Sustainability, stock management 
and fishery rents 
The sustainability of the current level of purse seine 
skipjack catch is  not in question, but the purse seine 
yellowfin  catch may impact on the longline yellowfin 
fishery. The question of the optimal allocation of the 
yellowfin  stock  between  the  two  gear  types  was 
analysed  within  a  benefit-cost  framework  Another 
stock management issue considered was the sharing of 
information  among  purse  seine  vessels  during  the 
search  process  for  schools  of  tuna.  The  different 
approaches of the U.S. and Japanese fleets to informa-
tion sharing are analysed and the benefits of coopera-
tion  are explored. The generation  of fishery  rents  in 
Papua New  Guinea's  purse seine,  pole-and-Iine,  and 
longline fisheries is also analysed. 
Interaction between the purse seine 
and longline fisheries 
Around 25% by weight of the catch of the purse seine 
fleet  consists  of juvenile  yellowfin  tuna,  while  adult 
yellowfin  constitute  around  40%  by  weight  of  the 
longline  catch. There is  clearly  the  potential  for  the 
purse seine fishery to have a significant impact on the 
longline fishery through its yellowfin catch. A benefit-
cost analysis  was  conducted to determine whether a 
small decline in the purse seine yellowfin  catch would 
generate sufficient benefits  in  the  longline  fishery  to 
offset the costs to the purse seine fishery. The benefit to 
the  longline  fishery  results  from  a  higher  yellowfin 
catch per unit effort This generates higher effort levels 
in  the longline  fishery  and results  in  changes  in  the 
catches of other species as well. The extent to which 
yellowfin  catch  per unit effort  rises  depends on  the 
relative  importance  of growth  and  natural  mortality 
among the additional juvenile yellowfin that escape the 
purse seine fishery, and  the importance of the adult 
biomass  in  determining  catch  per  unit  effort.  In 
addition  to  the  biological  effects,  the  higher  price 
obtained  for  longline  as  compared  with  purse seine 
caught yellowfin  is  an  important  determinant of the 
benefit of a reduction in purse seine catch. 
The extent of the cost of restraining the purse seine 
catch  depends on  whether purse seiners  can  target 
individual species. If they can target as indicated by the 
analysis of U.S. purse seine data described earlier, they 
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can substitute skipjack for yellowfin in their catch. The 
cost will  be  approximately the relatively  small  differ-
ence in price between yellowfin and skipjack multiplied 
by  the reduction  in juvenile  yellowfin  catch.  If  purse 
seiners are unable to target as indicated by the analysis 
of the Japanese data, purse seine effort will need to be 
restrained to secure a reduction in yellowfin catch. This 
will  also cause a  reduction in skipjack catch,  thereby 
making  the  cost  of  the  policy  higher  than  in  the 
targeting  case.  The  benefit-cost  ratio  of  a  policy 
involving  a  1  % decline  in  the  purse  seine  juvenile 
yellowfin  catch  in  Papua  New  Guinea's  fishing zone 
was  approximately  9  in  the  no-targeting  case  and 
around  30  in  the  targeting  case.  These  ratios  are 
subject to substantial error because they are based on 
estimated  variables,  but  even  taking  account  of  the 
standard errors involved there seems to be a case for 
considering a  reduction  in  the  purse seine yellowfin 
catch. The present value of the net benefit of reducing 
the purse seine yellowfin catch in  Papua New Guinea 
waters by 1  % was estimated to be around $3 million. It 
should  be  noted that these results are based on the 
level of activity and the prices and costs experienced in 
the 1980s. 
Search behaviour of  purse seine 
tuna vessels 
It  has been suggested  that  the Japanese  purse seine 
fleet adopts a cooperative approach to locating schools 
of tuna, whereas U.S. vessels behave in  a competitive 
manner.  Information  sharing  would  be  expected  to 
increase the efficiency of the search process,  thereby 
improving the returns to tuna fishing and the potential 
returns to the host nation. A sample of Japanese and 
U.S. purse seine vessels fishing in Papua New Guinea's 
fishing zone in the period 1983-86 was used to investi-
gate this issue. It was found that at any particular time, 
the Japanese fleet tended to be more concentrated by 
area than the U.S. fleet, suggesting a more cooperative 
approach to fishing. Japanese vessels also had a greater 
tendency to shift location when higher catch rates were 
being achieved elsewhere than did U.S. vessels. Statis-
tical  tests  supported  the  hypothesis  that  Japanese 
vessels, unlike U.S. vessels, were moving in response to 
information on catch rates in other parts of the fishing 
zone. Since the analysis tends to support the hypoth-
esis  of greater infonnation  sharing  by  the Japanese, 
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there should be objective evidence of greater efficiency 
of the Japanese  search  process.  An  analysis  of  the 
proportion of trip time consisting of days on which sets 
were made revealed thatjapanese vessels made sets on 
between 90  and 95% of days  as compared with 77-
84% for the U.S.  fleet. At least some of the difference 
could  be  attributed  to  the  efficiency  of the  search 
process. 
Fishery rents in Papua New Guinea's 
exclusive economic zone 
The  cost  estimates  for  the  Japanese  fleet  can  be 
combined  with  the  catch  data  for  Japanese  vessels 
operating  in  Papua  New  Guinea's  fishing  zone  to 
obtain an estimate of the rents which were generated in 
the  tuna  fishery.  In  view  of the  evidence  presented 
above on the profitability of the Japanese offshore and 
distant water tuna fleets it is not surprising that the rent 
estimates  for  some  categories  of vessels  fishing  in 
Papua New Guinea are negative in some years. Positive 
rents, expressed as a percentage of the gross value of 
the catch, were observed for small longliners (50- 100 
GRT)  in  the  following  years:  1983  (30.3%),  1984 
05.4%), 1985 (33.7%) and 1986 (5.2%);  medium sized 
longliners  000-200  GRT)  earned  positive  rents  in 
1983  0 3.2%)  and  broke  even  in  1986;  and  large 
longliners  (200-500 GRT),  pole-and-line vessels  and 
group purse seiners made consistent and substantial 
losses in Papua New Guinea in  the period covered by 
the  analysis. This  performance  may explain  why  the 
Japanese withdrew  from  the Papua New Guinea tuna 
fisheries after 1987. The rent estimates also provide a 
guide to Papua New Guinea as to the appropriate level 
of  access  fees  as  a  percentage  of  expected  catch. 
Clearly, small and medium longliners could have paid 
access fees  of more  than 6% of gross revenue in  the 
period studied. 
Rent generation and sustainable yield 
The decision on how  best to develop and manage a 
nation's  tuna resource  is  difficult  to  make,  since  it 
embraces  a  range  of social,  political  and  biological 
factors. In this study,  the question of management is 
analysed on the baSIS of fishery  rent and the level  of 
effort  applied  to  the  fishery.  Controlling  the  level  of 
effort  in  order to  maximise rent from  the  fishery  is 
assumed to be the operative goal of management. Economic Issues in  Tuna  Fisheries Management and  Development in  Papua  New Guinea 
Simple yield and rent models were constructed and 
applied  to  the  Papua  New  Guinea  pole-and-line 
skipjack fishery, with the results being compared with 
empirical  fishery  statistics  from  the  1970s and early 
1980s when the fishery was in operation. The compar-
ison revealed that the model predictions were reason-
ably  close  to  the empirical  averages.  For a  range  of 
prices,  the  level  of effort  which  maximised  rent was 
determined. Not surprisingly, optimal effort, and hence 
optimal rent, was found to be very sensitive to fluctua-
tions  in  tuna  prices.  This  alone  suggests  that  tuna 
marketing research is critical to good management For 
the  pole-and-Iine  fishery,  the  results  indicate  that 
fishers should target the]apanese market for fresh and 
frozen tuna 
Fisheries law, monitoring and 
enforcement 
Two areas of research on legal and enforcement issues 
were the International Law of the Sea together with the 
national  and  international  legal  frameworks  within 
which Papua New Guinea operates, and the problem of 
obtaining  accurate  catch  data  from  distant  water 
fishing fleets. 
Law of  the Sea: a southern Pacific fisheries 
perspective 
A study was undertaken of a number of aspects of the 
modem  law  of the sea and  their impacts  on south 
Pacific  state fisheries  and economies. The economic 
survival  of many small states depends largely  on  the 
exploitation of the living  resources of their territorial 
seas and exclusive economic zones. A general goal of 
this work is to draw attention to the impact treaty provi-
sions may have on international law and the domestic 
legal  systems of individual  countries. Particularly,  the 
provisions of an international agreement may  restate 
pre-existing  customary  law,  may  crystallise  emergent 
rule, or may precipitate an action which may eventually 
become generally accepted practice. 
The  nature  of south  Pacific  state  practice  and 
direction in  managing their fishery resources and the 
problems they  have  or could  have  in  the future,  are 
discussed  in  general  terms.  Specific  developments 
within  the western  Pacific  fisheries  are discussed  to 
highlight  these  issues,  and  the  acceptance  and 
adoption of the Law of the Sea Convention provisions 
by various south Pacific states are examined. 
The  feasibility,  relevance  and  adequacy  of  the 
various regional agreements are assessed, particularly 
the  1982 Nauru  Agreement and the  1992 Arrange-
ment for the Management of the Western Pacific Purse 
Seine Fleet Fishery. The enforceability of these enact-
ments is also examined, in the context of both interna-
tional and domestic law, pre and post- ratification, and 
comparing  convention  signatories,  ratifiers  and 
non  parties.  Also  considered  is  the  issue  of  what 
problems could arise in  the face of foreign  resistance. 
In other words, how much power is  really conveyed to 
south Pacific states via the various legal instruments? 
Marine fisheries law and regulations in 
Papua New Guinea 
A detailed study was undertaken of the enforcement of 
fisheries law and regulations, with specific reference to 
Papua  New  Guinea.  The  study  reviews  the  relevant 
provisions  of  the  United  Nations  Law  of  the  Sea 
Convention,  and  discusses  in  detail  the  array  of 
practical measures and procedures that lie at the core 
of  most  fisheries  law  enforcement  systems.  It  then 
examines Papua New Guinea's enforcement framework 
in  detail.  Discussion of this framework  is  divided  into 
three sections: the national regime, the bilateral regime 
operating  in  the  Torres  Strait  and  involving  close 
cooperation  with  Australia,  and  the  regional  regime 
operating  under  the  aegis  of  the  Forum  Fisheries 
Agency. 
Monitoring reported catch rates 
Pacific Island nations such as Papua New Guinea have 
the objective  of obtaining as  access  fees  a  specified 
proportion  (currently  6%)  of  the  value  of  the  tuna 
catches in  their exclusive economic zones or fishing 
zones. In order to achieve this objective, and to manage 
their  fish  stocks  efficiently,  these  countries  need 
accurate information about catches. Since access fees 
are normally set as a percentage of the expected value 
of the catch per trip, individual vessels do not have an 
incentive to under report; foreign  fleets,  on the other 
hand, do have an incentive to under report since it is 
the aggregate catch which is  being used to  determine 
expected catch per vessel per trip. It is believed that the 
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us. vessels were providing reasonably accurate infor-
mation  on  their  recent  catches.  The  Korean  and 
Taiwanese purse seine vessels are similar to those of 
the US., although  the Taiwanese vessels  tend  to  be 
smaller. If Korean and Taiwanese catch rates differed 
significantly  from  that  of  the  U.S.  fleet  this  could 
indicate a difference in fishing skill or technology, or a 
difference  in  the accuracy of reporting. A sample of 
data  on  US.,  Korean  and Taiwanese  purse  seiners 
operating in  Papua New  Guinea's fishing zone in  the 
period 1983-88 was used to compare catch rates. 
At an aggregate level the reported catch rates of the 
Korean and Taiwanese vessels are significantly lower 
than those of the United  States. When  the data are 
disaggregated to provide comparisons of catch rates in 
the same quarter and subzone, however, the significant 
differences in catch rates tend to disappear. The differ-
ence between the results of the comparison at aggre-
gated and disaggregated levels  of data could indicate 
that US.  vessels  were  better at locating  productive 
fishing grounds than the Korean or Taiwanese. In view 
of  the  results  of  the  analysis  of  search  behaviour 
described  previously  further  research  is  required  to 
resolve this issue. In  principle, however, relative vessel 
catch  rates  can  be  a  useful  tool  in  monitoring  the 
accuracy of logbook data. 
The processing sector 
The westward  movement of the Pacific tuna-canning 
industry over the past decade is  attributed mainly to 
exchange  rate  changes.  An  economic  model  of  a 
tuna-canning plant is  used to determine whether the 
establishment  of a  cannery  would  bring  significant 
benefits to a country such as Papua New Guinea. 
Exchange rates and comparative 
competitive advantage 
A study was undertaken on the role of real (as opposed 
to  nominal)  exchange  rate  movements  in  providing 
Thailand with the opportunity to establish and expand 
its  'value-adding'  canned  tuna  industry  during  the 
decade  of the  1980s. It also  considers  the adverse 
conditions faced  by Japan over the same  period, and 
the prospects for expansion of 'new' sources such as 
Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and the Philippines. 
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By  the end of the decade, on the basis of relative 
levels  of real  exchange  rates, Indonesia appeared to 
have achieved a significant competitive advantage over 
the Philippines and Thailand. The question of  whether 
this  can  be  translated  into  increased  market  share 
depends on a range of other factors, but the opportu-
nity is clearly present 
Cannery costs 
This work entailed the development of a template for 
assessing the financial viability of new investments in 
tuna-canning plant located in  the western Pacific. It is 
assumed that the  project  is  a  greenfield  investment, 
and thus requires investment in local infrastructure as 
well  as  plant  and  machinery. The  resulting  analysis 
reveals that financial rates of return in the range of 15-
20% can  be  predicted  under  relatively  conservative 
assumptions but as would be expected, these rates of 
return are particularly sensitive to variations in  labour 
productivity and the price received for canned tuna 
While  the  development  of infrastructure  can  be 
extremely  beneficial  to  developing  economies,  for 
western Pacific nations the benefits will  be highly site 
specific. In order to simplify the economic analysis, net 
external  benefits  were  assumed  to  be  negligible. 
Ignoring the impact of market distortions, the analysis 
indicates that economic internal rates of return within 
the range 10-20% are not unreasonable. Taking into 
account foreign  exchange and labour market distor-
tions, the analysis suggests that internal rates of return 
within  the range 20-30% can be expected. However, 
these results  depend, to  a  significant degree, on  the 
assumption  that  canned  tuna  is  exported  to  the 
European  Community  (E.c.)  under  tariff-free  entry 
conditions. 
International tuna markets 
The three most important tuna markets are the United 
States, Japan and Europe. The features of each market 
are explored and the factors  determining demand in 
each  market  are  analysed.  A  forecasting  model 
developed  for  the  Japanese  market  is  relatively 
successful at forecasting skipjack, yellowfin, bigeye and 
albacore prices within the sample period. Economic Issues In  Tuna  Fisheries Management and  Development in Papua  New Guinea 
The U.S. market for canned tuna 
The U.S. tuna market is primarily a market for canned 
product, although small markets are evolving for speci-
ality tuna products. Traditionally, meat products have 
been the staple diet of Americans, and canned tuna is 
the  only  seafood  product  which  enjoys  widespread 
acceptance.  More  recently,  shrimp consumption  has 
risen to a level of demand almost equivalent to that of 
tuna, and it is anticipated that shrimp consumption will 
exceed  that  of  tuna  in  the  near  future.  However, 
chicken  and  red  meat  products  remain  the  major 
competitors for canned tuna 
A comprehensive overview of the U.S. canned tuna 
market was  undertaken, identifying the major factors 
which 'drive' the market, and deriving estimates of their 
relative importance. The results of a statistical analysis 
indicate that increases in real disposable income have 
been  the  major  driving  force  behind  increased  per 
capita U.S. consumption of canned tuna over the past 
two decades. While the impact of (real) falls in the price 
of canned tuna has also been a significant factor,  the 
magnitude of  the impact has been relatively small. 
The Japanese tuna industry and market 
This  study  provides  a  detailed  evaluation  of  the 
Japanese  tuna market,  with  particular  emphasis  on 
imports,  trade  barriers,  consumer  preferences,  the 
wholesale  marketing  system,  market  participants, 
purchasing patterns and price determination. 
The development of the tuna industry in Japan has 
been  characterised  by  significant  changes  over  time 
and  a  lack  of  general  stability.  The  structure  and 
conduct of Japan's present tuna industry  is  a  conse-
quence  of  relatively  recent  developments,  and  the 
industry is continuing to change rapidly in response to 
a variety of factors. A knowledge of these developments 
and  the  underlying  factors  responsible  for  them  is 
important both for  exporters  in  the region,  who  are 
endeavouring  to  formulate  effective  tuna-marketing 
strategies, and for government fishery authorities in the 
western Pacific, who are charged with the development 
and implementation of effective management policies 
for their respective fisheries. 
Over 80% of tuna consumed in Japan is eaten raw, 
either as sashimi or sushi. The remainder is processed 
into  a  number of forms  including  canned,  smoked, 
dried and salted. Tuna is marketed primarily in carcass 
form  at the wholesale  level,  although  an  increasing 
proportion  is  processed to  fillet,  chunk or blocks for 
direct sale to retailers. 
Fresh  and  frozen  tuna  consumption  has  been 
increasing steadily in recent years, fuelled in  particular 
by  increasing  imports.  Over  the  period  1986-92, 
Japanese  fresh  and frozen  tuna imports  doubled, a 
significant portion of the increase coming from Taiwan. 
Current trends indicate that consumption will continue 
to increase in the near future. 
Japanese  consumption  of canned  tuna generally 
increased over the period 1981-91, although this was 
largely facilitated by a decline in exports. While produc-
tion levels were reasonably stable during most of the 
period,  they  declined  in  the  latter  years.  Imports 
remained low during 1981-87, then increased signifi-
cantly  in  the following  four  years. The increase was 
supplied principally by Thailand. The increasing supply 
of canned tuna from  Thailand  may  have  a  negative 
impact upon domestic production because it is signifi-
cantly cheaper than the domestic product This may be 
further exacerbated by  the increasing use of albacore 
for sashimi, thereby reducing the supply of albacore for 
canning. If the situation in  the Japanese canned tuna 
market continues on  its  current course, such trends 
may  lead to the demise of the domestic canned-tuna 
industry in forthcoming decades, and the rise of Japan 
as a major importer of canned tuna 
The European market for tuna 
The European market for canned tuna is dominated by 
the E.C. It is an extremely diverse market, with distinctly 
identifiable  market structures and  consumer prefer-
ences. Historically, the E.C.  market has represented a 
considerable challenge to canned tuna exporters, due 
to  differing  standards  and  requirements  among 
importing  countries,  and  considerable  non  tariff 
barriers to trade, particularly in  mature markets such 
as  France.  In  recent years,  that challenge  has  been 
successfully taken up by Asian canned-tuna exporters, 
particularly Thailand and the Philippines. 
With a view to achieving uniformity across markets, 
uniform regulations for imports into the E.C. were intro-
duced in January 1993. While a single, community-wide, 
standard was originally intended to be of considerable 
benefit to exporters, lobbying  by  French interests has 
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resulted in the additional implementation of a commu-
nity-wide  import quota of 75000 tonnes  for  canned 
tuna, excluding that which  is  imported  from  certain 
Asian, Canibean and Pacific (ACP)  nations. The major 
beneficiaries  of this  move  will  be  canneries  in  ACP 
countries, while Thailand and, to a  lesser extent, the 
Philippines will be the major losers. Thailand alone, the 
dominant supplier to the E.C.,  has exceeded this level 
annually since 1989. 
This study provides a description of the European 
processing  sector  and  current  trends  in  European 
canned-tuna  production.  This  is  followed  by  an 
overview of the canned-tuna market, including import 
policies and rules of origin, current trends in consump-
tion and imports, and individual  market descriptions. 
Recent  changes  in  E.C.  legislation  regarding  canned 
tuna imports are also discussed. 
Modelling tuna prices 
Based upon monthly price data at the Yaizu market, a 
vector  auto  regressive  model  was  constructed  to 
provide  short-term  price  forecasts  for  skipjack, 
yellowfin,  bigeye, albacore, and southern bluefin tuna. 
Estimation of the model was  based on data over the 
period 1976 to 1992 (196 observations in  total), with 
forecasting extending to the end of 1994. 
The model was  able to  reproduce the peaks and 
troughs  of price  movements  over  the  period  with  a 
reasonable degree of accuracy, with  the exception of 
southern bluefin where prices were invariably underes-
timated. This latter observation could  be  due to  the 
effects  of  quotas  being  established  and  varied 
throughout the later part of the sample period, thereby 
changing the fundamental structure of the time series 
used for estimation. 
Summary and conclusions 
The main conclusions of the research described in this 
paper can be summarised as follows. 
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The Japanese tuna fleet  as  a  whole  was  making 
significant economic losses during the 1980s. It was 
able to maintain its operations because of substan-
tial subsidies from the Japanese government. 
- In spite of the overall losses, sections of the opera-
tions of the tuna fleet were profitable. In Papua New 
Guinea small Japanese longliners made consistent 
profits during the 1980s. 
- The Financial Appraisal  Model  indicated that the 
rate of return  to small  longliners was  unlikely  to 
attract  foreign  investment  to  this  activity  under 
current price and cost conditions. 
- Economic analysis of the technology of tuna purse 
seining and longlining revealed significant substitu-
tion  and  complementarity  relationships  among 
species.  In  purse  seining,  skipjack  and  juvenile 
yellowfin  were  found  to  be  substitutes, while  in 
longlining yellowfin  and  bigeye  are substitutes in 
production for  albacore and billfish  or swordfish. 
These relationships have important implications for 
multi-species stock management. 
The net present value of Papua New Guinea's tuna 
fisheries  could  be  increased  by  increasing  the 
escape  rate  of juvenile  yellowfin  from  the  purse 
seine fishery to promote higher catch per unit effort 
in the longline fishery. 
- Greater cooperation in information sharing among 
U.S.  tuna  purse  seine  vessels,  as  practised  by 
Japanese  vessels,  would  increase  the  returns  to 
these vessels and the potential returns to the host 
nation. 
- The provisions  of some  of Papua New  Guinea's 
fisheries legislation are outmoded, and review and 
consolidation  of the legislation  is  required  if  the 
country is to develop an effective fisheries enforce-
ment policy.  In  particular,  enforcement would  be 
facilitated  if  Papua New  Guinea  transformed  its 
fisheries zone into an exclusive economic zone. 
- Underreporting  of  catches  may  be  detected  by 
intervessel  comparisons  in  the  same spatial  and 
time dimension. This has reportedly been implicitly 
acknowledged  by  a  distant  water  fishing  nation 
agreeing to an increase in the access charge. 
- Real  exchange rate depreciation vis-a-vis  the U.S. 
dollar delivered a significant competitive advantage 
to Thai exporters of canned tuna during the early 
1980s but, more recently, Indonesia has been the 
major beneficiary of a depreciating real  exchange 
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Analysis  of cannery costs indicated that the most 
important  factors  which  influence  the  financial 
viability  of  new  tuna  canneries  located  in  the 
western Pacific are: the price received for  canned 
tuna exported to the E.C. and plant throughput as 
determined by tuna yields. In the case of the former, 
the question of eligibility for  duty-free access is  of 
paramount importance, while  low  labour produc-
tivity in the region is of concern for the latter. 
The United States, the E.C. and Japan are the three 
major world  markets for  tuna and tuna products. 
Each of these markets has individual  characteris-
tics that differentiate it from the other two, while the 
E.C.  market is  also characterised by  the heteroge-
neous  nature  of  the  individual  markets  of  its 
member countries. 
- A recurring theme is that tuna marketing research 
is critical to good management, and the use of time 
series forecasting techniques may provide manage-
ment  with  information  that  will  assist  in  deter-
mining fishing effort and potential financial returns. 
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Economics  and  Politics  of Tuna 
Fisheries in the South Pacific 
G.H.  Waugh 
Background 
The tuna resources of the south Pacific are vast and 
may well  be the one large fishery resource that is still 
biologically  underexploited.  The  total  harvest  is 
variable,  but in  excess  of 1 million  tonnes  annually, 
valued  in  excess  of $US  1  00  million.  There  are  a 
number  of  tuna  species  harvested,  the  important 
species being yellowfin, bigeye, skipjack and albacore. 
Skipjack is the most abundant and is the major source 
of tuna for  canneries. It is  an unusual resource:  the 
species  is  mobile,  spawns  daily,  is  short  lived 
(three-four  years) and is thought to be able to sustain 
up to a several fold increase in catch (Kearney 1981). 
Economic factors and international intrigues have 
interacted to determine both the harvest and the distri-
bution of that harvest Although economic factors play 
the  dominant role  in  the  long  term,  historical  and 
political factors have had important repercussions. The 
distant  water  fishing  nations  include Japan,  Korea, 
Taiwan, Russia and the United States (for a summary of 
catches  see Waugh  1989). Japan,  to  a  large  extent 
ceased operations in  1987, being unwilling to pay the 
licence  fees  required  by  the  south  Pacific  countries. 
However, a number of  Japanese vessels still operate in 
various  Pacific  island  waters.  Taiwan  and  Korea 
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continue to pay less than might be considered reason-
able.  Russia  has  had  two  shortlived  agreements  on 
fishing rights  but has had numerous discussions and 
negotiations with a number of south Pacific countries. 
The United States has signed and renewed a multilat-
eral five-year treaty with the Forum countries. 
In addition,  the south Pacific  tuna resources have 
been  exploited  by  the  Pacific  islanders  themselves. 
Their activities  have  included small  harvesting indus-
tries and in some cases extensive  industries primarily 
based  on  pole-and-Iine  vessels.  In  some  cases 
canneries  have been worked for  considerable  periods 
of time but, as in other parts of the world, such opera-
tions are generally marginal at best.  For many of these 
countries, fishing is part of their history and culture. It is 
the  intrusion  of  international  markets  and  interna-
tional  fishing politics that has changed the course of 
events,  and  these  intrusions  have  not always  been 
determined by rational economic debate. 
Who will  exploit these resources  may  depend on 
who has the ultimate sway in the political arena, where 
aid  money comes  from,  as  well  as  other economic 
circumstances. Although jurisdiction may be firmly  in 
the  hands  of the  south  Pacific  peoples,  history  and 
socioeconomic  conditions  may  influence  the  final Economics  and Politics  of Tuna  Fisheries In  the South  Pacific 
outcome. Either way,  it is unwise to ignore the lessons 
of history. 
Apart from  the issues of jurisdiction and develop-
ment, the south Pacific tuna fishery is an extraordinarily 
complex  one,  and  provides  an  array  of  difficult 
problems for management and policymakers. Tuna are 
a highly mobile (and sometimes migratory) species and 
thus management cannot be left to individual coastal 
states acting in  isolation. In addition, several species of 
tuna are fished by a number of different nations using a 
variety of gear types. 
Second, since the rights to harvest the resource are 
generally  sold  to  the  distant  water fishing  nations, 
issues  arise  that  are  analogous  to  more  general 
problems of international trade. The actions of coastal 
states in  seeking the service  of distant water fishing 
nations can be considered in terms of the coastal state 
importing,  harvesting  and  processing  services. 
Economic  factors  play  an  important  part here,  and 
traditional  societies  are  quickly  becoming  adept  at 
dealing in these markets. 
Third, since all of the coastal states in question are 
developing  nations,  problems  arise  as  to  how  these 
states can best develop their fisheries resources to their 
maximum potential. The trade-off is between domestic 
harvesting and processing using domestic capital and 
labour,  and selling the rights to distant water nations 
who process the catch overseas.This raises issues as to 
where the comparative advantage is  likely to lie (for a 
summary of the  issues see Brown and Waugh  1989; 
Waugh and Brown 1990). 
Finally, all these issues are clouded by the politically 
charged nature of the discussions and events that have 
taken place. On the one hand, strong national feelings 
on the part of the coastal states have led to pressures 
for increased domestic participation in the fishery, even 
when economic circumstances are unfavourable.  On 
the  other,  the  interests  of the  distant  water  fishing 
nations have not always resulted in constructive negoti-
ations for fishing rights. 
Economic perspective 
From  an  economic  point  of view,  catching  tuna  is 
basically about the search for increased rent from  the 
resource. Rent can be thought of in its simplest form as 
the  difference  between  the  gross  revenue  from 
harvesting the tuna resources and the opportunity cost 
of capital and labour used in harvesting the resource. 
While  the tuna resources remained unowned, all 
the distant water fishing  nations were competing for 
that  rent.  With  the  establishment  of the  200  mile 
exclusive  economic zone,  coastal  nations in  general, 
and the south Pacific countries in  particular, claimed 
exclusive ownership of tuna resources. The rent now 
belonged to them. 
The rationale that coastal states ought to collect the 
rent  is  similar  in  one  respect  to  the  rationale  that 
mining companies should pay a royalty for the title to 
mineral  resources.  Mining  companies  would  earn, 
without  a  royalty,  profits  in  excess  of their  normal 
returns  for  operation. And  that super profit  rightly 
belongs to the owners of the resource, in this case the 
crown. So it is with fisheries: the fishery is an unpaid-for 
input in the production process and there is  potential 
for  excess  profit.  This  profit  rightly  belongs  to  the 
coastal state and  therefore  should  be  paid  back  to 
them in the form of a royalty. 
However, there is a further reason why  the coastal 
state should charge a  royalty  or rent for the right to 
. harvest And  that reason is  concerned with  economic 
efficiency.  Unless  the  rent  is  collected  there  is  a 
tendancy  for  fishers  to overexploit the resource. The 
result is  lower stocks and excess  capital  and labour 
invested in harvesting the resource, with the eventual 
dissipation of the rent 
A more difficult question is  related to  how uncer-
tainty can be included in the calculation of rent. Tuna 
is a very risky business. There are large fluctuations in 
markets,  catches,  the  environmental  conditions  and 
weather. In short, luck plays an important role. Fishers 
must  therefore  be allowed  a  return  over and above 
their normal return in order to compensate for this risk. 
The  greater the  risk,  and  the  more  risk  averse  the 
fishers,  the higher return required, and the lower the 
rent earned. Although it is not possible to do justice to 
the complexities  here,  it  is  important to  realise  that 
uncertainties and risk reduce the level of rents that can 
be collected. 
That a coastal state bears considerable risk in  both 
exploiting  and  processing  its  resource  adds  another 
dimension to the problem. A coastal state that is  risk-
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averse and finds that it has a large abundance of tuna 
relative to other natural resources, can reduce its own 
risk by  leasing to many distant water fishing  nations. 
The reverse is also true: the smaller the fishing industry 
in  the economy, the less critical is  the risk factor, and 
the  greater the  rent from  domestic  development as 
opposed to fee fishing.  Nevertheless, small economies 
with relatively large fisheries may achieve more rent by 
spreading the risk and seeking returns from fee fishing. 
This is generally the case in the south Pacific. 
Distant water fishing nations often offer payment-
in-kind  rather than direct cash for  the rights  to  fish. 
These  payments  may  include: grants  of goods  and 
services,  provision  of scientific  data, technical  assist-
ance,  aid,  provision  of  capital  and  infrastructure, 
domestic  processing facilities,  and access  to  foreign 
markets for locally caught fish products. These benefits 
may  be  considered  'defacto  royalties'  only  if,  in  the 
absence of a fishing agreement, the particular in-kind 
payment would not have been a necessary expenditure 
for  the distant water nation to fish. For example, the 
provision  of  much  of  the  technical  assistance  to 
processing plants  by  the distant water nation  under 
joint  venture  agreements  cannot  be  considered  a 
defacto  royalty,  nor  can  access  to  markets  or  the 
provision of infrastructure, where these are part of the 
normal  requirements  of  operation;  some  of  these 
payment-in-kind are really part of the firm's operating 
costs. 
If a foreign government has negotiated a reduction 
in  fee  payments  in  return  for  support of domestic 
processing  facilities,  then  it  is  possible  that  the 
perceived  returns  to  the  coastal  state  are  largely 
illusionary. The foreign  finn  has made no substantial 
losses or gains if the lower fees are compensated for by 
higher operating costs: but the domestic government 
has made a substantial loss in terms of lower fee collec-
tions. 
In some other circumstances there may be genuine 
defacto royalties. The provision of infrastructure such 
as wharves or port facilities,  or the construction of a 
road, may allow other industries to grow and prosper. 
In  general,  however, provision  of infrastructure does 
not substitute for fee payments for the right to fish; nor 
does the provision of more value added, more employ-
ment,  and  more  technical  assistance  automatically 
imply that the coastal state has received any substantial 
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benefit that would have not been forthcoming. Indeed 
the provision of payments-in-kind has the potential to 
complicate  what  would  otherwise  be  a  simple  fee 
negotiation. 
If we  accept that the rents are there to be taken, 
then  the  western  world  has  done  this  remarkably 
efficiently over this century, and has built a major inter-
national industry. Estimates of the size of this rent put 
it  at  in  excess  of  $US200  million  (Waugh  1987; 
Troedson  and Waugh  1993). Japan  was  the first  to 
realise this potential. 
The Japanese fleet 
The development of the Japanese tuna fleets began in 
the early  part of this  century,  and the tuna fisheries 
have been directly, or indirectly, subsidised by govern-
ment through the Distant Water Fisheries Promotion 
Act 1897; this act was later used to provide a vehicle for 
the expansion of tuna fisheries into the central western 
Pacific. Initially, Japanese tuna fishing  was  limited  to 
nearshore  fisheries  around  Japan.  In  1914  Japan 
occupied some islands of the central western Pacific, 
and after World War I,Japan was granted trusteeship of 
over 14000 islands including the Marianas, Carolines 
and Marshall islands. Japanese tuna fisheries expanded 
along with  this  increase  in  territory.  Based  in  Truk, 
Saipan and Ponape, the pole-and-Iine fisheries  began 
their incursion into the central western Pacific waters. 
By  the  late  1920s the  pole-and-Iine  fleets  were  well 
established in Micronesia with shore facilities to service 
fleets. The main interest was Katsuobushi (smoked and 
dried skipjack) and canned skipjack - which later was 
used to supply the military  forces. By  the late  1930s 
nearly 8000 Japanese fishers were operating in  Micro-
nesian waters. 
World WarII marked the transfer of tuna vessels to 
military control. Japan's loss  in  this war meant also a 
loss of much of its gains in tuna fisheries. Immediately 
after  the war,  with  food  production  a  high  priority, 
fisheries subsidies again assumed importance. Initially 
the tuna fleet was restricted, firstly to the 12 mile limit, 
and then to the so called McArthur lines (Matsuda and 
Ouchi 1984). 
Postwar  development  paved  the  way  for  the 
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the Pacific, restricted only  by Japanese fishery  legisla-
tion which restricted gear types to specified areas. The 
McArthur  lines were gradually  relaxed  and the tuna 
fleet started again its southern and eastern sweep into 
the central western Pacific. 
Developments in the longline fishery, with improve-
ments in  vessel  design  and technology, coupled with 
government subsidies, provided added impetus to the 
fleet expansion. By  the 1960s, bases had been estab-
lished throughout the Pacific - in Fiji, Vanuatu, French 
Polynesia  and  American  Samoa - supporting  the 
longline fleets fishing for albacore. 
However, the success of the Japanese fleets brought 
new competition. Longliners from Taiwan and Korea 
quickly replaced the  Japanese albacore fleet which now 
turned to the more lucrative sashimi species, such as 
yellowfin (bluefin in Australian waters), bigeye and (to a 
lesser extent)  billfish.  The pole-and-Iine  fleet  at this 
stage was supplying fish  primarily for the canned tuna 
market 
The Taiwanese and Korean vessels were initially all 
longliners.  The area of operation  was  generally  the 
more  southerly  and  eastern  areas - Kiribati  and  the 
Cook Islands. Here they competed with  the Japanese 
for albacore, which is used for canning and sold princi-
pally  in  North  America  and  Europe.  More  recently 
these two Asian countries have turned their attention 
to  purse seining and  to  longlining  for  the Japanese 
sashimi  market There has thus  been  an  increasing 
presence in the waters off Papua New Guinea. 
Despite  this  Asian  competition, Japan  has  had  a 
long historical interest in the western Pacific. Although 
there  are  no  multilateral  agreements  with  Pacific 
islanders, Japan continues to fish  under arrangements 
with countries such as Papua New Guinea. This long-
term  interest  coupled  with  growth  in  the Japanese 
economy,  is  likely  to ensure continuing presence  of 
Japanese  interest  in  the  development  of  the  tuna 
industry in the south Pacific. 
The United States 
The world  market for canned tuna continued to  rise 
throughout the  1960s and  1970s,  but pole-and-Iine 
fishing was hampered by  the lack of good supplies of 
baitfish.  Purse seining, a  United States innovation of 
the  1970s,  provided  a  solution.  Schools  of skipjack 
could be efficiently encircled and harvested on a large 
scale.  Although  these  captures  were  unsuitable  for 
sashimi,  they  found  a  ready  outlet  in  the  ever 
expanding market for canned tuna. Both the Japanese 
and  the  United  States  began  an  'invasion'  of  the 
western Pacific tuna grounds. 
The  United  States  has  never  unambiguously 
accepted  the  200  mile  exclusive  economic  zone. 
Between  1980 and 1987 it fished  almost unhindered 
in south Pacific waters, although there were a handful 
of arrests of United States vessels by  the small island 
states (for a summary of United States involvement in 
the  Pacific  see  Waugh  1987).  In  response,  both 
Kirabati and Vanuatu signed one-year agreements with 
the Soviet  Union.  Subsequently  in  1987  a  five-year 
agreement  was  signed  with  the  Forum  countries 
allowing United States vessels to fish  for a fee,  mostly 
paid by the United States Treasury. The United States 
tuna fishers see this as foreign aid, and others see it as 
a  market for  'not dealing with  the Russians'.  Subse-
quent  events  in  Europe  have  not  diminished  the 
interests  of  the  United  States  government  in 
supporting tuna fisheries in the central western Pacific. 
The  United  States  purse  seine  fleet  (vessel  size 
ranging from  200 GRT to 2000 GRT)  was developed 
and operated traditionally outside the western Pacific 
in  the  waters  of  the  eastern  tropical  Pacific.  Their 
markets were canneries on the west coast of the United 
States  and  the  canned  product  was  for  home 
consumption. The 'invasion' from the north arose as a 
direct result of a  number of economic and environ-
mental effects that made their operations unprofitable 
at home. 
During the tuna boom period of the late 1970s the 
United  States  industry  overinvested  in  large  purse 
seiners  and  became  overcommitted  in  debt  repay-
ments.  During the  1980s, oversupply  in  the interna-
tional  tuna market brought on  largely  by  the purse 
seine  revolution,  led  to  a  price  collapse  in  the  tuna 
market Traditional markets on the west coast of the 
United  States  closed  as  prices  fell,  exchange  rates 
moved  against  vessel  owners,  fuel  prices  rose,  and 
imports  from  Asia,  particularly  Thailand,  became 
cheaper. Vessel owners were faced with high transship-
ment costs to foreign ports, higher than expected debt 
service payments and fuel  payments, and a 30% fall  in 
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tuna  prices.  In  1982  and  1984 El  Nino  conditions 
prevailed,  resulting in  poor fishing  conditions  in  the 
eastern tropical Pacific and very good conditions in the 
western  tropical  Pacific.  Further,  the  conservation 
lobby  was  pressing  the  tuna  vessels  about  the 
incidental catches of dolphins,  a  problem associated 
with tuna catches in the eastern pacific, but not in the 
western tropical Pacific (see Joseph 1991). 
As  a result,  in  the 1980s many of the large purse 
seiners headed to the western Pacific,  in  some cases 
attempting to get agreements with the island states at 
very  low  access  fees.  When  that failed,  in  line  with 
United States policy, they fished anyway. 
The United States view at that time was that tuna 
did not come under exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal 
states beyond the 12 mile limit Such a view developed 
to protect the interests of United States fishers who, as 
a  group,  have  proved  a  powerful  lobby. Despite  the 
dispute in  the Pacific  having recent origins,  develop-
ment of United States policy has a much longer history. 
The entry of the United States tuna fleet into the 
south Pacific was at a turbulent time for the world tuna 
market The United States tuna fleet was, itself, heavily 
in  debt, and given  a long history of disputes over the 
200  mile  limit,  strong  action  by  the  United  States 
government in support of those tuna vessels that broke 
coastal state fishing regulations, and a virtually surveil-
lance-free  fishing  area,  the  outcome  was  hardly 
surprising. The first  seizure was  the Danica,  a  1500 
tonne United  States purse seiner, arrested  by  Papua 
New Guinea in  1982. This issue was quickly resolved 
and the American Tunaboat Association then entered 
into an agreement with the coastal state to pay fees for 
the right to fish. 
Several of the island states were, however, alanned 
at the continued 'illegal'  fishing  in  their waters.  One 
vessel  (the  Carol  Linda)  had  run  aground  while 
allegedly  fishing  in  Kiribati  waters,  clearly well  inside 
the  12  mile  limit  The  presence  of helicopters  was 
common in  Solomon Islands waters, indicating illegal 
tuna activities.  The Solomon Islands  prime  minister 
protested  fonnally  to  the  United  States,  citing  the 
presence of two United States purse seiners, the Lone 
Wolf and the Bold Adventurer; photographic evidence 
apparently showed clear violation of Solomon Islands 
fishing laws. The position of the United States govern-
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ment was that it was not responsible for the actions of 
individual vessels. 
On  the 20th June  1984 the  United  States purse 
seiner the Jeannette Diana was seized after a two-hour 
chase  that  ended  only  when  the  Solomon  Islands 
patrol boat fired  three shots. Despite the captain and 
owners of the  Jeannette Diana vigorously defending the 
charges of illegal  fishing, the defendants were found 
guilty  by  the  High  Court,  fined  a  total  sum  of 
SI$72 000, and the court ordered the forfeiture of the 
vessel,  gear and  illegal  catch.  The Solomon  Islands 
government sought to sell the vessel for SI$3.9 million. 
For its  part the United States imposed a total ban on 
imports of fish  products from  Solomon Islands under 
the  Magnuson  Act,  and  agreed  to  recompense  the 
owners and captain of the arrested vessel, adding the 
threat that this would be subtracted from its foreign aid 
to Solomon Islands. The Solomon Islands government 
responded  by  banning  United  States  vessels  from 
fishing in  its waters and by offering an open invitation 
to the Soviet Union for negotiations on fishing rights, a 
proposal it had previously rejected. 
The dispute continued for seven months, and it was 
not until April  1985 that an agreement was  reached. 
The Solomon Islands sold the Jeannette Diana to its 
owners  for  SI$770000 and the embargo was  lifted. 
Negotiations between the United States and the south 
Pacific nations on a fishing agreement were then able 
to proceed. Solomon Islands never regained the loss of 
its SI$lO million trade with the United States. 
There  were  a  number  of  other  incidents.  The 
Federated States of Micronesia threatened to have the 
Ocean  Pearl  blacklisted,  thus  inducing  her  to  pay 
US$500000  (she  had  escaped  after  threatening  to 
drop a small boat rigged to its boom on the boarding 
party).  Criminal action against the Pricilla M induced 
her owners to pay US$400 000 in an out of court settle-
ment (she had pulled into Federated States of Micro-
nesia to seek medical attention for an injured crew). 
These  events,  reinforced  by  the  presence  of a 
Russian fleet  in  the south Pacific,  led  to a series of 
negotiations  between  the  United  States  and  the 
Forum  countries.  There  were  10  meetings  over  a 
period of two and a half years. The treaty was signed 
in Port Moresby early in  1987. Forum countries were 
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grant United States access to the tuna resources; the 
industry  only  contributes about  10% to  these fees. 
The treaty was renewed in  1992, reinforcing the view 
that the United States has a long-term interest in tuna 
in the western Pacific. 
The treaty was unique from a number of points of 
view. First, it was the first treaty between a single nation 
(the United States) and a region (the Forum countries). 
Second,  it  was  the first  time  that the  United  States 
accepted  the  200  mile  limit  And  third,  the  United 
States agreed to pay, not only for fishing within the 200 
mile  exclusive economic zone,  but also for  fishing in 
the high seas pockets that are enclosed by  the zone. 
This treaty was renewed, prompting increased, if unsuc-
cessful,  pressure on Japan to  also sign  a multilateral 
treaty. But as the Pacific islanders are finding, the hiera-
chical  nature of Japanese society  is  more difficult  to 
deal with than the individualistic culture of the United 
States. 
Other fleets in the south Pacific 
In addition to the major fleets of Japan and the United 
States, a number of other countries have continued to 
show interest in  the central and western Pacific. The 
Philippines and Indonesia have had recent agreements 
with  Papua New  Guinea and the Federated States of 
Micronesia  for  the  operations of purse  seiners. The 
Soviet Union had negotiated agreements with Kiribati 
and Vanuatu, although these short agreements were 
never renewed, primarily because the Russian vessels 
were less successful at harvesting tuna than their Asian 
and United States counterparts. 
Taiwan  and Korea  have  operated  in  the central 
western Pacific for some time. Although these nations 
have  played  a  smaller  role,  their  interest  has  been 
increasing. This has been partly a result of the rapid 
economic development of Asian  countries. Indonesia, 
Taiwan  and  Korea  have  seen  advantages  in  distant 
water fishing, while Thailand and Philippines and now 
Indonesia have exploited their industrial advantages in 
operating tuna canneries. Exchange rate movements 
are  important  in  this  regard -movements  in  tuna 
processing  have  coincided  with  changes  in  real 
exchange rates. 
Drift netting became an issue in the late 1980s. One 
reported estimate of the length of drift nets in 1989 was 
that,  end  to end,  they  would  stretch  one-and-a-half 
times around the equator. Recent international alarm 
at  the  damage  being  caused  has  promoted  many 
countries to  reduce drift netting. Some estimates put 
the reduction at one-half of previous levels.  If correct, 
drift  nets  now  stretch only three-quarters of the way 
around the equator. France proudly proclaims that it 
only  uses small drift nets (7  km  in  length - hopefully 
not in multiples of seven). 
Domestic operations 
If the interest of Asian and north American tuna indus-
tries  can  be  understood  in  terms  of economic  rent, 
what of the Pacific islanders themselves? The position 
is not clear. 
For anyone raised in a society where the accumula-
tion of wealth is the prime mover in economic affairs, it 
may come as a shock to learn that in many traditional 
societies  it  is  unimportant Here,  traditionally,  profit 
does  not  motivate,  capitalism  is  not  the  engine  of 
production, and wealth does not pay dividends; rather 
.  it attracts considerable social costs Oohannes 1989). 
The coastal states of the south Pacific have a choice 
in the development of their offshore fishery resources. 
They may, at the one extreme, leave the entire industry 
of harvesting  and  processing with  the distant water 
fishing nations; or, at the other extreme, they may elect 
to seek development of the industry themselves, either 
with  their own  resources  or through  a joint venture 
arrangement (Waugh 1986, 1993). 
In practice, the island states have sought to partici-
pate  in  the  development of the  tuna fishery  to  the 
fullest possible extent. The south Pacific island states 
are  fiercely  independent  nations,  and  they  have 
cultural and historical reasons for seeking to develop 
both  their  harvesting  and  processing  facilities.  Net 
economic  gains  do  not  figure  prominently  in  their 
arguments. 
The  Solomon  Islands  Development  Plan  1980 
(Solomon Islands 1980), for example, provides for the 
maximum participation of nationals in the tuna fishery; 
benefits are seen in terms of export earnings, employ-
ment  and  import  substitution.  The  joint  venture 
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arrangement  (Solomon-Taiyo  Ltd)  has  been  the 
vehicle  through  which  these  objectives  have  been 
pursued. 
In its Eighth Development Plan 1981, Fiji finds that 
'the major economic potential lies in the development 
of industrial pelagic fisheries' (Fiji  1981); the argument 
is  that tuna fishing  operations  provide  'the greatest 
potential  to  increase  foreign  exchange  earnings,  to 
maximise  value  added,  [and)  increase  the  rate  of 
import substitution'. Comparative advantage does not 
figure strongly in their claims. 
Vanuatu, in  its  First Development Plan sought to 
develop  a  'locally-based,  industrial-scale  fishery, 
exploiting tuna resources' and 'where appropriate tuna 
processing facilities'.  Economic justification  for  these 
plans is missing, and by the 1990s these hopes remain 
largely unfulfilled. During the 1980s many of the other 
island  states  purchased  tuna  vessels,  including 
Solomon Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, and 
Tuvalu,  and  there  were  processing  facilities  in  Fiji, 
Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. 
In general. the south Pacific island governments see 
the need to create employment opportunities, generate 
foreign  exchange,  and  increase  value  added;  the 
argument used is  that local  participation in  the tuna 
fishery  is  likely  to  provide  these  opportunities.  The 
counter economic view is that although there may be 
some room for a small domestic operation, the greatest 
gains  are  likely  to  come  from  using  the  services  of 
distant water fishing  nations to  harvest (and process) 
tuna resources, and extracting the economic rent,  in 
the form of licence fees, from  those nations. This view 
rests on the case for trade (Munro 1984, 1985). Simply 
stated, the argument for trade is that welfare for both 
trading partners is  raised  if  trade is  allowed  to  flow 
freely.  Countries  can  export  those  commodities  in 
which they have a comparative advantage. The island 
states may have an advantage in  the ownership of the 
tuna  resources  which  pass  through  their  exclusive 
economic zones, but a comparative disadvantage in the 
harvesting  and  processing  of them.  The  struggling 
domestic harvesting and processing industries in  the 
Pacific provides evidence for this view (see for example 
Waugh 1986). 
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The law of the sea 
The United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea 
provides  the  impetus  for  the  Pacific  islanders  to 
continue their ambitions to expand  harvesting facili-
ties.  Most  international lawyers  argue that control of 
tuna  resources  within  the  exclusive  economic  zone 
rests with the coastal states. The two sections of special 
concern are Article 62 and Article 64. 
Article 62 relates to a number of issues, including 
the licensing of foreign vessels and the payment of fees. 
It gives the coastal state the right to require payment of 
fees for access by foreign fishing vessels to its surplus of 
harvestable  fish  stock within  its  200  mile  exclusive 
economic  zone.  In  relation  to  this  article,  William 
Burke (1984:31) adds that there is 'no specific limita-
tion or restriction on fee  level. and although reasona-
bleness  is  required  the  treaty gives  ample leeway  to 
coastal  states  to  secure  monetary  benefits  from  its 
exclusive economic zone: 
Article 64 deals with  highly migratory species and 
Annex 1 includes the tunas among its listing of highly 
migratory species. Article 64 requires the coastal state 
to cooperate with other states fishing in the region to 
ensure conservation and optimum utilisation of those 
species both within the exclusive economic zone and 
beyond.  In  the view  of Burke  (1984)  and Tsamenyi 
(1986), and probably many other international lawyers, 
highly migratory species are subject to coastal authority 
in  the exclusive  economic zone  in  the same way  as 
other species, except for  this  added  requirement of 
cooperation. 
Tuna  are  highly  mobile,  and  some  species  are 
migratory. Fishing in one zone or in the high seas must, 
in time, have an impact in other zones. The Convention 
of the Law of the Sea requires international coopera-
tion for  highly migratory species, but firmly  leaves the 
control  of  all  species  in  any  200  mile  exclusive 
economic zone in the hands of the domestic country. 
So the south Pacific countries can confidently claim 
ownership of the tuna resource, at least while the tuna 
are in their exclusive economic zone. But the zone for 
each of the states is very large and there is  little hope 
that they can enforce their claims. They rely on interna-
tional  cooperation  and  good  will.  There  is  another 
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the domestic country to allow other countries to  use 
that part of the resource which is  not being harvested 
domestically,  at least up to some undefined  optimal 
level.  While  they  have  signed  the  provision  of  the 
United  Nations  Convention  on  the  Law  of the  Sea 
relating  to  the utilisation  of surplus  fish  stocks,  the 
south  Pacific  countries  appear  in  practice  to  be 
reluctant to relinquish control over any portion of the 
fish stocks in their exclusive economic zones. 
There are three ways  they can maintain at least 
partial control. First, they can define the optimal level 
of  catch at some low level. This would require a difficult 
exercise in semantics. 
Second, they can continue to sell the rights to fish. 
Here international negotiation has always been a long 
and  difficult  road.  High  licence  fees  have  not been 
easily won,  although the Forum Fisheries Agency has 
had a number of notable successes. 
Third, they can expand their own domestic opera-
tions.  There  have  been  a  number of successes and 
failures  here. Expertise, capital and skiIled  labour are 
required, all suggesting that the comparative advantage 
is with the distant water fishing nations, and that selling 
the rights may well be the better way to go. Who really 
has the right to fish depends on the social context. 
A cultural perspective 
The western perspective then is  seen as a search for 
rent and  market efficiency.  What is  not so clear is 
whether this search has been embraced by the Pacific 
community. In  specific  terms it  is  not clear that the 
Pacific people wish to maximise their share of the rent 
from the resource. Nor can it be established that in an 
imperfect  world,  policy  changes  that  move  actual 
conditions in  the direction of the assumptions of the 
rent collection  model  necessarily  result in  increased 
efficiency  or mutually beneficial  outcomes, especially 
for very small, less developed communities. 
An alternative view for understanding and justifying 
fisheries  resource  development in  the Pacific  region 
recognises  explicitly  that the basic and fundamental 
forces (if there are any) are cultural and social, or at the 
very least not just economic. There is nothing honour-
able  or  right  about  particular  cultural  and  social 
features:  they are just there, are structured and run 
deep.  Serious  problems  emerge  when  explanations 
and modes of action challenge and frustrate traditional 
values  that  on  historical  evidence  have  a  strong 
tendency to  reassert themselves, in  the process often 
upsetting the best intentioned development plans. 
Rent  maximisation,  especially when  international 
competition and markets are considered, stiII  has an 
important role to play, but this concern may not neces-
sarily  be the primary or dominant one. The primary 
concern could well  be about minimising the vulnera-
bility  of Pacific  ways  of working the world. Here it  is 
recognised  that  traditional  society  is  valuable,  and 
deserves the concern of those who seek to advise on 
resource development and markets in the island states. 
The imposition  of markets  has often  failed  in  tradi-
tional cultures. It may be more appropriate to consider 
a  vulnerability  framework  for  sorting  out  fisheries 
development  strategies;  that  is,  a  framework  that 
directly  represents  cultural  and  social  features  (see 
Ruddle 1989; Brown and Waugh 1989). 
From this framework, fee fishing could well emerge 
as the most appropriate course of action. Although this 
is  in  accord  with  the rent maximising  outcome,  the 
conclusion is  reached by a different path, a path that 
recognises  the vulnerability  of Pacific  society  to  the 
impacts of international forces. 
Revenues from  fee  fishing may have an impact on 
Pacific  customs.  This  wiII  vary  depending  on  how 
revenue  is  distributed, whether in  accord  with  tradi-
tional ways of sharing, or ways driven by a value system 
that  features  individual  self-interest  and  private 
ownership,  features  that  are  generally  accepted  as 
fundamental  and  necessary  in  western  capitalist 
society, but may be lacking in traditional society. 
It is clear that domestic participation in  harvesting 
and processing, given the size of the resource and the 
gearing of output to international markets, takes on a 
different  dimension  in  a  vulnerability  framework. 
Domestic participation necessitates a different way of 
working the world, a different sort of industrial organi-
sation, a different reward system, and a different institu-
tional  framework,  amongst other things. This type  of 
enterprise cannot be isolated from  traditional ways of 
working the world  in  other sectors of the community. 
The switch and sway  of international forces,  and the 
aspirations of foreign participants 00int-venturers and 
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investors) would necessarily have an impact on tradi-
tional culture and custom, particularly in crisis. Foreign 
currency  debt could  deepen  and widen  the  impact. 
Foreign creditors who rightly demand their 'pound of 
flesh'  have  not been,  and are  not likely  to  become, 
serious  respecters  of traditional  cultural  and  social 
systems.  Recent  and  current  events  in  central  and 
south America, and in  Papua New Guinea, strengthen 
this concern. 
There  are  also  direct  environmental  effects  to 
consider. Fluctuations in harvest, due to overfishing or 
random and temporal environmental changes, would 
be more strongly and widely transmitted to the Pacific 
community  under  domestic-participation  outcomes. 
There is  no guarantee  in  the  findings  on biological 
research, where explanation is often based on meagre 
and deficient data. It is important that decision-makers 
are not swayed by the impression of precision given by 
these representations, more particularly the economic 
models  that make the sort of existence  claims  that 
biologists would not entertain. 
The  formal  representation  of  sustainable  yield 
serves to illustrate this concern. This concept is given 
ostension  through  the  population  yield  relationship. 
Although  biologists  know  and  accept  that  this 
ostension  does  not extend  to  the  seas  and  ocean, 
sustainable yield has been eagerly embraced by those 
fisheries economists who prefer to proceed along the 
rent maximising path. With great facility the population 
yield  curve is  converted to a  total revenue curve and 
ostension given to the rent maximising output by  the 
addition  of a  total  effort  or cost  function.  But  this 
ostension is only in  the model. The variability of inter-
national  market  forces  and  the  impact  of environ-
mental effects seriously challenges, and diminishes, the 
importance  of  the  rent  maximising  outcome.  The 
efficacy  of this  outcome  is  only  supported  by  the 
presuppositions of the model. The collapse of the tuna 
market at the beginning of this decade, and the closure 
of nearly all  processing facilities on the west coast of 
the United States had little effect on the United States 
economy. It  is  possible to  imagine the serious social 
effects of closures if these facilities had been located in 
the Pacific region. 
Secondary  effects  of crisis  arise  when  domestic 
participation  strategies  are  upset  by  debt  servicing 
problems. This has its effect on the wider community, 
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often  making necessary different ways  of working the 
world: cash crop expansion  at the  expense  of tradi-
tional  food  crops,  as  well  as  externally  imposed 
constraints.  Serious  social  tensions  generally  follow. 
These issues are important and have been highlighted 
in recent times. 
The Pacific peoples may not view fee fishing as the 
most  desirable  outcome.  Emerging  from  a  global 
framework,  fee  fishing  could  well  be  viewed  as  a 
western, capitalist trick, as this mode of operation may 
not give  the immediate impression of being develop-
ment  at all.  It  could  well  be  taken  as  a  locking-in 
strategy.  For  less  developed  small  economies  this 
framework  leads  to  a  circularity;  stage  of  human 
resource  development  determines  comparative 
advantage, and comparative advantage determines and 
fIXes stage of development There is no avenue here for 
domestic  participation  in  fishery  resource  develop-
ment, no direct employment effect,  no skill  enhance-
ment, construction or infrastructure development - the 
very  indicators  that  are  commonly  understood  as 
measures of economic development. 
Economists  give  considerable  emphasis  to 
secondary effects. These effects have, no doubt been of 
considerable benefit in  more  developed  and diverse 
economies. It  is  not so evident that they apply to the 
small Pacific economies. The revenues from fee fishing 
could  well  be  dissipated  in  the  consumption  of 
imported goods, increasing consumer welfare, but not 
necessarily  domestic  development  in  the  commonly 
accepted sense. 
Whether fee fishing would be more readily accepted 
emerging from a vulnerability minimising framework is 
an  open  question.  But  at  least  concern  is  given  to 
protecting  those  things  that  are  traditional  and 
valuable  from  the  intrusion  of  different  and  often 
disagreeable world views. 
Conclusion 
It would appear that rent maximisation is an important 
driving force  in  international markets, both in  under-
standing the present situation in  the south Pacific and 
in  development  planning.  The  major  distant  water 
fishing nations, the United States and Japan in partic-
ular, have attempted to increase their returns from the Economics and  Politics of  Tuna  Fisheries In  the South  Pacific 
tuna resources. Japan has had a  long interest in  the 
south Pacific,  and is  unlikely to be dissuaded by  the 
exclusive  economic zones or licence  fees.  There are 
significant gains for the Pacific people in selling fishing 
rights to these countries in the long term. 
However, Pacific views on how they wish to develop 
their tuna resources  may  not coincide  with  market 
outcomes, or if they do their line of reasoning may be 
different The Asian and European ways of  working the 








Papua New  Guinea has a  total land area of approxi-
mately 464000 km2  and,  together with  its  exclusive 
economic zone, encompasses over 2 million km2 of the 
western Pacific region. It is  the largest country in  the 
Pacific  islands  region.  The  country  consists  of the 
eastern  archipelago,  the  northern  islands  of  the 
Solomon group and many other smaller islands. In all 
there are about 600 islands of significance. Papua New 
Guinea  shares  common  borders  with  Australia,  the 
Federated  States  of Micronesia,  Indonesia  and  the 
Solomon Islands (Fig. 3.1). The country has a popula-
tion of  over 3 million and an annual population growth 
rate  of 2%.  Of the  total  population  of Papua New 
Guinea, 80%  live  in  the interiors of the main islands 
and  the  remaining  20%  inhabit  the  coastline  of its 
many islands. According to the 1980 census the Papua 
New  Guinea  population  density  is  6.5  persons/km, 
which is modest by international standards. 
Papua New  Guinea's  national economy is  heavily 
dependent upon exports of gold and copper and, to a 
lesser degree, tree crops (coffee, cocoa, copra and palm 
oil) and forestry products (Table 3.1). In  1980, fisheries 
Table 3.1  Papua  New  Guinea, value  of exports, selected years,  1980-93 (kina  million) 
1980  1983  1987  1990  1993 
Minerals  500.0  425.3  714.9  757.5  1997.0 
Coffee  183.8  108.0  134.7  103.5  105.4 
Cocoa  72.1  472  562  29.9  37.9 
Forestry products  71.0  62.4  110.9  79.6  112.8 
Copra  products  38.0  27.4  29.7  20.3  26.9 
Palm  oil  25.7  22.8  23.9  32.7  60.1 
Fisheries  products  52.5  10.9  11.0  82  18.7 
Other exports  1292  79.6  41.9  90.9  75.6 
Total  1072.3  783.6  1123.2  1122.4  2434.4 
Source:  Papua  New Guinea  Bureau  of StatistiCs. 
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Agure 3.1  Papua New Guinea, major fishing areas. Source: Doulman 1980. 
exports accounted for 5% of the total value of exports, 
but since  1983 this  proportion  has  been  about 1  % 
(Table 3.1). Marine and freshwater fisheries resources 
account for some of the major valuable and renewable 
resources. These resources are capable of stimulating 
economic  development  within  the  13  maritime 
provinces  of Papua New  Guinea. Fisheries  resources 
also  guarantee  a  protein  supplement  for  domestic 
consumption  and  generate  foreign  exchange.  The 
government promotes fisheries  development because 
of  its  distinct  advantage  over  the  development  of 
nonrenewable  resources.  If  rationally  managed,  fish 
stocks are intergenerational assets which will continu-
ally yield harvests without overexploiting the resource. 
The two  components of the Papua New  Guinea 
fishing industry are the industrial (large-scale) and the 
artisanal (small-scale) sectors. Catches in the industrial 
sector  have  consisted  primarily  of  tuna,  prawns, 
lobsters,  and  a  small  amount  of  barramundi.  This 
sector has  required  a  high  level  of investment from 
-----
foreign  companies in  capital,  equipment and skilled 
personnel. Another important feature of this sector is 
that it is export oriented and market arrangements are 
dominated by foreigners. 
Papua New Guinea's coastal and oceanic waters are 
well  stocked  with  an  abundance  of varied  marine 
resources. However, with the exception of a very large 
tuna resource and smaller prawn,  lobster and barra-
mundi resources, the bulk of the species do not have 
an  adequate  total  biomass  to  sustain  an  industrial 
fishery operation. Most of the fish species exploited are 
marine species, with  the exception of tilapia (TiJapia 
mossambica), an introduced freshwater species,  and 
barramundi (Lates calcarifer) of a native catadromous 
species.  They  have  supplied  the  major  sources  of 
protein among the river and delta populations. 
A major feature of Papua New Guinea's industrial 
commercial fishery is  its heavy dependence on foreign 
skill  and  capital.  Because  of cyclical  market  price 
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fluctuations, the tuna fishery has experienced ups and 
downs, resulting in  the lack of long-tenn shore based 
establishments. The prawn fishery on the other hand 
has  experienced  a  rather  stable  development  with 
minor fluctuations and a gradual increase in  national 
ownership, especially over the past few  years. This is 
partially due to the fact that the fishery caters for high 
price foreign  prawn markets with  an upward trend in 
product  price.  There  has  also  been  government 
encouragement  and  assistance  to  local  fishing 
companies. In  1984, a  national fishing company was 
fonned  which  acquired  four  fishing  trawlers.  It also 
established a subsidiary in Japan. 
Coexisting with the industrial fishery is the artisanal 
fishery, which involves local fishers using simple fishing 
gear  and  labour-intensive  fishing  methods.  The 
artisanal  fishery  is  mainly  for  subsistence,  with  any 
surplus  catch generally  being sold  in  local  markets, 
although the government has coastal fisheries stations 
in some provinces to purchase the surplus catch. The 
advantage of this fishery is  its closeness to the coastal 
and riverine fishing communities and the use of simple 
fishing gear. A major constraint is the lack of adequate 
storage, transportation, marketing and proper fishing 
skills.  Without  the  proper  fishing  techniques  and 
adequate  assistance,  the  fishery  has  survived  as  a 
sector  catering  for  the  domestic  requirements  of 
coastal and riverine fishing communities only. 
Present status of the commercial 
tuna fishery 
Papua New  Guinea's  principal  commercial  fisheries 
exploit tuna, prawn, lobster and barramundi. All these 
fisheries are export oriented and they meet the require-
ment of industrial fisheries. 
By the nature of their development, they have been 
dominated  by  foreign  companies  that  have 
assembled  the  necessary  capital  equipment and 
key  personnel,  that  have  organised  the  fishing 
operations, and that have  exploited  the overseas 
marketing channels open to them (Copes 1982). 
The  most significant  industrial sectors consist  of 
the tuna and prawn fisheries which export almost all of 
their products. 
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The Papua New Guinea tuna fishery has two  major 
components,  the  domestic  pole-and-Iine  fishery  and 
the  distant  water  fishery  which  has  employed 
pole-and-line, purse seine, and longline techniques. 
For  successful  operation,  industrial  fisheries 
generally  require  access  to  commercially 
significant quantities of high value species ... Papua 
New Guinea waters lie astride the migration path 
of major South Pacific  stock (Figure  3.2). These 
waters  are  very  important  to  the  skipjack  tuna 
stocks originating from  spawning grounds in  the 
Micronesian waters. Sizeable schools of these fish 
at two to three years of age remain available for a 
considerable length of time in the surface layers of 
Papua New Guinea waters (Copes 1982). 
Biological research of tuna stocks was  undertaken 
by  the  Papua New  Guinea  government  in  the  early 
1970s. A recent survey from the South Pacific Commis-
sion  Skipjack  Tagging  and  Assessment  Program 
estimated that the potential annual sustainable yield of 
tuna within  the country's  200 mile  zone significantly 
exceeded  the  quantity  currently  being  harvested 
(Doulman  1987a). Skipjack is  the  predominant tuna 
species and is capable of sustaining an annual harvest 
of  over  100000  tonnes  according  to  South  Pacific 
Commission assessments. 
Domestic tuna fishery 
The  Papua  New  Guinea  domestic  commercial  tuna 
fishery  began  in  March  1970, after initial  baitfish  and 
tuna surveys in the late 1960s indicated the existence of 
bait and tuna stocks capable of sustaining commercial 
exploitation.  Between  1970  and  1981  a  number of 
foreign  fishing companies set up bases in  Papua New 
Guinea to harvest tuna, but by 1979 only two remained 
in  the fishery.  These companies were Star Kist (Papua 
New Guinea) and New Britain Fishing Industries (NBFI) 
Pty Ltd. The two companies operated through 1981, but 
as a result of deteriorating world tuna market conditions 
they did not fish  in  1982 (Doulman and Wright 1983). 
The  NBFI  eventually  announced  its  intention  to 
tenninate  its  operation  in  Papua New  Guinea,  after 
incurring losses in  1~81 and the reorganisation of its 
parent company. Star Kist followed suit by tenninating 
its  Papua New  Guinea operation  in  early  1983. The 
closure  of  the  domestic  tuna  fishery  affected  1200 
Papua  New  Guinean  nationals,  and  commerce  in , 
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Rabaul and Kavieng. where the tuna fleets were based 
and provisioned, was badly affected (Doulman and Kuk 
1986). 
The fishing operations by the two companies were 
mainly pole-and-Iine, although NBFI operated a purse 
seiner in its fleet The boats employed were of the tradi-
tional Okinawan type. Most of the pole-and-Iine vessels 
were of 59 GRT, about 12 metres in length. The main 
engine  of these  boats  ranged  from  350-600 horse 
power with  a 50 to  150 horse power auxiliary power 
unit 
In  1980, NBFI  operated with  two  motherships, 12 
pole-and-Iine boats and a purse seiner, while Star Kist 
worked  with  four  motherships  and 36 pole-and-Iine 
boats. One-third  of these  boats were  owned  by  Star 
Kist;  the  remainder  were  individually  owned  and 
delivered their catch to the companies under contract 
or on other commercial arrangements. All  of the tuna 
catch was exported frozen  in  the round from  mother-
ships and shore holding facilities of the two companies. 
The catcher boats  operating  in  the  fishery  used  an 
anchored mothership of 1000 to 4000 GRT as a base. 
These vessels moored close to the baiting grounds so 
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that  catcher  boats  could  take  on  supplies  and 
discharge  their catch at the end of the day's  fishing, 
prior  to  taking  bait  the  same  night The  operating 
range of the pole-and-Iine boats is limited to near shore 
waters, no more than 1  00 km  away from  the mother-
ship and the baiting grounds (Copes  1982; Doulman 
and Wright 1983). 
Migrating  patterns  of tuna in  the  Bismarck  Sea 
appear to  be relatively  predictable, but are related  to 
the seasonal changes in current and associated events. 
For an efficient exploitation of surface schooling tuna, 
considerable  vessel  mobility  is  required  to  take 
advantage  of  year-to-year  seasonal  and  spatial 
variation in  abundance, and hence favourable fishing 
conditions  (Papua  ew  Guinea,  Department  of 
Fisheries and Marine Resources 1989). 
As a result the pole-and-Iine fishery was confined to 
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and New Hanover (Fig. 3.3). Significant tuna stocks do 
occur in  other coastal areas and a  number of them 
have  been  fished  at  some  time.  The  pole-and-Iine 
method of fishing catches only young juvenile tuna that 
inhabit the upper layer of the ocean. The young tuna 
are mostly of the two and three year class skipjack tuna, 
with some two year old yellowfin tuna. 
Distant water fishery 
The vessels of foreign countries operating in the Pacific 
island  region  are  referred  to  as distant water fishing 
nation  vessels.  Three  fishing  techniques  are  used: 
longline,  pole-and-Iine and purse seine. The latter two 
methods  target  on-surface  tuna  stocks,  particularly 
skipjack (Katsuwonus  peIamis),  and juvenile yellowfin 
tuna  (Thunnus  aIbacares),  while  the  longlining 
technique  exploits  deeper  dwelling  tuna,  particularly 
adult  yellowfin,  albacore  (Thunnus  aIaIunga),  and 
bigeye tuna (Thunnus abesus) . 
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•  Subsidiary tuna fishing grounds 
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26 In  1984 there were 115 purse seiners from Cayman 
Islands,  Honduras,  Indonesia, Japan,  Korea,  Mexico, 
Panama,  Philippines,  Taiwan  and the  United  States 
operating in  Papua New Guinea's 200 mile exclusive 
economic zone. Japan accounted for 90% of all seiners 
and  most of the  longliners  and pole-and-liners. The 
number of seiners licensed  in  waters fluctuates each 
year as some United States seiners enter and exit the 
Papua New  Guinea waters  from  the  eastern  Pacific 
fishing grounds. There are 700 longliners fishing in the 
region (including Papua New Guinea waters). Most are 
Japanese  and  Korean  owned,  but  there  are  also  a 
number of Taiwanese  owned  vessels.  Distant water 
fishing nation pole-and-line fishing  has declined over 
the years  as  a  result of the Japanese rationalisation 
program. 
Most  of the  distant  water  fishing  nation  vessels 
operating  in  Papua  lew  Guinea  waters  fish  under 
'access agreements' that recognise the jurisdiction of 
coastal  states over  tuna stocks  and  the  right  of the 
government  to  regulate  and  control  access  to  these 
resources. Access  agreements offer  access  to  foreign 
vessels  under a  licence  to  operate on  payment of a 
negotiated fee and compliance with specific tenns and 
conditions.  These  conditions  govern  the  crew  and 
vessel obligations in provision of catch data and orderly 
exploitation of the tuna resource. Catch infornlation is 
crucial  to  provide  a  basis for  the biological  manage-
ment  of  the  fishery.  Access  agreements  are  either 
bilateral  or multilateral  between  Papua New  Guinea, 
Pacific  islands  and  Taiwan, Japan  and  the  United 
States. They yield a small financial return to the govern-
ment together with an aid component. The Papua New 
Guinea/Japanese fishing arrangement was  tenninated 
in  1987 after disagreement over fee calculations. 
The  access  arrangements  under  which  foreign 
vessels  are licensed  to fish  are influenced  by Papua 
New  Guinea  government  policy.  Government  policy 
encourages distant water fishing nation vessels to  fish 
in Papua New Guinea's zone because: 
- the country's domestic harvesting capacity is insuffi-
cient to fully exploit its tuna resource; 
- government  revenue  is  generated  through  the 
payment of access fees and other statutory charges 
as provided for in the Fisheries Act; and 
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- the provision  of Article 56  of the United  Nations 
Convention of the Law of the Sea, relating to  the 
utilisation  of the surplus  fish  stocks,  is  acknowl-
edged by Papua New Guinea. 
The  government  does  not  discriminate  in  the 
licensing of tuna vessels on the basis of nationality or 
vessel type. However, access can be denied if the vessel 
or its  owner have  infringed  previous  licensing condi-
tions.  Access  can  also  be denied  if  the vessel  is  not 
registered  in  the  Forum  Fisheries  Agency  Regional 
Register of foreign  vessels or has been removed from 
the Register. 
For the right to  harvest tuna  stock in  the Papua 
New Guinea exclusive economic zone, the government 
levies a fee on each operating vessel. The access fee is 
imposed: 
- to extract resource rent from the fishery; 
- to  foster  operational efficiency  in  the  use  of the 
resource; and 
- to  provide  an  instrument  for  the  government  to 
regulate, develop and manage the fishery (Doulman 
1980). 
Vessels can decide not to pay access fees  and fish 
illegally,  but the ultimate financial burden payable if a 
vessel  is  apprehended  greatly  exceeds  the  cost  of 
access compliance. 
Types of fishing operation 
There are three major types of tuna  fishing operation 
currently employed in the waters of the Pacific islands 
region -Ionglining,  pole-and-lining and purse seining. 
The distant water fishing  nation  longline  fleets  from 
Japan,  Korea  and  Taiwan  are  registered  with  the 
Regional  Register.  These  vessels  vary  in  size  from 
20-500 GRT,  and  operate  predominantly  in  Papua 
New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Micronesian waters. 
They  concentrate  on  the  exploitation  of  skipjack, 
yellowfin, albacore and bigeye. 
The Japanese  longline  fleet  consists  of 500-600 
vessels  which  are  closely  monitored  by  the  Japan 
Fishery Agency. Korea and Taiwan also have a sizeable 
longline  fleet  operating  throughout  the  region, 
exporting  most  of  their  catch  to  the  United  States 
canners; they are, however, gradually shifting supply to 
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the  more  lucrative  Japanese  sashimi  markets.  This 
trend is expected to continue because the Korean and 
Taiwanese fishing costs are lower than Japanese fishing 
costs,  and  the  Japanese  trading  houses  frequently 
contract and  finance  Korean  and Taiwanese  fishing 
fleets (Doulman 1987a). 
Distant  water fishing  nation  pole-and-Iine  opera-
tions in  the region are undertaken by Japanese fishers 
only. There are 80 vessels operating out of  Japan, using 
live  bait  and  fishing  mostly  in  the  Micronesian  and 
Kiribati  waters,  as required  by  the Japanese govern-
ment.  However,  this  fleet  rarely  fishes in  Papua  New 
Guinea  waters,  since  Japanese  government  policies 
were  formulated  to  minimise  the  interactions  and 
conflicts between the three modes of fishing, especially 
between purse seiners and pole-and-Iiners. These two 
techniques of fishing concentrate on the exploitation of 
the  same  surface  schooling  skipjack  and  yellowfin 
stocks.  The  pole-and-Iine  catch  data  report  94% 
skipjack and 6%  yellowfin, while  purse seine catch  of 
skipjack  and  yellowfin  account  for  70%  and  30% 
respectively  (Papua  New  Guinea  Department  of 
Fisheries and Marine Resources  1989). Pole-and-Iine 
catches are usually destined more for high quality use, 
mainly in the sashimi market,  than for canning,  since 
the cost per  unit of output is  relatively  higher  than 
purse seine  caught  tuna.  There  has  been  a  gradual 
decline in the pole-and-Iine fleet under a plan by  the 
Japanese government to  allow  only  additional  purse 
seine vessels to be registered as pole-and-line licences 
are  surrendered. The extent  to  which  pole-and-Iine 
vessels  have  been scrapped has been determined  by 
competing market requirements for varying qualities of 
fish.  The  demand  for  high  quality  skipjack  and 
yellowfin  for  the  fresh  market  required  some 
pole-and-Iine  vessels,  whereas  the  need  to  deliver 
reasonably  priced  fish  for  other  local  processed 
demand required the use of purse seine gear (Matsuda 
and Ouchi 1984). 
The distant water fishing nation  purse seine fleet 
has experienced a rapid growth in  the Pacific islands 
region, especially in  Papua New Guinea and Microne-
sian waters. The Japanese operate 14 purse seiners and 
other countries  operate  the  remaining  seiners.  The 
total number of seiners operating in the region peaked 
at  115  in  1984  but  has  since  decreased  with  the 
departure of some of the United States fleet from  the 
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region  to  the eastern Pacific. However,  there is  still  a 
sizeable number of United States seiners operating in 
the Pacific  islands  region,  fishing  under the  United 
States/South Pacific  multilateral  fisheries  treaty. The 
Regional Register of foreign vessels has a total of 145 
seiners varying in  size from  300-2000 GRT from  11 
countries, but 64%  of the fleet are United States and 
Japanese flagship vessels. These seiners are mobile in 
their operation  in  and  out of Pacific  islands  waters 
throughout the year. The 14 Japanese seiners were the 
core of the foreign fleet in the region (Doulman 1987  a). 
The core fleet  operates exclusively in  Papua New 
Guinea, Federated States of Micronesia and Palauan 
waters, including the high  seas pockets  between  the 
200 mile jurisdictions of these countries. A significant 
proportion of the catch is  transshipped or discharged 
in the south Pacific region, either at canning facilities or 
United States territory ports. In  1984, the foreign and 
south  Pacific  island  national  fleets  landed a  total  of 
600000  tonnes  of  tuna  with  a  market  value  of 
US$662.7 million. 
Biology of the fishery 
The  two  major  species  of  tuna  being  exploited  in 
Papua New Guinea's 200 mile zone are skipjack and 
yellowfin  tuna. The most important stock accounting 
for  80% of  the  catch  is  skipjack  tuna (Katsuwonus 
peJamis). Skipjack tuna are fast swimming fish, inhab-
iting tropical  and subtropical waters where tempera-
tures  range  from  17°C-30°C.  They  are  a  pelagic 
species that have no connection at any period of their 
life with the sea-bed or coast (Grandperrin 1978). They 
inhabit the  upper 200 metres  of the  surface  of the 
ocean and tend to be found between 40S and 40N. 
Skipjack are a heterosexual species of fish with eggs 
being  fertilised  externally.  The  fish  commence 
spawning after one year of age, beginning with  about 
100000 eggs  each  spawning  period  and  increasing 
with  age.  Skipjack tuna spawn  several  times in  each 
spawning period. The eggs  hatch out about four days 
after  fertilisation.  As  usual  with  schooling  species, 
mating is promiscuous. Biological research has found 
that  spawning  takes  place  throughout  the  year  in 
equatorial  waters.  Spawning probably takes  place  in 
surface  waters,  consistently  being  observed  by  the 
fishers  from  their  fishing  vessels.  Mature  female skipjack probably produce  between  1 and 3  million 
eggs in a year as the production of eggs is proportional 
to  the  body weight of the  fish  (Waldron  1958).  The 
larvae  of  these  fish  are  widely  distributed  in  the 
Atlantic, Indian and Pacific oceans. The concentration 
of fry  in  the Pacific Ocean increases significantly from 
east to west, being especially heavy in the area between 
ION and 10S. 
The hatching skipjack  larvae  approach 3  mm  in 
length and become juvenile when they are between 15 
and 30 cm. After the juvenile reaches 20 cm it has the 
full  body  form  and  coloration  of an  adult  skipjack 
(Kearney  1978).  Juveniles  develop  in  the  nursery 
ground and disperse beyond these grounds when the 
young skipjack have reached 35 cm in length but their 
migration  is  horizontal  and  they  are  rarely  found 
feeding with  adult skipjack in  surface water layers.  It 
has been observed by Japanese fishers and researchers, 
that  oceanographic  conditions  have  considerable 
influence on skipjack tuna. The fish gather in commer-
cial  concentrations in  latitude 40N to 40S, especially 
where the colour of the sea is  blue or blue-green. The 
transparency of the water is  measured with  a Secchi 
disc to exceed 20 m and temperature in its upper layer 
is between 17°C and 30°C. The adult skipjack distribu-
tion in the Pacific Ocean is complex, but it would seem 
there are two major tuna populations. 
The Papua New Guinea skipjack tuna resource is of 
the  western  Pacific  stock  and  the  relationship  and 
interaction  with  other  tuna  stock  is  complicated. 
Additional  information  is  required  on  dynamics  and 
stock interactions to establish effective management in 
the region. The movement of skipjack tuna within the 
Papua  New  Guinea  fishery  according  to  Kearney 
(1978) has been established accurately in the Bismarck 
Sea and to a lesser extent in  the Solomon and Coral 
Seas. This distribution is due to: 
- the movement of freshwater from  the major river 
systems  in  Papua  New  Guinea  to  north  of  the 
equator to about 4N; and 
- a clockwise  movement around the Bismarck Sea, 
spilling over into the Solomon and Coral Seas (Fig. 
3.2). 
Operation  of  the  skipjack  fishery  based  in  the 
southern and south western Bismarck Sea has shown 
consistently good catches (Kearney 1978). These areas 
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have  an  abundant tuna resource  and good  baiting 
grounds, essential for a sustainable pole-and-Iine tuna 
industry. 
Property rights and fisheries 
management 
Fisheries regulation 
Regulation has become a crucial element of fisheries 
management There have been dramatic advances in 
fishing technology and fishing power, and rapid devel-
opment of fish processing and marketing. With this has 
come  recognition of the threat of resource depletion, 
and acceptance of the urgency for government inter-
vention  to  control  the  rate  of  exploitation  (Pearse 
1980a). Associated with this  recognition has been the 
declaration of the  200 mile  fishing  limit  by  coastal 
states. This development can be interpreted as part of 
the effort of coastal  states to  protect their resources 
from expanded fishing by foreign fleets. It  was less than 
a  quarter  of a  century  ago  that the  jurisdiction  of 
coastal  states  extended  to  12  miles  only.  In  1977 
fishing jurisdiction was extended to 200 miles, and now 
encompasses most of the world's richest fish resources. 
Governments of coastal states recognise the need for 
fisheries regulation and a much broader responsibility 
for resource management 
A  third  major  change  concerns  the  theory  and 
practice of fisheries regulation. In  the past, regulatory 
organisations  aimed  at  achieving  the  maximum 
sustainable yield  level of catch for each stock Econo-
mists have now succeeded in  ensuring recognition of 
the alternative goal of maximising resource rents and 
other  benefits.  Coastal  states  acknowledge  the 
economic desirability of restricting entry whilst comple-
menting  the  effort  of regulators  to  control  fishing 
pressure (Pearse 1980a). 
It is evident both in  theory and experience that in 
the absence of regulation a profitable fishery is unsus-
tainable over the long run.  If access is  not restricted, 
profit will attract new entry, resulting in the expansion 
of fishing power and labour and the elimination of all 
returns in excess of the cost of fishing. Sometimes this 
adjustment towards  an equilibrium  between revenue 
and cost leads to resource depletion. But even if it does 
not, or if the catch is carefully regulated at the desired 
29 The  Economics of Papua  New Guinea's Tuna  Fisheries 
level,  the  fleet  will  inevitably  expand  beyond  the 
required capacity and all  potential  net yields  will  be 
dissipated (Pearse 1979). 
Common  property  status  is  a  primary  cause  of 
economic inefficiency in the fishing industry. Individual 
fishers  expand  their operations in  response  to  profit 
opportunities. However, they neither have control over 
the fish  resources on which  they depend nor over the 
other fishers  with  whom  they  compete for  the catch. 
This results in exploitation, inefficiency and waste. 
Property rights and individual 
transferable quotas 
The  major  characteristic  of  fisheries  resources  that 
distinguishes them from most other natural resources is 
the institutional arrangements regarding the ownership 
of the  resources.  Fisheries  resources  most often  are 
unowned  or  under  collective  ownership  of  nations, 
tribes or other groups. There are three major fonllS  of 
property  rights  over  fisheries  resources.  First  at one 
extreme,  is  sole  ownership  Scott  (1955),  where  the 
exclusive right of ownership is held by a single owner. 
At the other extreme is  open access or absence of 
property  rights.  Here  the resources are unowned (res 
nullius) and no fisher can enforce rights to exploit over 
any other. This absence of property rights has tradition-
ally  been associated with  high  seas fishing. High seas 
constituted  the  bulk  of the  world's  oceans until  the 
1977 declaration of the 200 mile jurisdiction by coastal 
states. 
Between the two  extremes are the group fonns of 
ownership where the resources are common property 
(res communes). Here rights over resource exploitation 
are held  by  persons in  common with  others (Pearse 
1980b). 
There are three general fonns of common property 
rights.  Firstly,  there  is  unrestricted  access  which  is 
closest to the case in which there are no properly rights. 
Here anyone in the group that holds the rights may use 
the resource, but no one has power to  exclude other 
members  of  the  group.  The  non-enforcement  of 
property rights, in this case, has a two fold impact: 
- The  reluctance  of individual  fishers  to  conserve 
some proportion of current stock for regeneration 
has  historically  resulted  in  stock  depletion.  No 
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fisher finds  it  advantageous to  release or leave  in 
the sea small fish  so that they can grow to a more 
profitable size. The likelihood is  that they are only 
going  to  end  up  in  the  nets  of  other  fishers. 
Therefore, the individual has no incentive to devote 
resources  to  habitat  maintenance  or  fish  stock 
enhancement (Copes 1980). 
- The misallocation of resources  because of excess 
investment in  capital  and labour. This results  in 
excessive fishing effort and low productivity per unit 
of effort 
The second general fonn of common property right 
involves  access  restricted  to  those who  hold  explicit 
rights. Access  rights  may  be in  the fonn  of licences, 
heritage  rights  or common  law  privileges  based  on 
residency. Properly rights holders can collectively claim 
rights  over specific  resources  and  have  the  right  to 
exclude  others.  Traditional  unrestricted  access  has 
been ended to pave the way for  limited entry policies, 
involving various fonns of restrictive licensing. 
The third  fonn  of common properly right can be 
regarded as a subcategory of restricted access in which 
the rights of an individual holder are stinted, allowing a 
specific quantity of the resource to be taken. This is  a 
characteristic  of  the  individual  transferable  quota 
scheme. The objective  of the individual  quota  is  to 
allocate  a  fixed  share  of  the  catch  in  advance  to 
individual operators (Copes 1986). 
The advantage of management by individual trans-
ferable  quota  lies  in  the  elimination  of  important 
external  diseconomies  associated  with  open-access 
fisheries  and  with  fisheries  subject  to  limited  entry 
licensing.  When fishers  are guaranteed an individual 
quota they  can  take  their time  to  make their catch, 
spreading  their  efforts  optimally  and  using  efficient 
configurations of equipment and labour in the process. 
The  transferability  of  quotas  further  facilitates 
rationalisation if there is  excess capacity in  the fishery 
relative to the total allowable catch, that is there is  not 
sufficient  harvesting  opportunity  under  the  quota 
scheme for all existing fishing vessels to operate at full 
capacity throughout the season. Rent can be generated 
from the fishery by the withdrawal of some fishing units 
from  the fishery  and their application elsewhere. The 
quota rights system allows quotas to be consolidated in 
the hands of the most efficient operators who can fish full  time and reduce unit costs of production (Copes 
1986). 
However,  there  are  several  disadvantages  of 
individual transferable quotas: 
- difficulty in enforcement 
- the culling and discharging of surplus catch at sea 
- the inapplicability to short-lived species. 
Therefore this fonn of regulation is not suitable for 
all fisheries. 
The 200 mile jurisdiction 
Governments of coastal states have declared 200 mile 
jurisdictions in  response to concern about overfishing 
by distant water fishing nations. It should be noted that 
the declaration of 200 mile  limits  by  coastal states in 
itself does not address the common property status of 
fisheries, which is the cause of economic inefficiency in 
the fishing industry. The declaration excludes non-citi-
zens, but citizens of the coastal states can collectively 
exploit their zonal fisheries  resources. An  unregulated 
collective exploitation of the fish  stock by citizens of a 
coastal state still  has the problems of an open-access 
fishery. 
There are three major advantages of enforcing the 
200  mile  jurisdiction.  Coastal  states  can  control 
overfishing  by  distant  water  fishing  nations.  Where 
foreign  fishers  are allowed,  they  have  been  licensed 
under stringent conditions. Second, the 200 mile juris-
diction  enables  national  fishers  to  increase  fishing 
activities without competition from  foreign  fishers and 
to use fishing as a means of promoting economic devel-
opment Third,  it  enables  coastal  states  to  regulate 
fishing  effort  by  their  own  nationals  and  prevent 
overexploitation of fisheries resources. 
However, the implementation of the 200 mile juris-
diction has resulted also in three major disadvantages. 
It has generated an expansion of fishing  effort on  a 
number of valuable fish species and the underexploita-
tion of many other fish  stocks through lower levels of 
effort. The exclusion  of distant water fishing  nations 
from 200 mile zones has resulted in the shifting of their 
fishing activities to the high seas. This has generated a 
rapid expansion of distant water fishing nation fishing 
effort on the remaining high seas stocks (Copes 1981). 
It has also resulted in  the underexploitation of certain 
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fish  resources  of coastal  states  which  do  not  have 
adequate  fishing  capabilities  and  which  have  not 
concluded  agreements  with  distant  water  fishing 
nations to fish  in  their zones. Finally, it has resulted in 
boundary disputes  between  coastal  states,  especially 
over  more  productive  fishing  banks  and  migration 
channels. 
Tuna management in the Pacific 
islands region 
Tuna stocks are highly migratory and pass through the 
waters  of many 200 mile  zones and the enclaves of 
high  seas.  Regional  and  subregional  joint  fisheries 
management  provides  an  important  measure  of 
control over migrating tuna stocks between respective 
fisheries jurisdictions. To exercise a degree of control 
over distant water fishing nation fleets,  Pacific islands 
states  have  established  a  number  of  regional  and 
subregional  fisheries  organisations  to  monitor, 
conserve  and  regulate  the activities  of distant water 
fishing  nations  and  their  interactions  with  national 
fishing operations. The Naurll Group, which was estab-
lished in  1983 by  the Federated States of Micronesia, 
. Kiribati,  Marshall Islands,  Republic  of Palau,  Naurll, 
Papua  New  Guinea  and  Solomon  Islands,  is  an 
example of such an organisation. Its major objective is 
to develop a coordinated approach to control. manage-
ment and conservation of common tuna stocks. This 
organisation functions in line with the spirit of the U.N. 
convention of the Law of the Sea (Matsuda and Ouchi 
1984). 
The distant water fishing nation vessels licensed to 
fish  in the waters of the Naurll Group are subject to an 
identical  set of tenns of access  and other licensing 
requirements,  to  enable  a  coordinated  approach  to 
foreign  fishing  activities.  The  Naurll  Group  share 
common tuna stocks in the region, together with some 
of the best tuna intercepting zones in the south Pacific. 
The distant water fishing nations are obligated to pay a 
negotiated fee  under bilateral and multilateral fishing 
arrangements with countries of the region for access to 
their waters. The distant water fishing nation fleet can 
avoid  paying these fees  by waiting to fish  in  the high 
seas or by  engaging  in  illegal  fishing.  However,  it  is 
more  effective  and  cheaper  to  fish  migrating  tuna 
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stocks from  the best interception zones, reducing the 
average cost per tonne of fish. 
Three major reasons for the dissipation of resource 
rents in  a common property situation are: inadequate 
management  capabilities  in  the  coastal  states;  the 
existence of shared stocks; and ideological and philo-
sophical  constraints. But the  two  major  underlining 
reasons analysed by Munro (1979) are: 
A coastal state may lack the resources to facilitate 
effective  stock  assessment  surveillance  and 
enforcement. The distant water nations have every 
incentive  to  discount  the  future  returns  of  the 
resources and may lack incentives to honour their 
obligations. 
Tuna are highly mobile, and stocks are shared by a 
number of coastal states. Tuna stocks also  move 
into the high seas adjacent to coastal state zones. 
This puts a premium on cooperative management 
programs.  With  uncertainty  and  inadequate 
management capabilities,  and  the  transboundary 
nature of the tuna stocks, it is difficult to coordinate 
management policies. Distant water fishing nations 
have an incentive to underreport their harvest and a 
complementary  incentive  to  fish  heavily  in  the 
present in fear of restrictions on fishing effort in the 
future. 
The 1977 international fisheries  regime  based on 
the 200 mile fishing zone brought most of the world's 
fisheries  under national jurisdictions and there was a 
rush to the proclamation of 200 mile limits. Article 56 
of the  draft  U.N.  Convention  of the Law  of the Sea 
assigns  each  coastal  state  'sovereign  rights  for  the 
purpose  of  exploring,  exploiting  and  managing 
resources'  in  a  designated  fishing  zone  extending 
beyond the 12 mile territorial sea to a distance of 200 
miles  from  a  coastal  baseline.  However,  the  task of 
determining the total allowable catch was  left  to  the 
coastal state, but 'where the coastal state does not have 
the capacity to harvest its entire total allowable catch it 
shall ...  give  other states access to the surplus' (Copes 
1981). 
The draft Convention attempts to solve the trans-
boundary stock problem by requiring adjacent states to 
cooperate in  the establishment of joint management 
arrangements. The guidelines for  this type of arrange-
ment  under the draft Convention  are  not tight  and 
32 
provisions  for enforcement are absent.  Prospects for 
such arrangements are often good if they involve only 
two  countries,  thus  reducing  the  complexity  of 
bargaining necessary to achieve a  mutually advanta-
geous management program. 
The overlappingltransboundary tuna stocks in  the 
central and western Pacific require joint management. 
This is because of the: 
wide range of stock management problems 
complexity  of  stock  composition  and  migration 
patterns 
many coastal state and distant water fishing nation 
participants 
many stock components. 
The  south  Pacific  tuna  fisheries  are  complex, 
consisting  of  many  overlapping  stocks  of  several 
species.  Managing  mixed  tuna  stocks  requires 
regulating  fishing  effort,  targeting  more  effort  on 
stronger and less on weaker stocks, gear regulation and 
area closures. 
Current management policies 
Most  management policies  introduced  in  the Papua 
New Guinea tuna industry are designed to avoid sector 
conflict, especially between the locally based operators 
and  distant  water  fishing  nations.  Regulations  are 
designed  to  protect  local  pole-and-Iine  operations, 
baitfish  grounds,  and  artisanal  fishers.  The  major 
management policies that have been implemented to 
date include: 




Area and time closure 
There  are  restrictions  on  major  inshore  tuna  and 
baitfish grounds, especially around Cape Lambert and 
Ysabel Passage. Foreign vessels are not allowed to fish 
or travel within a radius of 100 km  of Cape Lambert 
and Taskul in  the East New  Britain and New Ireland 
provinces respectively. These areas are near the major 
inshore tuna grounds. In  addition to these two  areas, the 12 mile territorial waters, inland waters and a major 
spawning area bounded by the parallels and meridians 
from  latitude  0.30S  to  latitude  3.30S  and  from 
longitude 149E to longitude 153E are also restricted to 
all  foreign  fishing  activities.  Fishing  in  these  areas 
would  adversely  effect  the economic viability  of any 
future  locally  based pole-and-Iine operation, and the 
viability of the artisanal fishery. 
The time closure was introduced to areas within the 
seasonal tuna fishery,  especially  in  the southwest of 
New Britain islands and the eastern Papuan waters for 
about three months of the year. 
Gear restriction 
The government has introduced a restriction on purse 
seining in the above areas of its 200 mile zone to avoid 
potential  damage to  locally  based operations.  Heavy 
purse  seining activity  in  Papua New  Guinea  waters 
greatly affected the catch rates of pole-and-Iine opera-
tions between  1984 and 1985. The restrictions were 
formulated to safeguard future attempts to re-establish 
the locally  based tuna operation, while  at the same 
time controlling the number of seiners in  Papua New 
Guinea waters. Gear restriction is  crucial for ensuring 
the economic viability of a locally based tuna industry. 
The restriction on longlining activities within the 12 
mile zone was  introduced after gear conflict between 
artisanal  fishers  and foreign  based  longliners.  Local 
fishers and provincial governments have long opposed 
the  licensing  of longliners  within  the  12  mile  limit 
because they interfere with  local  shipping traffic  and 
community based fishing  activities. There have  been 
instances where  local  fishers  have  removed  longline 
gear and retrieved the catch. The success of any restric-
tions depends on the effectiveness of surveillance and 
enforcement. In  Papua New Guinea, such services are 
not very effective because of a lack of adequate labour 
and financial and capital resources. But the actions of 
local fishers have been very costly to the foreign based 
longliners. 
Limited entry 
The number of vessels allowed in the two major areas 
mentioned above has been restricted according to the 
availability  of  resources  and  baitfish.  The  Cape 
Lambert area has been restricted to  10 pole-and-Iine 
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vessels and one mothership, while 24 pole-and-Iiners 
and  two  mothers  hips  are  allowed  into  the  Ysabel 
Passage  area The limited  entry  measure was  intro-
duced after the  1984 fishing  season, on the basis of 
experience during the period 1971 to 1981, to ensure 
the viability of the locally based tuna industry, and in 
particular to  safeguard  the then Papua New  Guinea 
Tuna Fisheries Pty  Ltd operation. The policy can be 
re-examined for future pole-and-Iine operations, with a 
view  to possibly incorporating seiners into the locally 
based tuna industry. 
Baitfish management 
The baitfish fishery is a subsidiary of the pole-and-Iine 
operation. Pole-and-Iine vessels take on bait at the end 
of each day.  Bait are used to feed  migrating tuna to 
induce them to a feeding frenzy before they are caught 
by  pole-and-Iine  using  barbless  hooks.  Because  the 
fishery  is  heavily  dependent upon baitfish  it  disturbs 
the  fishing  activities  of  artisanal  fishers.  The 
pole-and-Iine companies are required to compensate 
the local  artisanal  fishers  for  the inconvenience and 
loss  of  fishing.  The  fishing  companies  pay  baitfish 
royalties to local owners of the baitfish resources as a 
condition of licence. 
Refined management policies 
There are  certain  refined  management policies  that 
could  be  introduced  to  the  fishery  as  a  means  of 
inducing new foreign investment in the industry. These 
policies include the restriction of purse seining activi-
ties in  Papua New Guinea waters. The new incentives 
would  have  to  be  consistent  with  policies  on  joint 
venture participation and restrictions on fishing in the 
archipelagic waters. 
Restriction on purse seine fishing activities 
Purse  seine  fishing  activities  in  Papua New  Guinea 
waters have expanded rapidly over the past five  years, 
reflecting  the government's nondiscriminatory policy. 
This policy specifies that distant water fishing  nation 
fleets will  not be discriminated against so long as they 
pay  the  appropriate  fees  and  satisfy  government 
requirements.  However,  it  is  worth  noting  that 
increasing  seining  activities  would  adversely  affect 
catch per unit effort of the locally based tuna operators. 
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The  greatest  impact  has  been  experienced  in  the 
yellowfin  catches,  where  catch  per  unit  effort  has 
declined  with  increasing  seining.  The  government 
needs to introduce new policies that will control growth 
of future seining activities.  Such policies will  require 
detailed  analysis  of the  dynamics  and  interactions 
between overlapping tuna stocks, and their effects on 
the foreign and locally based purse seine, longline and 
pole-and-Iine fleets. 
As  the  government  is  actively  seeking  foreign 
partners to develop the locally based tuna industry, it is 
timely to consider a restriction on seining. The govern-
ment would also need to reconsider its current policy of 
nondiscriminatory  licensing  of  foreign  vessels.  A 
restriction  on  seining  would  succeed  only  if  all 
countries  sharing  a  common  stock  cooperate  in 
reducing effort.  The Papua New  Guinea government 
would  need  the  cooperation  of  all  Nauru  Group 
members to  restrict  the  number of licensed  seiners. 
The highly migratory nature of the fishery requires joint 
management policies  to  be  fonnulated  belween  the 
host countries and the distant water fishing nations. 
Incentives to the tuna industry 
For the government to  satisfy  its  objective  of estab-
lishing  a  sustainable,  competitive  and  integrated 
domestic tuna industry,  it  would  have to  provide  the 
appropriate incentives such as infrastructure (wharves, 
roads,  water  and  utilities),  exemptions  from  import 
duties, reduction of export taxes and exemption of all 
tuna vessels  from  the 8.5%  import  duly, which  is  a 
significant 'front end' cost Since there is  no national 
shipbuilding  industry  capable  of  constructing  tuna 
vessels, the domestic based companies have no option 
but to import their vessels. Such an exemption would 
not be unique. There have been precedents in a range 
of industries,  both  primary  and  secondary  (mining, 
meat  canning,  television),  that  have  been  granted 
exemptions  on  imported  equipment  required  to 
establish ventures. 
The government could exempt all tuna vessels from 
the current fuel  import duty of 2 toea per litre. Since 
distant  water  fishing  nation  seiners  and  longliners 
travel  long distances to the major tuna grounds, fuel 
constitutes  25%  of their  operation  cost  Exemption 
from  fuel  import duty would  provide  a  stimulus for 
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foreign  vessels  to  base  in  Papua New  Guinea.  Fuel 
concessions provided to these vessels would have to be 
comparable  with  competing  areas  in  the  region  if 
Papua New  Guinea  is  to  be successful  in  attracting 
foreign vessels. Such fuel  concessions are not without 
precedent The Papua New Guinea Electricity Commis-
sion was granted a reduced rate on imported diesel fuel 
used for electricity generation. 
There is  also a case for a  reduction in  the export 
tariff on round tuna exports from  the current 15% to 
2.5%.  This  reduction would  be consistent with  other 
established Papua New Guinea primary products, such 
as tea, coffee and copra, for which the export tariff is 
only 2.5%.  Such a reduction would greatly reduce the 
operational  expense of domestic  based vessels,  thus 
offering a  stimulus  to  base in  a  Papua New  Guinea 
port 
Joint venture participation 
The  government  has  long  recognised  the  need  for 
foreign  participation  to  develop  the  domestic  tuna 
industry. There is an urgent need to fonnulate a policy 
on joint ventures that require the government to take 
up equity. There has been precedent in  the primary 
and  secondary  industries  (mining  and  agriculture), 
where the government has taken out equity in  these 
ventures. Government participation provides a degree 
of confidence in the industry and encourages new local 
and foreign investment 
Archipelagic waters 
The government should consider restricting access to 
its  archipelagic  waters.  For  this  policy  to  succeed, 
considerable surveillance and enforcement would  be 
required. If some long-tenn benefits were to be derived 
from  foreign  vessels,  then  the  government  could 
introduce a differential access fee structure with locally 
based  vessels  paying  a  lower  fee  than  their  foreign 
counterparts. A very  high  fee  on  all  foreign  vessels 
would induce illegal  fishing in  the archipelagic waters 
and  would  influence  future  investment  decisions.  A 
locally  based fishing  fleet would generate substantial 
economic  benefit  to  the  local  economy,  through 
creation  of  employment  opportunities,  payment  of 
taxes and purchases of provisions. Conclusions 
Papua New Guinea has long recognised the potential 
of  its  tuna  resources  for  economic  development. 
However,  the locally  based tuna industry has experi-
enced  fluctuations  between  1971  and  1985.  There 
were four companies in  1972, reduced to two in  1979, 
which  then  ceased  operation  in  1981.  The  cyclical 
nature of the tuna industry has reflected world  tuna 
market  conditions  and  the  entry  of  new  low  cost 
producers to the industry. The local benefits from  the 
industry  were  substantial  and  its  closure  in  1981 
resulted  in  the  laying  off  of  1200  nationals,  which 
adversely affected  commerce in  Kavieng  and Rabaul 
where the industry was located. Attempts to re-estab-
lish  the  pole-and-line  fishery  in  1984  were  not 
successful because of the depressed tuna market and 
high operation costs. These are the two  major factors 
hampering attempts to  reactivate  locally  based  tuna 
operations. 
The government of Papua New  Guinea has been 
actively seeking potential foreign  partners to  develop 
the  industry,  especially  the  pole-and-Iine  fishing 
operation,  with  the  possibility  of  establishing  a 
processing facility  with associated shore based estab-
lishments.  The  major  internal  constraints  hindering 
the development of a tuna industry include the lack of 
adequately  skilled  labour,  lack  of  infrastructure 
(wharves,  water  supplies,  utilities  and  domestic 
markets), the high costs of inputs and lack of consistent 
government tuna policies on equity participation. The 
government will  have to reconsider its current nondis-
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criminatory licensing policy if it  is  going to develop a 
locally based tuna industry. For foreign based vessels to 
locate  in  the  country,  incentives  would  have  to  be 
provided: including fuel  concessions, tariff exemptions 
or  reductions,  and  equity  participation.  There  are 
significant long-term benefits to be gained from foreign 
vessels basing in the country. 
The current tuna industry includes the licensing of 
distant water fishing  nation vessels  to operate in  the 
Papua  New  Guinea  200  mile  zone.  The  highly 
migratory nature of tuna stocks requires joint manage-
ment of this transboundary stock. The joint manage-
ment regime would require a coordinated approach to 
exploit,  conserve  and  manage  the  common  trans-
boundary tuna stock. Since Papua New Guinea has no 
locally based tuna industry, the government can benefit 
significantly from  its tuna resource by simply charging 
high licence fees to foreign fishers. However, this could 
encourage  illegal  activities.  The  government  could 
induce them to base in Papua New Guinea if domestic 
based vessels paid a lower fee.  Failure to attract these 
vessels could result in Papua New Guinea imposing a 
high  licence fee  and closing off archipelagic waters to 
foreign based vessels. 
Gear  selectivity,  area  and  time  closures  would 
greatly enhance the domestic based tuna industry in 
the future. This policy would have to take account also 
of the  artisanal  fishers  whilst  avoiding  intersectoral 
conflicts. These incentives and management policies, if 
effectively  executed, would  result  in  a  well  managed 
tuna industry that would generate significant benefits 
to the local economy. 
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Introduction 
Recognition of the rights of Pacific island nations to the 
tuna resources in  their exclusive economic zones has 
given those countries the opportunity to manage their 
fisheries  with  a  view  to  maximising  their  economic 
return.  Where  distant  water  fishing  nations  are 
involved  in  harvesting,  Pacific  island  nations  are 
concerned with ensuring that they receive access fees 
which reflect the full value of the resource. This has led 
to a desire amongst coastal states to  negotiate higher 
payments  for  the  exploitation  of their  resources  by 
distant water fishing nations. The trend has been met 
with  reluctance  on  the  part of distant water fishing 
nations  to  pay  the  higher  fees.  Many  distant  water 
fishing nations, such as Japan, claim that the combina-
tion  of  rising  operating  costs  with  relatively  minor 
increases in  tuna prices is  constraining their ability to 
meet demands for increased access payments. Steadily 
increasing  labour  and  fuel  costs  are  argued  to  be 
placing the greatest  pressure on  profitability.  Access 
negotiations  between  resource  owners  and  distant 
water fishing countries have, as a result, become more 
vigorous. Some agreements, such as the one between 
Papua New  Guinea  and Japan  prior  to  1987,  have 
expired and have not been renewed. This is  primarily 
attributable to  the extent of disagreement about the 
ability  of distant water fishing  nation  vessels  to  pay 
higher access fees. 
The  purpose  of this  chapter  is  to  compile  and 
analyse revenue and cost profiles of Japanese offshore 
and  distant water  tuna fishing  operations. The cost 
profiles  are  based  on  estimated  economic  costs  of 
fishing,  which  have been calculated using accounting 
information  from  end-of-year  financial  statements, 
together with available data on Japanese capital costs. 
Tuna vessels  have been categorised by gear type  and 
size (based on gross registered tonnage). Annual profit 
or loss,  annual rate of return on invested capital, and 
the cost per fishing day for each category of vessel for 
the  period  1979-80 to  1988-89 is  calculated. This 
infonnation may help to resolve some of the disputes 
about the appropriate level of access fees. 
Background 
Prior to the early  1980s, tuna and skipjack fishing in 
the western Pacific  had been dominated by Japanese 
pole-and-line, longline and, more recently, purse seine 
vessels. Throughout  the  1980s,  there  was  a  steady 
increase  in  the number of United States, Taiwanese, 
Korean,  Filipino  and Indonesian  purse seine vessels 
fishing  in  the region. The number of longline vessels 
operated  by  the  latter  four  nations  also  increased. 
Purse seine activity is now dominated by Japanese and 
United States vessels, while pole-and-Iine fishing is still 
undertaken almost exclusively by Japanese vessels. 
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The expansion  of distant water tuna fishing  has 
been accompanied by rising costs, particularly of fuel 
oil  and  labour.  Together,  these  costs  account  for 
between 45%  and 60%  of Japanese vessel  operating 
costs for the three gear types Oapan, Ministry of Agricul-
ture Forestry and Fisheries various years).  Significant 
increases  in  fuel  costs  followed  the  world  oil  price 
shocks of 1973 and  1979. The most affected  fleets 
were  the  distant  water  fleets,  which  travel  long 
distances and operate large  freezer storage capacity. 
The effect of rising fuel cost has been compounded by 
the need for the fishing industry to pay higher wages to 
attract labour from other more attractive employment. 
Younger generations of Japanese workers continue to 
view  employment opportunities in  primary industries 
as less desirable than those in tertiary industries. 
In general, the fishing industry has been unable to 
translate rising fishing costs into higher market prices, 
further compounding the rising cost pressures faced by 
the fishing fleets.  Although seafood prices in  general 
rose steadily throughout the 1970s and 1980s, tuna 
and  skipjack  prices  did  not (ABARE  1988:276).  Of 
tunas, only bluefin prices followed an increasing trend 
between  1976  and  1989.  The  price  of  bigeye  rose 
steadily from  1976 to 1982, then fluctuated around a 
relatively stable trend to 1989. Yellowfin  and skipjack 
prices  were  relatively  constant  between  1976  and 
1982,  but went  into  gradual  decline  thereafter. The 
price of albacore has remained relatively constant.  1 
Of  the  many  distant  water  fishing  nation  fleets 
operating in  the western Pacific, Japanese and United 
States  vessel  designs  and  equipment  (fish  finding, 
freezer, net handling etc.)  form  the basis  of the  two 
major  technology  streams  employed.  Many  of  the 
Korean,  Taiwanese  and  Filipino  purse  seiners  are 
ex-United States vessels (Doulman  1987  a)  or vessels 
built in Asia to American specifications. Technically or 
mechanically related  operating costs are likely  to  be 
similar for vessels employing like technology. However, 
even for similar vessels the labour component of costs 
may differ due to the different wage structures which 
prevail in  those nations which  provide labour for the 
I Based on average Japanese market per kg prices for frozen tuna 
and skipjack: 1976 to 1982 from Matsuda and Ouchi (984); and 
1983-1989  calculated  from  monthly  Globefish  prices  (FAO 
various years). 
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tuna fishing  industries. The wages  for Japanese and 
American crew continue to be significantly higher than 
those  of  their  Asian,  Melanesian  and  Micronesian 
counterparts. 
United States vessels enjoy considerable freedom in 
choosing  home  ports,  nationality of registration  and 
sources of labour. To some degree they have been able 
to contain wage and fuel  costs by  basing their opera-
tions  in  American  Samoa  and  Guam,  and  hiring 
islanders  as  crew. The Japanese government on  the 
other hand exercises a considerable amount of control 
over the operations of  Japanese vessels. It continues to 
restrict Japanese vessels fishing in  the western Pacific 
to 'home ports' in Japan, using Japanese crew.  Excep-
tions to the use of Japanese crew occur in cases where 
access agreements with coastal states cover the use of 
islanders as crew members. The required employment 
of Japanese crew  has meant that vessel  owners have 
had  little  or  no  scope  for  reducing  the  labour 
component of operating costs.2 
Data 
Financial data for  the Japanese tuna industry for  the 
fiscal years (April to March) 1979-80 to 1988-89 were 
obtained  from  Japan,  Statistical  Yearbook  of the 
MinistIy of  Agriculture, ForestIy and Fisheries, Volumes 
56-65. The  data  provided  in  these  yearbooks  are 
averages derived from surveys of fishing vessel owners. 
The data state the financial positions of average vessels 
of particular types at the end of the financial year. They 
are reported as:  gross revenue from  fishing activities; 
expenditures  incurred  for  fishing  activities;  deprecia-
tion;  capital  assets  (fixed  and  nonfixed);  and opera-
tional data such as number of workers, days worked 
and days fished  during the year. Interest payments on 
debt to  banks,  cooperative  financial  institutions and 
government  related  financial  institutions  are  not 
reported  as  part of per vessel  fishing  activity  state-
ments. 
2  Although  data  on  wages  of Japanese  deckhands  are  not 
available to compare with other nationalities, an indication of the 
wage differential between.japanese and Taiwanese can be gained 
from  the following example. In  1989, a small longline vessel (20 
tonne) faced wages of US$43000 and US$57 000 for a Japanese 
boatswain  and  chief engineer  respectively  and  US$9600  and 
US$14400 for the Taiwanese equivalents (Thoulaug and Kawai 
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There  are  two  categories  of  owner.  small-scale 
owners with  capital assets of less  than ¥ 100 million 
and large-scale fishing companies with capital assets of 
greater  than  ¥100  million.  A  weighted  sample  of 
owners based on the number of vessels fishing  in  all 
areas by the  Japanese is taken, each year, to cover small 
owner vessels, whereas all available data for large-scale 
fishing companies is used. 
Assets are reported at depreciated historical  cost 
These are fixed assets (shore based facilities and vessel) 
and nonfixed assets (capital value of fishing  licences, 
goodwill  and  establishment  costs).  Fixed  assets  are 
depreciated on a declining balance basis over 12 years 
with a 10% initial historical cost as scrap value. Depre-
ciation of nonfixed assets is by any amount, at will. 
Unfortunately,  the  data reported  for  purse seine 
vessels  are for  group seining operations only,  which 
makes it somewhat difficult to judge how single seining 
operations are faring.  Group  purse seine  operations 
may  involve  up  to  four  vessels  per group:  two  net 
vessels (one of which may act as an anchor vessel) and 
two  carriers. Data on single purse seine vessel opera-
tions would have been more useful in investigating the 
viability  of tuna purse seining in  the western  Pacific 
because most Japanese purse seining activity  in  that 
region is undertaken by single vessel operations. 
Method of analysis 
The cost of fishing in foreign exclusive economic zones 
has three components: capital costs; variable costs (in 
the form of fuel, bait, wages, maintenance etc.); and the 
cost of gaining access, via a  negotiated agreement, to 
the fishing zone. As this chapter forms the basis of an 
analysis of Japanese vessel ability to pay for access to 
Papua New Guinea's fishing zone, the cost of effort for 
Japanese tuna vessels is considered exclusive of access 
fees. 
The data for this investigation are available only in 
the form  of averages derived  from  aggregated survey 
information and therefore it is not possible to compare 
actual vessel  costs. Thus, representative cost profiles 
for an 'average vessel' of the three gear types and sizes 
of vessels  are determined.  Determining average  cost 
profiles implies that all vessels in a particular gear type 
and size class are treated as identical with  respect to 
operating and capital costs. The role any variation  in 
skipper  skills  could  play  in  determining  vessel 
operating costs  is  also  ignored. Furthermore, as  the 
available  data derives  from  surveys  covering  vessels 
which most likely fished in a wide variety of geographic 
regions,  any  potential  variations  in  costs  faced  by 
vessels due to this factor is ignored. 
By using the revenue data from Ministry of Agricul-
ture, Forestry and Fisheries end-of-year statements  to 
estimate  profits,  it  is  assumed  that  prices  used  to 
determine revenues accurately reflect the true value of 
tunas and skipjack Observed  prices  may  not reflect 
true prices if Japanese tuna markets are  imperfect,  or 
involve  vertically integrated firms  able  to  shift  actual 
returns  to  different  sectors  of  their  operations  by 
adjusting prices within the firm for tuna to the different 
sectors.  This  behaviour  is  referred  to  as  'transfer 
pricing'.  For  firms  involved  in  tuna  and  skipjack 
harvesting  and  processing,  one objective  of transfer 
pricing could be to distort the true ability of vessels to 
pay  access  fees  for  fishing  in  foreign  exclusive 
economic zones by understating ex-vessel prices. 
We  now  turn  to  the  procedure  for  calculating 
economic profit It is  widely accepted that accounting 
measures of profit differ from  economic measures of 
profit Put simply, economic profit is defined as income 
in  excess of total  costs incurred. In  the case of tuna 
harvesting,  total costs  include explicit costs (such as 
wages,  fuel.  bait  etc.)  and the  implicit  cost of using 
capital for fishing when it could be invested in its next 
best alternative use.3  Economic profit is calculated in 
the following  way: the  residual  of total revenue  less 
operating costs gives operating profit; depreciation and 
the opportunity cost of capital is then deducted to give 
economic profit (or loss). The rate of return on invested 
capital can be calculated by  dividing operating profit 
less depreciation by the value of capital employed. 
A difficulty with this approach is in measuring both 
the economic cost of capital and the stock of capital to 
apply it to. Much of the available financial data report 
3  The cost of capital is  its 'opportunity cost' or the return that 
capital could earn if it was employed in its  next best alternative 
use (ie. the risk adjusted, expected return if the capital had been 
invested  in  the next best alternative activity  to  the activity  it is 
currently invested in). 
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capital stock as a  depreciated  historical  book value. 
This typically represents an undervaluation of capital 
stock, the most appropriate measure being one based 
on the market value of the capital stock. However, such 
estimates of capital stock are difficult to obtain. 
The available Ministry  of Agriculture,  Forestry and 
Fisheries data report capital stock {invested capita\}  of 
fishing units as (a) fixed capital (which includes vessels, 
fishing gear, buildings and other fixed  assets);  and (b) 
nonfixed  capital  (which  includes  such  assets  as 
goodwill,  fishing  licences and establishment costs  of 
the operation). Both are reported at depreciated histor-
ical  book  value.  The distinction  between  fixed  and 
nonfixed  capital  is  important  for  the  purpose  of 
measuring the cost of fishing effort because nonfixed 
capital costs should be excluded from costs in calcu-
lating economic profit from fishing since they probably 
represent capitalised rents from  fishery resources. The 
use of depreciated  historical  book estimates of fixed 
capital stock also avoids the potential inclusion of any 
rents which can be capitalised into vessel (and other 
fixed  gear) values, inflating fixed  capital costs. It is  not 
clear, however,  whether this  outweighs the disadvan-
tage  of  using  information  which  may  represent  an 
undervaluation  of  the  true  market  value  of  fixed 
capital. 
In  addition to  the above  considerations regarding 
the cost of capital is  the issue of how to treat interest 
paid on outstanding debt There are basically two ways 
for a finn  to finance capital investment One is  to use 
internal or equity financing; the other is to borrow from 
a bank or similar institution (debt financing). The cost 
of debt financing, in expenditure terms,  is  the interest 
payable on the loan. The cost of equity financing is the 
rate of return foregone from investing in the firm's next 
best alternative  investment  opportunity.  In  order  to 
measure the total cost of capital, both equity and debt 
costs  need to  be considered. There are two  ways  of 
taking debt costs into account. One is to calculate the 
interest payable on the debt component of capital by 
multiplying the debt by the market rate of interest. The 
other  way  is  to  treat  the  actual  reported  interest 
payments as a cost to the firm. The former approach is 
incorporated  in  the  weighted-average-cost-of-capital 
method  which  applies  an  average  cost of debt  and 
equity finance to the entire capital  base of the firm. In 
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the latter approach the total capital cost is calculated 
as the sum of actual interest payments plus the cost of 
equity  financing multiplied  by  the amount of equity 
capital.  In  this  paper  estimates  based  on  the 
weighted-average-cost-of-capital method are used. 
Since all the necessary data to calculate the oppor-
tunity cost of capital for the Japanese fishing industry 
are not available, estimates of average capital costs in 
Japanese industry as reported in Ando and Auerbach 
(1990)  are  used.  This  study  provides  estimates  of 
Japanese capital costs which cover the period 1979-80 
to  1988-89. It also  adjusts the series  of capital cost 
measures to account for a variety of effects. One which 
may be relevant to this analysis is  a correction to the 
basic  rate of return  to account for cross-holdings  of 
equity amongstjapanese firms. 
The basic method of estimating the cost of capital 
used by Ando and Auerbach involves  using observed 
debt-equity  ratios  from  a  cross-section  of Japanese 
firms  as  weights  to  calculate  an  'overall'  return  to 
capital.  This method assumes (at least over the long 
term) that firms' rates of return on capital will equal the 
rate  required  by  the  holders  of their securities. The 
primary source of data is  the Needs Nikkei Financial 
Tapes. This method is referred to as Return to Capital 
(A),  and the estimates of required  rate of return  are 
reported  in  Ando  and  Auerbach  (990)  Table  1, 
column (3). 
An adjustment for cross-equity holdings is made to 
account for the fact that only dividends,  rather than a 
total return (which includes capital gains) from uncon-
soli dated  holdings  amongst  firms,  are  reported  in 
Japanese financial statements. Therefore the returns to 
companies with subsidiary holdings will be understated 
and  their  capital  costs  will  be  underestimated. 
Although not all Japanese tuna vessels which operate 
in  the western Pacific are owned  by  large companies 
with significant subsidiary  holdings,  it  is  common  in 
Japan  for  small  to  medium  sized  firms  to  have  a 
financial stake in other companies. To account for this 
possibility  amongst tuna fishing operations, separate 
calculations  of economic  profitability  based  on  the 
above adjusted method of estimating the cost of capital 
have been made. We refer to this method as Return to 
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are reported in  Ando and Auerbach (1990) Table 6, 
column (2}.4 
The results  of the analysis  are  reported  in  three 
forms.  First,  estimates  of  economic  profitability  as 
revenue  less  the total  costs  of effort  (operation  and 
capital costs and depreciation) are shown. If tuna fleets 
are  not,  on  average,  earning  fishery  rents  from 
harvesting,  this  figure  will  be  zero.  Second,  profit 
estimates  as  a  rate of return  to  invested  capital  are 
reported.  Actual  rates  of  return  are  calculated  by 
subtracting  operating  costs  and  depreciation  from 
revenue and expressing the resulting value as a propor-
tion  of invested  capital.  As  nonfixed  assets  include 
goodwill  and the capitalised value of fishing licences, 
the reported fixed capital stock (historical value) only is 
used for calculating rates of return. This is based on the 
view  that the value  of goodwill  and  fishery  licences 
represent capitalised rents or quasi-rents and are not 
part of the opportunity cost of capital used to produce 
fishing effort These actual rates of return to capital are 
then  compared  with  the  required  rates  of  return 
reported by  Ando and Auerbach (1990). Third, given 
4 There are two  separate issues to consider here. One involves 
accounting for the cost of capital owned by parent companies in 
subsidiaries (subsidiary consolidation). while  the other involves 
accounting for the cost of  capital in nonsubsidiary cross-holdings. 
The  overall  effect  of excluding  these  considerations  from  a 
measure of the cost of capital is  that the returns to the firm  will 
be underestimated and therefore. so too will the cost of capital to 
the firm. 
Ando  and  Auerbach  account  for  the  absence  of  returns  to 
companies from subsidiaries in  their measurement of the return 
to  capital via  Method (A)  as follows. Data on  both  unadjusted 
earnings and earnings adjusted for subsidiary cross-holdings are 
available for the latLer part of their sample period. They assume 
that the observed difference is a rough estimate of the difference 
in  the  earlier period  when  unadjusted  data only  are  available. 
They then compute a series of adjusted earnings estimates of the 
whole sample period. 
A correction for nonsubsidiary cross-holdings was carried out by 
calculating an adjusted earnings-price ratio for a particular firm 
by  subtracting  the  dividends  from  cross-held  shares  from 
earnings and subtracting the total  (book) value of these shares 
from the equity of the company according to; 
(El PI, - [(El PI, - fdl/O-tJ  for company i; 
where EIP is  the earnings-price ratio. d is  the dividend yield  of 
equity  (total  dividends  divided  by  the  total  value  of equity. 
summed over all  firms) and fis the ratio of the market value of a 
company's cross-held equity to the market value of the company's 
own equity. 
The above adjustments are then combined to give a measure of 
returns to capital reported as Retum to Capital (8). 
the  cost  estimates.  the  information  reported  in  the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries volumes 
on  average vessel operations is  used to estimate the 
cost of a fishing day for the different vessel categories. 
Analysis of economic profits and 
rates of return to Japanese 
tuna vessels 
Table 4.1  contains estimates of the annual economic 
profit for an average vessel of each of the three different 
gear types and the various categories of vessel size for 
the  period  1979-80 to  1988-89. The estimates  are 
based on data reported in Campbell and Nicholl (1990 
and 1992a: Appendix A). Table 4.1  summarises profit 
calculations  for  both  estimates  of  required  rate  of 
return  to capital (Return  to Capital A,  and Return to 
Capital BJ. 
The profit calculations shown in Table 4.1  indicate 
that Japanese offshore and distant water tuna fishing 
ventures have tended to operate at an economic loss. 
Even  using the lower cost of capital estimates (Return 
to Capital (A)). which could underestimate the true cost 
of capital  by  ignoring the  effect of cross-holdings on 
. company returns.  by far the majority of years covered 
show economic losses for all gear types and vessel class 
sizes.  In  fact,  the only vessels  to record an economic 
profit for  the period covered by  the analysis are large 
longliners  (of the 100-200 tonne and 200-500 tonne 
classes) for  the years  1979-80 and 1987-88 through 
1988-89  (200-500  tonne  class);  and  one-net  boat 
purse seine operations of the 50-100 tonne class for 
the years 1979-80 and 1984-85. For the remainder of 
the period. gear types and size classes, economic losses 
fluctuate quite significantly from year to year. 
It  should  be  remembered  that  these  results 
represent  the  economic  situation  for  the  'average' 
vessel  of each gear type  and size class  and  that any 
individual  vessel  could  in  fact  be  making  economic 
profits, or alternatively greater economic losses,  than 
those reported. There is considerable variety amongst 
the size and types of vessels within  the classifications 
used. and the types of operation  and areas in  which 
vessels in any class operate are as varied as the range of 
vessels  themselves.  Therefore,  the  following  results 
represent an overview of total fleet operations and do 
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Table 4.1  Average  annual  per vessel  economic  profit (loss), Japanese Tuna  Fleet  1979-80 to  1988-89 (current values,  \1'000). 
Year  Longline vessels  Pole-and-line vessels  Group  purse seine vessels 
Size  (GAll  Size (GAll  Size  (GAll 
One-net boat  Two-net boats 
50-100  100-200  200-500  50-100a  200-500  50-100  100-200  10-30 
Aate  of return  IAl 
1979-80  (14357)  2371  20513  (12057)  (45614)  614  (16847)  (228) 
1980-81  (29421)  (34190)  (33307)  (82888)  (29244)  (4976)  (14679)  (891) 
1981-82  (28842)  (53338)  (52729)  (21790)  (54510)  (7511)  (12454)  (2381) 
1982-83  (22347)  (40889)  (33948)  (24044)  (64093)  (2451)  (6091)  (2567) 
1983-84  (20170)  (38925)  (32027)  (25780)  (42807)  (2927)  (8313)  (2609) 
1984-85  (14637)  (36921)  (11937)  (20407)  (33172)  921  (24117)  (3774) 
1985-86  (13366)  (5436)  (23713)  (9014)  (37864)  (17684)  (17790)  (2844) 
1986-87  (17431)  (7516)  (1895)  (9106)  (46548)  (9676)  (32825)  (2840) 
1987-88  (9132)  (316)  7011  (3261)  (15648)  (7926)  (25391)  (980) 
1988-89  (2951)  (18735)  13329  (5784)  (18933)  (2487)  (10747)  (627) 
Aate  of return  (B) 
1979-80  (14830)  1618  19671  (12656)  (47180)  267  (17530)  (286) 
1980-81  (30312)  (35538)  (34764)  (9022)  (31361)  (5442)  (15710)  (980) 
1981-82  (30107)  (54995)  (54593)  (22685)  (56876)  (8247)  (13484)  (2514) 
1982-83  (23666)  (42910)  (35890)  (25112)  (66626)  (3333)  (7653)  (2771) 
1983-84  (21460)  (40830)  (34156)  (26719)  (44783)  (3894)  (9654)  (2735) 
1984-85  (16407)  (39304)  (14734)  (21455)  (35429)  (63)  (25670)  (3907) 
1985-86  (15312)  (7498)  (26540)  (9945)  (40565)  (11932)  (9577)  (2235) 
1986-87  (19086)  (9088)  (276)  (9876)  (49160)  (10715)  (34256)  (2950) 
1987-88  (10794)  (2054)  4440  (3940)  (18761)  (8844)  (26836)  (1087) 
1988-89  (3795)  (14811)  (11881)  (6114)  (21120)  (3041)  (11640)  (698) 
aAverage  of full  and  part-time  boats. 
not hold for  all  specific circumstances. On  the whole  smallest  consistent  losses  recorded  are  for  10-30 
though, these results suggest that even before the cost  tonne purse seine operations. These losses fluctuate 
of access is taken into account, the costs of tuna fishing  between ¥0.2 million in  1979-80 and ¥3.8 million in 
for  Japanese vessels  outweighs  the  benefits,  at least  1984-85. In general. the purse seine operations have 
from an economic perspective.  recorded  consistently  lower  losses  per  vessel  than 
The largest consistent losses recorded are for large 
either longline or pole-and-line operations. 
vessel size (200-500 tonne), pole-and-line operations.  Both the large (200-500 tonne) and small (50-100 
These losses fluctuate between a low of ¥15.6 million  tonne) full  time pole-and-line operations fail  to record 
for the year 1987-88 to a high of ¥64.1 million for the  an economic profit throughout the period covered by 
financial year 1982-83. There is  a dramatic decrease  this  investigation.  The  losses  experienced  by  both 
in  losses for  these operations in  the late  1980s. The  groups  increased  throughout  the  years  1980-81  to 
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1982-83, but then began steadily to improve for  the 
remainder of the period to 1989. Both groups experi-
enced  decreasing  losses  prior  to  the  onset  of  the 
decline  in  profitability  experienced  during  the  early 
1980s. 
All  of  the  longline  vessel  groups  experienced  a 
similar, though somewhat more pronounced, decline in 
profitability  in  the  early  1980s  compared  with  the 
declines experienced  by  the  pole-and-Iine fleets.  The 
onset of this deterioration  in  profitability for  longline 
vessels,  however,  came  a  year  earlier  than  for  the 
pole-and-Iine fleet but so too did the recovery in profit-
ability.  Nevertheless, economic profit remained below 
(economic) break-even throughout the 1980s. 
Table  4.2  compares  actual  rates  of  return  on 
invested  capital  for  all  vessel  profiles  with  required 
rates of return over the period. These comparisons are 
based on  required  Return  to  Capital (A);  the  results 
based  on  required  Return  to  Capital  (B)  were  very 
similar to those of Return  to  Capital (A).  As  reported 
capital stocks are valued at depreciated historical cost 
calculated actual rates of return will overstate the true 
rates  of  return  to  the  extent  that  historical  values 
understate market values of capital stock. Once again 
the results indicate that. in general. capital invested in 
offshore and distant water tuna fishing failed  to yield 
returns consistent with market expectations. 
The worst performances for  the period were from 
the  various  pole-and-Iine  fleets;  none  of  the  vessel 
classes covered by this analysis managed a positive rate 
of return. The trends in calculated rates of return were 
similar for  the three classes  of pole-and-Iine vessels: 
increasing to  1980-81 then decreasing significantly to 
1982-83, followed by a steady increase to 1987-88. 
For longliners, capital invested in the larger vessels 
of the fleet (of the 200-500 tonne class) earned rates of 
return  in  excess  of the  required  rate  for  four  years, 
1979-80 and 1986-87 to  1988-89. Capital invested 
in the 100-200 tonne vessels earned returns in excess 
of the required rate in  1979-80 and then  marginally 
below (0.2%) the required rate in  1987-88. The lowest 
return on capital for all gear types was recorded for this 
100-200 tonne class of vessel  in  1981-82 (-30.4%). 
Rates  of return  for  all  three  longline  vessel  classes 
improved from  lows  in  1981-82 to  1988-89, except 
for  the  100-200 tonne  class  which  experienced  a 
further decline in returns after 1987 -88. 
The rates of return to capital calculated for group 
purse seine operations vary widely across the different 
classes. Actual  rates were greater than required rates 
for  50-100 tonne single  net boat operations in  two 
years,  1979-80 and 1984-85. Rates of return went into 
decline for several years after  1982-83  before  recov-
ering in the late 1980s. Both 100-200 tonne single and 
10-30 tonne  two-net  boat operations  failed  to  earn 
positive  rates of return to invested capital except for 
one year each,  1979-80 (10-30 tonne)  and  1982-83 
(100-200 tonne). 
Interpretation of rate of return 
results 
Rates of  return on invested capital 
Estimated actual rates of return on fixed capital assets 
for the period 1979-89 have not only been consistently 
below  required  rates  of  return,  but  in  most  cases 
negative. Of all operations for the period covered, the 
larger vessellongline operations (of the 200-500 tonne 
class)  are  the  only  Japanese  tuna fleets  which  have 
shown  any  promise  with  respect  to  profitability. 
Returns to  capital invested in  these vessels  improved 
steadily throughout the 1980s, exceeding the required 
rate in 1986-87 and thereafter to the end of the period. 
However,  from  an  efficiency  perspective  it  would 
appear  that  there  has  been  overcapitalisation  in 
Japanese offshore and distant water tuna fleets. Much 
of the capital tied up in the industry could earn higher 
rates of return in alternative uses. 
Rising  labour and  fuel costs  have  been  cited  as 
reasons  for  low  rates  of  return  to  fishing  industry 
capital in the 1980s.  Using the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries data and Return to Capital (A) 
these costs can be calculated as a proportion of total 
cost While the proportions fluctuate from year to year, 
the fluctuations are moderate. In general, labour costs 
as a proportion of total  costs  fell  slightly  in  the early 
1980s then  began  to  increase  from  1982-83  to  the 
end of the period. For all  gear types  and size classes 
they are in  the range of 30-45% of total cost On the 
other hand, fuel  costs  as  a  proportion  of total  costs 
tended  to  increase  in  the  early  1980s  and  then 
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Table 4.2  Average annual rates  of returna, Japanese  tuna  vessels, 1979-80 to  1988-89. 
A ctual  rate  of return  ("laJ  RRoRb 
Average  longline vessel  50-100 t  100-200 t  200-500 t 
1979-80  115.5J  8.0  22.9  5.8 
1980-81  (26.3J  (18.7J  (16.2J  6.7 
1981-82  (19.2J  (30.4J  [25.8J  8.2 
1982-83  11 2.7J  (16.7J  113.4J  7.6 
1983-84  (9.6J  [14.9J  (8.9J  7.6 
1984-85  ( 4.01  113.3J  12  6.8 
1985-86  (2.7J  3.2  (4.8J  6.9 
1986-87  ( 7.2J  1O.3J  6.4  5.4 
1987-88  [2.6J  4.3  8.0  4.5 
1988-89  1.8  [9.1J  12.0  4.6 
Average  pole-and-line vessel  Average  of full  Full time  Full  time 
and  part time  50-100 t  200-500 t 
1979-80  ( 8.3J  [8.01  [14.6J  5.8 
1980-81  [4.6J  (3.9J  (7.1J  6.7 
1981-82  (21.01  (22.9J  [19.4J  82 
1982-83  (1 9.4J  (15.8J  (22.8J  7.6 
1983-84  (22.6J  (22.5J  116.2J  7.6 
1984-85  [18.5J  [17.2J  112.3J  6.8 
1985-86  [6.7J  (10.lJ  [12.7J  6.9 
1986-87  (8.8J  (8.0J  [16.0J  5.4 
1987-88  (l.7J  0.4  (2.01  4.5 
1988-89  (9.4J  (8.4J  [2.3J  4.6 
Average  group  purse seine  One boatC  One  boat  Two  boats 
vessel  50-100 t  100-200 t  10-30 t 
1979-80  7.0  (11.5J  3.0  5.8 
1980-81  [4.01  (7.5J  (3.2J  6.7 
1981-82  (4.11  (6.3J  113.2J  82 
1982-83  4.3  2.9  [7.5J  7.6 
1983-84  (3.3J  (6.8J  (22.8J  7.6 
1984-85  8.0  (13.4J  [30.3J  6.8 
1985-86  (21.2J  114.9J  (32.2J  6.9 
1986-87  [5.8J  (22.1J  (25.8J  5.4 
1987-88  ( 6.7J  (18.3J  [7.3J  4.5 
1988-89  1.0  [5.01  (2.4J  4.6 
"The figures report the  calculated  rates of return  to  fixed  capital  compared  with  the  required  rates  of return  to  capital  (from  Ando  and AuertJach  19901 for the 
three gear types.  Return  to  capitallAJ  Is  used. 
bRRoR  _ required  rate  of return. 
C One  boat - single-net boat group  purse selnlng; Two  boats - two-net boat group  purse selnlng. 
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decrease from about 1982- 83 to the end of the period. 
They have  ranged from  between 4  and 30%  of total 
costs.  Purse seine vessels  have  faced the  lowest fuel 
costs as a proportion of total costs, ranging between 4.2 
and 20.1%. 
The Japanese government together with the fishing 
industry have, since the world oil price shocks of 1973 
and  1979,  devoted  significant  effort  and  research 
resources  towards  alleviating  the  burden  to  fishing 
fleets  of rising fuel prices. The development of more 
fuel efficient vessel designs which incorporate reduced 
vessel drag in the water, larger propellers which turn at 
lower revolutions and energy saving freezer technology 
are  among  some of the strategies  which  have  been 
adopted by the industry in an effort to deal with the oil 
price shocks (Matsuda and Ouchi 1984). The results of 
the present paper suggest that these efforts have had 
some success. 
Other studies have also found low rates of return to 
Japanese fishing industry  capital. Matsuda and Ouchi 
(1984)  have  estimated  negative  rates  of  return  for 
skipjack  pole-and-Iine  and  longline  vessels  for  the 
years 1979-1982 (they omit purse seine vessels). They 
also  calculate a  positive  rate  of return  for  200-500 
tonne longline vessels in  1979. Furthermore, a report 
by the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics (ABARE  1988: 284) found that, for a high 
proportion of Japanese fishery establishments (46% in 
1982),  fishery  expenditure  has  exceeded  fishery 
receipts since the late 1970s. The results of this current 
investigation concur with both of these studies. 
Government assistance to fishing 
From  whichever  perspective  the  above  results  are 
viewed, either from that of economic profitability or the 
measured return to capital, it is clear that, on the whole, 
Japanese  tuna  fleets  have  not  been  viable.  These 
results  raise  two  important questions: why do these 
fleets  continue to  operate  over the longer term  at a 
loss?; and by what financial means can they continue to 
do so?  Both  of these questions  lead  to  the issue  of 
government involvement in the tuna fishing industry. 
If infrequent and short-lived  losses were observed 
for several vessel categories over the period covered, it 
would be tempting to conclude that an occasional poor 
season is  not sufficient to drive vessels out of a fishery 
which yields prosperous long-term returns. Seasons of 
poor profitability resulting from anyone, or a combina-
tion of circumstances such as low catches due to poor 
stock recruitment,  or  the failure  of fishers  to  locate 
tuna migratory patterns, would be carried by seasons of 
above average returns. Our results, however, cannot be 
explained in such a manner. 
While the major causes of these poor profitability 
performances  are  not  the  major  concern  of  this 
chapter, explanations as to why and how these situa-
tions have persisted are needed. The answer to the first 
question  lies,  most  probably,  in  either  stated  or 
unstated  government  policies  which  relate  to  two 
somewhat conflicting objectives. One is  that  of food 
security,  which  has  figured  significantly  in  Japanese 
agricultural  and  fisheries  policies  since  the  end  of 
World  War  11.  In  fact,  the  extent and  speed  of the 
expansion of the Japanese distant water fishing fleets 
throughout the  1950s  and  1960s  is  almost entirely 
attributable  to  the  objectives  of  food  and  export 
commodity production (Matsuda and Ouchi 1984). 
The other main objective of Japanese fishery policy 
has  been  to  maintain  fisheries  industries  (ABARE 
1988). There are likely to have been a variety of consid-
erations  underlying  this  objective,  ranging  from 
employment aims to political  pressure from coopera-
tives and prefectures representing communities heavily 
dependent  on  fishing  for  their  livelihoods  (Stokke 
1990).  Another relevant,  but secondary,  concern is 
likely to have been a desire by the Japanese to maintain 
a  presence  in  what  have  been  traditional Japanese 
fishing grounds,  prior to  the declaration of 200 mile 
exclusive  economic zones. The Japanese government 
and fisheries management agencies have been acutely 
aware that any redeployment of distant water vessels to 
offshore  and  coastal fishing  grounds would  lead  to 
competition and a possible deterioration in the viability 
of these operations.5  Furthermore, domestic  substi-
tutes for high value species, such as those supplied by 
skipjack  pole-and-Iine  and  longline  fleets  are  not 
readily available (ABARE  1988: 278).  Rising incomes 
and changes in consumer preferences have resulted in 
5 Claims  by  the  Japanese  that  the  introduction  of  200  mile 
exclusive  economic  zones  has  significantly  affected  the 
profitability of their distant water fleets are well documented (see 
for example; Matsuda and Ouchi 1984 and Stokke 1990). 
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a relative increase in  the demand for high quality and 
high  value  fish  which  would  otherwise  be  supplied 
through  increased  imports  from  countries  such  as 
Taiwan and Korea. 
It follows  from  the  above  discussion  that  if  the 
government  has  played  a  large  role  in  encouraging 
vessels to remain  in  distant water fishing grounds, it 
also  must  have  been  providing  financial  support  to 
those operations which have experienced losses. There 
is  in  fact  a  variety  of  schemes  through  which  the 
Japanese government  has  been extending  at various 
times  throughout the past several  decades,  financial 
assistance to the fishing industry in general. They have 
taken  the form  of price support schemes, favourable 
credit status and soft loans,  insurance assistance and 
subsidies, to name but a few of such assistance mecha-
nisms. 
Financial assistance to skipjack and tuna fleets has 
been  necessary throughout the  1970s  and  1980s to 
facilitate rationalisation of the industry  in response to 
fluctuating  economic  conditions  and  increasingly 
restricted  access  to foreign  fishing grounds.  Much  of 
the assistance has been aimed at reducing the amount 
of effort in the distant water fisheries; the construction 
of new vessels to form a  more fuel  efficient fleet;  and 
continuing support to remaining vessels.6 In  1976 the 
government embarked on a program of vessel replace-
ment which, effected via the Fisheries Special Recon-
struction and Adjustment Act (J  June,  1976),  sought 
the replacement of pole-and-Iine by purse seine vessels. 
Under  this  program, vessels  were  paid  up  to  ¥163 
million  each  as  compensation  to  retire  from  the 
skipjack fishery (Matsuda and Ouchi  1984). Assistance 
in the form of government subsidised low interest loans 
of between 3.5% and 5.7% amounting to ¥ 53.9 billion 
were also made available to tuna fleets between 1976 
and  1980.  These  loans  were  introduced  partly  in 
response to vessels experiencing difficulties as a result 
of the world oil price shock (Matsuda and Ouchi 1984). 
More recently, the Japanese Fisheries Agency of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries has been 
providing  substantial  assistance  to  the  industry 
6 Matsuda and Ouchi  (1984)  report that according to the Japan-
ese  Federation  of Tuna and  Skipjack  Fisheries  Cooperatives' 
plan, 164 of 887 longliners and 55 of 157 distant water pole and 
line vessels were withdrawn during 1980-82 alone. 
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through  a  range  of  subsidy  schemes  aimed  at 
promoting  consumption  of  fisheries  products,  price 
stabilisation, rationalisation of processing and distribu-
tion  facilities  and  industry  structural  adjustment 
schemes. In 1987, over ¥345 billion was allocated from 
the Japanese Fisheries Agency  budget to fund  these 
schemes. Of this total, 2l.4  % (¥60 billion) was provided 
as  special  low  interest  loans  for  the withdrawal  of 
vessels,  28.6%  (¥80  billion)  was  provided  for  the 
'rehabilitation' of distant water operations affected  by 
foreign  access  restrictions  and 44.6% (¥125 billion) 
was provided for fishing gear and equipment moderni-
sation. 
It is  possible, at least in  principle, for  these assist-
ance packages to have offset the losses incurred by the 
various tuna fleets. For simplicity it is assumed that the 
losses incurred by  the tuna fleets  reflect the perform-
ance of offshore and distant water fleets in general. In 
the  case  of  1987,  ¥269  billion  in  subsidies  was 
provided in  the form  of industry 'adjustment schemes' 
aimed at the harvesting sector. These schemes covered 
the promotion of structural adjustment, loans for boat 
scrapping,  the 'rehabilitation'  of distant water opera-
tions, and funds for modernisation of industry. If the 
entire offshore  and  distant water fleet  had incurred 
losses consistent with  those experienced by  the tuna 
fleet  in  general  for  that  year,  the  ¥269  billion  in 
subsidies  would  have  more  than  compensated  the 
industry for  that loss. We arrive at this conclusion in 
the following manner: 
Average  loss per tuna vessel  (regardless of size)  ¥6.4  million 
across the three gear types for 19877 
Estimated total  number of offshore and  distant  18 040 
water vessels in the Japanese fleet for 19878 
Estimated  loss for tuna Heets for 1987  ¥115.5  billion 
Japan  Fisheries Association assistance  package  ¥269.0  billion 
Japan Rsheries Association financial assistance  ¥153.5  billion 
net of total tuna  Heet losses for the year 
7  Calculated from Table  4.1. 
8calculated  as 4.2%  of  the  total number  of  fishing  boats  In  Japan  In  1987, 
which  was  429541.  The  proportion  of  powered  vessels  which  are  10-100 
tonne was  3.4%  and  that for powered  vessels  100 tonne  and  over was 0.8% 
IMlnlstry  Of  Agr1culture,  Forestry  and  Flsher1es  1988).  As  not  all  of  these 
vessels  are  likely to  have  engaged  In  tuna  fishing,  our estimate  of the  total 
economic  loss for the  entire tuna fleet will  be  overstated. The  Economics  of  the Japanese Tuna  Fleet 1979-80 to  1988-89 
More  detailed accounts as to  how  these fonns of 
financial  assistance are actually matched with  vessel 
needs  are  not  available.  There  will  be  many  cases 
where  individual  operations  were  not  suffering  the 
financial difficulties experienced by the fleets in general 
and therefore did  not require assistance. Conversely, 
there were  most likely  cases in  which the amount of 
assistance  available  from  various  agencies  was  not 
sufficient to cover the needs of fishing establishments. 
However,  from  a  broader perspective,  it  appears that 
the sums of government assistance  are  adequate to 
compensate the harvesting sector of the industry for 
operating losses. 
The cost of fishing effort for the 
Japanese tuna fleet 
The results of this investigation have shown that for the 
period  1979-80  to  1988-89  the  economic  costs 
incurred  by Japanese tuna vessels  have,  on  average, 
exceeded the revenues received from  harvesting activi-
ties. This conclusion is  consistent with  previous work 
undertaken for periods both prior to, and overlapping 
with, the period investigated. It is  also consistent with 
concerns  expressed  by  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries (1988)  regarding the financial 
difficulties  faced  by  the  industry  (see  also  Japan 
Fisheries  Association  1987).  Although  no  detailed 
attempt to analyse the causes of these poor profitability 
perfonnances has been made, the evidence suggests 
that the observed losses have been financed by govern-
ment subsidies.  It  is  difficult  to  believe  the  industry 
could have continued without such assistance. 
Having  detennined  overall  profitability  on  an 
annual basis, costs of fishing effort on a per unit basis 
can be estimated. Once again, measures will  be in the 
fonn  of averages. Operational profiles for  the vessels 
vary  both  between  and  within  gear  types  and  size 
classes. Smaller vessels tend to operate closer to Japan, 
making  frequent,  short  trips  to  and  from  fishing 
grounds.  Larger  vessels  on  the  other hand  venture 
much farther afield, some 'campaigns' taking vessels on 
fishing trips for up to a year or more. Each campaign 
entails a routine which is essentially specific to the type 
and scale of operation characteristic of the vessel type. 
First, there is predeparture preparation involving acqui-
sition of supplies, maintenance etc. This is followed by 
travel to the fishing ground during which time the crew 
may  undertake  basic  gear  and  vessel  maintenance 
while the fishing director, through past experience and 
contact with  peers, gathers and assesses infonnation 
on  current  fishing  conditions.  Days  at  the  fishing 
ground  (other  than  those  subject  to  breakdowns), 
involve  fishing  effort  in  the  fonn  of searching  and 
catching. Together, search and catch constitute what 
we  take  to  be  'fishing  effort',  and  the  basic  unit  of 
fishing  effort  is  a  day  fished.  The  campaign  is 
completed once the vessel has filled its storage capacity 
(unless of course it  transships at sea), and returns to 
port and unloads. The beginning of the next campaign 
is marked by the preparation for another voyage. 
In order to measure detailed costs for each segment 
of  a  campaign  or  component  of fishing  effort  (for 
example  the  cost  of  steaming,  or  search  time,  or 
making  a  'set'),  comprehensive  data on  operational 
profiles  and  technical  parameters  associated  with 
different vessel types would be required. The aim here 
is  not to  provide  a  detailed  breakdown  of costs  for 
specific areas of vessel operations. Rather, the aim is to 
provide infonnation which coastal nations can use to 
assess  the expected  costs  of operation faced  by  the 
differentjapanese vessel types fishing in their exclusive 
economic zones. As  much of the interest surrounding 
the harvesting capacity of distant water fishing nation 
vessels concerns their activity measured in 'zone days', 
we  have calculated average total costs per day fished 
(which translates to cost per zone-day) for the different 
gear types  of tuna vessels.  Based on the assumption 
that  campaign  routines  are  relatively  fixed  for  the 
different classes of vessel,  the average  total  cost per 
fishing day (ACFD) is calculated as follows: 
ACFDj  = (ATC/DY)/(DF  /DY) 
=  (ATC/DY)x(DY/DF)  (J) 
where ATCj is the average total cost per year of owning 
and operating vessel type i,  DYis the number of  days in 
the  fiscal  year (365),  DFj  is  the  average  number of 
fishing days of the year for vessel type  j and WY/DF) is 
a  ratio greater than one which  reflects  the fact  that 
vessels do not fish 365 days in  the year because a day 
fished involves associated periods of land based prepa-
ration and unloading, and steaming time to and from 
regular fishing grounds. 
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The average cost per fishing  day  has  been calcu-
lated by taking the average total cost of operating the 
average  vessel  for  one  year  and  dividing  it  by  the 
reported average number of fishing days for that year.9 
The cost of each fishing day will  implicitly incorporate 
the associated steaming, maintenance and port related 
costs required to support that day fished. The cost of 
owning and operating a vessel per day (not day fished) 
has  also  been  calculated. These estimates,  for  each 
gear type and size of  vessel, are reported in Tables 4.3-
4.5.  Costs  have  been calculated  in  nominal  (current 
value)  terms  and those  reported  here  are  based on 
Return to Capital (A);  calculations based on Return to 
Capital  (B)  give  similar  results.  Further  detail  is 
available  in  Campbell and Nicholl  (1990 and  1992a, 
Appendices A and D). 
The general  trend of cost  per fishing  day  for  all 
vessel  types  has been an increase to the mid-1980s, 
then a decline to the end of the study period. For the 
longline vessels, the largest increase in cost per fishing 
day  is  observed for  the 200-500 tonne vessels,  58% 
between  1979 and 1986. The 100-200 tonne vessels 
faced  a similar rise  in  cost of 50%,  and 22%  for  the 
smaller class of longliners. During this period fuel as a 
proportion of total cost was rising while labour cost as a 
proportion offset this rise by falling. The cost per fishing 
day  declined  steadily after  1986 for  all  longliners  to 
levels experienced around 1981 -82. 
Although the cost per fishing day faced by owners of 
50-100 tonne  pole-and-Iine  vessels  was  about  the 
same at the end of the period as it was  at the start of 
the period, costs did fluctuate significantly from year to 
year on an almost cyclical basis. On the other hand, the 
trend  of costs  of operation  for  the  large  (200-500 
tonne) pole-and-Iine vessels was one of steady increase 
to  1981-82 (of around 30%),  stabilising  until  1986, 
then  declining  for  the  remainder of the  period.  For 
purse seine vessels, both the 50-100 tonne and 100-
200 tonne classes increased steadily to 1984-85, then 
decreased moderately (by 15% and 14% respectively) to 
the end of the period. 
9For the case of the larger longliners, the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries statistics report operation data on the basis 
of a trip rather than a year.  In  most instances the trip lengths for 
these vessels exceed a fiscal year  and therefore we  have divided 
the annual cost of operation by 365 rather than the number of 
fishing days to reflect the fact that 365 is the absolute maximum 
number of fishing days possible for any given fiscal year. 
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Conclusion 
There  has  been  widespread  discussion  about  the 
viability of Japanese offshore and distant water fishing 
activities. The common view  held  by  the Japanese is 
that  the  introduction  of exclusive  economic  zones, 
restricting  their  access  to  traditional  foreign  fishing 
waters,  together  with  steady  upward  pressures  on 
operating costs resulting from the two oil  price shocks 
and higher wages,  has resulted in  financial difficulties. 
Our investigation suggests that the proportion of total 
costs contributed by fuel has fallen from the mid-1980s 
to the end of the period. This trend, however, has been 
offset by a rising proportion of labour costs, resulting in 
these  two  cost  components  together  constituting  a 
relatively  constant proportion  of total  cost of fishing 
effort over the period. 
Although  the cost per fishing day for most vessels 
appears to have declined throughout the latter half of 
the 1980s, this analysis has explicitly ignored the cost 
of fishing licences and access to foreign fishing waters, 
both of which have been on the increase. Access fees, 
while not forming part of the economic cost of fishing 
effort  as  defined  in  this  paper, are  still,  however, a 
financial cost which must be borne by vessel owners. 
Estimates of economic profitability for the Japanese 
tuna fleets  for  the years  1979-80 to  1988-89 show 
that, in general, concerns regarding the viability of the 
various fleets  are reasonably  well  founded. Economic 
losses are consistently recorded over the period for the 
three gear types and their corresponding size classes. 
In  fact, of the three gear types used to harvest tuna in 
offshore  and  distant  water  operations,  the  larger 
longline  vessels  are  the  only  ventures  which  have 
returned anything like what approaches the return to 
capital  required by  market expectations. For most of 
the  period,  however,  negative  rates  of  return  are 
observed for most types of vessel. 
In  relation to the question of how the industry has 
continued to operate while incurring significant losses 
over the long term, there is evidence to suggest that the 
Japanese government has, at least in  principle,  been 
able  to  offset  these  losses  using  subsidy  programs. 
There are two  primary  reasons  why  the government 
may  have  continued  to  provide  assistance  to  an 
industry which has such a poor economic record. One The  Economics of the Japanese Tuna  Fleet 1979-80 to  1988-89 
Table 4.3  Average  cost of owning  and  operating a Japanese  longliner'l, 1979-80 to 1988-89 (current value,  ¥'OOOJ 
Size  of vessel  (GRn 
50-100  100-200  200-500 
Cost per day  Cost per day fished  Cost per day  Cost per day fished  Cost per day  Cost per day fished 
1979-80  365  419  535  618  830  830 
1980-81  405  476  609  640  913  913 
1981-82  400  488  613  739  1030  1030 
1982-83  417  477  692  787  1078  1078 
1983-84  355  456  698  698  1153  1153 
1984-85  422  509  932  932  1312  1312 
1985-86  414  457  727  727  1044  1044 
1986-87  445  473  624  684  1109  1109 
1987-88  392  454  633  670  997  997 
1988-89  390  441  557  654  1017  1017 
aBased  on  Rate  of Return  IAI. see text 
Table U  Average  cost of owning  and  operating a Japanese  pole-and-liner'l, 1979-80 to 1988-89 (current values, ¥'OOOJ 
Size  of vessel  (GRn 
50-100 [Average)  50-100 (Full-time  only)  200-500 
Cost per day  Cost per day fished  Cost per day  Cost per day fished  Cost per day  Cost per day fished 
1979-80  344  470  387  467  725  789 
1980-81  379  554  440  542  911  972 
1981-82  403  558  436  553  928  1032 
1982-83  461  607  493  592  917  1037 
1983-84  426  533  436  526  993  1060 
1984-85  445  541  455  537  1001  1082 
1985-86  457  588  463  565  1040  1179 
1986-87  423  503  438  495  904  985 
1987-88  410  505  428  500  893  993 
1988-89  398  472  400  470  941  1002 
aBased  on  Rate of Return  IAI. see text 
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Table 4.5  Average  cost of owning  and  operating a Japanese group purse seine vessela , 1979-80 to  1988-89 (current values,  ¥'OOO) 
Size of vessel  (GRTI 
50-100  100-200  Two boats-l 0-30 
Cost per day  Cost per day fished  Cost per day  Cost per day fished  Cost per day  Cost per day fished 
1979~0  224  1411 
1980-81  239  1671 
1981~2  309  1926 
1982~3  357  2078 
19~  413  2271 
198W5  339  2198 
1985-86  341  2020 
1986-87  350  2003 
1987~8  315  1813 
19~9  312  1865 
aBased  on  Rate  of Return  !Al,  see text 
relates to the basic issue of food security. Japan has a 
post World War 11  history with  respect to agricultural 
policy,  of striving  for  maximum  output  of its  food 
producing  sectors.  This  has  been  with  a  view  to 
securing its  own  food  supply,  and to  earning export 
revenue. Second, there has been a desire, for a variety 
of reasons,  to  maintain existing fishing  industries.  A 
strong desire to maintain a presence in what have been 
traditional  (foreign)  fishing  waters,  political  pressure 
from  prefectures heavily reliant on fishing as a source 
of income and employment, and attempts to  cushion 
the impacts of industry rationalisation resulting from 
restricted  access  to  foreign  fishing  grounds  and  the 
subsequent over-capitalisation  of fishing  fleets  which 
expanded rapidly throughout the 1960s and 1970s, are 
but a few  of the possible motivations for government 
assistance to the industry. 
Japan's reluctance Oike  other distant water fishing 
nations)  to  pay  higher  access  fees  to  south  Pacific 
island nations for access rights to tuna resources has 
been  based on  the  inability  of the industry  to  meet 
these demands. While the overall economic picture for 












2534  56  435 
3148  60  476 
3213  69  531 
3351  75  542 
3989  83  718 
3466  80  600 
3567  69  550 
3160  74  562 
2906  75  576 
2990  68  597 
excess  profits,  it  appears  this  situation  may  be 
changing. Rates of return to invested capital for most 
fleets, while remaining below the required rates and in 
many  cases  below  zero,  have  been  improving  since 
around the mid-l 980s. It is difficult to predict, however, 
whether this trend will continue. 
Finally,  the  results  reported  in  this  chapter are 
averages  for  the various types  of vessels  investigated. 
There is  a wide variety of vessels within these catego-
ries, some of which could be earning high returns. The 
same may also hold for the returns from  the different 
fishing grounds in  which they operate throughout the 
year.  While  the productivity of some fishing grounds 
may  be very  poor, yielding little or no return to effort, 
the opposite may be the case for others. That is to say, 
although the general economic status of the Japanese 
tuna fleets  appears  rather  bleak,  there  may  well  be 
specific times of the year and fishing grounds in which 
returns to effort are well in excess of the costs. It is this 
type  of  case  by  case  analysis  which  should  be  of 
primary concern  to  the island  nation  looking to sell 
access rights to distant water fishing nations to fish  in 
its waters. Chapter 
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The  western  Pacific  purse  seine  tuna  fishery  has 
expanded considerably since it was initiated by a small 
Japanese fleet in the late 1970s. Fleets from the United 
States, Taiwan, Korea, Philippines, Indonesia and other 
nations  have  since  joined  Japanese  vessels  in  the 
fishery,  steadily  increasing  the  purse  seine  harvest 
relative  to longline and pole-and-Iine  catches.  By  the 
mid-1980s the purse seine catch amounted to over 60% 
of the total tuna catch in the Pacific islands region, and 
purse seine catches of yellowfin tuna were over 66% of 
the yellowfin  catch of all gear types (Doulman  1986b). 
The  purse  seine  fishery  is  essentially  a  two-species 
fishery  with  around  70%  of the  catch  consisting  of 
skipjack and the  balance juvenile yellowfin,  although 
there is  a small  by-catch  of juvenile bigeye tuna The 
purpose of this chapter is to determine the technology 
of the fishery by analysing the catch returns of  Japanese 
and  United  States  purse seiners  operating in  Papua 
New Guinea's exclusive economic zone in the 1980s. 
An  understanding of technological  aspects  of the 
fishery, such as the extent of the ability to harvest selec-
tively,  is  important for determining appropriate fishery 
management policies. If the species composition of the 
catch is technically determined then the only manage-
ment measure available to the policymaker is  control 
over the level of fishing effort. This can be accomplished 
by access fees or by limitations on numbers of vessels, 
or on seasons or areas fished.  If,  on the other hand, 
vessels have some control over the species mix of their 
catch, it is possible, in principle, to manage the two fish 
stocks independently through individual species quotas 
or differential  royalties. In  addition, information about 
technology,  together with  price  and cost information, 
can be used to determine the amount of fishing effort in 
the  exclusive  economic  zone  which  maximises 
individual vessel returns. 
Data 
Catch and effort data for Japanese and United States 
registered  purse seine vessels  fishing  in  Papua New 
Guinea waters were obtained from  the South Pacific 
Commission data base. These catch and effort data are 
compiled from vessel log sheets submitted as a require-
ment  of  the  conditions  for  access  to  Papua  New 
Guinea's exclusive economic zone. The data are daily 
catch  records for  the period  1979 to  1989 and give 
vessel identification, nationality, date, position, time of 
set,  type  of set,  catch  of yellowfin  and  skipjack  (in 
tonnes), average weight of fish of each species per catch 
and trip length. The period covered by the analysis is 
1983-86  Oapanese)  and  1984-86  (United  States), 
because there are only records for one United States 
purse seiner for one month in Papua New Guinea prior 
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to  1984, and Japanese fishing in  Papua New  Guinea 
ceased  in  March  1987.  The  daily  observations  on 
fishing activity have been aggregated to monthly obser-
vations on fishing effort, skipjack catch and yellowfin 
catch for individual vessels, consistent with the form of 
available price data. 
Not all vessels which fished in Papua New Guinea's 
exclusive economic zone for the above period did so on 
a continual basis. Many fished some months of various 
years and at no time  in  other years,  resulting in  an 
uneven  number of observations  across  months  and 
years for the period of the data sample. For the period 
1983-86, the data cover a total of 49 Japanese and 27 
United States registered vessels which fished for part of 
at least one month of the four year period. Calendar 
months for any vessel which report completely unsuc-
cessful fishing effort (i.e. all sets resulting in zero catch 
of either species)  are not included in  model  estima-
tions. There were 43 observations of this nature out of 
a total of 1155 monthly vessel observations. 
Yellowfin and skipjack prices for the Japanese fleet 
models were  obtained from  the FAO  Globefish  data 
base. These are average monthly ex-vessel  prices  for 
the Japanese port of Yaizu. Port prices used for United 
States purse seine catches are American Tuna Sellers 
Association  prices for  tuna delivered  to  canneries in 
American  Samoa.  These  prices  are  reported  in 
Campbell and Nicholl (1992). 
Purse seine caught yellowfin and 
skipjack supply functions 
Throughout this analysis it  is assumed that the purse 
seine fishery  in  Papua New  Guinea waters  produces 
only  two  products;  skipjack  and  yellowfin,  both  for 
canning, although it is  believed that up to  15% of the 
catch reported as yellowfin  is  actually juvenile bigeye 
tuna. The following  model is  a representation of how 
price  information,  fishing  effort  and  seasonal  influ-
ences combine to determine harvest levels  from  the 
fishery.  Of particular interest is  the degree  to  which 
purse seine skippers are able to choose their mix  of 
output, if at all. The extent of this ability is examined by 
conducting  various  statistical  tests  based  on  the 
economic model of purse seining outlined below. 
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Kirkley and Strand (1988) point out that there is no 
widely  accepted  theory  of  the  decision-making 
behaviour of fishers.  Most likely,  fishers  combine and 
determine the  levels  of inputs to  fulfil  one or more 
various objectives. Such objectives may include maxim-
ising profit maximising revenue and minimising costs, 
and will depend on whether short or long-term consid-
erations dominate. Squires and Kirkley (991) suggest 
that the overall long-term objective pursued by fishers 
is profit maximisation, accomplished in two stages. The 
first  stage involves  revenue maximisation over a  time 
horizon where vessel size and characteristics are essen-
tially  fixed.  The second stage, or profit maximisation 
stage, involves selecting a vessel design and size, gear, 
and equipment which  minimises  fishing  effort  costs 
and trip duration for the optimal vessel capacity. The 
capital investment (second stage) decision is made over 
a much longer time horizon. 
The  following  model  describes  the  behaviour  of 
vessels  in  the  revenue  maximisation  (first)  stage. 
Distant water fishing  nation vessels which  operate in 
Papua New  Guinea and other western  Pacific waters 
are based in ports which lie some distance from Papua 
New  Guinea.  Japanese  vessels  have  been  based 
primarily in Japan (although they have at various times 
.  throughout the past 40 years operated out of western 
Pacific ports) and the majority of United States vessels 
are based in pago pago (exceptions being those vessels 
operating out of Guam). Due to the distances involved 
between ports and fishing grounds, and the costs (both 
in terms of fuel and time) of steaming, vessels remain at 
sea until cumulative catch meets the storage capacity 
of the  vesseL!  Given  that  most  vessels  can  spend 
anywhere between 30 to 140 days and more at sea on 
any  particular fishing  trip, vessel  characteristics  and 
crew numbers are essentially fixed  while fishing. This 
implies that for any particular day a vessel is fishing in 
the Papua New Guinea zone, fishing costs are fixed and 
the  most  likely  economic  strategy  which  underlies 
fishing  activity  is  that of daily  revenue  maximisation, 
given  the (fixed)  cost of fishing,  current price informa-
tion and fishing conditions. 
All  vessels supply the processing sector with  canning 
material for which prices are competitively determined 
I It is now common practice for vessels to eliminate costly transit 
between port and fishing ground by transshipping, either at sea 
or at a suitable port in the region of the fishing grounds. by  the  combined  buying  activities  of  the  major 
processing  plants  in  the  international  tuna  market 
Hence,  individual  vessels  take  port  prices  as  given. 
Prices  are  communicated  to  vessels  through  radio 
communications or are known  prior to departure on 
any trip. 
Following Kirkley  and Strand (1988),  the revenue 
maximising  behaviour of purse seine  vessels  can  be 
described  using  a  generalised  Leontief  revenue 
function: 
R = L /Lj f3ij"  (PiPj f2 E + L ialie2 + 
Li Lk  8ikDkPiE + L i Lr  Yir Y  rPiE 
where E is a measure of the single  fixed input capital 
(used as a proxy for fishing effort); Pi is the price of tuna 
for j=S skipjack and i=Y yellowfin; Dk is  one of three 
dummy  variables  for  the  quarters  September-
November, December-February  and March- May; and 
~" is one of three dummy variables for the years  1984, 
1985 and 1986 included to capture any possible stock 
availability fluctuations over the period of the analysis.2 
Symmetry is  imposed by setting fJij=fJji'  i;ej. An input--
compensated  supply  function  for  species  i  can  be 
obtained from this revenue function  by differentiating 
with respect to price, Pi (McFadden 1978). Estimation 
of the supply  functions will  yield  elasticities  of supply 
for  each  of the  two  tuna  species.  Variation  in  the 
species mix of tuna catches which result from  relative 
price changes between the two  species is  one indica-
tion that purse seine vessels are able to target species. 
The  supply  functions  Qi  (Pfj  will  adequately 
represent the supply behaviour of individual vessels if 
the  assumptions  of revenue maximisation  hold. Two 
key assumptions  for  the  following  analysis  are  that 
vessels  operate  independently  of  each  other  and 
cannot individually influence the prices they receive for 
their catch; and that the marginal cost of fishing effort 
for all vessels is fixed for the duration of any particular 
fishing trip.  Furthermore,  it should be borne in  mind 
that  this  model  describes  the  short-run  economic 
behaviour of fishing vessels, that is  their behaviour for 
2The dummy variables included to account for changes in stock 
availability are intended to pick up charges in  Ule catchability of 
tuna  due  to  variations  in  migratory  patterns,  depUl  of 
lliermocline, recruitment and other environmental aspects of llie 
fishery which could affect catch per unit effort 
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any  particular  fishing  trip.  The  vessel-level  supply 
functions obtained from equation (1) are given by: 
From the results of estimating the models in (2), we 
can observe whether purse seine vessels of either fleet 
can target either yellowfin or skipjack (that is whether 
fishing  directors  or skippers can  control  the species 
mix  of catches) from  the magnitude and sign  of the 
relative  price  coefficient  fJij'  If  skippers  can  target.  it 
would  be  expected  that a  rise  in  the  price  of one 
species would result in an increase in  the catch of that 
species  and  a  reduction  in  the  catch  of the  other 
species, holding the level  of fishing effort constant In 
terms  of the coefficients  of the supply equation, the 
ability to target would imply: 
(3) 
In  the  absence of targeting,  the signs  of the  two 
expressions in (3) would have a zero value as the coeffi-
cient fJij would be zero. In tenns of the own and cross--
price elasticities of supply,  targeting implies a positive 
own-price input-compensated elasticity of supply and a 
negative  cross-price  elasticity.  The supply  elasticities 
are obtained by multiplying equation (3) by (P/ Q) and 
(~ / Q) respectively to give: 
Cii =  11 2 Ljot-if3ij( Pj / pf2(  E / Qi) 
cij =  I / 2f3iA Pj / pf2  (  E / Qi ) 
(4) 
For the case of just two species, the elasticities are 
equal and of opposite sign. The reason for this is  that 
for  a  given  level  of  effort  the  relative  quantities  of 
yellowfin  and skipjack harvested depends only on the 
relative  price.  Thus  a  1  % rise  in  the  price  of both 
species should have no effect on the harvest of either 
species, holding the level of effort constant 
The supply functions (2) for yellowfin and skipjack 
were estimated for each of the Japanese and American 
purse seine fleets using monthly catches for individual 
vessels for the periods 1983-86 for the Japanese fleet 
and  1984-86 for  the United States fleet Daily  catch 
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records for vessels of each fleet from the South Pacific 
Commission  data base  were  aggregated  to  monthly 
catches giving a series of cross-sections of observations. 
There were  981  monthly vessel  observations for  the 
Japanese fleet and 131 for the United States fleet The 
observations  for  each  fleet  were  pooled  and  supply 
functions estimated using all observations. The relative 
prices used were (average) monthly ex-vessel prices for 
the Japanese port of Yaizu and the American Samoan 
port of pago Pago. Three price categories for yellowfin 
(<7.5  Ib,  7.5 Ib-20 Ib, >20 Ib)  are available for the port 
of pago pago; we  use the mid-range  price series for 
yellowfin, 7.5 to 20 Ib (3.4-9 kg).3 
Fishing effort can be  defined  as  a composite input 
related to the capital stock of a vessel.  Gross registered 
tonnage (GRT)  is  used as a proxy for capital stock, and 
adjusted  by  a  factor to  reflect  the intensity with  which 
capital stock has been used in  any month. This means 
that fishing effort per month for a given vessel is measured 
as E=GRT x number of sets x scaling factor of 0.1. 
Estimation and results 
In many instances, vessels record zero catches of either 
yellowfin  or skipjack. Estimating the supply functions 
with  zero  catches,  where  catch  is  the  dependent 
variable, would present a statistical problem commonly 
referred  to as  a  limited  dependent variable  problem 
(see Kirkley  and Strand 1988). In  order to overcome 
this statistical problem, zero catches of either species 
were assigned the arbitrarily small value of O.l  tonnes. 
The input-compensated supply functions from  (2) 
were  initially  estimated  separately  by  ordinary  least 
squares and tested for heteroskedasticity. Prior expec-
tation was that heteroskedasticity would be introduced 
via the square of the composite input variable Ff! (see 
Squires and Kirkley  1991).4 Heteroskedasdicity of the 
3-Jne average size of a purse seine caught yellowfin is 5 kg. 
"The Breush-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity was carried out at 
the 5%  level  of significance; it has chi-squared distribution. For 
the ~apanese fleet supply functions, the critical value with 8 d.~ is 
X2"IB  - 21.955: the test statistic for yellowfin  supply was  X2IB  -
219.759, therefore reject the null hypothesis ofhomoskedasticity; 
and for skipjack supply X2IB1  - 57.670, therefore reject the  null 
hypothesis also. For the United States fleet supply functions, the 
critical value  with  7 dJ. is  X2"17)  - 20.278: the  test statistic for 
yellowfin  supply  was  X2(7)  - 53.622,  therefore  reject  the  null 
hypothesis of homoskedasticity; and for skipjack supply X2(7)  -
9.248, therefore cannot reject the null hypothesis. 
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form  discussed by Parks (970) was found in  three of 
the four  supply functions.  All  supply equations were 
then  divided  through  by  the  effort  variable  (E)  and 
yellowfin and skipjack supply per unit effort equations 
for each fleet were estimated using Zellner's seemingly 
unrelated regression  method and iterating to  conver-
gence. The procedure used to test for the final  struc-
tural form  of the supply functions was first to test for 
symmetry  and  then  to  test  for  the  inclusion  of the 
quarterly and yearly dummy variables both sequentially 
and as a group using a likelihood ratio test, -2[InJ'R-
lnJ'ul. which is X2 distributed. The results of these tests 
are reported in Table 5.1. 
The  symmetry  condition  f3ij= f3ji!  i:;e j  cannot  be 
rejected  for  either  the Japanese  or  United  States 
sample. The restriction  of zero  coefficients  on  the 
quarterly dummy variables cannot be rejected for the 
Japanese fleet; whereas the restriction of zero coeffi-
cients on the yearly dummies can be rejected at the 
5%  level  of significance.  Restricting  the  model  to 
exclude both quarterly and yearly  dummy variables 
as a group for the Japanese fleet, however, is rejected. 
For  the  United  States  fleet  model,  restrictions  to 
exclude quarterly and yearly  dummy variables both 
separately and as a group cannot be rejected. 
For both the Japanese and United States fleets, the 
hypothesis of input-output separability of purse seine 
technology is  tested by  means of the restriction  aj=O 
for i=Y,S. The restriction is rejected implying that effort 
interacts differently with each of the outputs of harvest 
activity  and  that  the  entire  catch  (combining  both 
yellowfin  and  skipjack)  cannot  be  treated  as  one 
composite output (see Squires and Kirkley  1991). The 
results of these tests suggest that the appropriate struc-
tural form for the Japanese fleet includes both seasonal 
and yearly dummy variables, while  that of the United 
States fleet does not include any dummy variables. 
The results  of the  final  model  for  the Japanese 
fleet  are  presented  in  Table 5.2  and  those  for  the 
United  States fleet  in  Table 5.3.  Results  of models 
estimated both with and without the dummy variables 
are reported for both fleets although the final  model 
in  each case has been determined by the test results 
reported in Table 5.1. Prior to corrections being made 
to the models for heteroskedasticity, generalised J?2s An  Economic Model of  Tuna  Purse  Seine Fishing 
Table 5.1  Tests for model structure and technology, Japanese and  United  States tuna  purse  seine fishing 
Test  No. of restrictions  Critical X2  Test X2  Reject restriction? 
Japan neet 
Symmetry  7.879  1.622  No 
Qtr dummies  6  18.548  12.159  No 
Yr dummies  6  18.548  41.528  Yes 
Qtr &  Yr dummies  12  28.300  54.219  Yes 
Input-output separability  2  10.597  81.304  Yes 
United States neet 
Symmetry  1  7.879  0.788  No 
Qtr dummies  6  18.548  2.645  No 
Yr dummies  4  14.860  5.340  No 
Qtr & Yr dummies  10  25.597  6.529  No 
Input-output separability  2  10.597  16.072  Yes 
3Allllkellhood  ratio tests performed  at the  5%  level  of significance. 
Table 5.2  Parameter estimates of Japanese purse seine fleet supply per unit effort functions 
Variable  Model with dummies  Model without dummies 
Estimated  coefficient  t-ratio  Estimated  coefficient  t-ratio 
Yellowfin supply 
Effort  -0.4198E-04a  -3.7658  -0.4090E-W  -3.8296 
Ps/Py  02159E-Ol  0.5241  02811E-Ol  0.8519 
2nd  Qtr dummy  02099E-Ol  1.5824 
3rd  Qtr dummy  02728E-Ola  2.0295 
4th  Qtr dummy  02441E-Ol  1.5119 
1984 dummy  02691E-01a  22143 
1985 dummy  0.1119E-Ol  0.8988 
1986 dummy  0.3781 E-Ol a  2.8817 
Constant  0.8042E-Ol a  2.7540  O.ll17a  42389 
SkipJack supply 
Effort  -01801 E-03  -8.0547  -0.1967E-03a  -9.0986 
Py/Ps  02159E-Ol  0.5241  02811 E-Ol  0.8519 
2nd  Qtr dummy  02437E-Ol  0.9141 
3rd  Qtr dummy  0.4142E-01  1.5493 
4th Qtr dummy  0.7097E-Ol a  2.1896 
1984 dummy  -0.5882E-Ol a  -2.4199 
1985 dummy  -0.3925E-Ol  -1.5933 
1986 dummy  0.7601 E-01 a  2.9147 
Constant  0.3826a  5.4389  0.40777a  8.6041 
aSlgnlficant at the  5%  levellor a two-tall test 
In ",{'.  476.827 with  dummy varfables; In"'{' • 449.718 without dummy variables. 
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Table 5.3  Parameter estimates  of United States purse seine fleet supply per unit effort functions 
Variable  Model with dummies  Model without dummies 
Estimated  coefficient  T-ratio  Estimated coefficient  t-ratio 
Yellowfin supply: 
Effort  -0.1995E-04a  -2.9377  -02036E-04a  -2.9768 
Ps/P y  -0.6620°  -1.8923  0.76691  0.6819 
Constant  0.7613a  22256  -0.5823  -0.5468 
2nd  Qtr dummy  0.1754E-Ol  0.6001 
3rd  Qtr dummy  0.1565E-Ol  0.5081 
4th  Qtr dummy  -0.6908E-02  -02249 
1985 dummy  -0.8214E-Ol  -1.5814 
1986 dummy  -0.5076E-Ol  -0.9435 
Skipjack supply 
Effort  -02145E-W  -2.6051  -02396E-04a  -2.9051 
Py/Ps  -0.6620°  -1.8923  0.7669  0.68187 
Constant  0.8790a  2.4491  -0.6385  --0.5370 
2nd  Qtr dummy  02091E-Ol  0.5970 
3rd  Qtr dummy  -0.1995E-02  -0.0538 
4th  Qtr dummy  -0.1524E-Ol  -0.4111 
1985 dummy  0.6516E-01  1.1347 
1986 dummy  0.7879E-01  1.3039 
aSignlficant at the  5%  level for a two-tall test °Slgnlflcant at the  5%  level for a one-tall test 
In .,L' .192.8794 without the dummy variables;  IrtL' .196.1439 with  the  dummy variables. 
for  the  Japanese  and  United  States  fleet  supply 
systems were estimated.5 They were 0.505 and 0.504 
respectively.  The  key  parameter  estimate  for  this 
analysis is the estimated coefficient, f3ij for the relative 
price variable, which will  by symmetry have the same 
value  in  both  the  yellowfin  and  skipjack  supply 
functions within the models for each fleet. 
The results reported in Table 5.2 show that for the 
Japanese fleet,  the coefficient f3ij' i;tj, is  not statistically 
different  from  zero.  This  indicates  that  there  is  no 
evidence to support the hypothesis thatjapanese purse 
seine  vessels  control  the  output  mix  of species  in 
iYrhe  generalised  R2  is  calculated  as  l-expI2(InJ'R-InJ'u)1N1. 
where  In.,L'R is  the log-likelihood when all  slope coefficients are 
constrained  to  equal  zero;  InJ'u  is  the  log-likelihood  of the 
unconstrained  model.  Log-likelihoods are from  models with  all 
dummy variables included. 
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response  to  relative  price  changes,  thus  Japanese 
fishing directors have not been targeting yellowfin. 
The  coefficients  reported  in  Table  5.2  for  the 
quarterly  dummies  indicate  that  yellowfin  catch  is 
significantly  higher  in  the  third  quarter (December-
February)  than  in  the default quarter Oune-August), 
and  that skipjack catch  is  significantly  higher in  the 
fourth quarter (March-May) than in the default quarter. 
The  coefficients  reported  for  the  annual  dummies 
suggest that 1984 and  1986 were significantly better 
years  for  yellowfin  catches than 1983, and that 1984 
was a bad year and 1986 was a good year for skipjack 
harvests. The time frame of the analysis is too short to 
provide evidence of stock depletion of either species. 
The results  reported  in  Table 5.3  for  the United 
States  fleet  show  that  the  estimated  relative  price 
coefficient,  f3ij'  is  statistically significant and negative. This  result  suggests  that  United  States  purse  seine 
skippers can, and do, change the species mix of their 
catches in  response to changes in  the relative price of 
yellowfin to skipjack. As the price of yellowfin relative to 
skipjack  has  increased,  United  States  vessels  have 
targeted and caught more yellowfin. The results of the 
tests for structural form  from  Table 5.l indicate that 
the supply of yellowfin  and skipjack from  the United 
States purse seine fleet has not been subjected to any 
significant  seasonal  influences,  nor  is  there  any 
evidence of significant annual variations in  catch per 
unit effort 
While the preferred model, which  on the basis of 
the model specification tests omits the season and year 
dummies, suggests the ability to target on the part of 
the United States fleet, there is no evidence of targeting 
behaviour by  the Japanese  fleet  In  view  of the  low 
t-ratios  for  most  coefficients  in  the  full  model  the 
targeting result cannot be regarded as conclusive. As 
the  low  t-ratios  could  be  caused  by  correlations 
between  the  (American  Tuna  Sellers  Association) 
relative price of tuna variable and other variables, it was 
decided  to determine the extent and effect,  if any,  of 
such  correlations  by  means  of  several  statistical 
methods. 
The relationship between the relative price variable 
and the dummy variables in  the United States sample 
was  first  investigated  by  computing a set of pairwise 
correlation  coefficients  between  the  relative  price 
variable and each dummy,  but no strong association 
was detected at the pairwise level.6 The relative price 
variable was  then regressed on the dummy variables 
(and a  constant) by  ordinary least squares to get the 
following relation (with t-ratios) and R2= 0.907: 
(PsI Py)=c  +alOt  +  u2Q2  +a3<1:l  +a41 '1  +a5Y2 
= 0.945 - 0.786£ -02 - 0.371£ -02 +  O. 745£ -02 +  0.418£ -01  +  0.396£ - 01 
(688.4)  (-4.784 )  (-2.064 )  (0.4 11)  (31633)  (22.005) 
(5) 
The high  R2 indicates  that the dummy variables 
appear to  explain  much  of the variation  in  relative 
price, suggesting a strong correlation between relative 
price and the two groups of dummies. Furthermore, the 
year  dummies  are  highly  significant  in  predicting 
&rhe coefficients were as follows: Prs and Ql  = 0.260; Prs and ~ 
- -0.115; Prs and O:J  = -0.300; Prs and Yj  = -0.601; Prs and Y2 
= -0.300. 
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movements in the relative price variable. The period of 
the study (I  984-86) was one of falling tuna prices, but 
of little  change  in  the  relative  price  of yellowfin  to 
skipjack (Campbell  and Nicholl  1992b).  The  sample 
mean  and  the  standard  error for the  relative  price 
variable  in  the  United  States  sample  are 0.971  and 
0.02, giving  a  relatively  low  coefficient of variation of 
0.02.  Thus,  it  may be that the  significant downward 
annual  trend  in  tuna prices  over the period  of the 
sample has made it  difficult  to establish  the effect of 
monthly relative price changes on harvest. 
The dummy variables were included in the original 
econometric model to pick up any seasonal or yearly 
fluctuations  in  availability of tuna stocks to  the fleet 
However,  it appears that the year dummies are corre-
lated with changes in the relative price variable (PslP0 
because of market  trends in  the early  to  mid-1980s. 
While  the  statistical  tests  indicate  that  the  dummy 
variables should  be dropped  from  the  United States 
model, an alternative approach is to look for an instru-
mental  variable  which  will  measure  year  to  year 
changes  in  stock  availability  if  they  are  significant 
Under certain conditions, stock availability is  reflected 
in  catch per unit effort Mean catch per unit effort for 
the United States fleet sample  for  the years  1984-86 
for yellowfin were 0.l0, 0.06 and 0.09; and for skipjack 
0.l3, 0.16 and 0.l7. Tests to determine whether mean 
catch  per unit  effort  (of skipjack and yellowfin)  had 
changed throughout the sample  period  revealed that 
they  were  not significantly different  from  each  other 
except for the case of yellowfin catch per unit effort in 
1985.7  Mean catch per unit effort of yellowfin was not 
significantly  different  in  1985  from  the  base  year 
(I  983),  but was  significantly different  in  1984 (lower) 
and 1986 (higher); therefore there does not seem to be 
a  consistent  pattern  of  yellowfin  stock  fluctuation 
across  the  Japanese  and  American  sectors  of  the 
fishery. 
7Changes in catch per unit effort for yellowfin and skipjack over the 
three years were tested by regressing catch per unit effort for each 
species separately on a constant and the dummy variables for 1985 
and 1986. In the case of ye 1I0wfin, catch per  unit effort was found 
to  be significantly different from  tile  base year (l98L!) in 1985 (t-
ratio=-1.969 on its coefficient) but not statistically different from 
the base year in 1986 (t-ratio=-0.460). For skipjack, catch per unit 
effort was not found to be statistically different from the base year 
in 1985 or 1986 (t-ratios of 1.299 and 1.269). 
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Total catch (yellowfin  and skipjack) per unit effort 
was  calculated  for  each month of the United  States 
fleet  sample  and  included  in  each  vessel  supply 
equation as an index of stock availability. The results 
are reported in Table 5.4. It can be seen that the coeffi-
cient on total catch per unit effort is significant in both 
the yellowfin and skipjack supply equations. The coeffi-
cients on the relative price variable (P/~) in yellowfin 
supply is significant at the 5% confidence level, using a 
one-tail test. Thus the introduction of the alternative 
stock  availability  variable  tends  to  confirm  the 
presence of targeting. 
Table 5.4  Parameter estimates  of  United States  fleet supply with 
catch  per unit effort 
Variable  Estim ated 
coefficient 
Yellowfin supply 
Effort  -0.1871 E-W 
Ps/P y  -0.6580b 
Constant  0.6878a 
Total  catch  per unit effort  3.4057a 
Skipjack supply 
Effort  -0.1949E-04a 
Py/Ps  -0.6580b 
Constant  0.7633a 
Total catch  per unit effort  5.4675a 
aSlgnlflcant at 5%  level. 










An  alternative  instrumental variable  approach  to 
using total catch per unit effort is  to consider a substi-
tute relative  price variable.  It was noted that there is 
little variation in  the American Tuna Sellers Associa-
tion series of relative  price (P /P). The Yaizu  relative 
price received by the Japanese fleet is weakly correlated 
with  the Tuna Sellers  relative  price  (the  correlation 
coefficient for the sample is  0.20)  but the Yaizu price 
exhibits more variation, with a coefficient of  variation of 
0.137 as compared with 0.02 for the American Tuna 
Sellers Association price series. When the Yaizu deter-
mined relative  price is  used in  the estimation of the 
United  States  fleet  supply  equations,  the  estimated 
coefficient (and  standard  error)  for  the  relative  price 
variable  f3ij  is  -0.097  (0.046)  which  also  tends  to 
confirm the hypothesis of targeting. 
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In  summary,  the  balance  of evidence  tends  to 
support the hypothesis that United States vessels are 
targeting  yellowfin  tuna. The statistical  tests  on  the 
original  model  incorporating the seasonal and yearly 
dummies  indicated  that  these  variables  should  be 
excluded  from  the model specification. The resulting 
model  reported in  Table 5.3, had a significant coeffi-
cient on  the  relative  price  variable,  as well  as  more 
plausible coefficient estimates for the constant and the 
effort variable in  the supply per unit effort equations. 
The regression of relative price on the dummy variables 
suggested  that a  correlation  between  price  and  the 
yearly  dummies  is  responsible for  the lack of signifi-
cance of the f3ij  coefficient in  the original model. This 
conclusion was supported by the fact that omitting the 
year,  but retaining the  season  dummies  produced  a 
model with  a significant  f3ij'  Alternative  instrumental 
variable  approaches  were  adopted  to  deal with  the 
correlation between the relative price variable and the 
year dummies. One approach was to use total catch per 
unit as a  measure of stock availability, and the other 
was  to  use Japanese tuna prices,  which  exhibit more 
variability than the American Tuna Sellers Association 
prices,  to  compute  relative  price  (P/ P).  Both 
approaches  tended  to  support  the  hypothesis  of 
targeting. In conclusion, the available evidence tends to 
support the results reported in Table 5.3 for the model 
based on  the  preferred  specification  which  excludes 
the dummy variables. 
Using  the  results  reported  in  Table  5.3,  the 
estimated  input-compensated  supply  elasticities  for 
United States vessels  are evaluated at mean  sample 
values of price and  quantity  using equation (3),  and 
reported  in  Table  5.5  as  percentage  changes  in 
quantity supplied in  response to a  1  % increase in  the 
indicated variable. As noted earlier, the non-zero values 
of these input-compensated price elasticities indicate 
that skipjack and yellowfin  are substitutes in  produc-
tion, implying that the product transformation curve is 
Table 5.5  Input-compensated  elasticities  of  yellowfin  and  sklp-
jack supply:  United  States fleet 
Variable 
Price of yellowfin 
Price  of skipjack 
Price  of yellowfin 
Eyy- 5.248a 
ESY- -5.248a 
aSlgnlflcantiy different from zero at the 5%  level. 
Price of skipjack 
EyS= -2.577a 
£ss=  2.577a convex  from  above.  If  there  is  no  targeting,  these 
elasticities take zero values. 
A further piece of information  about purse seine 
technology  which  can  be  obtained  from  the  results 
concerns product specific returns to scale. The sign of 
the coefficient on the square of effort coefficient, ai' in 
the supply equation (the square of effort in the supply 
per  unit  effort  equation)  indicates  the  extent  of 
increasing or decreasing returns to scale. The results 
for  both the Japanese and United States fleets  reveal 
significant  decreasing  returns  to  scale.  This  can  be 
interpreted as indicating local stock depletion  effects 
as monthly effort levels increase. The product specific 
scale elasticities can be calculated for  product i from 
the supply equations (2) as: 
(6) 
When these are evaluated for United States vessels 
at mean sample values of price and effort the estimates 
(and standard errors)  eYE  = 0.491  (0.l83) and  lOSE  = 
0.720 (0.109) are obtained.8 
Finally,  we  test  the  hypothesis  that  the  average 
vessel in the United States sample was contributing the 
long-run equilibrium level of effort.  Long-run equilib-
rium  is  where  the  marginal  return  per unit of effort 
equals the opportunity cost of effort, c. The hypothesis 
is given  by equation (7) which is derived  by differenti-
ating the revenue function (1) with respect to effort and 
equating the derivative to the opportunity cost of effort: 
The estimated value of the marginal return to effort 
for the average United States Pacific class purse seiner 
in  the sample is  US$106.27 with  a standard error of 
18.24. 
We  can  compare  the  estimated  value  of  the 
marginal return to effort with an estimate of cost calcu-
lated from Waugh. Based on a 1985 survey carried out 
by the United States Marine Fisheries Service, Waugh 
8Asymptotic t-ratios are ty  Z  2.678 and ts = 6.590 indicating that 
product specific scale elasticities are significantly different from 
zero at the 5% level. 
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estimates the annual costs of a 1100 tonne purse seine 
vessel (Table 5.6).  The total annual cost is  US$2674 
million, or US$222815 per month. We use this figure 
as  an  estimate of the monthly  cost of operating the 
average sized  vessel in  our sample,  which was  1228 
tonnes. The average monthly effort (measured as GRT 
x  number of sets x 0.1)  for the sample  was  2007.2. 
Based on Waugh's estimate of monthly vessel cost the 
average total cost per unit of effort was US$IIl.0  l. An 
estimate  of  average  variable  cost  is  obtained  in  a 
similar  manner,  using  the  annual  total  general 
expenses estimate of US$2211 million. The estimate of 
average variable cost is US$9l.79. 
Table 5.6  Estimated  annual  cost  of a 1110 tonne United  States 
purse  seiner, 1985 
Operating  expenses  US$ 
Fuel  696524 
Galley  77446 
labour  675855 
Other  140986 
Total operating expenses  1590811 
General expenses 
Repair and  maintenance  210000 
Insurance  320000 
P rofessional  30000 
Dues,  licences  30000 
Other  30000 
Total  general  expenses  620000 
Total variable  costs  2210811 
Capnal costs 
Interest and  depreciation  463000 
(at  6%  real  over 15 years) 
Total  cost  267381 1 
Source: Waugh 1987: Table  9. 
The estimate of a marginal return to effort for the 
average United States purse seine vessel of US$1 06.27, 
with standard error 18.240, is not significantly different 
at the 5%  level  (t-ratio= -0.260) from  the estimate of 
average  total cost of $11l.01  derived from  Waugh's 
analysis  of  costs.  This  suggests  that  United  States 
vessels are contributing their long-run equilibrium level 
of effort to the Papua New Guinea fishery. 
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Conclusion 
This study  has used a revenue maximising framework 
to  analyse  the  technology  of Japanese  and  United 
States purse seine tuna vessels operating in Papua  ew 
Guinea's  exclusive  economic  zone  in  the  1980s.  A 
significant difference between  the technologies of the 
two  fleets  is  detected:  United  States  vessels,  unlike 
those  of Japan,  exhibit  the  ability  to  target  juvenile 
yellowfin  tuna. Targeting ability  probably depends on 
both technical characteristics of vessels and the type of 
fishing  strategy  adopted.  As  far  as  technology  is 
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concerned, the United States purse seiners are larger 
and faster than the Japanese, and capable of deeper 
sets  of the  net.  Fishing  strategies  are  examined  in 
Campbell  and Nicholl  (1992b) where  it  is  suggested 
that free-school sets may offer a higher proportion of 
yellowfin  than  log  sets.  The  study  also  found  that 
United  States vessels, which  continue  to  operate  in 
Papua New Guinea's exclusive economic zone, were in 
long-run  equilibrium  in  the  sense  that  they  were 
contributing the profit maximising level of effort to the 
fishery. Chapter 
6 
The Ability of Tuna Purse Seiners 
to Vary the Species Composition 
of the Catch 
H.F.  Campbe// 
R.B. Nicholl 
Introduction 
Purse seine vessels tuna fishing in  the western Pacific 
catch mainly skipjack and juvenile yellowfin tuna. The 
average  proportion  of yellowfin  catch  by  weight  is 
around 25-30%, but individual vessels report propor-
tions  varying  from  below  20%  to  higher  than  50%. 
Juvenile yellowfin  fetch  a  higher price  than skipjack, 
and  those  that survive  are  recruited  into  the  adult 
yellowfin  stock which  is  a  major species  in  the tuna 
longline fishery. From the viewpoint of fishery manage-
ment, it is important to know whether vessels can exert 
some  control  over  the  proportion  of yellowfin  they 
harvest through choice of fishing practices, or whether 
variations in  the harvest proportion are exogenous as 
far as vessels are concerned. 
If  purse  seiners  can  target  juvenile  yellowfin,  a 
management  regime  which  allows  access  to  both 
stocks under the same terms will  result in the dissipa-
tion of fishery  rent through relatively too much effort 
being directed at yellowfin stocks. The fishery manage-
ment regime currently employed by most Pacific island 
states bases access fees  on  the assumption  that the 
proportion by weight of yellowfin to skipjack harvested 
is  30%.  There  is  no  additional  charge  imposed  on 
vessels which exceed this proportion and no rebate for 
vessels which  fail  to achieve it. Targeting may  lead to 
added pressure on western Pacific yellowfin stocks over 
and above the pressures already resulting from steadily 
increasing levels of purse seine activity. 
The ability to target juvenile yellowfin  depends on 
the ability of vessels to vary the proportion of yellowfin 
in  the catch  by  choice of fishing  practices. The  next 
section  of  this  chapter  describes  the  fishery  and 
discusses vessel  operation and fishing  practices. It  is 
possible that one kind of set of the net is likely to result 
in  a higher proportion of yellowfin  than another,  and 
that certain vessels are more likely to choose this  type 
of set It can be argued that the basic consideration of 
the fishing director is  the value of the catch and that 
the price of yeIlowfin relative to skipjack will influence 
the choice of fishing technique. A sample of catch and 
effort data for  the Japanese and United States purse 
seine  tuna  fleets  operating  in  Papua  New  Guinea 
waters during the period 1983-86 is  used to examine 
the various hypotheses which  have been put forward. 
The data sample is  described in  the third section, and 
is  used in section four to analyse the choice of fishing 
practices. The fifth  section  reports  the  results  of an 
assessment of the  influence of the price  of yellowfin 
relative to skipjack on the species composition of the 
catch. 
Background 
The most intensive areas of purse seine effort are the 
exclusive economic zones of Papua New  Guinea and 
Federated  States  of Micronesia,  and  the  high  seas 
region which  lies  between them, although fleets have 
become active  in  recent years as far east as Kiribati. 
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Purse seine catches of skipjack and yellowfin  have led 
to  a  significant  increase  in  total  harvests  of  these 
species in the central and western Pacific and the rapid 
expansion of purse seine activity has recently sparked 
concerns regarding the sustainable  level  of yellowfin 
exploitation in the region. 
Purse seine operations 
Purse seining involves placing a net around a school of 
fish and closing the net at the base. Tuna purse seiners 
fish two types of schools-those which are concentrated 
under some floating object and those which appear to 
have  no  focal  point In  the  eastern  Pacific  tuna are 
found  in  association  with  dolphins,  whereas  in  the 
central and western pacific association is  with  floating 
objects such as logs. The reason for these associations 
is not fully understood at present Schools which appear 
to  have  no  focal  point  may  be  migrating  between 
regions. Purse seine operations can be broadly classi-
fied as those which involve log sets (associated) or free-
school sets (un associated). It  is  believed  that catches 
from free-school sets are more likely to be monospecific 
than from log sets, and that where free-school sets yield 
mixed species they offer a higher proportion of yellowfin 
than  do  log  sets  (South  Pacific  Commission  1990a; 
Suzuki  1988).  Furthermore,  yellowfin  harvested  with 
free-school sets are typically larger than those from  log 
sets. Most yellowfin caught from log sets are less than 80 
cm, while sets on unassociated aggregations often yield 
yellowfin  up to  150  cm  (Forum  Fisheries Committee 
1990; Suzuki 1988). Suzuki reports that yellowfin from 
sets on free  swimming schools are dominated by  the 
100 cm to 150 cm size range. 
Before a set is  made, the skipper must determine 
whether the aggregation is of sufficient size, containing 
predominantly  larger fish,  or of an acceptable species 
mix to warrant the cost and effort of making a set On 
the large  United States vessels spotters observe free-
school  characteristics  from  helicopters  and  crow's 
nests, relaying this information to the skipper. Japanese 
vessels  have  yet  to  use  helicopters  but  have  crew 
watching from  a crow's nest and other vantage points 
on the vessel. When log sets are considered, both the 
United  States  and  Japanese  vessels  use  sonar  to 
determine aggregation size and the average size of fish. 
The  Japanese are believed to have developed the use of 
sonar detection to the point where they can now differ-
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entiate between yellowfin and skipjack on the basis of 
sonar signature. 
Early attempts by the Japanese to establish a purse 
seine fishery  in  the central and western Pacific experi-
enced mixed success. Initial  purse seine fishing strate-
gies centred on free-school sets (Hutton 1984). However, 
the oceanic conditions of the region (clear water and a 
relatively  deep  thermocline of around 200 m)  proved 
somewhat challenging to vessels unable to set and purse 
at sufficient speeds, and which used nets shallower than 
the  depth  of the  thermocline  (Hutton  1984;  Suzuki 
1988). Log sets made prior to dawn, pursing slowly so as 
not to  disturb feeding  tuna and also  maintaining net 
depth proved a more successful and reliable practice. 
When  the United  States fleet  entered the central 
and western  Pacific  it  brought vessels which  differed 
significantly  from  Japanese seiners. In  an attempt to 
increase total catches and the value of these catches, 
United  States vessels  introduced  the  use of deeper, 
lighter  weight  nets  and  more  powerful  hauling 
equipment, significantly increasing the speed at which 
free-school sets could be made. The result has been an 
increase in  the success rate of free-school sets. While 
all vessels employ both fishing practices, United States 
fishers  are generally credited with  refinement of free-
school  set techniques (skills  they  have  brought with 
them from  the eastern Pacific),  whereas the develop-
ment of log set techniques are generally credited  to 
Japanese fishers. 
Regardless of the type  of aggregation exploited, 
fishing  effort can be broadly defined as a  two step 
procedure:  searching; and making a set. The search 
for both types of aggregation is based largely on past 
experience and knowledge of oceanic conditions for 
the  particular region.  The search  for  tuna is  also 
enhanced  by  exchange  of  information  regarding 
current fishing conditions between vessels, typically 
of the  same  nationality or related  flag  of conven-
ience. 
The technical details of purse seine gear and how 
sets are made are well  documented (see for example 
Hutton 1984; Doulman 1987c; Medley 1989). Vessels 
will  not  typically  set  on  any  aggregation.  Often  no 
attempt will be made to catch small aggregations if the 
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cost of making the set.l  On the other hand, potentially 
large catches may also be avoided as they can result in 
burst nets and jammed gear.  Time  is  also  a  critical 
factor in making a set. At one extreme is the possibility 
that the escape rate from a particular set is very high, in 
which case the net must be hauled in and then reset as 
quickly as possible in  order to try and catch the same 
fish. At the other extreme is the situation where a very 
large catch can involve a lengthy brailing operation in 
which case much of the catch can spoil in the net. The 
time to harvest located aggregations is also presumably 
minimised to allow the greatest daylight search time. 
In  summary,  although  skippers  are  unable  to 
change vessel  size,  gear,  or crew  while  on  any given 
fishing trip, they can vary fishing strategies in  order to 
affect  the  economic  outcome  of  any  trip.  Modem 
vessels are equipped with a wide array of instruments 
which allow them continual contact with  ports, satel-
lites and other vessels. This provides for a constant flow 
of information both to and from  the vessel regarding 
current fishing  and market conditions.  Communica-
tions regarding fishing conditions increase the effective 
search  area of cooperating groups  of vessels,  while 
current price information may influence the dominant 
fishing  strategy  for  a  given  trip.  Improved  search 
efficiency  together  with  technological  developments 
which  have  increased set speed and vessel  capacity, 
have resulted in  purse seiners becoming very efficient 
tuna fleets. 
Yellowfin and skipjack prices 
Although there is no single world price for tuna, Yaizu 
ex-vessel  prices are widely  considered to  represent a 
benchmark for  world  tuna  prices.  Prices  offered  for 
canning material in  other parts of the world, such as 
Thailand, American Samoa, Puerto Rico  and Taiwan, 
follow  trends similar to those of Yaizu  prices, but are 
generally  at  levels  below  Yaizu  prices.  Yaizu  is  the 
major  destination  of Japanese  purse  seine  caught 
yellowfin and skipjack. This is demonstrated by the fact 
that between 1984 and March 1987 the distribution of 
purse seine landings for the Japanese fleet was Yaizu 
I The cost of making a set is generally considered in tenns of  wear 
and tear on gear and net,  but there is  also an opportunity cost 
measured  by  the  value  of fishing  an  alternative  school.  The 
success  of  previous  fishing  days  seems  to  be  an  important 
detenninant  as  to  what  constitutes  the  minimum  acceptable 
catch per set 
90%;  Shimizu  9%;  and  other  1  %  (Forum  Fisheries 
Committee 1990). 
Campbell  and  Nicholl  (l992b)  report  average 
yellowfin and skipjack prices for the ports ofYaizu and 
Pago  Pago  for  the  years  1983-1986. The  reported 
prices indicate the existence of a clear price differential 
between yellowfin and skipjack at Yaizu and a smaller, 
more  consistent  differential  between  yellowfin  and 
skipjack prices for tuna landed in American Samoa A 
price differential  between yellowfin  and skipjack does 
not typically apply to all sizes of fish. The same price is 
most often paid for fish of both species up to 7.5 Ib (3.4 
kg) and a premium is  paid on yellowfin over that size. 
According  to  the  prices  reported  in  Campbell  and 
Nicholl  (l992b),  there  has  been a  smaller premium 
paid by American canners for larger yellowfin than has 
been the case at Yaizu. 
Since juvenile yellowfin command a premium over 
the  price  of skipjack  there may  be  an  incentive  for 
purse  seine  skippers  to  increase  their  revenue  per 
fishing trip by increasing the proportion of yellowfin in 
their total catch. Vessels would do this by  expending 
effort  on searching for  aggregations with  a  relatively 
high proportion of yellowfin. This has been suggested 
by Medley (1989) with specific reference to the United 
States  purse seine  fleet.  The price  incentive  would, 
however, seem to have been stronger for the Japanese 
fleet. 
Purse seine access fees for 
Papua New Guinea 
Papua New Guinea has not had a domestic tuna fishery 
since 1984, and since that time has relied on the access 
fees  paid  by  distant water fishing  nations  to  obtain 
returns  to  its  tuna resources.  Access  fees  consist of 
three  components:  boat  licence,  fisher  licence  and 
operation  fee.  Of  these  three  components,  the 
operation fee  is  the primary instrument of fishery rent 
collection and is  determined by a combination of (l) 
vessel  type  and  size;  (2)  estimated  catch  rates;  (3) 
duration of fishing trip and time spent in  Papua New 
Guinea waters; (4) Japanese (3 month moving average) 
market  prices  adjusted  for  transport  costs  (fishing 
ground to port); and (5) estimated species composition 
of catch. It is the last of these fee determinants which is 
of direct relevance to this analysis. 
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As Papua New Guinea authorities cannot verify the 
exact catch  composition  of any  vessel,  they  rely  on 
estimates  of  anticipated  catch  compositions  when 
setting fee  levels. This  means that the operation  fee 
paid  by  an  individual  vessel  is  independent  of the 
species  composition  of  its  catch.  Estimates  of  the 
proportion of total catch by  purse seiners of yellowfin 
are around 25%-30%. Although species mix for purse 
seine catches on the whole has been treated by Papua 
New  Guinea  authorities  as  fixed,  there  is  a  great 
variation in the actual species mix of individual vessels. 
To give an example of the variation of species mix from 
purse seine catches, a United States vessel spending 44 
days fishing in Papua New Guinea waters between late 
November  1985 and late January  1986 caught 49% 
yellowfin. The same vessel made a subsequent 39 day 
trip between the beginning of February 1986 and mid-
March, as a result of which  20% of its  total catch was 
yellowfin  (FFA  1989a). Japanese (single)  purse seine 
operations in  Papua New  Guinea waters from  1979-
1987 made catches which varied, on average across all 
vessels of the fleet,  between 19% yellowfin  in  1980 to 
42% yellowfin in  1987. 
Data 
Catch and effort data for Japanese and United States 
registered  purse seine vessels  fishing  in  Papua New 
Guinea waters were obtained from  the South Pacific 
Commission data base. These catch and effort data are 
compiled from vessel log sheets submitted as a require-
ment  of  the  conditions  for  access  to  Papua  New 
Guinea's exclusive economic zone. The data are daily 
catch  records  for  the  period  1979-1989  and  give 
vessel identification, nationality, date, position, time of 
set,  type  of set,  catch  of yellowfin  and  skipjack  (in 
tonnes), average weight of each species of fish per catch 
and trip length. The period covered by  the analysis of 
yellowfin proportion in the total catch is 1983-87, and 
for  the  analysis  of  fishing  practice  it  is  1983-86 
Oapanese) and 1984-86 (United States), because there 
are records for only one United States purse seiner for 
one month in  Papua New  Guinea prior to 1984, and 
Japanese  fishing  in  Papua  New  Guinea  ceased  in 
March 1987. Daily observations of set type (log or free-
school) at the vessel level across both the United States 
and Japanese fleets are used. 
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Not all vessels which fished in Papua New Guinea's 
exclusive economic zone for the above period did so on 
a continual basis. Many fished some months of various 
years  and at no  time  in  other years,  resulting in  an 
uneven  number of observations  across  months  and 
years for the period of the data sample.  For the period 
1983-86, the data cover a total of 51 Japanese and 26 
United States registered vessels (which fished for part 
of at least one month of the four year period). 
Yellowfin and skipjack prices for the Japanese fleet 
models were  obtained from  the FAO  Globefish  data 
base. These are average  monthly ex-vessel  prices for 
the Japanese port of Yaizu. Port prices used for United 
States purse seine catches are American Tuna Sellers 
Association  prices  for  tuna delivered  to  canneries in 
American  Samoa.  These  prices  are  reported  in 
Campbell and Nicholl (1992b). 
Model of purse seine 
tactics/behaviour 
Although successfully setting on unassociated aggrega-
tions has proved more challenging to the purse seine 
fishing director, the return to effort may be greater if it 
yields  a  higher proportion of large juvenile yellowfin, 
the more valuable catch. Measures adopted by United 
States fishers  to overcome difficulties  relating to sets 
on  un associated  aggregations  (clear water and deep 
thermocline)  have  raised  the  likelihood  that United 
States vessels will fish this type of aggregation. Further-
more, the Japanese may also  be attempting to  target 
yellowfin by honing their skills on log sets. 
The approach  of the analysis  in  this  part of the 
paper is first to see whether there is any evidence that 
sets on unassociated aggregations yield, on average, a 
higher proportion of yellowfin than skipjack. Second, a 
probit model is  used to investigate whether there is a 
greater probability of United States or  Japanese vessels 
making  sets  on  associated  or  unassociated  aggre-
gations. Third,  we  look  for  evidence  that individual 
vessels  within  a  fleet  harvest greater proportions  of 
yellowfin than the fleet average; and fourth whether the 
location  fished  within  Papua  few  Guinea's exclusive 
economic zone has any influence on the proportion of 
yellowfin  caught The results  of the  revenue-maxim-
ising  framework  described  in  Campbell  and  Nicholl The  Ability of Tuna  Purse Seiners to  Vary the Species Composition of the Catch 
(1992b) are used in a discussion of whether the relative 
price of yellowfin to skipjack plays a significant role in 
the behaviour of purse seine vessels. 
The proportion of  ye  11 owfi  n in different 
aggregation types 
For the purposes of the following  analyses  the total 
catch of a purse seine set is treated as the total weight 
in  tonnes  of yellowfin  and  skipjack  (ignoring  any 
possible  by-catch  such  as  juvenile  bigeye  tuna). 
Reference  has  been  made  to  the  difference  in  the 
proportion of catch of yellowfin  between log and free-
school sets. It is  therefore reasonable to  expect that 
there may be some conditions under which purse seine 
vessels are able to target yellowfin. If this were not so, 
encountering  aggregations  yielding  more  yellowfin 
would always be a random event and no search tactic 
or measure could be employed  by  fishers  in  order to 
deliberately increase yellowfin catches. 
It can be hypothesised that free-school sets (unasso-
ciated  aggregations)  offer  the  opportunity  for  higher 
yellowfin catches as sets made on them yield a consist-
ently higher proportion of yellowfin. This hypothesis is 
tested by calculating the mean proportion of yellowfin 
per set for  log sets and free-school  sets,  then testing 
whether  there  is  any  difference  between  them.  The 
proportion  of yellowfin  for  any  set is  defined  as  the 
weight of yellowfin  divided  by  the combined weight of 
skipjack  and yellowfin  caught  for  that set Sets  are 
defined as log sets, 'Type 0' and free-school sets, 'Type 
1'. Individual set records indicating the type of set and 
yellowfin and skipjack catch for the Papua New Guinea 
exclusive economic zone for the years 1983-1987 were 
used  to  find  total  catch  per set  and  proportion  of 
yellowfin  per  set  There  are  13 197  individual  set 
records  for  vessels  across  the Japanese  and  United 
States fleets  for the period. Of the total records, 2885 
were  for  free-school  sets  and  10312  log  sets.  All 
recorded sets, whether successful or not were included 
in the analysis. The mean proportion of yellowfin per set 
was then determined for each set type and the hypoth-
esis that the mean proportion of yellowfin from Type 1 
sets was greater than that of  Type 0 sets was tested. The 
mean proportion of yellowfin per Type 1 set (0.388) was 
found to be significantly greater than that ofType 0 sets 
(0.329).2 Furthermore, it was concluded that at the 95% 
confidence level  the proportion of yellowfin  from  free-
school sets was between 3.8% and 7.8% greater than the 
proportion of yellowfin from log sets.3 
In deciding to target juvenile yellowfin by increasing 
the number of school sets relative to log sets, a skipper 
would need to take account of the lower success rate 
for  school  sets.  Table  6.1  shows  the  proportion  of 
successful sets of each fleet together with the number 
of observed sets. 
The hypotheses that the success rates are the same 
for both types of sets is  tested and rejected at the 5% 
level.  It can be seen from  Table 6.1  that the United 
States fleet seems to experience a higher success rate 
for both types of sets. The hypotheses that the success 
rates of the two  fleets  were  the same was tested and 
rejected for  both log sets (t=-3.8068) and free-school 
sets (t=-4.1480). 
A probit model to describe the choice of 
fishing practice 
For the years  1983-87, the average ex-vessel price of 
purse  seine  caught  yellowfin  has  been  consistently 
greater than that of skipjack Catch data for Japanese 
and American  purse seine fleets  for  the same period 
indicate the mean proportion of yellowfin caught from 
un  associated aggregations is  between 3.8%  and 7.8% 
greater than the mean proportion caught from associ-
ated schools. Furthermore, Hutton (1984) and Suzuki 
(1988) have discussed why United States skippers are 
more likely to pursue a fishing strategy which favours 
the search and capture of unassociated aggregations: 
larger and faster vessels with  more powerful gear and 
the  ability  to  set on  free-schools  at high  speed will 
presumably engage more frequently in this strategy. It is 
not  suggested  that Japanese  skippers  will  fish  only 
associated  aggregations  or  United  States  skippers 
un associated aggregations, but rather that there may 
be a dominant strategy for each. 
Each time a vessel encounters an aggregation, the 
skipper  or fishing  director  must  decide  whether to 
make a set on that aggregation. What we are interested 
in  specifically,  is  detennining  what  influences  the 
Vrhe t-statistic was -5.905. 
:J-rhe  95% confidence intervals for  both mean proportions were 
also  calculated:  they  were  0.3203<PO<0.3385;  and  0.3700 <P1 
<0.4056-where  Pi  =  mean  proportion  of  yellowfin  for  i-O 
(associated  aggregation  sets)  and  1  (unassociated  aggregation 
sets). 
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Table  6.1  Proportions of successful  sets for Japanese and  United 
States fleets 
Log  sets  School sets  t-statistic 
Japanese fleet  0.8955  0.4459  52.42 
No.  of sets  7208  4306 
United States neet  0.9332  0.5293 
No. of sets  1084  716  15.85 
Pr (I> 1.6451: 0.05 
probability that a skipper will decide to make a Type 1 
(free-school) set It can be hypothesised that a higher 
price  for  yellowfin  together with  the  ability  to  make 
successful  free-school  sets  and  the  knowledge  that 
these type of sets are likely to yield a higher proportion 
of yellowfin, will  lead United States skippers to choose 
Type 1 sets as a dominant fishing strategy. 
This  behaviour can  be  modelled  using  a  simple 
probit analysis where the decision to adopt a particular 
fishing  strategy  is  dependent on  skipper nationality, 
vessel  size  and  the  relative  price  of  yellowfin  to 
skipjack.  Although  we  cannot  observe  the  actual 
decision  to adopt either strategy, we  can observe the 
outcome of that decision by the type of set made. The 
decision  outcome  can  be  represented  by  a  dummy 
variable defined as: y =  1 for a Type 1 set (free-school); 
and y  =  0 for a Type 0 set (Jog). The model  is  repre-
sented mathematically as; 
(1) 
where K is  a  dummy variable  taking the value  0  for 
GRT ~  499 and 1 for GRT >499; Nis a dummy variable 
which takes the value 1 for a United States vessel and 0 
for  a Japanese vessel;  and P is  the  relative  monthly 
(Yaizu)  price  of  yellowfin  to  skipjack  (Py/ P~. The 
model is estimated by adding an error term to equation 
(1)  and using pooled cross-section data for  the years 
1983-87. 
Time  is  accounted  for  by the  inclusion  of three 
quarterly  dummy variables. As  the  beginning of the 
fishing year in Papua New Guinea waters is around the 
start of June,  the base quarter for  which  there is  no 
dummy  variable  is  June,  July,  August.  The  dummy 
variables could enter the model in two ways. One way is 
through a  seasonal influence on price,  implying  that 
seasonality is  accounted for  in  the above behavioural 
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function as interaction terms with  the relative price of 
yellowfin  to  skipjack,  P.  The  inclusion  of  seasonal! 
relative price interaction terms changes equation (1) to: 
y = a + f3KK +  f3NN + f3pP + 8lOlP + 8202P + 8303P 
(2) 
Another way for the quarterly variables to enter into 
the model is  as intercept shifts, implying stock effects 
from  season  to  season  throughout the  fishing  year. 
Intercept  shift  variables  would  be  incorporated  by 
dropping the price variable from the seasonal dummies 
in  equation (2). However, it  is  not clear what,  if any, 
effect changes in the underlying stocks would have on 
the decision  to  choose set Type  1 or Type  O.  In  the 
absence of strong a  priori  expectation on how  these 
variables should be treated in the model, both types of 
dummy  variables  are  tested  as  restrictions  to  the 
original  model  in  (1). The restrictions  involving  the 
inclusion of the price interaction variables from (2) are 
tested  using  a  likelihood  ratio  test,  -2UnJ'R -11"bfJ. 
which  is X2 distributed with degrees of freedom equal 
to  the  number of restrictions.  The  inclusion  of the 
intercept  dummy  variables  is  then  tested  as  an 
additional set of restrictions using the same procedure. 
Finally,  no account is  taken of the year,  or of where 
fishing  activity  takes  place,  or whether some fishing 
grounds within Papua New Guinea waters yield aggre-
gations with  higher proportions of yellowfin  than do 
others. 
The above restrictions were tested sequentially and 
then together as a group; the results of these tests are 
reported in Table 6.2. 
The restrictions were all  rejected at the 5% level of 
significance and the fonn of the model to be reported is 
therefore: 
y = a + f3KK + f3NN + f3pP + 8lOlP + 8202P  (3) 
+ 8303P + ylOI + Y202 + Y303 
The  results  from  estimating  equation  (3)  are 
reported in  Table 6.3. From these results the general 
opinion that United States vessels are more likely  to 
make free-school sets is supported by the positive and 
significant  coefficient  on  the  nationality  variable  N 
However,  no significant effect of the relative  price of 
yellowfin alone can be detected apart from its seasonal 
interaction, which is  measured by  positive  and signifi-
cant  coefficients  for  the  second  (September-The  Ability of Tuna  Purse Selners to  Vary the Species Composition of the Catch 
Table 6.2  Tests  for  problt  model  structure  describing  choice  of 
fishing practice. 
Test  No. of  Critical x2  Test x2  Reject 
restrictions  restriction? 
Interaction  3  7.82  244.8  Yes 
dummies 
Intercept  3  7.82  227.8  Yes 
dummies 
All  dummies  6  12.59  306.8  Yes 
Table 6.3  Parameter estimates for probit model describing choice 
of fishing practice. 
Variable name  Number of  Estimated 
observations  coefficient 
y..1  4902 
y..0  7899 
Constant  0.6641 a 
K  12801  -0.0257 
N  12801  0.0672a 
p  12801  0.0097 
O,p  4135  0.4292a 
02P  5068  -0.0262 
03P  1606  0.5281 a 
0,  4135  -0.4580a 
02  5068  0.40W 
03  1606  -0.3349a 
log Of likelihood functlon: -8364.4 
Log  of likelihood function  (constant only!: -8518.9 
P  (t >  1.645): 0.05 
19 d.f.:  309.0 












November}  and  last  (March-May)  quarters  of  the 
fishing  year.  The size  of vessel  appears  from  these 
results to have no significant effect on the decision to 
make a log or school set casting doubt on the claim 
that larger and faster vessels are those most likely  to 
fish  unassociated aggregations.4 Finally, the significant 
coefficients on the second and third quarter intercept 
shift terms suggest that relative to the first quarter of 
the fishing  year,  free-school  sets are less  likely  to  be 
made by either nationality in  the second quarter, and 
more likely in the third. 
~is does  not  imply  that  larger  and  faster  vessels  are  not 
relatively more successful at making school sets. 
Variation in targeting ability across vessels 
The  above  results  report  that  there  was  a  greater 
proportion  of yellowfin  on  average  from  free-school 
sets than from  log  sets, and the results of the probit 
analysis  indicate  that  United  States vessel  skippers 
were  more likely  to make free-school  sets than their 
Japanese counterparts. Additionally,  the suggestion is 
made that United States vessels were more successful 
at making free-school  sets as  they were larger,  faster 
and equipped with more powerful gear, enabling them 
to  reduce free-school set time and therefore increase 
the success rate of these sets. 
This line  of analysis  is  taken one step further to 
examine  whether  any  of  the  United  States  vessels 
consistently achieved  proportions of yellowfin  higher 
than the fleet average. This is done by calculating the 
mean  proportion  of yellowfin  for  free-school  sets for 
the United States fleet and then for each United States 
vessel, for the period of the sample (1984-1986), and 
testing  whether  the  highest  and  lowest  proportions 
recorded by individual vessels are statistically different 
from the fleet mean. 
The mean proportion of yellowfin from  free-school 
sets (standard error, number of observations) for  the 
fleet was 0.3808 (0.3306,104). The highest vessel level 
mean  proportion  was  0.5532 (0.5084,  3).  At  the 5% 
level  of  significance  this  is  not statistically  different 
from  the fleet  average (t-ratio  =  0.8835).5 The lowest 
vessel level mean proportion was 0.1 029, which at the 
5%  level  is  significantly  less  than  the  fleet  average 
proportion (t-ratio = 2.3557). The fleet average was also 
calculated for each year of the sample periods and then 
compared with  the overall  sample average. The year 
with  the highest fleet average proportion of yellowfin 
from free-school sets was 1986 (0.4791) and the lowest 
1985  (0.3262),  both  of which  are  not  statistically 
different from the sample mean at the 5% level (t-ratios 
=  1.4057, 0.9602). The 95% confidence interval for the 
fleet sample mean is 0.3166 < f.1  < 0.4450; 60% of the 
vessel level averages fall within this confidence interval. 
This simple analysis does not provide any evidence 
to  suggest  that any  particular vessels  in  the  United 
States  fleet  are  more  successful  at catching  higher 
5Vessel  level  mean proportions are considered only for vessels 
with more than one monthly observation. 
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proportions of yellowfin than other vessels of the fleet, 
or that there was  any  particularly good or bad years 
over the sample period for the United States fleet 
Catch rates ofyellowfin and skipjack 
by  zone 
The preceding sections provide some support for the 
hypothesis that purse seine vessels can target yellowfin. 
There is statistical evidence to suggest yellowfin form a 
greater proportion of purse seine catches when  free-
school sets are fished, and that United States skippers 
are, on the whole, more likely to fish  free-school sets. 
There is  no strong evidence, however, to indicate that 
some  United  States  vessels  are  more  successful  at 
harvesting larger proportions of yellowfin  than other 
United States vessels.  Whether there  is  any  regional 
influence on the proportion of yellowfin  in purse seine 
catches  is  now  considered. This  is  done  by  dividing 
Papua  New  Guinea's  exclusive  economic  zone  into 









•  PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
yellowfin  and  skipjack  from  purse  seine  sets  for 
combined  United  States  and Japanese  fleet  activity 
over the period  1983 to  1986 (inclusive). The mean 
proportion of yellowfin from sets where at least one of 
the species skipjack or yellowfin  was  caught  is  also 
calculated.  Figure  6.l  shows  Papua  New  Guinea's 
exclusive economic zone and its breakdown into seven 
zones. Two analyses were carried out: one for log sets 
and another for free-school sets. In  both analyses, the 
data were  grouped  by  quarter as  well  as  zone with 
quarter  1  defined  as  June  to  August  The  results, 
together with  the level  of fishing activity measured in 
terms of the number of sets in a zone for a quarter, are 
reported  in  Table 6.4  (Jog  sets)  and Table 6.5  (free-
school sets). 
The  mean  catch  per  unit  effort  (CPUE)  figures, 
where a  unit of effort  is  measured as a  set,  for  both 
Tables  6.4  and  6.5  indicate  there  are  consistently 
higher catches of skipjack per set than there are for 
yellowfin, both across zones and quarters. The greatest 
FEDERATED  STATES OF MICRONESIA 
---- --... 
'"  5  '"  6 
'\ 
\ 
r-~~~~o----~  ) 
o  North  / - "''--_/ 
\)  Solomons  / 
7  ~rOVinCe j  • I1 
Pang una  :0--. 
SOLOMON  SEA  / 0  ~ 
(..-- --- \:)"  SOLOMON ISLANDS 
to 
e  '\::j 
Milne Bay Province 
AUSTRALIA 
Agure  6.1  Papua  New  Guinea's  exclusive  economic lone,  by fishing  lone. 
70 
\  0  ~("... 
'\  ~o 






300 km The Ability of Tuna Purse Seiners to  Vary the Species Composition of the Catch 
Table 6.4  Total  effort (sets),  mean  CPUE for yellowfin  and  skipjack, and  ratio  of CPUEy/CPUES for United States  and Japanese combined  neet  LOG 
SETS,  by lone, 1983-87. 
Quarter  Zone 1  Zone 2  Zone 3  Zone 4  Zone 5  Zone 6  Zone 7 
(tonnes) 
No.  of sets  966  20  490  3  95  65  143 
%  success  93.7  95.0  94.3  66.7  96.8  98.5  99.3 
CPUEy  6.15  5.40  6.55  5.67  13.80  12.32  14.57 
CPUEs  16.67  15.75  20.17  0.33  16.65  25.91  20.42 
Proptn Yfn  0.35  029  0.35  0.94  0.49  0.40  0.49 
2 
No.  of sets  1614  63  1496  360  188  60  63 
%  success  92.8  92.1  90.6  94.4  83.5  96.7  93.7 
CPUEy  5.55  6.49  5.43  7.11  6.00  10.53  12.56 
CPUEs  17.75  10.92  18.62  23.93  21.70  27.33  21.44 
Proptn Yfn  0.31  0.44  0.31  0.30  0.33  0.36  0.51 
3 
No. of sets  1533  644  1178  304  364  46  79 
%  success  89.1  89.9  88.5  96.4  90.9  95.7  962 
CPUEy  6.12  7.01  6.13  725  8.44  6.44  6.92 
CPUEs  17.61  12.34  22.59  12.88  29.59  25.72  18.15 
Proptn Yfn  0.32  0.39  029  0.42  0.30  023  0.32 
4 
No. of sets  597  32  304  21  79  6  10 
%  success  88.6  87.5  91.5  85.7  91.9  100.0  80.0 
CPUEy  5.63  822  4.84  4.05  6.44  8.50  1.40 
CPUEs  19.85  12.09  28.34  24.24  21.38  40.00  3.00 
Proptn Vln  029  0.56  0.23  0.28  0.39  0.10  0.32 
Total sets  4710  759  3468  688  726  177  295 
mean  CPUE  for  yellowfin  from  log  sets  was  14.57  quarter 1, zone 6; and the lowest was zero for quarter 1, 
tonnes in  quarter 1,  zone 7; and the lowest was  1.40  zone 4 and quarter 4, zone 7. 
tonnes for quarter 4, zone 4.  For free-school sets, the  However,  it  is  important  to  note  the  amount of 
highest catch  per unit  effort  of yellowfin  was  34.34  effort which was expended (in terms of the number of 
tonnes  for  quarter 4,  zone 4;  and the  lowest  0  for  sets made) in each zone when reviewing these results. 
quarter 1, zones 2, 4 and 6, and quarter 4, zones 6 and  Some zones record  high  CPUE  but little  cumulative 
7. In  the CPUE of skipjack, the highest for log sets was  fishing  effort over the four year period.  For example, 
40.00 tonnes for quarter 4, zone 6; and the lowest was  although the highest mean CPUE of yellowfin  for log 
0.33 tonnes for quarter 1, zone 4; while for free-school  sets was found to be for zone 7 (quarter 1), there was in 
sets  the  highest  was  139.0  (from  a  single  set)  for  fact  very  little  cumulative effort  for  zone  7  over the 
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Table  6.5  Total  effort (sets), mean  CPUE for yellowfin and skipjack and  ratio  of CPUEy/CPUEs for United States and Japanese combined fleet  FREE-
SCHOOL SETS,  by lone, 1983-87 
Quarter  Zone 1  Zone 2  Zone 3  Zone 4  Zone 5  Zone 6  Zone 7 
1 
No. of sets  376  30  281  1  25  14 
%  success  52.9  36.7  49.8  0  76.0  100.0  100.0 
CPUEy  229  0  6.92  0  13.04  0  14.71 
CPUEs  13.07  6.57  14.92  0  15.68  139.0  2823 
Propt" Yfn  022  0  0.30  0  0.34  0  0.42 
2 
No. of sets  612  62  1004  125  191  18  31 
%  success  47.1  53.2  41.4  43.2  50.8  66.7  51.6 
CPUEy  4.61  721  8.15  2.46  829  1.50  4.81 
CPUEs  1121  1529  8.04  8.96  15.68  32.56  28.48 
Propt" Yfn  0.35  0.36  0.55  027  0.33  0.03  0.17 
3 
No.  of sets  1037  230  610  108  161  19  31 
%  success  47.0  522  46.7  57.4  41.6  68.4  38.7 
CPUEy  5.66  14.96  6.32  13.24  827  5.52  7.87 
CPUEs  12.73  821  11.82  7.74  7.70  1121  7.13 
Propt" Yfn  0.36  0.58  0.42  0.59  0.41  0.39  0.46 
4 
No. of sets  508  156  100  29  64  5 
%  success  42.5  43.0  41.0  72.4  51.6  100.0  0 
CPUEy  3.90  8.83  6.11  34.34  3.63  0  0 
CPUEs  11.58  8.34  10.60  13.07  23.70  6.0  0 
Propt" Yfn  0.33  0.54  0.34  0.64  026  0  0 
Total sets  2533  478  1995  263  441  39  81 
period: 6.2% of the cumulative number of sets for zone  It is  suggested  above  that calculating catch  rates 
1 and 8.5% of those for zone 3. In fact, if we look at the  and species  mix  for  different  zones  may  offer some 
zones which attracted the greatest amount of activity,  indication  that  the  potential  for  vessels  to  target 
then zone 1 had the most sets for log and free-school  yellowfin  exists. Tables 6.4  and 6.5  report the mean 
sets  followed  by  zone  3;  both  significantly  more  proportion of yellowfin by zone and quarter. Interpreta-
intensive with respect to purse seine effort than any of  tion of these results is, however, most meaningful if the 
the other five zones. Tables 6.4 and 6.5 also report the  level  of effort is  taken into account when comparing 
success rate for  sets by  quarter and zone. It is  clear  mean  yellowfin  proportions  from  each  zone.  What 
from  these results that the success rate for log sets is  needs to be determined, is whether at any time of the 
greater than that of free-school sets, regardless of zone  year any zone (or zones) offers  higher proportions of 
or quarter.  yellowfin per set than do others. In order to determine 
this,  the  mean  proportions  for  each  quarter  are 
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Table 6.6  Results  of ANOVA  analysis of proportion  of yellowfin:  zones  2-7 relative to  zone  1 
-..  -"'-- -
Constant  Zone 2  Zone 3  Zone  4  Zone 5  Zone 6  Zone 7 
Dummy  Dummy  Dummy  Dummy  Dummy  Dummy 
Log  sets 
Qtr 1  0.345a  -0.055  0.008  0.593a  0.149a  0.060  0.142a 
(35.340)  (-0.800)  (0.490)  (2.852)  (4.632)  (1.569)  [5.353) 
Qtr2  0.314a  0.126a  -0.002  -0.015  0.018  0.046  0.195a 
[44.919)  [3.471)  [-0.215)  [-0.932)  [0.793J  [1.278J  [5.422) 
Qtr3  0.324a  0.063a  -0.028a  0.096a  -0.020  -0.095a  -0.002 
(42.273J  (4.456J  (-2.4011  (5.271J  [-1.155J  (-2.176J  (-0.071J 
Qtr 4  0.289a  0.268a  -0.061a  -0.005  0.097a  -0.191  0.033 
(23.673J  (4.933)  [-2.929J  (-0.068J  (2.751J  [-1.657J  [0.3271 
School sets 
Qtr 1  0.220a  -0.219  0.D79a  0.131  -0.219  0.201 a 
[8.522J  (-1.942J  11.973J  [1.496J  [-0.600)  [2.004J 
Qtr2  0.348a  0.008  0.203a  -0.082  -0.018  -0.3W  -0.178 
(13.959J  (0.102)  (6.273J  (-1.314)  (-0.360)  [-2.519)  (-1.639) 
Qtr3  0.360a  0217a  0.056  0230a  0.050  0.040  0.102 
(19.043)  (5.092)  (1.805)  (4.085J  (0.912)  (0.342)  (0.833) 
Qtr 4  0.326a  0214a  0.Q17  -0.069a 
(11.726)  (3.728)  (0.237)  (3.316) 
alndlcates significant at the  5%  level. 
Note: In the  above  regreSSions, the dependent variable  Is the  proportion  of yellowfln  from  each  set recorded. 
Table 6.7  Summary of ANOVA  analysis  results 
1st Qtr  2nd  Qtr 
>Zl  <Zl  >Zl 
Log  sets  4,5,7  2,7 
School sets  3,7  3 
compared using an ANOVA  procedure.6  As  zone 1 
attracted the most activity for both log and free-school 
sets, it was  decided  to  use it as  the base zone. The 
results of these analyses are reported in Table 6.6, with 
a summary in Table 6.7. The ANOVA results show the 
proportion of  yellowfin per set for zones 2-7 relative to 
EYrhis  is  done by  running ordinary least squares regressions for 
each  quarter  with  the  mean  proportion  of yellowfin  as  the 
dependent variable and dummy variables for the different zones. 
The base zone for which there is no dummy variable is zone 1. 
<Z1 
6 
3rd  Qtr  4th  Qtr 
>Zl  <Zl  >Zl  <Zl 
2,4  3,6  2,5  3 
2,4  2,4 
the base case, zone 1. The statistical differences of the 
proportion of  yellowfin per set between zones 2-6 were 
also  tested.  The results  are  too  numerous  to  report 
here but a summary is  reported in Table 6.8, showing 
there is  no particular zone which offers an unambigu-
ously  higher or lower proportion of yellowfin  per set 
than other zones. 
The summary results reported in Table 6.7 indicate 
the zones which  had a proportion of yellowfin  per set 
either greater or less than the proportion of yellowfin 
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Table 6.8  Summary of  ANOVA  analysis  comparing  all  zones to  other zones 
1st Qtr  2nd  Qtr 
Highest  Lowest  Highest 
Log  sets  4 
No.  of sets  1782  3844 
Successful  1686  3525 
School sets  2  3 
No.  of sets  728  2043 
Successful  384  916 
per set from zone 1. Zone 2 appears to have offered a 
species mix with more yellowfin than zone 1 quarters 2, 
3 and!! for log sets and the quarters :3  and 4 for free-
school sets. Zone 7 also offered a higher proportion of 
yellowfin in  three cases (quarter 1,  log and school sets 
and quarter 2, log sets). In  most instances, the [Jro[Jor-
tion  of yellowfin  per set  in  zones  is  not statistically 
different from that in zone 1. 
The results in Table 6.8 do not show any consistent 
pattern,  although  zone  2  seems  to  offer  a  higher 
proportion of yellowfin per set in quarter 4 for both log 
and free-school sets. In most cases there is no zone (or 
zones)  which  unambiguously  offers  higher or lower 
proportions of yellowfin per set than do others within 
Papua New Guinea's exclusive economic zone. Finally, 
there is  no clear indication from  the above analyses 
that there is any opportunity for purse seiners to target 
yellowfin by choice of fishing ground within Papua New 
Guinea's exclusive economic zone. Although zones 2 
and 7  appear to have offered  higher proportions of 
yellowfin per set for the period 1983-1986, by far the 
bulk of the fishing  effort  has been  directed  towards 
zones 1 and 3. 
Results from the revenue maximising model 
If  purse  seiners  are  able  to  influence  the  species 
composition of their catch it would be expected that 
the effect of an  increase or decrease in  the price  of 
yellowfin  relative to skipjack would  be to increase or 
decrease  the  proportion  of  yellowfin  in  the  catch. 
Campbell and Nicholl (l992b) use a  model in  which 
vessels  are assumed  to  act so as to  maximise  their 
monthly revenue to try to identify this effect if it exists. If 
targeting is possible then the cross-elasticities of  supply 
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Lowest 
3rd  Qtr  4th  Qtr 
Highest  Lowest  Highest  Lowest 
2  2 
4148  1049 
3732  939 
2,4  1,3,5 
2196  863 
1046  379 
in  a  two-species  model are  negative;  this  means,  for 
example, that if the price of yello",fin rises, the quantity 
of skipjack caught falls  a.,  vessels  increasingly direct 
their  efforts  towards  the  relatively  more  valuable 
species. 
Campbell  and  Nicholl's  results  for  Papua  ~ew 
Guinea in  the period 1983-86 reveal  no evidence of 
targeting by Japanese vessels. They conclude, however, 
that United States vessels have been targeting yellowfin 
in  periods when its price has been relatively high. As 
noted earlier, the United States vessels are larger and 
more technically efficient and this  may explain  their 
targeting  ability.  The  cross-elasticities  of  supply 
estimated by  Campbell and Nicholl for United States 
vessels are -5.248 and -2.577; these results indicate 
that a 1  % rise in yellowfin price will cause a 5.248% fall 
in  skipjack catch, and a  1  % rise in skipjack price will 
cause a  2.577% fall  in  yellowfin  catch of the average 
vessel.  The  results  provide  further  evidence  for  the 
hypothesis  that  United  States  vessels  can  vary  the 
species composition of their catch if it is  profitable to 
do so. 
Conclusions 
The analysis of the harvests from  log and free-school 
sets  indicates  that  the  proportion  of yellowfin  was 
significantly higher in  free-school sets. The analysis of 
vessel  behaviour indicates  that  United  States  purse 
seiners were more likely to make free-school sets than 
were  Japanese  vessels.  The  results  of  the  revenue-
maximising model indicates that United States vessels 
were varying the proportion of yellowfin in  their catch 
in  response  to  changes  in  the  ex-vessel  price  of ne Ability of Tuna  Purse Seiners to  Vary the  Species Composition  of  the  Catch 
yellowfin  relative  to  skipjack.  Although  the  revenue-
maximising  analysis  provided  no  evidence  that 
Japanese single purse seiners have been able to target 
yellowfin,  a  recent South Pacific Commission tagging 
study  undertaken on a Japanese group  purse seiner 
operation  reports  that  a  prevailing  low  price  for 
skipjack  led  the  fishing  director  to  'concentrate  on 
making daytime sets on unassociated yellowfin schools' 
(South Pacific Commission 1990b:7). 
Since targeting contributes to profit maximisaLion it 
can be expected that an increasing number of vessels 
in  the  fishery  will  adopt the  technology  and fishing 
practices  that  make  it  possible.  This  means  that 
targeting ability should be taken into account in  the 
design of future management policies. In  the absence 
of targeting, the level of fishing effolt is the un  ly control 
variable available to the fishery manager. This means 
that  if  it  were  decided,  for  example,  to  conserve 
yellowfin stocks by reducing purse seine harvests, this 
could  only  be  done by  reducing fishing  efforL  which 
would  also  reduce  skipjack  catches.  The  ability  to 
target introduces another control variable, the species 
composition of the catch, which  can,  in  principle,  be 
influenced  by  a  differential  royalty or quota scheme. 
Lnder such a policy, the skipjack harvest would not be 
reduced to the same extent by  a  policy'  of protecting 
juvenile yellowfin, and the economic costs of the policy 
would be correspondingly lower. 
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The future  of the western  Pacific  tuna fisheries  will 
ideally be characterised by stock management regimes 
which  aim  at sustainable exploitation,  together with 
attempts to regulate conflicts between the various gear 
types  used  for  tuna fishing.  The complexities  which 
arise  from  the  multispecies  nature  of  the  fisheries 
involved  means that a  comprehensive understanding 
of  tuna  production  will  be  required  for  effective 
management  This  chapter  uses  a  multispecies 
revenue  function  framework  to  estimate  individual 
vessel supply curves for each of five  species harvested 
by Japanese longliners fishing in  Papua New Guinea's 
exclusive economic zone in the period 1979-1987. 
The  main  findings  of  the  analysis  are  that  the 
Japanese  longline  fleet  can  be  considered  as  being 
comprised of two distinct vessel types  based on gross 
registered tonnage (GRT);  small (GRT<lOO)  and large 
(GRT > 1  00). In the small vessel sector of the fishery the 
species composition of harvests of individual vessels is 
not independent of the level of vessel effort, or of the 
relative species prices. The large vessel sector, on the 
other hand, exhibits price inelastic supply of all species, 
with the species mix being technically determined, but 
varying with the level of vessel effort 
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Data 
The  catch  and  effort  data  used  in  the  following 
analyses  were  obtained  from  the  South  Pacific 
Commission data base. The data describe the fishing 
activities  of Japanese  longline  vessels  operating  in 
Papua New Guinea's exclusive economic zone between 
September  1979  and  March  1987.  Daily  log  sheet 
information  recording vessel size,  identification, date, 
number of hooks per set and catch of each species by 
number of fish  and average weight are reported in  the 
data  series.  The  species  for  which  catch  data  are 
recorded are yellowfin, albacore, bigeye,  marlins (blue, 
black  and  striped),  sailfish,  swordfish,  bluefin  and 
'other' species which include sharks. Price data for the 
years  1979-1989  were  obtained  from  the  Forum 
Fisheries  Agency  data  base.  These  data  record  ex-
vessel average monthly prices for each species for the 
Japanese port ofYaizu. 
The vessel  level  catch and effort data were aggre-
gated  to  give  monthly  observations  on  catch  and 
fishing  effort consistent with  the format of the price 
data. The resulting data set is  a  time  series  of fleet 
cross-sections  at  the  vessel  level.  The  three  marlin 
species and sailfish were aggregated to form a category 
referred to as 'billfish'. The Fisher ideal index method was  used to calculate quantity and priLe  indices  for 
billfish; this  is  calculated  as  the square  root of the 
product of the  Laspeyres  and  Paasche  indexes.  As 
bluefin  are  a  temperate  species,  those  caught  by 
longline  vessels  in  Papua  ew  Guinea  waters  are 
presumed  to  be  purely  incidental  and are  therefore 
excluded from the analysis. On average, 'other' species 
constitute less than 1.5% of total catch for the Japanese 
fleet  in  any  year  and  are  also  excluded  from  the 
analysis. 
Modelling longline production 
technology 
A revenue maximising framework 
An  economic  theory  to  describe  the  behaviour  of 
fishing  directors  and  skippers  will  need  to  specify 
whether short or long-run  considerations  dominate. 
Profit  maximisation  is  widely  held  as  the  long-run 
objective pursued by fishing firms. However, a case can 
be made for treating profit maximisation as a two-stage 
procedure.  Following  Squires  and  Kirkley  (I  991), 
fishing operations are treated as conforming to a two-
stage procedure in  which  there are short-run (single 
trip) revenue maximisation and long-run profit maxim-
isation objectives. At the individual trip level of fishing 
activity,  a vessel  remains at sea until  catch meets its 
storage capacity. While  at sea,  vessel  size,  or capital 
stock, and vessel characteristics are fixed. The level of 
other inputs such  as  labour and fuel  are essentially 
determined by vessel size and are therefore also fixed 
for any given fishing trip. As the costs of the inputs are 
fixed for the duration of any given fishing trip, then the 
cost per trip can also be considered to be fixed. Facing 
given  total  costs  of  fishing  effort,  the  most  likely 
behaviour  of  fishers  for  any  trip  is  that  which 
maximises revenue. Costs which vary with trip duration 
are assumed to fluctuate randomly as do trip lengths, 
with variable factors such as weather. Over the long-run 
(probably up to ten years or more) finns determine the 
optimal size of vessel and suitable gear and equipment 
types and configurations. The choice of vessel size and 
type  is  a capital investment decision and represents a 
part of the  long-run  profit  maximising  stage  of the 
fishing operation. 
An  Economic Model of Tuna  Longlining 
A generalised Leontief revenue function  (used  by 
Kirkley  and  Strand  1988  and  Squires  and  Kirkley 
1991) can be used to model the revenue maximising 
short-run behaviour of fishers, and with all inputs fixed 
is  equivalent to short-run profit maximisation (Kirkley 
and  Strand  1988).  Functions  describing  the  supply 
decisions of each species can in  turn  be derived from 
the revenue function. Within this framework, revenue 
for species i is postulated to be a function of the price 
of species i, the price of species irelative to the prices of 
other species in the output mix, and the level of inputs 
or fishing effort In  the following analyses the number 
of hooks per month is  used as a  measure of 'fishing 
effort'. 
Economic theory also suggests that supply is deter-
mined  in  part by  the level  of fish  stocks from which 
harvests are taken. Stock or species abundance would 
appear in the supply function as a technical parameter 
in  the  production  process,  rather than  as  a  choice 
variable. Stock level  or species abundance can affect 
harvest  rate  (measured  as  CPU  E)  in  essentially  two 
ways:  (I) through  the  general  abundance  of species 
available to be harvested; and (2) through the density of 
fish  in any particular fishing ground. However, the lack 
of stock  or species  abundance  data  preclude  their 
inclusion  in  this  analysis.  The  omission  of a  stock 
variable from  the supply function could mean that the 
model  described  above  is  mis-specified,  if  species 
abundance is  truly  a  statistically significant  determi-
nant of supply. Whenever a relevant variable is omitted 
from  an econometric model, there is a possibility that 
bias will be introduced into the estimated coefficients if 
there is  any correlation between the omitted variable 
and other explanatory variables in the model (Gujarati 
1988). In the case of the longline fishery, if there were a 
negative  correlation  between  own-price  and  species 
abundance  (price  rises  as  a  species  becomes  more 
scarce), then the potential bias in the estimated own-
price coefficient would be negative. Unfortunately, the 
presence of bias  or its  extent cannot be determined 
empirically, but the possibility of the above bias should 
be  borne  in  mind  when  reviewing  the results of the 
estimations.  Although  the  effects  of stock levels  on 
species supply cannot be incorporated directly into the 
model, fluctuations in  the stocks available to longline 
fleets  from  season to season and year to year can be 
accounted  for  indirectly.  The  inclusions  of dummy 
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variables for season and year are aimed at adjusting 
estimated  supply  responses  in  order to  account for 
such variability. 
The  longline  fishery  in  Papua  New  Guinea's 
exclusive economic zone is  essentially a sub-tropical, 
multi-species  fishery  in  which Japanese vessels  have 
been  present year round. While  fishing  directors are 
believed  to  hold some influence over the prices they 
receive for their vessels' catches, this is not considered 
to be nearly as significant as in  the temperate longline 
fisheries.  Therefore,  ex-vessel  prices  are  treated  as 
exogenous to the vessel. 
As  a  primary aim  of this analysis  is  to gain some 
insights  into  the  underlying technology employed  in 
the longline fishery,  a  functional form  which imposes 
restrictions on technology would limit the scope of the 
analysis.  The  generalised  Leontief  approach  frees 
model estimation of some a priori restrictions on the 
technology employed  by  the  industry,  and allows  for 
technological  restrictions  to  be  tested  rather  than 
imposed. The Leontief fom1 of a revenue function does, 
however,  impose  linear  homogeneity  in  output  (or 
species) prices. Linear homogeneity in output prices, or 
symmetry, implies that the optimal output mix remains 
unchanged if all output prices were to rise (fall)  by the 
same proportion. 
The  mathematical  fonn  of the  revenue  function 
described above is: 
where for any month of fishing activity, R is revenue, Pi 
is the average monthly ex-vessel price of the ith species 
for the Japanese port ofYaizu (for i=yellowfin, albacore, 
bigeye,  billfish,  and  swordfish),  E  is  fishing  effort 
measured in  thousands of hooks, Dk (for k= 1,2,3) are 
dummy variables to account for seasonal variations in 
the  fishery,  and  Yr  (for  F1981,  1982,  1983,  1984, 
1985, 1986, 1987) are dummy variables to account for 
annual fluctuations  in  stock availability  which  could 
result from  environmental factors, changes in  recruit-
ment,  mortality,  vessel  technology  etc.  There  were 
observations  for  the  last  four  months  of  1979  and 
these  were  pooled  with  the  1980  observations. 
Although  the  data  describe  only  the  activities  of 
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longline vessels within Papua New  Guinea's exclusive 
economic zone, the behaviour of fishing directors can 
be assumed to  be consistent across all  fishing zones. 
Furthermore, since the data do not provide any indica-
tion  as to the commencement and finishing dates of 
particular fishing  trips,  a  calendar month  of fishing 
effort is used as the level of observation. For any given 
month of fishing activity, fishers will be following short-
run revenue maximisation objectives and it is assumed 
that this behaviour is consistent not only within fishing 
trips, but also between them. 
If equation (l) is differentiated with respect to price 
p. a series of input-compensated supply equations is  r 
obtained as follows: 
oR / oPj = Qj(PjE} = L#d3ij(Pj / pyl2 E + f3jjE 
+ajE2+LkDjkDkE+LrYjrYrE  (2) 
for all  i. The function Qj(Pj EJ represents the supply of 
species  i  from  a  month  of  fishing  activity  and  is 
measured in tonnes. The resulting series of n equations 
(for n species) can be estimated together as a system to 
obtain infonnation about the structure and technology 
of  the  production  process  in  the  longline  fishery. 
Symmetry  in  the  model  implies  the following  cross-
equation coefficient equalities: f3jj=f3ji for all i:;t: j. 
Following Squires and Kirkley (1991), the technical 
and economic aspects  of the  longline  fishery  which 
influence fishing director behaviour are discussed. It is 
only  with  the  knowledge  of technological  structure, 
economic incentives and costs that suitable manage-
ment  regimes  can  be  designed  and  implemented. 
There  are  various  forms  of  production  technology 
which could characterise the longline fishery. In  order 
to  test  for  the  nature of the  production  technology 
employed  in  the longline  fishery,  log-likelihood  ratio 
procedure which involves imposing restrictions on the 
model in (2) is used. The test statistic for the likelihood 
ratio procedure is  -2[Jncl'R - In1!J, where Incl'u is  the 
log-likelihood  value  of the  unrestricted  model,  and 
Incl'R is the log-likelihood value of the model when the 
restrictions to be tested are imposed. The test statistic 
is  distributed as X2, with degrees of freedom equal to 
the number of restrictions. Tests for technology 
The Japanese longline  fleet  can  be  divided  into  two 
vessel  size  classes:  GRTdOO  and  GRT~lOO (with 
vessels ranging up to 500 GRT). It is  possible that the 
size of vessel affects the CPUE of species in  the output 
mix,  measured as the weight of fish  per hook. Differ-
ences in  catchability due to vessel size may arise from 
differences  in  the state of technology between  larger 
and  smaller vessels;  and  larger vessels  may  have  a 
wider choice of fishing grounds. In  order to  test the 
hypothesis  that  the  size  of  vessel  affects  CPUE, 
equation (2) can be rewritten as: 
Qj(PjE) =  Lj~J3ij(Pj / py/2 E + f3jjE + ajE2 
+  LkojkDkE + Lr  YiI'YrE + ).)IE  (3) 
where V is  a dummy variable which takes the value 0 
for vessels of GRT  d  00 and 1 for vessels of GRT~  1  00. 
The hypothesis that technology is  the same for  both 
vessel sizes is tested, using a likelihood ratio test, in two 
different ways. First by the restriction Ai=O for all  j; and 
second estimating separate subsamples for small and 
large vessels. Rejection of the restriction suggests that 
technology in the fishery is vessel size dependent 
As  the longline fishery  is  a  multispecies fishery,  it 
can be viewed  as a  multi product production process 
with each species treated as a separate output The way 
in which inputs are combined to produce the various 
outputs  has  implications  for  the  response  fishing 
directors  would  have  to  a  variety  of  regulatory 
measures. Inputs to the production process in the short 
run  are fixed  and can  be  regarded  as  a  composite 
input: 'fishing effort'.l If there is no specific interaction 
between effort and the individual species, catch can be 
considered a single composite output and the catch of 
each species is determined by relative prices, independ-
ently of the level  of effort. Generally,  in  a multi-input, 
multi-output production process, constraining the mix 
of inputs does not affect the optimal combination of 
species harvested by vessels, and regulating the species 
mix  in  output has no bearing on  the  mix  of inputs 
combined  to  produce  'effort'  (Squires  and  Kirkley 
(The  implication  with  respect  to  separability  for  using  a 
composite input variable in  the revenue function  is  that inputs 
are assumed to be separable from  outputs (Kirkley  1986).  The 
hypothesis that outputs are separable from inputs is not assumed 
to hold and is tested for. 
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1991). The appropriate restriction to test this hypoth-
esis is ai=O for all i. 
Information  about the ability  of vessels  to  target 
particular species or groups of  species is also embodied 
in  the technology of the fleet By  targeting, it is  meant 
that fishing directors vary the species mix with changes 
in  relative prices of the species in  the output bundle. 
The various species fished will be either complements, 
substitutes or neutral in  production. For example, the 
vertical distribution of yellowfin, albacore and bigeye in 
the  water  column  is  such  that  fishing  the  deeper 
swimming bigeye is  likely to result in  forgoing catches 
of  yellowfin  and  albacore.  Conversely,  harvesting 
species of the surface fishery  (yellowfin)  may comple-
ment  catches  of other  similarly  distributed  species 
(albacore). The statistical significance and signs of the 
estimated f3jjS  and own  and cross-price elasticities of 
supply indicate such relationships between the species 
harvested. 
It is also possible for the catch of some or all species 
in  the output mix  to  be technically  determined and 
therefore  independent  of  relative  prices.  Under  this 
scenario a species, or group of species, will be nonjoint 
in inputs, implying that a separate production function 
exists for the nonjoint species or group of species. If the 
species mix of the catch can be altered by  the fishing 
director and is not technically determined, then regula-
tory measures controlling the exploitation of a partic-
ular  species  can  be  accomplished  through  relative 
price changes or individual species harvest quotas. The 
econometric restriction which applies to a production 
process completely nonjoint in species i is f3iF 0 for all 
j,j~; and if nonjoint in all species is f3ij=  0, i;rjfor all i,J. 
Finally, whether the fishery is  in  equilibrium is also 
determined. If the fishery  is  in  economic equilibrium 
then vessels will  be expending the optimal amount of 
fishing  effort consistent with  the  opportunity cost of 
that effort This equilibrium will  be a long-run equilib-
rium and requires specifically that the marginal return 
per unit of effort  is  equal to  the opportunity cost of 
fishing  effort,  which  we  denote  by  c.  The  marginal 
return  to  effort  can  be  calculated from  the revenue 
function as: 
(4) 
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and when set equal to c gives the long-run equilibrium 
condition. An estimate of c is obtained from Campbell 
and  Nicholl  (1990;  1992a)  in  which  estimates  of 
various  economic  costs  of  fishing  effort  for  the 
Japanese longline fleet are reported. 
Estimations and results 
Initially,  the  five  supply  functions  from  equation  (3) 
were estimated as single equations and heteroskedas-
ticity attributable to the inclusion of the square of effort 
as an independent variable was found to be a problem. 
In  response to this problem each equation was divided 
through by effort with the resulting supply per unit of 
effort equations having the dependent variable CPUE. 
The  series  of  five  functions  was  then  estimated 
together as a system of seemingly unrelated equations 
using  Zellner's  method  of  SURE  estimation  and 
iterated to  convergence. Symmetry in  the model was 
tested  at  the  5%  level  of significance  and  rejected 
(X200)=25.0); since it  is  a  logical  requirement it  was 
imposed  in  subsequent  estimations  via  the  cross-
equation restrictions f3ij 
=  f3ji' all i;t!  j. 
Likelihood ratio tests for the significance of vessel 
size  and  the restriction  that technology  is  the same 
across both vessel size classes were performed sequen-
tially at the 5%  level  of significance. The first of these 
tested the restrictions for the exclusion of the dummy 
variables  V relating to the size of vessel  measured by 
GRT;  the  restrictions  are  Ai=O  for  all  i.  The results 
indicate  that the restrictions should be rejected  and 
that these dummy variables, as a group, are statistically 
significant (X2(5)=221.4). Following this test,  the data 
samples  for  small  and  large  vessels  were  estimated 
separately. The sum of the log  likelihood values from 
these models was compared with that of the combined 
sample  estimate;  the  restriction  that  the  same 
technology is employed across both vessel size classes 
is rejected (X2(80)=700.4). 
Having  established  that the  technology  for  small 
and large  vessels  should  not be  restricted  to  be  the 
same, separate models based on vessel size were then 
estimated and tested for model structure and techno-
logical  characteristics.  Tests  for  symmetry,  the 
inclusion of seasonal and yearly dummies separately as 
a group, input-output separability, and nonjointness in 
inputs  were  calculated  sequentially.  All  tests  were 
carried out at the 5% level of significance. 
Table  7.1  Tests for model structure and technology: small vessel  sample 
Test  No.  of restrictions  Critical X2  Test X2  Reject restriction? 
Symmetry  10  18.31  24.6  Yes 
Season  dummies  15  24.99  110.0  Yes 
Year dummies  35  43.77  2997  Yes 
Season  and year dummies  50  67.51  2865  Yes 
Input-output separability  50  11.07  35.0  Yes 
Overall  nonjointness  5  31.41  142.8  Yes 
Nanjaintness for 
Yellowfin  8  15.51  602  Yes 
Albacore  8  15.51  59.4  Yes 
Bigeye  8  15.51  31.8  Yes 
Billfish  8  15.51  58.8  Yes 
Swordfish  8  15.51  38.4  Yes 
Block nanjaintness 
Yellowfin  and albacore  16  26.30  95.6  Yes 
Yellowfin, albacore  and  bigeye  18  28.87  141.6  Yes 
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(Table 7.1) indicate that symmetry is  rejected and it is 
therefore imposed in all subsequent estimations via the 
appropriate cross-equation  restrictions. Tests for  the 
inclusion of dummy variables to account for seasonal 
and yearly fluctuations in stock availability indicate that 
they are statistically significant, both as separate groups 
and as a combined group. With the inclusion of these 
variables, the model was then re-estimated and tested 
for separability and nonjointness. Input-output separa-
bility  is  rejected  suggesting  that  the  small  vessel 
longline fishery harvest should be considered as multi-
species rather than as an aggregate output of 'tunas'. 
Overall nonjointness is rejected indicating that the five 
species  are  interdependent  and  that  regulating 
harvests of any species will  affect  the exploitation of 
other species in  the output mix. Similarly,  individual 
nonjointness for  each species is  rejected  as  is  block 
nonjointness for yellowfin and albacore and yell owfi n, 
albacore and bigeye. 
Symmetry is also rejected in the large vessel sample 
model (Table 7.2) and is therefore imposed throughout 
subsequent estimations.  Restrictions  to  exclude  the 
dummy variables for seasonal and yearly fluctuations in 
stock availability to the fleet are rejected. Input-output 
separability is also rejected, indicating that large vessel 
fleet  harvest  cannot  be  considered  an  aggregate 
output.  Overall  nonjointness  in  inputs  cannot  be 
rejected,  which  means  that  separate  production 
functions exist for each species and fishing directors of 
large vessels maximise outputs of each species rather 
than adjust species mix with changes in  relative prices 
in order to maximise revenue. For the case of nonjoint-
ness,  the supply of each species  is  perfectly inelastic 
and therefore independent of relative prices. 
Table  7.2  Tests for model structure and technology:  large vessel sample 
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The full  results from  the estimation of the supply 
systems  for  the  small  and  large  vessel  fleets  are 
reported  in  Tables  7.3  and 7.4.  A discussion  of the 
results treats the small and large vessel sample estima-
tions separately. Throughout the following discussion, 
longline activity in Papua New Guinea waters is defined 
as  the  'Iongline  fishery'  which  is  comprised  of  five 
sectors,  in  turn  defined  by  species  harvested,  and is 
exploited  by  the  two  broadly  defined  fleets  outlined 
above-small and large vessels. Statistical significance 
is accepted at the 5% level. 
Small vessel fleet 
The coefficient  on  E  in  the  CPUE  equations  is  the 
coefficient on £2 in the supply equations and indicates 
the  marginal  effect  on  the  increase  in  output  of 
increasing the number of hooks fished  by  1000 in  a 
month. The law  of diminishing marginal  productivity 
implies that with a constant fish  stock, as the number 
of hooks  fished  increases,  the  marginal  increase  in 
CPUE for each unit increase in hooks fished will be less 
than  for  the  previous  unit  of  increase.  Decreasing 
supply per unit of effort arises  largely from  the fixed 
nature of the exploited resource. The estimated coeffi-
cients in  all  but the bigeye sector of the small vessel 
fleet are not statistically different from zero, suggesting 
constant marginal productivity of effort. The estimated 
coefficient for the bigeye sector is  negative, an indica-
tion of diminishing marginal productivity. The result of 
constant  marginal  productivity  of  effort  for  most 
sectors  suggests  that  profit  could  be  increased  by 
increasing the number of hooks fished per month and 
hence vessel size; however, the attractiveness of such a 
change could be offset by Japanese government policy 
on  vessel  licences  and  taxation  policies  which  has 
favoured the construction of vessels under 100 GRT. 
Test  No.  of restrictions  Critical x 2  Test x 2  Reject restriction? 
Symmetry  10  18.31  812  Yes 
Season  dummies  15  24.99  103.3  Yes 
Year dummies  35  43.77  1129  Yes 
Season  and year dummies  50  67.51  1216  Yes 
Input-output separability  5  11.07  25.6  Yes 
Overall  nonjointness  20  31.41  242  No 
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The coefficient on the constant in  each equation 
signifies  the own-price  effect  on  supply  decisions;  a 
positive  coefficient  is  expected.  The estimated  own-
price  coefficients  are  positive  for  all  but the  billfish 
sector, suggesting that supply of each species (barring 
billfish)  increases in  response to  rising species  price 
independently of the prices of other species. A statisti-
cally insignificant own-price coefficient for billfish may 
indicate that harvests of that species are incidental. 
In  the  yellowfin  supply  equation  the  cross-price 
coefficients for albacore and billfish are negative, which 
indicates  that these  species  are  both  substitutes  in 
production with yellowfin. The same holds by symmetry 
for the albacore and billfish sectors with yellowfin. This 
result  is  somewhat  unexpected  for  albacore  and 
yellowfin  since  they  are  believed  to  have  a  similar 
vertical  distribution  in  the water column. The result 
could,  however,  be  indicating  a  difference  in  the 
regional distribution of the two species. The cross-price 
coefficients  for  bigeye and swordfish  in  the yellowfin 
equation are not statistically different from zero. In the 
albacore supply equation there is a negative cross-price 
coefficient for bigeye (the same holding by symmetry for 
the bigeye sector) and this indicates that albacore and 
bigeye are substitutes in production for the small vessel 
fleet This  result  is  consistent with  what is  generally 
known about the vertical distribution of these species, 
with  the deeper swimming bigeye  being harvested by 
vessels switching from regular to deep longlining. In the 
bigeye  equation there is  a  negative cross-price coeffi-
cient with  swordfish  (and by  symmetry with  bigeye  in 
the swordfish equation) suggesting that these species 
are also substitutes in  production. It is  possible that 
swordfish are distributed similarly to albacore and that 
changes in  the longline  method, which  target bigeye 
but result  in  lower  albacore  CPUE,  affect  swordfish 
catches in the same manner. 
Many  of the estimated coefficients  for  the dummy 
variables which were included to account for seasonality 
of the  longline  fishery  are  not statistically significant, 
indicating that CPUE for most species does not fluctuate 
on a quarterly basis. Recall that the base quarter for the 
model  estimations  is  June-August  and  the  dummy 
variables  indicate  changes  in  CPUE  relative  to  that 
quarter.  Yellowfin  CPUE  is  greatest  in  June-August, 
dropping  significantly  in  September-November,  and 
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although increasing again for  the quarters December-
May  has  remained  below  that  for  the  first  quarter. 
A1bacore CPUE is greater in the March-May period than 
in any other quarter, and for bigeye, CPUE is greatest in 
the  December-February  quarter  with  no  significant 
change between the other three quarters. There appears 
to be no influence by seasonal factors in the billfish and 
swordfish sectors of the fishery. 
Changes in  CPUE  for  each year compared to  the 
base year 0980} for each species are interpreted from 
the  coefficients  on  the yearly  dummy variables.  The 
issue of annual fluctuations in CPUE for each species is 
addressed in  detail in  Campbell and Nicholl 0992b}. 
Yellowfin  CPUE  was  lower  in  all  successive years  of 
fishing from  1981 to 1987 except for  1983 in which it 
was  not statistically different  from  1980. The largest 
falls  in CPUE relative to 1980 occurred in  1981, 1986 
and  1987. For albacore, CPUE was generally greater 
throughout the 1980s than it was at the beginning of 
the  period  0981,  1983,  1984  and  1986}.  In  1982, 
1985 and 1987 it was  not significantly different from 
1980. CPUE  of bigeye was  lower in  1981,  1982 and 
1983 than  it  was  in  1980,  not significantly  different 
from  1980 in 1984-86 and greater in 1987. For billfish 
CPUE there were only two years that were significantly 
different from the base period; 1985 and 1986 in which 
CPUE  was  greater.  Swordfish  CPUE  was  lower  in 
1982-84 than the base year and higher in  1985-86 
than in the base year. 
Large vessel sample 
The large vessel sample exhibits nonjointness in inputs 
over all species. This implies that the cross-price terms 
do  not appear in  the equations for  the  large  vessel 
sample  model  and  that  the  species  composition  of 
supply is  independent of all  species prices. The large 
vessel component of the overalllongline fishery can be 
viewed as a combination of single species stocks which 
are exploited by a common form of effort. 
All estimated coefficients for the constant terms are 
positive except for that of albacore which is not signifi-
cantly  different  from  zero.  This  indicates  that  there 
cannot  be  negative  fitted  values  for  supply  of any 
species.  The  yellowfin,  albacore  and  swordfish 
equations all have statistically insignificant coefficients 
on the variable E, indicating constant marginal produc-An  Economic Model of  Tuna  Longlining 
Table  7.3  Parameter estimates for small vessel  sample: dependent variable  Is  CPUE 
Variable  Estimated  coefficient  t-ratio  Variable  Estimated coefficient  t-ratio 
Yellownn  SWordnsh  Icontd.l 
Constant  630.51 a  18.105  1981  -0.6219  -1.0832 
Effort  0.2550  1.0046  1982  -1.4875a  -3.0041 
PA/P y  -57.689a  -3.4331  1983  -1.8169a  -3.6338 
PE/P y  37.484  1.8833  1984  -1.608oa  -2.5293 
PB/P y  -2.4422a  -3.2212  1985  1.6088a  2.8482 
PW/Py  -0.4359  -0.1760  1986  2.6509a  3.7778 
Season:  2nd  Qtr  -97.298a  -7.0818  1987  1.6688  0.9697 
3rd  Qtr  -42.301a  -3.0788  1981  -0.6219  -1.0832 
4th  Qtr  -41.038a  -3.0252  Albacore 
1981  -225.28a  -14.195  Constant  122.07a  80201 
1982  -180.59a  -11.219  Effort  0.0162  0.2282 
1983  20.718  1.2315  Py/P A  -57.689a  -3.4331 
1984  -154.62a  -7.9617  PE/PA  -38.118a  -3.4064 
1985  -135.65a  -7.2346  PB/P A  1.0818  1.1517 
1986  -227.68a  -11.084  Pw/P A  -01014  -00388 
1987  -309.00a  -5.2892  Season: 2nd  Qtr  -1.7220  -0.4243 
Blgeye  3rd  Qtr  -4.8599  -1.1509 
Constant  122.36a  6.9478  4th  Qtr  8.7765a  2.1225 
Effort  -0.4027a  -5.4564  1981  26.845a  5.4218 
Py/PE  37.484  1.8833  1982  2.3451  0.4565 
PA/PE  -38.118a  -3.4064  1983  29.012a  5.6279 
PB/PE  0.3565  0.6819  1984  38.306a  5.7563 
Pw/PE  -4.2171 a  -2.5878  1985  -5.6644  -1.0112 
Season: 2nd  Qtr  2.2567  0.5256  1986  13.693a  2.0960 
3rd  Qtr  21.487a  4.7582  1987  31.674  1.8218 
4th  Qtr  7.7988  1.7736  811msh 
Blgeye  Constant  1.0480  1.4699 
1981  -62.050a  -12.060  Effort  -0.0004  -0.2463 
1982  -47.011a  -9.2407  Py/P B  -2.4422a  -3.2212 
1983  -10.288a  -2.0471  PA/PB  1.0818  1.1517 
1984  -7.7821  -1.3077  PE/PB  0.3565  0.6819 
1985  8.3626  1.4855  Pw/P B  0.2937  0.4002 
1986  -5.9938  -0.9796  Season:  2nd  Qtr  0.1529  1.3719 
1987  53.957a  3.1522  3rdQtr  0.0759  0.5926 
SWonlllsh  4th  Qtr  0.0471  0.3895 
Constant  6.3800a  3.0607  BII~lsh 
Effort  -0.0043  -0.6711  1981  0.1230  0.7561 
Py/Pw  -u.4358  -0.1760  1982  -0.2493  -1.7365 
PA/Pw  -0.1014  -0.0388  1983  -0.1475  -1.0122 
PE/Pw  -4.2171 a  -2.5878  1984  -0.0093  -0.0451 
PB/Pw  0.2937  0.4002  1985  0.7119a  4.1263 
Season: 2nd  Qtr  0.5992  1.5964  1986  0.6423a  2.9864 
3rd  Qtr  0.2181  0.5121  1987  0.2794  0.5410 
4th  Qtr  0.6572  1.6304 
alndlcates significant at the  5%  level for two-tall test 
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tivity of effort in these sectors of the fishery. The bigeye 
and billfish equations have negative coefficients on the 
variable E suggesting decreasing marginal productivity 
for  large  vessels  in  these sectors of the fishery.  This 
latter result implies that the species composition of the 
catch varies with the amount of effort used. 
Seasonal  effects,  indicated  by  the coefficients  on 
the quarterly dummy variables, are more evident for the 
large vessel fleet than for small vessels. Yellowfin CPUE 
is lower for the September-November quarter, but not 
significantly different in  the third and fourth quarters 
from the first quarter (Table 7.4). For albacore, CPUE is 
greater in  the December-February quarter than  the 
other three quarters whereas for bigeye, CPUE is lowest 
in  the  September-November  quarter  as  it  is  for 
yellowfin  and  greatest  in  the  December-February 
quarter. For billfish, CPUE is  marginally higher during 
the September-February quarter than at other times of 
the  year,  while  CPUE  of  swordfish  appears  to  be 
marginally  lower  throughout  the  December-May 
period than for the rest of the year. If we compare these 
observations with those of the small vessel fleet we find 
there is little similarity between them. Yellowfin CPUE, 
while falling from  the first to second quarters for both 
fleets,  remains  lower  for  the small  vessels  while  not 
being  significantly  different  in  the  third  and  fourth 
quarters  to  the  first  for  the  large  vessel  sample. 
Albacore  CPUE  increases for  one quarter relative  to 
other quarters  for  both  the  small  and  large  vessel 
samples.  With  respect  to  bigeye  CPUE,  both  fleets 
experience  an  increase  in  the  November-February 
quarter and  there  is  a  marginal  seasonal  effect  on 
billfish  and  swordfish  CPUE  experienced  by  large 
vessels. There appears to be no seasonal effect on the 
small vessel catches of these species. 
The yearly variations in  supply of each species for 
the large vessel fleet is, on the other hand, very similar 
to  the  effects  observed  for  the  small  vessel  fleet. 
Yellowfin  CPUE was lower in  1981-82 and 1984-86 
than for other years. There is a similar observation for 
bigeye, where CPUE was lower from  1981-85 than in 
1980  and  not  significantly  different  in  1986-87. 
Annual variation in albacore stock availability appears 
to  have  been  more moderate than for  yellowfin  and 
bigeye,  being slightly  greater in  1981  and  1983-84 
than  in  1980 and not significantly different  in  other 
years. Although variations for billfish and swordfish are 
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statistically significant they are small compared with 
those associated with the main tuna spe.cies. 
Long-run equilibrium 
Using  the  expression  from  equation  (4)  we  can 
calculate the marginal return per unit of effort for the 
'average' small and large vessel of each sample. Calcu-
lated  on  a  monthly  basis  and using  mean values  of 
effort and prices, and where 1000 hooks is taken as the 
unit  measure  of effort aRlaE for  the  average  small 
vessel  is  ¥450 190  (with  a  mean  monthly  effort  of 
31527  hooks)  and  for  the average  large  vessel  it  is 
¥489840  (with  a  mean  monthly  effort  of  34065 
hooks).2 Estimates of the opportunity cost of effort are 
derived  from  Table  I,  Appendix  D in  Campbell and 
Nicholl (1992a). From these estimates it is  possible to 
average total cost per vessel per year for the fiscal years 
1979-80 to  1986-87 and convert this to a  monthly 
estimate, which  is  then divided  by  the sample mean 
level  of effort to give  the mean long-run average total 
cost per thousand hooks. There is some debate about 
the actual  magnitude of access fees  paid during the 
1980s. The intention of the host country was to collect 
4%  of gross revenue. An  analysis of vessel  returns by 
the Forum Fisheries Agency (1986) for the year 1985 
suggests  that on  average,  access  fees  for  small  and 
large  vessels  were  at  the  intended  level.  Doulman 
(1990)  on  the  other  hand  suggests  that Japanese 
industry sources rated access fees at between 0.2% and 
0.6%  of operating costs. The test of long-run equilib-
rium in  this analysis is based on the 4% of revenue fee 
level.  The  mean  estimated  value  of  the  marginal 
product of effort for each vessel class is  multiplied by 
0.96 to give  a net-of-access-fee figure which can then 
be compared with the unit cost of effort. For the large 
class of vessels, Campbell and Nicholl report costs for 
100-200 GRT  and 200-500 GRT vessels and it was 
decided  to  calculate a weighted  average  total cost of 
effort  for  the  large  vessels  based on  the  number of 
observations  for  each  size  class  in  the  sample  (~ee 
footnote 2). 
z.rhis is a weighted average based on the number of observations 
in  the large vessel  sample which  pertain to vessels of 100-200 
GRT (846 observations) and 200-500 GRT (37 observations); the 
mean level  of effort for the fonner size was  34101 and for the 
latter it was  33253 hooks. Mean sample prices/kilogram were: 
yellowfin  ¥582;  albacore  ¥440;  bigeye  ¥795;  billfish  ¥876; 
swordfish ¥786. An  Economic Model of Tuna  Longlining 
Table H  Parameter estimates for large vessel samples: dependent variable is CPUE 
Variable  Estimated coefficient  t-ralto  Variable  Estimated  coefficient  t-ratlo 
Yellowftn  AJbacore 
Constant  776.48a  21.085  Constant  14.189  1.0482 
Effort  -1.0465b  -1.9006  Effort  0.0069  0.0202 
Season: 2nd  Qtr  -73.013a  -2.2701  Season: 2nd  QIr  3.3457  0.2830 
3rd  Qtr  0.0628  0.0022  3rd  Qtr  -29.124a  -2.5405 
4th  Qtr  -49.282  -1.5778  4th  Qtr  9.5112  0.8284 
Year.  1981  -278.56a  -7.9981  Year.  1981  37.650a  2.9410 
1982  -263.74a  -6.8762  1982  27.420  1.9450 
1983  15.564  0.40317  1983  109.61a  7.7247 
1984  -203.4oa  -5.0226  1984  50.174a  3.3705 
1985  -166.74a  -4.2641  1985  14.695  1.0223 
1986  -283.4~  -5.7243  1986  26.162  1.4375 
1987  -254.24  -0.7929  1987  14.666  0.1244 
Blgeye  Blllftsh 
Constant  152.21a  15.953  Constant  0.6429a  5.8879 
Effort  -0.5037a  -4.2924  Effort  -0.0037a  -2.2876 
Season: 2nd  QIr  -15.097a  -2.2024  Season: 2nd  QIr  0.4274a  4.4819 
3rd  Qtr  18.235a  2.7433  3rd  Qtr  0.3409a  3.6858 
4th  Qtr  6.6577  1.0001  4th  Qtr  0.0511  0.5523 
Year.  1981  -50.100a  -6.7494  Year.  1981  -0.2865a  -2.7743 
1982  -47.115a  -5.7634  1982  -0.3202a  -2.8157 
1983  -27.539a  -3.3471  1983  -0.2475a  -2.1620 
1984  -22.520a  -2.6091  1984  -0.1551  -1.2913 
1985  -10.992  -1.3189  1985  0.8764a  7.5583 
1986  -9.8774  -0.9360  1986  0.7170a  4.8840 
1987  84.680  1.2390  1987  0.4973  0.5231 
SWordftsh 
Constant  2.4856a  5.7435 
Effort  0.0033  0.5077 
Season: 2nd  Qtr  -0.2881  -0.7622 
3rd  Qtr  -1.1664a  -3.1824 
4th  Qtr  -0.8378a  -2.2826 
Year.  1981  -0.3788  -0.9256 
1982  -0.9801a  -2.1745 
1983  -1.5456a  -3.4069 
1984  -1.4528a  -3.0527 
1985  2.0504a  4.4621 
1986  2.8446a  4.4888 
1987  -1.4454  -0.3836 
alndlcates significant at the 5%  level for two-tall test; bfor one-tall test 
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The estimate of c for  the average small  vessel  is 
¥398247  and  for  the  average  large  vessel  it  is 
¥633802. At the 5% level both estimates of c are signif-
icantly different from  the respective values of aRlaE; 
¥51943 less for small vessels (t-statistic, 4.6444) and 
¥143960 greater for large vessels (t-statistic, -5.620). 
These results  indicate that on average, small vessels 
have contributed less  than the economically optimal 
level of effort per month for Papua New Guinea waters 
while the opposite was the case for the large vessels. As 
the  Japanese  government  exercises  considerable 
influence over the allocation of its distant water fishing 
fleets  between regions, and provides subsidies to  the 
industry  which  could  well  distort  the  economic 
decision-making process of fishing firms,  a misalloca-
tion of fishing effort, from an economic perspective, is 
quite  plausible.  Furthermore,  in  the  short  run,  the 
relationship  between  marginal  revenue  product and 
the opportunity cost of fishing effort can be affected by 
stock  fluctuations  and  relationships  with  other 
fisheries. 
Conclusion 
The estimates of the production  technologies  of the 
small and large vessel fleets, together with information 
available  about  costs,  can  be  used  to  draw  some 
conclusions which are relevant to the management of 
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the fishery. The conclusions relate mainly to manage-
ment options and the efficiency of the fleet The results 
suggest  that  large  longliners  lack  the  ability  to 
influence the species composition of their catch. This 
means that a policy of conserving one or a subset of the 
species currently fished and concentrating on harvest-
ing  the other species  is  not practicable where  these 
vessels  operate. Small longliners, on the other hand, 
are able to respond to individual species quotas, or to 
incentives such as differential royalties, to some extent 
by  targeting  particular species.  This  means  that the 
range of management policy measures and outcomes 
is broader where small vessels are operating. This infor-
mation may be useful to Pacific island countries which 
are considering establishing their own longline fleets. 
In  long-run  equilibrium  it  is  expected  that 
individual vessels will devote effort to the fishery up to 
the point at which  the  marginal  revenue  product of 
effort  equals  its  opportunity  cost  This  equilibrium 
condition was tested for both vessel size samples. It was 
found  that, on average, small vessels are contributing 
less, and large vessels more, than the long-run equilib-
rium  level  of  effort.  Since  the  differences  are  not 
substantial, and since in the short run this relationship 
can be affected by stock fluctuations and relationships 
with  other fisheries, it  cannot be concluded that the 
behaviour of individual vessels in the fleet is inefficient Chapter 
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Longline fishery has been an important part of Papua 
New  Guinea's  tuna  industry,  with  the  activities  of 
Japanese  fleets  by  far  outweighing  the  activities  of 
longline  vessels  from  any  other nation.  Tunas  and 
billfish harvested by longline vessels were, up until the 
early  1970s,  supplied  as  canning  material  for  the 
Japanese  and  other processing  industries.  However, 
since  the  early  1970s the  more  lucrative  'fresh  fish' 
product markets of Japan have become the destination 
of longline catches. 
Although  Japanese  fleet  activities  in  Papua New 
Guinea waters ceased in March 1987, with the expiry of 
a bilateral access agreement there remains the possi-
bility  of  renewed  Japanese  longline  activity,  or  of 
longlining by  the fleets  of other distant water fishing 
nations  in  Papua New  Guinea's  exclusive  economic 
zone. The western Pacific region, and in particular the 
waters of Papua New Guinea and the Federated States 
of Micronesia, offer productive fishing grounds which 
are rich  in  deep water fish  resources, especially tunas 
and tuna-like species. The re-emergence of a  Papua 
New Guinea domestic tuna fleet in the form of longline 
vessels, also remains a possibility. There has been little 
work undertaken  to  establish  the economic  interac-
tions  among  species  exploited  by  longliners,  and 
between longline and other gear types. It is only on the 
basis of an understanding of the underlying production 
technology and determinants of economic behaviour 
in  the  longline  fishery  that  the  potential  effects  of 
management  policies  and  conflicts  with  other gear 
types on longline fleet operations can be assessed. 
The longline fishery in Papua New 
Guinea 
An overview of  the biology 
The western Pacific offers a wide  range of tunas and 
billfish to the industrial fishing fleets which operate in 
the region. The distribution of species is determined in 
the most part by  water temperature, although ocean 
currents are also recognised as an important factor. In 
broad terms,  the most significant gradations of water 
temperature are from the tropical waters of the equato-
rial  region, in  both northerly and southerly directions, 
and from  the sea surface (or mixed  layer)  to deeper 
layers of the water column. 
The main  tuna species  harvested  in  the  tropical 
longline fishery of Papua New Guinea are yellowfin and 
bigeye,  with  incidental  catches  of  albacore.  Other 
catches are of billfishes, namely striped, blue and black 
marlins, together with sail fish  and swordfish. In  terms 
of catch by weight, yellowfin  is  the dominant species, 
followed  by  bigeye  then  albacore. In  general,  bigeye 
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inhabit  a  lower  region  of  the  water  column  than 
albacore and are therefore more vulnerable to a deeper 
longline method of fishing. This suggests that fishing 
directors may be able to switch to some extent between 
fishing  either bigeye  or albacore in  conjunction with 
yellowfin catches, although it has been suggested that 
targeting bigeye could mean forgoing yellowfin catches 
to some degree. This is  because yellowfin  and bigeye 
have different vertical distributions in the water column 
(SPC  1989).  However, the bulk of albacore harvests 
from  the south Pacific are taken from  more southerly 
regions (30-40S and east of New Zealand), where they 
are targeted in  the troll  and what was  previously the 
drift-gillnet surface fisheries (SPC 1989 and 1992b). 
Although catch per unit effort (CPU E) of the various 
tuna species fluctuates on an annual basis, variation in 
stock abundance due to factors other than exploitation 
are believed to be minor. In  cases where fluctuations 
are observed, they are most likely  attributable to  the 
age class structures of particular stocks. The effect of 
'simple age class' structures on catches is that when a 
strong year class  is  recruited to the stock, catches of 
this class will  be relatively  higher (and dominated by 
this year class) for a season or two, until the class disap-
pears  resulting  in  a  drop  in  CPUE  (Suda  1972). 
However,  tuna stocks  in  the western  Pacific  are  not 
widely believed to exhibit such 'simple age class' fluctu-
ations. Stocks of marlins in the Pacific are not believed 
to be susceptible to significant fluctuations either, and 
an observed declining trend in catch rates for blue and 
black marlins over the period 1974-1980 is likely to be 
due to longlining activities (Suzuki 1989). 
History of the fishery 
The longline fishery in Papua New Guinea continues to 
be concentrated in the northern region of the exclusive 
economic zone. Although there has been some Korean 
and Taiwanese vessels  in  this  fishery  throughout  the 
1980s,  their  activities  have  remained  insignificant 
relative  to  the operations of the Japanese fleet which 
expanded  rapidly  throughout  the  1950s  and  ceased 
operations  in  Papua  New  Guinea  in  1987.  To  the 
Japanese longline fleets, Papua New Guinea waters have 
represented a productive and reliable source of tropical 
tuna species which were originally harvested for canning 
material,  and  from  the  mid-1970s  for  high  grade 
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sashimi, katsubushi and similar products. A breakdown 
of longline catch for  the Papua New  Guinea exclusive 
economic zone by year and species is given in Table 8.1. 
Yellowfin has featured prominently in both phases of the 
Japanese longlining industry; together with  albacore in 
the first  phase when the bulk of tunas landed in Japan 
were canned or exported as canning material, and then 
subsequently with bigeye as the focus of activity switched 
to  supplying  the  more  lucrative  Japanese  domestic 
market for 'fresh fish' products. Table 8.1  shows that for 
the period 1980-1986, yellowfin as a proportion of total 
longline fleet catch in Papua New Guinea waters ranged 
from 72-82%. 
The  level  of  longlining  activity  in  Papua  New 
Guinea, although fluctuating during previous decades, 
peaked in  1982 before declining thereafter to cease in 
1987  (SPC  1988a).  CPUE  for  the  longline  fleet  is 
reported to have decreased since 1979 in  Papua New 
Guinea's  exclusive  economic  zone,  although  it 
remained higher in Papua New Guinea than elsewhere 
in  the Pacific region (SPC  1988a). Speculation about 
the causes of declines in CPUE for the longline fishery 
has  ranged  from  changes  in  targeted  species  and 
accompanying  changes  in  fishing  methods,  to  the 
potential for interaction between the purse seine and 
longline fisheries through yellowfin stocks. 
Most of the effort in the fishery has come from the 
smaller class of vessels, which are less than 100 GRT. 
Between 1984 and 1987 vessels smaller than 100 GRT 
caught from 77.9-91.4% of the total annual landings of 
tuna by Japanese longline vessels  (FFA  1989b). The 
smaller vessels  have fished  in  waters closer to Japan, 
whereas  the  larger  vessels  have  made  longer  trips 
fishing the more valuable temperate species, in  partic-
ular bluefin. Prior to the 1960s most longline activity 
was within  the equatorial band ION-lOS, but during 
this decade attention began to turn to more intensive 
harvesting  of billfish  (primarily  marlins  and sailfish) 
which  required  vessels  fishing  beyond  the equatorial 
zone. The move towards including billfish  in  longline 
harvests was prompted by Japanese market acceptance 
of them as sashimi products (Caton and Ward 1989). 
After  the  mid-1970s,  competition  to  Japanese 
longliners  supplying  albacore  as  canning  material 
emerged from  the expanding Korean and Taiwanese 
fleets.  This  led  to  a  further  shift  by  the  Japanese 
longline  fleets  towards  supplying  the  Japanese The  Tuna  Longline Fishery  in  Papua  New Guinea 
Table  8.1  Papua  New Guinea  exclusive  economic lone, long line  catch  by speciesa, 1980-86 (tonnes) 
Yellowfin  Albacore  Bigeye 
1980  10146  280  1768 
(80.8)  (2.2)  (14.1) 
1981  8474  940  1264 
(77.2)  (8.6)  (11.5) 
1982  9008  366  1449 
(82.1)  (3.4)  (13.2) 
1983  9510  745  1485 
(79.9)  (6.3)  (12.5) 
1984  5178  609  1164 
(64.3)  (7.6)  (14.4) 
1985  7532  159  1761 
(76.0)  (1.6)  (17.8) 
1986  4594  152  1271 
(72.2)  (2.4)  (20.0) 
a Agures  In brackets are percentages. May not add  to  100 due to  rounding. 
Source: Compiled  from  South  Pacific  Commission  catch  data. 
domestic sashimi  market The  1970s represented  a 
period of significant structural change for the industry. 
The first  of the world  oil  price shocks, together with 
emerging  trends  of  labour  shortages  manifested  in 
increasing crew costs, signalled a new era of high cost 
operations for longline (and other distant water) fleets. 
Faced with  seemingly little  ability  to  increase  CPUE, 
supplying higher value markets was seen as  a way  of 
offsetting  the  effects  of  rising  costs.  These  circum-
stances prompted a large scale modernisation of the 
Japanese longline fleets.  The modernisation program 
effectively  adopted  two  main  approaches  to  dealing 
with the deteriorating economic position of these fleets. 
One aspect was  the development of equipment and 
freezing techniques suitable for  handling and storing 
sashimi  grade  fish.  The  innovation  in  freezing 
techniques served two purposes -it  enabled the higher 
value market to be supplied, and increased campaign 
duration (thereby lowering costs). A second aspect was 
an  increase  in  vessel  size  combined  with  increased 
mechanisation  aimed  at decreasing  labour  require-
ments and increasing fishing power (Caton and Ward 
1989). In addition to the above vessel changes, fishing 
directors began attempting to increase catches of more 















216  45  33  71 
(1.7)  (0.4)  (0.3)  (0.6) 
156  32  40  67 
(1.4)  (0.3)  (0.4)  (0.6) 
82  19  13  28 
(0.8)  (0.2)  (0.1)  (0.3) 
101  86  40  220 
(0.9)  (0.1)  (0.1)  (0.2) 
678  56  82  275 
(8.4)  (0.7)  (1.0)  (3.4) 
366  64  13  15 
(3.7)  (0.7)  (0.1)  (0.2) 
266  62  10  5 
(4.2)  (0.1)  (0.2)  (O.Q7) 
valuable  and  deeper  swimming  bigeye  relative  to 
catches of albacore. They achieved  this  by  changing 
their  fishing  technique  from  'regular'  to  'deep' 
longlining, effectively fishing a deeper segment of the 
water column by increasing the number of hooks per 
basket (Caton  and Ward  1989). By  the  early  1980s 
deep  longlining  had all  but replaced  the  traditional 
'regular longlining' method (SPC 1988a). 
Longline fishing technique 
The practice of longline  fishing  is  a  well  established 
method  of  catching  mid  and  deep-layer  swimming 
tunas and billfish, typically older and hence larger than 
those of the surface fisheries. Longline gear consists of 
a mainline (which can be up to  130 km  in  length) to 
which  branchlines (or snoods) with  baited hooks are 
attached. By attaching buoys to  the main line (usually 
300-350 m spacing) a series of catenaries (also known 
as 'baskets') are formed, each catenary allowing a range 
of depths in the water column to be fished in one set of 
the  line.  Details  of  the  search,  set  and  retrieval 
techniques  are  given  by  Baron  (989)  and  Medley 
(989). 
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All  longline vessels employ a wide range of modem 
electronic equipment in the search for potential fishing 
grounds and the location of schools of fish.  Satellite 
navigation  and  weather  receiving  equipment  allow 
skippers  a  high  degree  of accuracy  in  mapping the 
location of productive fishing grounds and predicting 
favourable  conditions  for  line  sets  and  retrieval. 
Satellite transmissions also offer accurate information 
on sea surface  temperature  contours covering  large 
areas. Using satellite data together with information on 
oceanic currents, fishing  directors can carefully  plan 
locations  and  orientations  for  line  sets,  significantly 
reducing  the  random  component  of searching  for 
fishing  sites.  As  Japanese  fishers  believe  tunas  and 
billfish swim parallel to regional currents, longline sets 
are typically made perpendicular to prevailing currents; 
this  also  minimises  the chance that lines  will  tangle 
during a set (Medley 1989). Other devices used to help 
identify  potential fishing  sites  include echo sounders 
for  detecting  fish  beneath  the  surface,  radar  for 
detecting  sea  bird  activity,  sea  water  temperature 
sensors  and  radio  direction  finders  used  to  locate 
buoy-mounted transmitters which mark the location of 
the end of a line set 
The depth to which a longline sinks is determined 
primarily by the interval between buoys and the speed 
at which the line is paid. Baited hooks (both fresh and 
frozen) are placed at intervals in a specific order across 
the  baskets.  Regular  longlining  uses  between  5-7 
hooks per basket and is more likely to result in harvests 
of fish which inhabit the mid- layer of the water column. 
In  order to  catch deeper swimming species (such as 
bigeye)  the  number of hooks  per  basket  has  been 
varied from 10-14 allowing the lower part of the line to 
sink farther. One of the trade-offs associated with  this 
change in technique is that fewer billfish are likely to be 
caught as  they  are  primarily  surface  swimmers  and 
therefore  more  vulnerable  to  regular  longline  gear 
(Suzuki  1989). There is  also  a  possibility  that fewer 
yellowfin  will  be  caught  as  their  movements  are 
generally  restricted  to  the  mixed  layer  above  the 
thennocline; however, there is  no conclusive evidence 
that this  has  been  the case  (SPC  1988a).  As  noted 
earlier,  a  general  shift  towards  the  use  of  deep 
longlining  gear  amongst  Japanese  longline  vessels 
began in  the mid-1970s; by  1983 almost all Japanese 
vessels were using this type of gear (SPC 1988a). 
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During line retrieval the vessel will slow or stop only 
if a valuable catch is to be landed. Tunas are processed 
immediately and handled in a way which minimises the 
stress experienced by fish; excessive stress can result in 
deterioration of the meat quality (often referred to as 
'burning'  of  the  flesh).  Tunas  are  bled,  gutted  and 
tagged  for  identification.  Billfish  have  the  sword 
removed  before  being  gilled,  gutted  and  filleted 
(marlins are not filleted),  weighed and frozen  (Baron 
1989). The overriding concern with  both  tunas  and 
billfish,  however,  is  the  handling  of the  fish  during 
preparation for freezing, as quality and price are highly 
correlated. Both types of fish can command high prices 
in the sashimi market Fishing ground, season and the 
reputation  of the fishing  director are other determi-
nants of price. 
Japanese longline  vessel  catches  have  historically 
been  sold  at  markets  by  auction  at  various  ports 
around Japan. However,  in  recent years about 75% of 
the deep frozen  sashimi tuna has been sold through 
what  are known  as  'whole-ship  deals',  where  buyers 
negotiate the sale of an entire vessel  catch while the 
returning vessel  is  in  transit (Fujinami  1986b). This 
system  is  only effective when  both buyers and sellers 
have sufficient experience with respect to the effects on 
quality  of  season,  fishing  ground  and  handling 
procedure. 
Interaction with other fisheries 
As  most longline  fisheries  supply  high  quality,  high 
value  markets,  they  are generally  accepted  as  being 
able to generate the highest returns from  the exploit-
ation  of  tuna  and  tuna-like  species.  Since  longline 
catches are typically of larger fish,  there are concerns 
regarding  the delayed  effect  on  longlining  from  the 
exploitation  of  smaller  fish  (Forum  Fisheries 
Committee 1990; Campbell and Nicholl 1992b; Medley 
1989;  Suzuki  1986  and  1988),  particularly  the 
potential  effects  of purse seine yellowfin  catches on 
longline harvests. 
Fonteneau (1986)  defined  three  classes  of inter-
action  (I)  inter-generational  whereby,  for  example, 
excessive exploitation of the adult portion of a stock 
leads to declining reproductive potential of the popula-
tion; (2) intra-generational, where a species is exploited 
by different fisheries at different stages of its life cycle (the  yellowfin  example);  and  (3)  intra-generational 
where a common stock is exploited by several fisheries 
and  the same  or similar cohorts  are  caught  in  the 
different fisheries. 
Other fisheries which have  the potential  to impact 
on a sector of the longline fishery are the troll and drift-
giIInet  albacore  fisheries,  although  activities  of  the 
latter have  been reduced significantly in  recent years 
(by  international  agreement).  While  both  of  these 
fisheries have operated mainly in  the southern regions 
of the Pacific (south of 30S), the underlying population 
of albacore is  possibly common to all  western  Pacific 
fishery stocks. While the question of albacore depletion 
through  interaction  with  other  fleets  is  not  as 
important an issue with respect to longlining activities 
in  Papua  New  Guinea  waters  as  that  of  yellowfin 
depletion, any indication of an interaction between the 
surface fisheries  and longline catches  of albacore  in 
Papua New  Guinea may  nonetheless  be useful  infor-
mation. 
The dynamics of potential albacore interactions are 
similar to  those of the purse seine/longline yellowfin 
interaction, in  that drift-gillnet and troll  fleets produce 
surface yields of albacore and longline fleets  produce 
deeper (mid-layer)  yields. While  the  primary  focus  of 
concern has been on the overall sustainability of drift-
giIInet albacore harvests and their impact on the troll 
fishery  (SPC  1991  and  1992b),  concerns  have  also 
been  raised  regarding  the  possibility  of  reduced 
longline  yields  of  albacore  (SPC  1989:  11),  not  to 
mention widespread concern about the indiscriminate 
nature of drift-gillnet gear. 
In  both  the  above  cases of potential  interaction 
between longline and other fisheries, certain assump-
tions must be made in order to use CPUE comparisons 
of species, on both a spatial and temporal basis, as an 
indicator of declining stock due to surface yields. These 
assumptions  are  that  variations  in  CPUE  reflect 
changes in either local stocks or the underlying popula-
tion from  which stocks are recruited, and not fluctua-
tions  in  catchability due to  environmental causes or 
changes  in  vessel  technology.  However,  it  is  often 
difficult to isolate the effects of environmental  fluctua-
tions and changes in vessel gear and technology when 
analysing CPUE trends (SPC 1988b). 
The Tuna  Longline Fishery in Papua  New Guinea 
Stock depletion and interaction 
with other fisheries 
In an analysis of Papua New Guinea's longline fishery 
for the period 1979- 1987, Campbell and Nicholl (see 
Chapter 7  of this volume) have  incorporated annual 
dummy variables in each of the supply equations for 
the  five  main  species caught by  longliners.  Although 
the issue of stock depletion should be addressed over a 
longer period and over a wider area than were consid-
ered  in  that analysis,  the  estimated values  of these 
dummy variables offer some indication as to local stock 
status,  or at least to stock availability to the longline 
fleet over  the  successive  years  of the  analysis.  The 
exclusive economic zone of Papua New Guinea repre-
sents only a portion of the total area over which  the 
species  in  the  longline  fishery  are  harvested,  and 
various substocks of tunas may interact with an under-
lying  regional  population.  Details  of  tuna  stock 
dynamics  are  yet  to  be  determined  and  therefore 
abundance  measures  for  any  species  in  any  given 
fishing ground are still  to be treated with some caution 
in  drawing  conclusions  about  harvest  sustainability. 
Nonetheless,  the  dummy  variable estimates reported 
by Campbell and Nicholl suggest that there were signif-
icant annual changes in CPUE for at least some years 
for all longline species. Given the potential interactions 
behveen the longline, purse seine, drift-giIInet and troll 
fisheries, a closer analysis of this segment of the results 
has been carried out for both the small and large vessel 
fleets. 
The supply equations are estimated in  the form of 
catch per unit effort equations  in  which  the constant 
tenns  measure  the  mean  vessel  CPUE  in  the  base 
period  1979-80  as  the  level  of fishing  effort  of the 
individual vessel  tends to zero. As  such, the constant 
term can be interpreted as an indicator of stock avail-
ability  to  the  fleet prior to  any  local  stock depletion 
caused by fishing effort. The yearly dummy variables in 
the CPUE equations represent changes relative to the 
base  period  level  of  CPUE  over  the  period  of  the 
sample. As  the results  of the supply analysis  indicate 
only whether  CPUE  for any species was  different  in 
successive  years  from  the  base  period  1979-80, an 
ANOVA  analysis was  carried out for each species to 
determine whether there was any change in CPUE over 
the years 1981-1986. The year 1987 was omitted from 
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the ANOVA  analysis  as  the  three  months to  March 
represented  the transition  to total  withdrawal  of the 
Japanese tuna fleets  from  Papua New  Guinea waters. 
The results of the ANOVA analysis of small and large 
vessel base level CPUEs are reported in Tables 8.2 and 
8.3. In each case, tests of the hypothesis that CPUE for 
the years  1981-1986 together as a  group were  not 
different from each other, and then the hypothesis that 
CPUE for  any two of these years was  not significantly 
different, were carried out 
The ANOVA analysis indicates that the hypothesis 
of a constant CPUE over the period 1981-86 can be 
rejected for all  species. On a species by species basis, 
CPUE  in  certain  pairs  of years  is  not  significantly 
different;  for  example,  yellowfin  CPUE  in  1981  and 
1986,  1982 and  1981 ~,  and  1984 and  1985  for  the 
small  vessel  sample  as  reported  in  Table  8.2. The 
results  of  the  pairwise  comparisons  of  CPUEs  in 
different years are not identical for  the two  classes of 
vessels;  for example, yellowfin  CPUE  has  been  more 
unifonn over the period for the large vessel sample, as 
reported in Table 8.3, than for the small vessel sample, 
as reported in Table 8.2. 
The results indicate that there has been significant 
annual variation in  the  mean CPUE  for  the various 
species over the period of the analysis. In  addition to 
the  results  presented  in  Tables  8.2  and  8.3,  mean 
CPUEs for  each species for  each year,  by  vessel  size, 
have  been  calculated  and  presented  graphically  in 
Figures 8.1  to 8.10. The first observation which can be 
noted from  comparing the mean CPUE by species of 
small and large vessels as illustrated in Figures 8.1-8.5 
and 8.6-8.10, is the similarities in patterns of change in 
CPUE  between the two vessel sizes for all species but 
albacore;  although  the absolute levels  of CPUE  vary 
between vessel size and species. For example, looking 
at the mean CPUE for each species by vessel size (large, 
small)  over the period  1979-1986, large vessels  had 
higher  mean  CPUE  (measured  as  kilograms  per 
thousand hooks) over the period for yellowfin  (567.1, 
461.5),  albacore (42.3,  18.7)  and billfish  (0.73,  0.60), 
while small vessels had higher CPUE for bigeye (90.4, 
101.7) and swordfish 0.88, 2.0). 
The  small  vessels  of  the  fleet  experienced  less 
variation in CPUE  for yellowfin  and bigeye  relative  to 
the other species. Yellowfin CPUE declined from a high 
for the period of  727 kg! 1  000 hooks in 1979 to 351 kg! 
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1000 hooks in  1980, with another high of 604 kg! 1  000 
hooks in  1983 and then declining steadily to 291  kg! 
1000 hooks in  1987. For albacore, CPUE rose from  a 
period low of 1.52 kg!100 hooks in  1979 to a period 
high  of  38.38  kg!1000  hooks  in  1981,  declining 
dramatically  in  1982 and  then  increasing  to  around 
1981  levels  again  in  1983-84  before  once  again 
declining sharply in  1985 and remaining relatively low 
through to 1987. Bigeye CPUE was reasonably steady at 
around  110  kg! 1  000  hooks  throughout  the  period, 
except for a drop in  1981-82 and a peak for the period 
of 184 kg!1000 hooks in  1987. Changes in  CPUE  for 
billfish and swordfish follow similar patterns, increasing 
sharply  from  1979-1980  then  steadily  declining  to 
1984 followed  by  a very  large  increase (324%  billfish 
and 741 % swordfish)  in  1985 and then remaining at 
similar levels to 1987. 
For the large vessels of the fleet,  yellowfin  CPUE for 
the years  1979 and  1986 was  basically at two  levels;  a 
higher level of around 700 kgI1 000 hooks for 1979, 1980 
and  1983,  and  a  lower  level  of around  440 kgI1000 
hooks for the remaining years. Albacore CPUE fluctuated 
around 40 kgI1 00 hooks for most of the period except for 
1979 and  1980 which  were  very  low  levels,  and  1983 
which was a year of particularly high CPUE (119 kgI1 000 
hooks). CPUE for bigeye was consistently greater than for 
a1bacore, increasing from  1981 (61.8 kgI1000 hooks) to 
1986 (100.4 kgI1 000 hooks) after declining from a period 
high  of 113.3 kgI1000 hooks in  1979. For billfish  and 
swordfish,  trends in  CPUE were similar to those experi-
enced by small vessels; there was a very large increase in 
1985-1986 from  much lower levels throughout the early 
1980s, with  highs for tile earlier period in  1980 in  both 
cases. 
In summary, there appears to be a slight decline in 
yellowfin  CPUE  from  1983-1986. Furthennore, there 
appears to  have been a gradual increase in  CPUE of 
bigeye,  the  second  most  important  species  to  the 
longline fishery, for both vessel sizes after 1981. There 
does not appear, from  these results, to be any discern-
ible  relationship  between  CPUEs  for  albacore  and 
bigeye. An inverse relationship between CPUE of these 
species would  be  expected  if  they  are substitutes in 
production as suggested  by  the analysis of Campbell 
and Nicholl (Chapter 7 of this volume). An  increasing 
focus  on catching bigeye  by  longline  fleets  does  not 
appear to have affected catch rates between 1983 and The  Tuna  Longline Fishery  in  Papua  New Guinea 
Table 8.2  ANOVA for difference  in  CPUE  between years, 1981-86: small vessel sample 
Test  Ye lIowfi n  Albacore  Bigeye  Billfish  Swordfish 
All years equala  47.49  14.99  53.34  77.33  64.23 
Y1981=Y1982  12.10  42.63  13.47  40.84  2274 
Y1981=Y1983  243.3  0.970b  125.30  6.460  5.390 
Y1981=Y1984  22.27  1.525b  114.8  15.70  6.162 
Y1981-Y1985  28.55  48.76  161.1  134.4  109.0 
Y1981=Y1986  0.436b  2528  85.92  104.6  160.7 
Y1982EY1983  152.0  25.21  60.37  11.18  0.856 
Y1982=Y1984  3.587b  1624  59.61  1.439b  1.585 
Y1982=Y1985  5.970  2.405b  92.30  283.6  135.7 
Y1982=Y1986  3.921  0.004b  41.69  2262  189.9 
Y1983=Y1984  71.42  0.124b  0.745b  2.694b  0.181 
Y1983=Y1985  67.08  32.98  6.081  171.0  139.3 
Y1983=Y1986  134.3  16.07  0.002b  137.2  192.4 
Y1984=Y1985  0.181 b  23.77  2.052b  178.7  122.9 
Y1984=Y1986  10.85  11.38  0.505b  148.3  171.7 
Y1985=Y1986  14.15  1.472b  4.368  0.118b  7.686 
aCrltlcal value  of  Fk  n-1 Is 2.10  at the  5%  level  of significance; all  other tests  have a critical F  value of 3.84. 
bCannot reject the  restriction  at the  5%  level  of significance. 
Table 8.3  ANOVA for  difference  in  CPUE  between years, 1981-86: large vessel sample. 
Test  Yellowfin  A1bacore  B igeye  Billfish  Swordfish 
All  years equala  12.99  8.013  5.834  27.16  19.56 
Y1981=Y1982  0.155b  0.375b  0.409b  0.774b  2.482b 
Y1981=Y1983  61.79  26.89  8.098  0258b  6.751 
Y1981=Y1984  3.704b  0.751 b  12.59  0.833b  6.595 
Y1981=Y1985  7.193  2.449b  16.33  99.36  31.80 
Y1981=Y1986  0.147b  0.345b  14.07  38.87  30.23 
Y1982=Y1983  48.60  29.07  4294  1.620b  0.981b 
Y1982=Y1984  2.128b  1.822b  7.641  2.648b  1.049b 
Y1982=Y1985  4.620  0.826b  10.22  102.0  44.67 
Y1982=Y1986  0.433b  0.002b  9.674  43.68  41.23 
Y1983=Y1984  26.71  14.29  0.561 b  0.153b  0.005b 
Y1983=Y1985  21.75  37.52  1.251 b  74.91  56.37 
Y1983=Y1986  39.09  19.71  1.963b  30.18  50.79 
Y1984=Y1985  0.381b  4.726  0.115b  63.74  0.015b 
Y1984=Y1986  3.316b  1.444b  0.559b  25.44  53.70 
Y1985=Y1986  5.656  0.394b  0223b  2.762b  0.821b 
aCritlcal value  of  F~ n-, Is 2.10 at the  5%  level  of significance; all  other tests  have a critical F  value  of 3.84. 
°cannot reject the  restriction at the  5%  level  of significance. 
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Agure 8.9  Average  CPUE for billfish, large vessels. 
1986.  CPUE  for  the  fleet  between  these  years  was 
unchanged, but increased in  the first quarter of 1987. 
We can conclude from  these results that stock availa-
bility of bigeye has not shown signs of depletion for the 
period  of the  analysis.  For  albacore,  a  pronounced 
decline in CPUE occurred between 1983-1986. While 
this is not direct evidence of conflict between the drift-
gillnet albacore fishery and the longline fishery, it does 
offer some indirect support to the hypothesis that the 
gillnet fleet activities are capable of affecting longline 
catch rates. While it  is  also possible that part of this 
decline  in  albacore  CPUE  may  be  attributable  to 
switching  by  Japanese  fishing  directors  to  deep 
longlining. we are unable to determine to what degree 
this  may  have  occurred  as  our effort  data  do  not 
provide any information on the number of hooks per 
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Figure 8.10 Average  CPUE for swordfish,  large vessels. 
basket  in  longline  sets.  By  1983  nearly  all  longline 
vessels  in  the  Japanese  fleet  were  using  the  deep 
longlining method. Suzuki (1989)  has suggested  that 
fewer  billfish  are  caught  with  the  deep  longlining 
technique.  Given  that  most  vessels  had  apparently 
switched to deep longlining by  1983, our finding that 
CPUE  for  billfish  increased  markedly  in  1985  and 
1986 is not consistent with Suzuki's suggestion. 
Supply elasticities 
It is useful to know the supply responsiveness of fishing 
firms to changes in species prices, due either to market 
changes or to changes induced by regulatory measures. 
If relative output price changes result in  variations in 
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fishing intensity,  then such variations may have impli-
cations for biological or economic management In the 
absence  of  knowledge  regarding  the  interaction 
between relative price changes and output mix,  policy 
instruments applied to any particular species can cause 
unanticipated  shifts  in  output mix,  especially  where 
species are substitutes in  production. Similarly,  rising 
prices of species which are already over-exploited and 
increasingly difficult to supply, may act as incentives for 
an increased  focus  on supplying  those species. The 
result  could  be disproportionate  amounts  of fishing 
effort directed towards the supply of these species and 
increasing pressure on remaining stocks. 
The  ability  of vessels  to  change  output  mix  by 
substituting  between  species  implies  a  degree  of 
targeting. By targeting is meant that if the price of one 
species were to rise relative to other species, then more 
of this species would be caught and less of another (or 
others), for a constant level of fishing effort. Conversely, 
if the price of a species were to fall  relative to the price 
of other species, then less of it would be caught for  a 
given level of fishing effort From the model described 
in  Camp  bell  and  Nicholl  (Chapter  7)  targeting  of 
species i is interpreted as: 
Input-compensated own and cross-price elasticities 
of supply for each of the five species can be calculated 
by multiplying the terms from (l) by (P/Q) and ([JlQ). 
These elasticities measure supply response for a fixed 
input level and in the case of the cross-price elasticities, 
indicate  pure substitution  effects  in  output between 
pairs of species for a change in  the price of one of the 
pair. The own (ejj) and cross-price (eij) elasticities are: 
e.· =-1I 2L .~ .{3  .. (P .I p.)1I2(EIQ.) 
J/  Jr l  IJ  J  I  I 
eij  =1I2{3ij(PjPit1l2(PjEIQi) 
Ljeij = 11 2LI*i{3ij (PjPi t 1l2  (PjE I Qi) = -eii  (2) 
The input-compensated price elasticities of supply 
for the small vessel sample analysed by Campbell and 
Nicholl are reported in Table 8.4. They are calculated 
using  mean  sample  values  of  effort  and  quantity 
supplied  and  represent  the  average  short-run  or 
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monthly level supply response to output price changes. 
For the large vessel sample, input-compensated supply 
of each species in the output mix appears to have been 
perfectly inelastic; this result is  a  consequence of the 
finding of nonjointness in  inputs for all species (f3ij=O 
for all  i~  J) for that sample. For the small vessel sample 
the expected sign of the own price input-compensated 
supply  elasticities  is  eiPO.  For  the  cross-price 
elasticities,  f.jpO  indicates  species  i  and  j  are 
substitutes  in  production,  f.ij>O  indicates  they  are 
complements and f.ij=O that they are neutral. We also 
note  from  the lastIine of equation  (2)  that for  any 
species i and a given level of effort the sum of the cross-
price elasticities  is  equal to  the negative  of the own-
price elasticity. This is a consequence of the property of 
linear homogeneity in  output prices which is  imposed 
by  the  generalised  Leontief  form  of  the  revenue 
function used in the analysis in Chapter 7. 
The elasticities in  the first row of Table 8.4 are the 
calculated own-price input-compensated elasticities of 
small vessel supply for each of the five species. All own-
price elasticities are not statistically different from zero 
at  the  5%  level.  This  result  suggests  that  fishing 
directors  do  not  respond  to  changes  in  individual 
species prices in isolation from all other output prices. 
As  yellowfin  and bigeye generally constitute over 80% 
of longline  catches and therefore by  far  the greatest 
proportion of revenue earned for  any campaign, low 
(although not necessarily zero) own-price elasticities of 
supply for  these species would  be expected. In  other 
words, as the mainstay of revenue for any campaign is 
earned from  catches of these two species, fluctuations 
in  their prices  will  do  nothing to change the aim  of 
effort with respect to these species. 
The last four rows of Table 8.4 show the calculated 
input-compensated cross-price elasticities of  supply. All 
elasticities statistically significant at the 5%  level  have 
the expected negative sign. Those elasticities which are 
significantly different from  zero are yellowfin/albacore 
(-0.0532),  yellowfin/billfish  (-0.0032),  albacorel 
yellowfin (-1.2112), albacore/bigeye (-0.9236), bigeyel 
albacore  (-0.1623),  bigeye/swordfish  (-0.02L~0),  and 
billfish/yellowfin  (-0.5895).  The  zero  and  very  low 
cross-price  elasticities  for  yellowfin  indicate  that 
relative to all other species in the output mix, yellowfin 
does not have any close substitutes in output although 
albacore may to a small extent serve as a substitute for The  Tuna  Longline Fishery in  Papua  New Guinea 
Table 8.4  Input-compensated  own  and  cross-price elasticities of supply: small vessel sample 
Y=yellowfin  A=albacore  E=bigeye  B=billfish  W=swordfish 
cyy  0.0111  CM  02192  cEE 
(0.0311)  (0.6160) 
cYA  -0.0532a  cAY  -1.2112a  cEA 
(0.0155)  (0.3528) 
cYE  -0.0459  cAE  -0.9236a  cEY 
(0.0244)  (0.2711) 
cYB  -0.0032a  CAB  0.0282  cEB 
(0.0010)  (0.0245) 
cyw  -0.0054  cAW  -0.0025  cEW 
(0.0031)  (0.0637) 
aSlgniflcant at the  5%  level, for two-tall test standard  errors  In  brackets. 
yellowfin.  On  the  other  hand,  a  reasonably  large 
negative response of supply of albacore with respect to 
an  increase  in  the  price  of  yellowfin  shows  that 
yellmvfin  may readily be substituted for albacore. This 
observation is consistent with yellowfin being the more 
valuable  of the  two  species.  Similarly,  a  significant 
cross-price response between  albacore and bigeye  is 
expected and reinforces the view that these species can 
be fished as substitutes by changing longline configura-
tion. There is a statistically significant but small supply 
response  for  bigeye  to  swordfish  price,  suggesting 
limited  substitution  possibilities,  while  the  elasticity 
with  respect  to  billfish  and  yellowfin  also  suggests 
possible substitution in  output. Finally, all  cross-price 
elasticities for swordfish with  respect to  other species 
are zero, indicating that swordfish supply is not respon-
sive to changes in  the prices of other species and may 
therefore  be  considered  incidental  to  the  overall 
harvest aims of longline fishing directors. This finding 
is reinforced by the observation from Table 8.1  that the 
proportion of swordfish in  total catches between 1980 
and  1986 was  on average  0.55%  of annual  longline 
harvest in Papua New Guinea waters. 
Conclusion 
This paper has presented a summary of the develop-
ment of the tuna longline fishery in Papua New Guinea 
during  the  1980s.  In  addition  to  the  general 
background of the fishery, the technology of small and 
large  longline vessels,  as described by  input-compen-
0.0511  cBB  6.5446  cww  -0.4926 
(0.1436)  (18.392)  11.0730) 
-0.1623a  cBA  0.5897  cwv  0.8594 
(0.0476)  (0.5120)  (0.8957) 
0.1835  cBY  -0.5895a  cWA  0.9926 
(0.9744)  (0.4753)  (1.0366) 
0.0022  CBE  0.2579  cWE  1.8491 
(0.0032)  (0.3782)  11.9310) 
-0.0240a  cBW  0.2140  cWB  2.0520 
(0.0093)  (0.5347)  (2.1429) 
sated supply elasticities, was  discussed, and results of 
the  supply  analysis  relating  to  sustainability  were 
considered. 
For the large vessel  fleet  all  elasticities of supply 
were  not significantly  different  from  zero,  indicating 
that  the  species  composition  of the  catch  is  inde-
pendent of product prices. This means that the fleet's 
impact on individual  species cannot be  regulated by 
means  of  individual  species  quotas  or  royalties.  If 
harvesting by large vessels of a particular species is  to 
be  restrained  it  will  be  necessary to  reduce the total 
effort of the fleet; however, note that large vessel activity 
represented only about 24% of totallongline activity in 
Papua New Guinea waters for the period 1979-1987. 
While  the species composition of the catch does not 
vary with species prices, it does change as the level of 
individual  vessel  effort  changes.  This  introduces  a 
further consideration for  management attempting to 
control the exploitation of individual species. 
The small  vessel  fleet  demonstrates an ability  to 
target individual species in response to changes in  the 
relative prices of species. For example, for a constant 
level of fishing effort, a rise in the price of yellowfin will 
cause falls in the catches of albacore and billfish; a rise 
in the price of albacore could lead to falls in the catches 
of yellowfin and bigeye; and a rise in the price of bigeye 
will cause falls in the catches of  albacore and swordfish. 
Further results  are  reported  in  Table 8.4.  The own-
price  elasticities  of  supply  of  the  major  species, 
yellowfin,  bigeye  and albacore,  are low  because of a 
97 The  Economics of Papua  New Guinea's Tuna  Fisheries 
heavy reliance of the fleet on these species for the bulk 
of revenue. The cross-price elasticities suggest that it 
would be possible to pursue independent management 
policies  for  certain  stocks.  For example,  if  albacore 
stocks were judged to  be overfished, the small vessel 
fleet could be encouraged to replace albacore to some 
extent  with  yellowfin  and  bigeye.  This  could  be 
achieved  by  an  individual  vessel  catch  quota  or  a 
royalty on albacore. The test for input-output separa-
bility indicated that, as in  the case of the large vessel 
sample, the species composition of catch varies at the 
individual  vessel  level  with  the  amount  of  effort 
supplied. This would need to be taken into account if 
policy measures were introduced which affected effort 
levels of vessels in the fishery. 
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Finally,  the  paper  presents  some  slight  indirect 
evidence about the sustainability of the fishery. Since the 
period  of the  analysis  is  relatively  short (1979-1987), 
evidence  of significant  stock  depletion  would  not be 
expected.  However,  in  the  case  of  the  two  stocks, 
yellowfin and albacore, which are or have been exploited 
by other gear types (purse seine for yellowfin, and drift-
gillnet and troll for albacore), although not necessarily in 
the same area, there is some evidence of local depletion 
at least The estimated annual stock dummy variables 
and  the  ANOVA  analyses  of  the  CPUE  estimates 
suggested  stock depletion,  particularly  in  the  case  of 
albacore. Chapter 
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A Financial Appraisal Model of Tuna 
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There is growing interest in  Papua New Guinea in  the 
re-establishment of a  domestic  fleet  to  supply shore 
based  facilities  proposed for  various  ports. The inte-
grated development of transshipment and processing 
facilities,  together  with  the  re-emergence  of  local 
and/or locally  based  fishing  fleets,  could  mark  the 
beginning  of Papua New  Guinea gaining significant 
economic benefits from its tuna resources. 
As  the economic success of a  domestic fleet  will 
depend  largely  on  catch  rates,  operating  costs  and 
world  tuna  prices,  a  framework  for  evaluating  the 
economic  perfonnance  of  vessels  under  various 
harvest and  market scenarios  would  be  valuable  in 
making initial assessments regarding the feasibility of 
fishing ventures. Although  any joint venture partners 
bringing vessels and experience into the industry would 
no doubt be able to make reasonable assessments of 
the potential viability of domestic fleet operations, it is 
in  Papua New Guinea's interest to make independent 
assessments, especially if vessels are to be Papua New 
Guinea owned and operated. 
This chapter fonns the accompanying document to 
a spreadsheet model developed by  LY.  Duchesne and 
designed to aid the assessment of potential investment 
in  domestically  operated  tuna  vessels.  Varying 
scenarios  of  harvest  and  market  conditions  are 
combined  with  vessel  operating cost  infonnation  to 
provide  a  financial  appraisal  of  potential  fishing 
ventures. 
Background 
Around  two-thirds  of total  world  tuna  catches  are 
caught  in  the  Pacific  Ocean  (Copes  1987),  with  the 
western Pacific region representing the most important 
source  of  commercially  exploited  tunas  within  the 
Pacific. Within the western Pacific, Papua New Guinea 
has one of the largest endowments of tuna resources. 
Although the history of the tuna industry in Papua New 
Guinea is  somewhat recent relative to tuna fishing in 
the Pacific in general, and represents only a small per-
centage  of gross  domestic  product (Kuk  199 n the 
potential exists for a greater involvement by Papua New 
Guinea in world tuna markets. 
Papua New Guinea's tuna fisheries have in the past 
been  totally export orientated and composed of two 
sectors-a distant water sector which  has fonned the 
principal tuna fishery; and a domestic sector which has 
had  a  limited  operation.  Three  gear  types  have 
comprised  the  distant water sector (to  1987):  purse 
seine,  longline  and  pole-and-Iine.  Purse  seine  and 
pole-and-Iine have exploited (and still do in the case of 
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purse seine) surface stocks of yellowfin  and skipjack, 
whereas  the longline  fleets which  have  been  almost 
exclusively Japanese, have targeted deeper swimming, 
larger yellowfin, bigeye and to a lesser extent albacore. 
Most of the single purse seine vessels continue to be in 
the  750  GRT  to  1500  GRT  size  range  and  have 
typically operated some distance from the Papua New 
Guinea  coastline.  Almost  all  pole-and-Iine  and 
longline  vessels  ceased  operating  in  Papua  I  ew 
Guinea's  exclusive  economic  zone  following  the 
breakdown of access negotiations between Japan and 
the  Papua New  Guinea government As  Papua New 
Guinea recognises and adheres to Article 62.2 of the 
United  Nations  Convention  on  the  Law  of the  Sea, 
which  requires  that  island  nations  make  resources 
excess to their harvesting capacity (but within allowable 
catches) available to other fishing nations, the distant 
water  fishing  nation  sectors  of  the  fisheries  will 
continue. 
The Papua New Guinea domestic tuna fleet experi-
ence  is  well  documented  by  Doulman  and  Wright 
(1983) and Kuk (1991). There were at various  times 
throughout the  1970s and early  1980s between  two 
and four companies operating pole-and-line boats in 
Papua  New  Guinea.  These  companies  were  either 
totally  foreign  owned  or  represented  joint  venture 
arrangements between the Papua New Guinea govern-
ment and Japanese interests. The fishing operations of 
all  Papua  lew  Guinea  based  boats  were  centred 
around Cape Lambert in East  lew Britain and Kavieng 
in  northern New Ireland, due to their proximity to both 
reliable  baitfish  grounds  and  good  fishing  grounds. 
Apart from  the downturn in  world market tuna prices 
in  the early  1980s, the domestically  based operations 
were impeded by the necessity to fish within about 100 
km  of mother ships,  as fresh  bait had to be taken on 
board each night (Doulman and Wright 1983). Shore 
based facilities for handling and processing catches for 
export  were  also  lacking,  adversely  affecting  the 
viability of the operation as a whole.  It  is  unlikely,  for 
the reasons of commercial convenience and technical 
expertise, that any future domestic  fleet would involve 
pole-and-line fishing. 
As purse seine and pole-and-line gear fish the same 
surface stocks  of skipjack and yellowfin,  there  is  an 
increasing tendency for the use of purse seining as it is 
a  far  more  efficient  means  of  harvesting  tuna.  The 
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choice  between  the  two  gear  types  is  not  simple 
though,  as  efficiency  of harvest  must  be  traded  off 
against a lower value end use. In this respect much of 
the pole-and-line caught skipjack and yellowfin is sold 
for  katsubusi and sashimi, whereas the bulk of purse 
seine  catch  is  supplied  as  canning  material.  This 
trade-off is moderated to some extent however, by the 
fact  that  the  superior sashimi  grade  tunas  are  the 
larger,  deeper  swimming  fish  targeted  by  longline 
vessels.  Depending  upon  the  targeted  market  (or 
markets) for Papua New Guinea domestically supplied 
tuna, it seems likely that purse seine vessels would offer 
the most efficient means of harvesting canning grade 
tuna.  However,  purse  seine  vessels  would  most 
probably need to be small to medium sized vessels due 
to  a  range of factors  of which  capital cost would  be 
dominant. 
The Japanese  sashimi  market  provides  lucrative 
returns to  the supply of high  grade fresh and fresh--
frozen  tunas.  Papua  New  Guinea  is  well  placed 
geographically to establish links with Japanese markets 
and, using a fleet of longline vessels, could well provide 
the  appropriate  grades  of  tuna.  Japanese  longline 
vessels of a wide range of sizes (50-100 GRT up to 500 
GRT)  have had a significant presence in  Papua New 
Guinea waters  throughout the history of Papua New 
Guinea's  tuna  fisheries,  a  strong  indication  that  its 
fishing grounds are suitable for this gear type. Studies 
have  shown,  however, that  it  is  the smaller class  of 
longline  vessel  that  is  more  economical  and  better 
suited  to  the  longline  fishery  of Papua New  Guinea 
(Camp bell and Nicholl 1992a and b). 
Functions of the model 
The  Papua  New  Guinea  Financial  Appraisal  Model 
(F  Al \1) provides simulations of the operations of various 
types and sizes of tuna vessels. Its purpose is  to help 
assess the viability of tuna vessel investment The FAM 
reports several operational, cost and profitability char-
acteristics  based  on  existing  data  available  from 
research undertaken by Campbell and Nicholl  (1990, 
1992a) into Japanese tuna  operations in  Papua New 
Guinea  waters.  The  approach  adopted  in  the  FAM 
provides  a  benchmark  against  which  potential 
domestic  investors  can  compare  their own  projects. 
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wages and unloading capacity) is possible; this allows a 
wide range of scenarios to be examined. 
Three main tools are provided within the model to 
analyse investment feasibility;  (1)  financial  measures; 
(2)  sensitivity  analysis;  and (3)  graphical display.  The 
model  can  be  used  to  calculate  various  financial 
measures, such as net present value and internal rate 
of return;  it can be used to provide a sensitivity analysis 
of the results; and it can be used for graphical display. 
Financial measures 
Cashffow 
The  cash  flow  statement  demonstrates  calculated 
incoming and outgoing cash flows on a yearly basis for 
the expected life of the investment project (or projected 
economic life of the vessel). It is centred on operating 
cash flows,  ignoring associated capital costs, such as 
interest  repayments.  Similarly,  depreciation  is  not 
included since it is not a cash flow. While having some 
interest of its own, the cash flow table is used primarily 
to  calculate  financial  indicators  based  on  the  dis-
counted cash flow method. 
Payback period 
One of the simplest measures, the payback period (PP), 
provides a direct measure of the time it  takes for  the 
initial cash outlay of a project to be recovered from the 
project's  net cash  inflows.  The PP is  then  compared 
with  some  maximum  required  PP  to  detennine 
whether the financing horizon of the project is accept-
able. A project with  a  PP greater than the maximum 
acceptable  period  will  be  rejected. The PP  is  not a 
measure of profitability. Furthermore, no discounting 
method  is  applied  within  the  PP  framework,  thus 
ignoring the timing of cash flows. The PP is primarily an 
indicator of cash liquidity for a given project. 
Return on investment 
The other nondiscounted  measure  is  the  return  on 
investment (ROn. It provides a first measure of project 
profitability.  For  the  ROI,  the  percentage  return  on 
invested  capital  is  calculated  for  a  typical  year  of 
operation.  This  return  can  be  compared  with  a 
minimum required rate of return. 
Net  present  value 
A  net  present value  (NPV)  calculation  involves  dis-
counting  cash  flows  taking  into  account  both  the 
magnitude and timing of cash flows. The NPV method 
is characterised  by  a  predetermined required  rate of 
return. All future cash flows are discounted at this rate. 
The resultant discounted  sums  are  then  subtracted 
from  the initial cash outlay. The project is approved if 
the sum of the discounted income stream  is  greater 
that the sum of discounted expenses. The amount of a 
positive NPV  represents the increase in  the investor's 
wealth that will result from undertaking the investment. 
Internal rate of  return 
The internal rate of return (IRR)  is that discount rate 
which results in a NPV of zero. It can be considered as 
the maximum  rate of interest that could  be  paid  for 
debt financing without making a loss. The viability of 
the project is  determined by comparing the IRR  with 
some required rate of return. Again, a project with  an 
IRR greater than the required rate should be accepted. 
Sensitivity analysis 
The calculation  of financial  indicators is  based on a 
variety  of  input  parameters,  such  as  ex-vessel  tuna 
prices, wages,  daily  catch  rates and waiting days  (see 
next  secion).  A  useful  analysis  is  to  examine  how 
sensitive  the  financial  indicators  are with  respect to 
some of the key parameters. For example, tuna market 
prices  have  fluctuated  significantly  from  month  to 
month and year to year. It is  possible with the spread-
sheet model to change tuna market prices and assess 
the  impact  of  such  changes  on  profitability,  as 
measured by  T PV and IRR. In  this way, the model will 
prove useful for scenario planning and risk assessment. 
Graphical displays 
The FAM  has  been developed within  the  Lotus  123 
framework,  which  provides  easy  access  to  graphical 
displays  of the  results. This  facilitates  interpretation. 
For example, a graphical display is a useful instrument 
for  following  the  evolution  of  a  certain  financial 
indicator throughout a sensitivity analysis. Net present 
value could be plotted against daily catch rate. A more 
detailed  approach  could  integrate  more variables  in 
the  analysis;  for  example,  showing  combinations  of 
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daily catch rates and tuna market prices that result in a 
NPV of zero (for example, see McIlgorm 1989). 
Details of  the model 
The FAl\1,  which draws on earlier work of the Forum 
Fisheries Agency (1985) can be applied to purse seine, 
longline or pole-and-Iine operations (McIlgorm  1989). 
Using  input parameters, three output statements 
are provided for each of the possible vessel categories. 
For each vessel category (type and size)  there are two 
files - an edit file and a run file. The edit file contains all 
the  input parameters  for  the  output statements, for 
example ex-vessel  tuna prices, vessel  cost categories, 
and daily catch rates. The input parameter values can 
be changed at any time;  this automatically alters  the 
output statements. The run file  contains the different 
output statements. The calculations are based on the 
input parameters. 
An  application  of  the  model  for  a  Japanese 
longliner in the size range 50-100 GRT is presented in 
Appendix 1. 
Input parameters 
The input parameters are contained  in  the edit files. 
They are divided into three categories: 
[ll  input parameters for the operating statement 
[2]  input parameters for the revenue statement 
[3]  input  parameters  for  the  cash  flow/investment 
analysis statement. 
The values for the input parameters are taken from 
Campbell  and  Nicholl  (1990)  and  FOnlITI  Fisheries 
Agency (1985). All  parameter values can be changed, 
allowing the user to execute a sensitivity analysis with 
respect to certain key input variables. 
Output statement 
The output statements are contained in  the run files. 
As  with  the  input parameters,  they  are  divided  into 
three categories: 
[4]  vessel operating statement 
[5]  vessel revenue statement 
[6]  vessel cash flow/investment analysis statement. 
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The model  is  not designed  to  allow  the  user to 
make changes  to  the  structure  of the  output state-
ments. The remainder of this section explains in detail 
the calculation  of each  of the statements  using  the 
example in Appendix 1. 
Vessel operating  statement 
The vessel operating statement [4]  reflects the opera-
tional  practice  of  the  vessel  in  an  average  year  of 
operation. It  provides  detail  of how  many  trips  the 
vessel  undertakes, how  many days  it  spends waiting 
and unloading or actually fishing,  and total catch for 
the vessel. 
Number of trips per year is  calculated by  dividing 
days  available  for  fishing  by  trip  duration.  Days 
available  for  fishing  are obtained  by  subtracting the 
total  number of days  of bad weather, from  365. Trip 
duration  is  the sum of fishing  time,  unloading time, 
transit time  and waiting  time. Fishing time  is  vessel 
storage capacity divided by daily catch rate. Unloading 
time is obtained by dividing the vessel hold capacity by 
the unloading capacity of the port. Transit time divides 
the distance between port and fishing grounds by  the 
transit speed. Waiting time is defined as the number of 
days waiting to unload divided by the number of trips. 
The  complete  output  statement  can  therefore  be 
considered as a system of equations. 
Days fishing, days steaming, days waiting and provi-
sioning and days unloading are all calculated by multi-
plying the respective times (as obtained above) by  the 
number of trips. 
Days other is  the remainder after subtracting days 
fishing,  days  steaming, days  waiting and provisioning 
and days unloading from 365. 
Annual catch  is  vessel  storage capacity times  the 
number of trips. 
Daily  catch  of  the  vessel  is  treated  by  species. 
Japanese longline vessels typically harvest five varieties 
of fish  in  Papua New Guinea waters; albacore, bigeye, 
yellowfin,  billfish  (blue  marlin,  black  marlin,  striped 
marlin  and  sailfish)  and  swordfish.  The  three  tuna 
species make up the bulk of the catch, with yellowfin 
accounting for  about 63% of the catch.  Billfish  and 
swordfish are incidental but together provide about 8% 
of the total catch on average. The division of daily catch 
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the different varieties can vary  significantly.  Over the 
past decade bigeye  tuna has yielded the best price of 
the  three  tuna species,  with  a  mean  price  that was 
¥lOO/kg to ¥200/kg  higher. The price of billfish and 
swordfish  has been considerably higher than  that of 
tuna. 
The  critical  variable  in  the  vessel  operating 
statement is  daily  catch.  Changes  in  the daily  catch 
rates will  significantly alter the financial  results of the 
investment.  Since  daily  catch  rates  are  specified  in 
tenns of individual species, detailed sensitivity analysis 
is  possible.  It will  show the  financial  implications  of 
variability in daily catch or of variability in the composi-
tion of daily catch. 
Vessel revenue statement 
The  vessel  revenue  statement  [51  as  calculated  in 
Appendix  1, represents  receipts  and costs  in  the year 
1988-1989.  The values  of operating  cost  and  profit 
reflect the research in Campbell and Nicholl (1990). The 
calculation of these values  has  been  made flexible  to 
account for possible variation in key input parameters. 
The vessel revenue statement is  divided into three 
parts. The first part calculates gross vessel receipts, the 
second part tabulates the vessel  operating costs and 
the  third  part  combines  the  gross  receipts  and 
operating costs to calculate the gross and net operating 
profit. 
The first part of the vessel revenue statement repre-
sents vessel gross receipts, and is simply the product of 
annual  catch  and  ex-vessel  price.  Annual  catch  is 
calculated from the operating statement by multiplying 
daily catch by  the number of trips per year.  As  in  the 
operating statement, annual catch is given  by species. 
Market value (per tonne) is the average market price of 
the fish (per kilogram) times one thousand. The market 
value by species is a mean price for each species for the 
period  1980 to  1987 Oapan Tuna 1992). Gross  fish 
receipts is detennined by multiplying the annual catch 
by market value. Again, details are provided on receipts 
by species. 
From this calculation we can see that the profit-a-
bility of the investment project will  greatly depend on 
daily catch (which detennines annual catch). Not only 
variability  in  daily  catch,  but  also  variability  in  the 
composition of daily catch, will affect gross fish receipts. 
It  is  equally  clear  that  operational  practice  will 
influence gross fish  receipts. More efficient unloading 
facilities  will  increase  the  actual  days  fishing,  hence 
gross fish receipts. 
The second aspect of the vessel revenue statement 
is  operating costs.  This  statement lists  variable  and 
fixed  operating costs per vessel in  an 'average year' of 
operation.  Wages  is  based  on  adding two  potential 
measures of remuneration. One varies with catch and 
ex-vessel price, the other by catch only. The fonner is 
crew share as a percentage of gross fish  receipts. The 
latter is  crew share in  thousands of Yen  per tonne of 
fish  landed multiplied by  annual catch. Both calcula-
tions represent a crew effort-based type  of remunera-
tion, which reflects the general practice in the industry; 
although it could easily be argued that crew have no 
influence on price received from  purse seine catches. 
Fishing gear, oil,  ice,  miscellaneous materials, cost of 
business, capital cost and other costs are all  entered 
straight from the input parameter file. Bait is measured 
by multiplying bait cost with annual catch. Fishing boat 
represents vessel  repair and maintenance costs.  It  is 
calculated as a proportion of the initial purchase price. 
Brokerage reflects the insurance costs of the vessel. It 
too is a proportion of the initial purchase price. 
The  third  part  of the  vessel  revenue  statement 
matches  vessel  receipts  with  costs  to  calculate 
operating profit Gross operating profit subtracts total 
operating  cost  from  gross  fish  receipts.  Subtracting 
capital cost from  this value leaves net operating profit. 
These profit measures are calculated before tax liabili-
ties are assessed. 
Although  the  revenue  statement  is  primarily 
designed to aid the calculations contained in  the cash 
flow  table  and  the  financial  indicators,  it  does  offer 
relevant infonnation in and of itself. It presents the user 
with the operating results (receipts, costs and profit) of 
an average year of operation during the life cycle of the 
vessel. The key parameters that will likely influence the 
results considerably are daily catch, operational param-
eters (for example days of waiting),  fish  market prices 
and wages. A sensitivity analysis on these variables is 
therefore appropriate. 
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Vessel cash flow/investment  analysis statement 
The  cash  flow/investment  analysis  statement  [6]  is 
composed  of a  cash  flow  table  and  calculations  of 
financial indicators. 
The cash  flow  table  shows  all  cash  inflows  and 
out-flows for each year during the life of the vessel. The 
vessel economic life  is  a flexible  input parameter and 
the cash flow table is set up to adjust automatically as 
the projected vessel life changes. Vessel cost is entered 
as the main  cash outflow  in  the first  year,  while  the 
vessel salvage value represents an additional inflow at 
the end of the economic life span. It is calculated as a 
percentage of the initial purchase price. Average capital 
cost, operating cost and revenue are entered each year 
from the revenue statement as average cash flows. Net 
cash flow  subtracts the outgoing from  the  incoming 
money flows  (see above for  explanation of cash flow 
table interpretation). 
The second  part of this  output statement is  the 
investment analysis, which allows the user to evaluate 
the  investment  by  offering  four  different  investment 
measures  discussed  above.  Return  on  investment 
shows the percentage return on the invested capital in 
an average year of operation. It is calculated by dividing 
net operating profit by  the vessel cost. NPV discounts 
each of the annual net cash flows at a chosen discount 
rate; it is calculated using the Lotus 123 NPV function. 
IRR is that discount rate which results in a NPV of zero. 
It is  the return on the project which would result in  a 
break even situation. The calculation  is  done by  the 
Lotus  123  IRR  function.  Payback  period  shows  the 
number of years  it  would  take  to  recoup  the  initial 
investment. It is obtained by dividing the vessel cost by 
the net operating profit. 
An example 
FAM  can be used to assess potential investment in  a 
single vessel. An extension of this exercise to a fleet of 
vessels is easily undertaken. The data and calculations 
for the following example are presented in Appendix 1. 
Assume a Papua New Guinea initiative involves the 
establishment of a  domestic tuna fishing  fleet.  As  an 
initial investment, the purchase of a longline vessel of 
100  GRT  has  been  proposed. An  initial  assessment 
regarding the venture's feasibility  is  required. For this 
purpose, the FAM  is  specified for  a Japanese longline 
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vessel of 50-1  00 GRT. All prices and costs in the model 
are in  Yen. The Japanese example is  used because at 
present no domestically operated  tuna fleet  is  active. 
The Japanese  example  will,  however,  provide  some 
guide as to what could be expected from  a Papua New 
Guinea based operation. In this case, the analysis would 
be augmented by adjusting certain variables in accord-
ance with Papua New Guinea's specific conditions. 
The following  input variables are noted. The daily 
catch rate is  expected to  be  1.4  tonnes per day.  The 
following  catch  composition  is  anticipated:  63% 
yellowfin; 29% albacore and bigeye; and 8% billfish and 
swordfish. This catch composition is  quite important 
since the market prices of the different species can vary 
substantially.  Of  the  tuna  varieties,  bigeye  typically 
attracts the highest average market price at ¥416/ kg. 
The average market price of yell owfi n is ¥312/kg, while 
that of albacore is  only ¥236/kg. Note,  however,  that 
the two  residual species (billfish  and swordfish)  yield 
480  and  ¥4211kg  respectively.  Of  these  average 
market prices per kilogram, ¥144 goes directly to the 
crew  as  remuneration.  The  vessel  under  review  is 
assumed  to  have  an economic  life  of 12  years.  The 
investors regard 10% as the minimum before tax rate of 
return they require from the project 
The operating statement indicates that the vessel 
can  be expected  to  undertake five  trips  per year on 
average. The unloading facilities  represent a  signifi-
cant constraint (30 days per year are spent loading and 
unloading). As  stated before,  the daily  catch consists 
mainly of yellowfin. Each fishing day 882 kg of yellowfin 
is  caught While the market price of bigeye is  higher, 
only 165 kg are caught per day. 
From  the revenue statement we  determine that an 
average vessel year will result in a positive net operating 
profit of ¥13 242000. It  is yellowfin catch which repre-
sents most of the receipts;  ¥86 l!24000  out of some 
¥141952000, or about 60%. Bigeye  tuna is  the next 
most important species in terms of revenue, accounting 
for  ¥20800000,  which  is  14% of revenue.  Although 
billfish is a residual catch, its receipts are quite substan-
tial  (¥  13440000). On the cost side, the largest item is 
wages, which represents 44% of total operating cost 
From the cash flow statement we note that the first 
year of the project shows a very large cash outflow of 
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purchase of the vessel. All  subsequent years show an 
even net cash inflow of ¥ 13 242 000, except for year 12 
when the salvage value of the vessel is  received. This 
cash flow table shows the liquidity needs of the venture 
and also  its  ability  to  pay  back  possible  loans. Any 
financial agreements burdening the project with repay-
ments  larger  than  the yearly  cash  inflow  should  be 
avoided. 
The investment analysis statement shows there are 
problems  regarding  profitability  of  the  project. 
Problematic is  the payback period of the venture. The 
calculated payback period is  nearly 15 years, which  is 
longer that the economic life of the vessel at 12 years. 
This is  also reflected in  the low  return on investment 
(6.7%). Furthermore, the NPV is negative and the IRR is 
very  low.  Given  the present market and internal cost 
structure, the proposed project would not find financial 
support. 
The  above  example  is  based  on Japanese  data. 
Potential Papua New  Guinea investors should adjust 
certain key parameters, such as wages, to the domestic 
situation.  Having  done  this,  one  can  implement 
different  scenarios  (of  prices,  operational  and  cost 
parameters)  and  investigate  which  conditions would 
have to  prevail  in  order to  make the project feasible. 
The remaining task then is to look at the plausibility of 
profitable conditions and to convince potential finan-
ciers  of their  plausibility.  Furthermore,  although  the 
project will  not likely find financial support if adminis-
tered  as  a  purely  private  initiative,  there  might  be 
grounds for  government or joint private-government 
financial support. The wider effects on the Papua New 
Guinea economy of setting up a domestic tuna fishing 
fleet  may well  be considerable. The tuna fleet opera-
tions  may  lead  to  the  establishment  of  domestic 
canneries  and  to  increasing  port  handling volumes. 
Substantial spinoff effects on employment, investment, 
foreign  reserves and facilities  are to  be expected. For 
these reasons, a wider cost-benefit approach would be 
appropriate  and  will  increase  the  chances  of  the 
proposed investment project being undertaken. 
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Appendix 1  (2) Input  parameters for  the revenue statement 
Range  name  Description  Value 
Example application of  FAM to Japanese  nn%  repair and  maintenance  (%  of  0.05 
Longliner(size 50-1 00 GRT)  vessel costl 
fgm  fishing gear maintenance (¥lyear)  4652 
b  bait cost (lI/ tonne)  35 
(1) Input  parameters for the operating  statement  ice  ice  roOO¥)  248 
Range  name  D escription  Value  mm  miscellaneous materials roOO¥)  2539 
vhc  vessel  fish  holding capacity (tl  90  cob  cost of business roOO¥)  4269 
ptof  port to fishing grounds (n  miles)  800  insurance %  of book value  roOO¥)  0.028 
dsr  days annual steaming allowance for  0  oth  other costs (+  fish  box)  rOOO¥)  13107 
refit 
oil  oil  roOO¥)  16214 
dwu  days waiting to  unload/provision  2 
cc  capital  cost  roOO¥)  4858 
fuc  fish  unloading capacity (t/d)  12.5 
ts  transit speed  (miles/h)  19 
(3) Input  parameters for the cash flow/investment 
dcalb  daily catch  rate  of albacore  025  analysis statement 
dceye  daily catch  rate  of bigeye  (tl  0.16 
Range  name  Description  Value 
dcyel  daily catch  rate  of yellowfin (tl  0.88 
vs%  vessel  salvage %  of initial cost  0.1 
dcbil  daily catch  rate  of billfish  (t)  0.09 
vel  vessel  economic life (yrs)  12 
dcswo  daily catch  rate  of swordfish  (t)  0.02 
npvd  net present value discount rate %  0.1 
(2) Input  parameters for the revenue statement  (4) Vessel operating  statement 
Range  name  Description  Value  Range  name  Description  Value 
amp  average  market price  of tuna  0.326  df  days fishing  314 
rOOO¥lkg) 
ds  days steaming  9 
ampalb  average  market price of albacore  0236 
rOOO¥lkg)  dwp  days wait and  provisions  2 
ampeye  average  market price  of bigeye  0.416  du  days unloading  30 
rOOO¥/kg)  doth  days other  10 
ampyel  average  market price  of yellowfin  0.312  dtot  days total  365 
rOOO¥lkg) 
dcalb  projected daily catch  of albacore  (tl  025 
ampbil  average  market price of billfish  0.480 
projected  daily catch of bigeye  (tl  0.16  rOOO¥lkg)  dceye 
ampswo  average market price of swordfish  0.421  dcyel  projected  daily catch  of yellowfin  (tl  0.88 
rOOO¥/kg)  dcbil  projected daily catch  of billfish  (tl  0.09 
ten  total  crew number  20  dcswo  projected  daily catch of swordfish  (t)  0.02 
cs%  crew share  (%  of gross fish  0  dc  total  projected  daily catch  (tl  1.40 
receipts) 
nt  number of trips  per year  5 
csy  crew share  rooo  ¥ per tonne  of  144 
projected annual catch  (tl  440  fish  landed)  ac 
vc  vessel  cost  (¥  million)  197020 
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(5) Vessel revenue statement  (5) Vessel revenue statement 
Range  name  Description  Value  Range  name  Description  Value 
(1 J  Vessel  gross receipts  (2J  Vessel  operating  costs 
acalb  annual  catch  of alba core  (0  79  Variable  costs 
aceye  annual  catch  of bigeye  (0  50  w  wages  roOOYJ  54266 
acyel  annual  catch  of yellowfin  (0  277  fg  fishing  gear roOOYJ  4652 
acbil  annual catch  of billfish (0  28  oil  oil  roOOYJ  16214 
acswo  annual  catch  of swordfish Itl  6  bai  bait  roOOYJ  13190 
ac  total annual catch  (tl  440  ice  ice  roOOYJ  248 
mvalb  market value  of albacore  ('OOOYItl  236  mm  miscellaneous  materials  rOOOYJ  2539 
mveye  market value  of bigeye  rOOOYItl  416  oth  other rOOOYJ  13107 
mvyel  market value  of yellowfin  rOOOY/tl  312  subvc  subtotal variable costs  roOOYJ  104215 
mvbil  market value  of billfish  rOOOY/tl  480  Fixed  costs 
mvswo  market value  of swordfish  rOOOY/o  421  fib  fishing boat fOOOYJ  94851 
ralb  receipts  of albacore  catch  rOOOYJ  18644  bro  brokerage ('OOOYJ  5517 
reye  receipts of bigeye  catch  ('OOOYJ  20800  cob  cost of bUSiness  roOOYJ  4269 
ryel  receipts of yellowfin  catch  roOOYJ  86424  subfc  subtotal fixed  costs  rOOOYJ  19637 
roil  receipts of billfish catch  roOOYJ  13440  toc  Total  operating  cost  roOOYJ  123852 
rswo  receipts of swordfish  catch  roOOYJ  2644  (3J  Gross and  net operating  profit 
gfrtotal  gross fish  receipts  rOOOYJ  141952  gop  Gross  operating profit  ('OOOYJ  18100 
cc  capital cost  rOOOYJ  4858 
nop  net operating profit roOOYJ  13242 
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(6) Vessel cash flow and  investment analysis statement 
Range  name  Description  Year 
2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
(1)  Vessel  cash  flow statement 
vc  vessel cost  197020 
rooO¥) 
vsv  vessel  salvage  19702 
value  roOO¥) 
acc  average  capital  4858  4858  4858  4858  4858  4858  4858  4858  4858  4858  4858  4858 
cost  roOO¥) 
tcc  total  capital  cost  201878  4858  4858  4858  4858  4858  4858  4858  4858  4858  4858  -14844 
roOO¥) 
oc  operating  cost  123852  123852  123852  123852  123852  123852  123852  123852  123852  123852  123852  123852 
roOO¥) 
rev  revenue  ('OOO¥)  141952  141952  141952  141952  141952  141952  141952  141952  141952  141952  141952  141952 
ncf  net cash  flow  183788  13242  13242  13242  13242  13242  13242  13242  13242  13242  13242  32944 
roOO¥) 
(2)  Investment analysis statement 
Range  name  Description  Value 
roi  return  on  6.7 
investment  (%) 
npv  net present  -82604.5 
value  roOO¥) 
irr  internal rate  of  -0.02 
return  (%) 
pb  payback  period  14.9 
(years) 
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Rent Generation and Sustainable 
Yield  in  Papua  New  Guinea's 
Skipjack Fishery 
D.A. Troedson 
G.H.  Waugh 
Introduction 
Skipjack  (Katsuwonus  pelamis)  tuna  is  potentially 
Papua New Guinea's most valuable fishery resource. At 
present,  the skipjack fishery  is  under-exploited. The 
decision  on  how  best  to  develop  and  manage  the 
resource  embraces  a  range  of social,  political  and 
biological factors. 
In  this  chapter,  the  question  of management  is 
analysed on the basis of fishery  rent and the level  of 
effort  applied  to  the fishery.  Controlling the  level  of 
effort  in  order to  maximise  rent from  the  fishery  is 
assumed to be the operative goal  of management A 
simple yield model is constructed, based on the model 
developed by Beverton and Holt (1957). The model is 
applied  to  the  Papua  New  Guinea  pole-and-Iine 
skipjack  fishery,  and  the  results  are  compared with 
empirical  fishery  statistics  from  the  1970s and early 
1980s, when the fishery was in operation. A simple rent 
model  is  then  developed  and applied  to  the  fishery 
under a range of price scenarios. For each scenario, the 
level of effort which maximises rent is determined. The 
sensitivity  of  the  principal  economic  variables  to 
changes in  the value of the model parameters is  also 
examined. 
The decision whether to invest in domestic produc-
tion  or to  sell  fishing  rights  needs to  be assessed in 
terms of possible rent The following sections address 
the issue of possible rent by providing an assessment of 
the likely rents which can be generated. 
Simple yield model 
For a  unit stock,  calculation  of fishing  yield  can  be 
made  in  terms  of the yield  of a  single  period  class 
throughout its life. In the steady state, this will be equiv-
alent to the yield in one period, from  all period classes 
present in the fishery. 
Typically, the period of reference chosen is one year, 
although for species which breed regularly throughout 
the year, such as skipjack, a shorter period is  likely to 
be more appropriate. In each period, the number of fish 
alive,  the  number  caught,  losses  from  natural 
(non-fishery) causes, and the number remaining in  the 
fishery at the beginning of the next period can be calcu-
lated. In addition, the yield in weight can be calculated 
as  the  product  of  the  numbers  caught  and  their 
average weight (Gulland 1969). 
In  order  to  obtain  insight  into  the  influence  of 
various parameters upon the yield (catch in  numbers), 
it  is  useful  to express the yield  (from  a single period 
class  throughout its  lifespan)  in  algebraic  fonn. The 
relevant terms are defined as follows: 
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Nt 
=  number of skipjack remaining in the fishery at 
time t 
R =  number of recruits i.e. the number alive at time 
tr (assumed to be independent of population size) 
R'  =  number remaining in  the fishery at time  le,  at 
which they become vulnerable to the gear in use 
M  =  instantaneous coefficient of natural attrition 
(including  emigration  and  death  from  natural 
causes) 
F= instantaneous coefficient of fishing mortality 
Then for tr<l<tc 
dNt/dt = -MNt 
It follows that 
and 
N  - R  -M(t-tr) 
t- e 
R' = Re  - M(tc-tr) 
and for t>le,  when losses arise as a result of both fishery 
and natural causes 
or 
The number of fish  caught in  the interval (t t+dt) 
will  be  FN1dt,  and  hence  the  total  number caught 
throughout the lifespan  of a  period class,  H,  will  be 
given by the integral 
where tL is the maximum age obtained. 
Hence 




If tL is sufficiently large the equation reduces to 
H =  FR'/(F+M)  (2) 
This  simplification  is  assumed  in  the  following 
discussion. 
Thus,  fishing  takes  a  proportion  of  the  total 
numbers reaching the age of first capture, equal to the 
ratio of fishing mortality to total attrition. Equation 2 
represents both the total catch of a single period class 
throughout its  lifespan,  and the total catch from  the 
fishery (all period classes) in a single period. 
If the catch is  multiplied  by  the average weight of 
fish,  W, an expression for yield,  Y, in terms of recruiting 
biomass, B, is derived: 




Three related  measures which  are often  cited  by 
fishery scientists are: 
the catch per recruit 
HIR'  = FI(F+M) 
the catch per unit effort 
Hlf  =  qR'I(F+M) 
and associated yield per unit effort 




where f =  fishing effort, q  =  catchability coefficient 
and qf= F 
The ratio of fishing mortality to total attrition, termed 
the catch per recruit in  equation 4,  is  also termed the 
harvest ratio. Analysis based on the Beverton-Holt yield 
per recruit  model  (K1eiber  et al.  1983) suggests  that 
harvest ratios in the vicinity of 0.5-0.7 would provide the 
maximum  sustainable yield  (MSY)  in  western  Pacific 
skipjack fisheries. Assuming that the more conservative 
estimate of 0.5  is  correct an equation for  the level  of 
effort which  will  provide  the  MSY  in  the  Papua New 




When the fishery is  exposed to a constant level of 
fishing effort, the size of the resource at equilibrium, i.e. 
the equilibrium, fishable biomass, Pe' can be derived: 
dPldt = -(F+M)P + B 
At equilibrium dPldt= 0, hence 
Pe =BI(F+M)  (8) 
Thus yield (equation 3) is a function of equilibrium, 
fish able biomass 
Y=FP  e  (9) 
Application of  the simple yield 
model to the Papua New  Guinea 
domestic pole-and-line skipjack 
fishery 
An  analysis  of  the  Papua  New  Guinea  domestic 
pole-and-Iine skipjack fishery  was  undertaken, based 
upon  the  model  outlined  above.  Lotus  123  spread-
sheet soflware was used for all data manipulation. The 
relevant parameters, their assigned values and sources 
are documented in Table 10.1. The values relate to the 
area  that  was  fished  commercially  by  pole-and-Iine 
vessels in  1979: principally the eastem Bismarck Sea, 
St George's Channel, and New Hanover-Massau. 
The analysis was initially conducted over a range of 
effort levels, from  0 to 3578  boat-days/month  (~\1S;1,  I 
in  steps of 200.  At  each level,  values for  the various 
bioeconomic  measures  were  calculated,  and  are 
documented in Table 10.2. Each measure is discussed 
briefly in the following paragraphs. 
As  noted,  the yield  model  is  a  simple,  equilibrium 
model.  At  each  level  of effort,  there  is  an  associated 
equilibrium,  fishable  population  and  hence  biomass 
(assuming constant average weight of fish). As  the level 
1 The level of effort which will provide maximum sustainable yield 
(equation 7)  is  calculated to  be  approximately 3578 boat-days/ 
month.  The maximum sustainable yield  is  thus 6500 tlmonth 
(equation 3). 
of effort rises from 0 to 3578 boat days/month, equilib-
rium biomass falls 50%, from 40373 t to 20186 t 
In their analysis of skipjack resources in  the westem 
Pacific, K1eiber et al. (I987) estimate the standing stock 
of skipjack  in  the  Papua  New  Guinea  pole-and-Iine 
fishery  to  be 35000 t  associated with  an effort level  of 
644 boat-days/month (F=0.058 fish/month, q =0.00009 
fish/boat-day). This  is  reasonably  consistent  with  the 
present  model,  which  estimates  the  biomass 
associated with an effort level of  600 boat-days/month to 
be  34574  t  (Table  lO.2).  More  precisely,  the  model 
estimates the equilibrium biomass associated with  644 
boat-days/month to be 34214 t a discrepancy of 2.2%. 
The maximum  obtainable age,  tL  (60  months),  is 
sufficiently large relative to the age of first capture, tc (8 
months),  to validate  the use of equation 2  to  model 
catch  in  numbers.  Monthly  catch  rises  curvilinearly 
with  effort  to  a  level  of  1911824  individuals  when 
effort is 3578 boat-days/month. This is 50% of monthly 
recruitment as is indicated by the corresponding catch 
per recruit figure. 
Catch per unit effort and hence yield per unit effort 
decline  with  increasing  effort,  while  the  catch  per 
recruit rises  with  increasing effort. Each individual  is 
assumed to be 3.4  kg (the average weight), and hence 
yield (t/month) is catch times 0.003Lt 
As  noted, the aim of the model is  to provide insight 
into the influence of various parameters upon yield. It is 
relevant therefore to compare the model outcomes with 
empirical statistics (Table 10.3). 
Average  monthly effort during the period was 598 
boat-days, while the average monthly yield was 1989 t A 
comparison with Table 10.2 indicates that this is reason-
ably close to the model prediction; an effort level of 600 
boat-days/month corresponds to  a  harvest of 1867  tI 
month.  More  precisely,  the  model  predicts  that  598 
boat-days/month fishing effort will result in  a harvest of 
1862 tlmonth, a discrepancy of 6.4% with the empirical 
average. 
Average  yield  per  unit  effort  in  the  Papua  ew 
Guinea  fishery  during  1970-81  was  3.4  tlboat-day, 
associated with an average effort level of approximately 
600 boat-days/month. According to the model, an effort 
level of 600 boat-days/month is  associated with a yield 
per unit effort of 3.11  tlboat-day/month (Table 10.2), a 
discrepancy of 8.5% with the empirical average. 
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Table  10.1  Papua  New  Guinea skipjack yield  model: parameters and  assigned values 
Parameter  Units  Value  Reference 
R'  Rsh/month  3823529 
B  tlmonth  13000  Derived from  KJeiber et al.  1987 
M  Per month  0.322  Derived  from  Kleiber et al. 1987 
le  Months  8.0  Appendix 1 
~  Months  60.0  Kearney 1989 
q  Per boat-day  0.00009  Kleiber et al.  1987 
Boat-days/month  o  to 3000 
W  t  0.0034  Appendix 2 
Table  10.2  Papua  New Guinea  skipJack yield  model:  selected  output. 
AsIllng errort  Equlllbrtum  population  catch  Yield  Catch  per recruit  Catch  per unit errort !fishl  Yield  per unit enort 
(boat-days/month)  Id  Inshlmonth)  IVmontll)  (fraction  Of montllly  boat-day)  IVboat-da y) 
recruitment caughtl 
0  40373  0  0  0.000 
200  38235  202422  688  0.053  1012  3.44 
400  36313  384489  1307  0.101  961  3.27 
600  34574  549124  1867  0.144  915  3.11 
800  32995  698716  2376  0.183  873  2.97 
1000  31553  835237  2840  0218  835  2.84 
1200  30233  960328  3265  0251  800  2.72 
1400  29018  1075368  3656  0281  768  2.61 
1600  27897  1181520  4017  0.309  738  2.51 
1800  26860  1  279776  4351  0.335  711  2.42 
2000  25896  1370987  4661  0.359  685  2.33 
2200  25000  1455882  4950  0.381  662  225 
2400  24164  1535097  5219  0.401  640  2.17 
2600  23381  1609183  5471  0.421  619  2.10 
2800  22648  1678623  5707  0.439  600  2.04 
3000  21959  1743839  5929  0.456  581  1.98 
3200  21311  1805207  6138  0.472  564  1.92 
3400  20701  1863057  6334  0.487  548  1.86 
3578  20186  1911824  6500  0.500  534  1.82 
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Table 10.3  Papua  New Guinea domestic pole-and-line skipjack fishery, 1970-81 
Vessel  numbers  Fishing effort  Skipjack catch  Yield  per unit effort 
(boat-days)  Itl  (t/boat-day) 
1970  5 
1971  29 
1972  45 
1973  43 
1974  47 
1975  48 
1976  40 
1977  51 
1978  48 
1979  45 
1980  50 
1981  44 
Average  41.3 
Average monthly'! 
aAssumes effort  Is dlstrlbuted  uniformly throughout the year. 
Simple rent model 
A comparison of the model estimates with  empirical 
statistics indicates that the model is  not an unreason-
able representation of the fishery, and in  particular of 
the relationship between catch and effort. It is pertinent 
then  to  analyse  the conditions  of optimality,  i.e.  the 
optimal  level  of effort  and  subsequent yield  in  the 
fishery.  In  terms  of economic efficiency,  the  optimal 
level of effort is that which maximises fishery rent 
In  order  to  measure  the  rent generated  by  the 
fishery, two additional parameters must be included in 
the model: price per unit of biomass, P,  and cost per 
unit of effort, C More formally: 
rent = revenue-cost 
= PY-Cf 
= PFRWI (F+M)-Cf 
= PqfBI (qf+M)- Cf  (10) 
Rent as a  percentage of revenue can therefore be 
expressed as follows: 















2354  4.6 
16862  42 
11718  2.4 
27219  3.5 
40214  4.3 
15625  2.4 
24358  3.1 
20106  2.1 
45756  4.6 
23976  2.9 
30976  3.3 
27207  3.5 
23870  3.4 
1989 
=  (J -CfIPW  100 
=  I1-Cf l (PqfBI{qf+M/)] * 100  (11) 
The level  of effort which  maximises  rent can  be 
obtained by  differentiating rent with  respect to effort, 
and setting to zero. Hence 
d(rent)l df= [(qf+M)(PBq)-PBqf(q)]l (qf+Mf -C= 0 
The above expression simplifies to a quadratic in  f, 
and the solution is fopt. given by 
j-2qM  ±[(2q M)2  -4Q'(  M2 - (MPBq}/C) f2 ) 
[oPt=~--------------~--------------~ 
2q2 
[ ~ O 
(12) 
where fopt is the level of effort which maximises rent 
Assuming that the parameters q, M and B are fixed 
and known, the ratio between P and C will  determine 
the  optimal  level  of  effort  If  both  cost  and  price 
increase/ decrease by the same proportion (leaving the 
ratio  unchanged),  the optimal  level  of effort  wi\1  not 
change. The cost-price ratio  also  impacts  upon  the 
level  of rent accruing to  the fishery. If  both cost and 
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price  increase/decrease  by  the same proportion, the 
absolute value of the level of rent increases/decreases 
by  the  same  proportion. The  break-even  cost-price 
ratio (C/P break-even ratio),  i.e. the ratio beLween cost 
and price at which rent is zero, is a function of the level 
of effort, and can be derived as follows: 
rent =  PY-Cf 
When rent =  0 
PY=Cf 
Hence 
C/P break-even =  Ylf 
=  qBI (qf+M) 
=  yield per unit effort 
Hence, the yield per unit effort can also be used to 
evaluate the cost-price ratio at which fishery rent will 
be zero, for a given level of effort. 
If the prevailing cost-price ratio is greater than the 
C/P  break-even  ratio  for  the  given  level  of  effort 
operating in the fishery, the model predicts that losses 
will be made (i.e. rent will be negative). Conversely, if the 
prevailing cost-price ratio is less than the relevant C/P 
break-even ratio, the model predicts that profits will be 
made (i.e. rent will be positive). 
For a given level of effort, the percentage difference 
between the market price and the break-even price is 
equal  to  the  rent as a  percentage  of  revenue.  (The 
break-even  price  is  equal  to  the  cost  per boat-day 
divided by the C/P break-even ratio). This is illustrated 
below. 
The C/P break-even  ratio corresponding to  effort 
levels  between  200  and  3578  boat-days/month  is 
documented in Table 10.2 (under the column headed 
'yield  per unit effort'). As  effort increases from  200 to 
3578  boat-days/month,  the  C/P  break-even  ratio 
declines from  3.44 tlboat-day to  1.82 tlboat-day. One 
practical implication of this decline is  that as the cost 
per  boat-day  increases  relative  to  price  per  unit  of 
biomass, the optimal level of effort declines. 
Campbell and Nicholl 0990; 1992a) estimate the 
cost  of  fishing  effort  for  Japanese,  50-100  GRT 
pole-and-Iine  vessels  during  the  period  1980-81  to 
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1988-89.2  During the  period,  the cost per boat-day 
ranged from ¥466.7 thousand to ¥591.5 thousand, the 
average being ¥524.6 thousand.3 At current exchange 
rates, this is approximately US$4142 (using the 1992 
average exchange rate of ¥ 126.65 per US dollar; IMF 
1993). 
The Japanese government is  currently negotiating 
fishery  access  agreements  with  those  south  Pacific 
governments, including Papua New Guinea, which are 
parties to the Nauru Agreement.4 Should such negotia-
tions  be  successful,  it  is  conceivable  that Japanese 
vessels  will  operate  in  Papua  New  Guinea  waters 
during the current decade. Hence, the cost estimates 
made by Campbell and Nicholl are considered relevant, 
and therefore a cost level of US$4142 per boat-day is 
assumed in the following analysis. 
Table  10.3  documents  the  average  number  of 
active  vessels  and  the  average  monthly  effort  in  the 
Papua  New  Guinea  pole-and-Iine  skipjack  fishery 
during 1970-81. Using these figures,  monthly fishing 
effort per boat is  estimated to  be approximately  14.5 
boat-days. Assuming (for simplicity) that one full-time 
pole-and-Iine vessel operates for  15 days each month, 
and that the minimum operating unit in  the fishery is 
one full-time  vessel,  the CJP  break-even  ratio can be 
used  to  determine  the minimum  price  per tonne of 
skipjack for which  the fishery can be operated profit-
ably, given the cost per boat-day of fishing. 
The  C/P  break-even  ratio  corresponding  to  the 
minimum level of effort required for the fishery to be in 
operation  is  3.61837.  Consequently,  the  minimum 
price for which  the fishery could be operated without 
incurring a loss is US$1144.711t (in this situation, one 
full time vessel would operate and make zero profit). 
The  likelihood  of  vessel  owners  recelvmg 
US$1144.711t for skipjack depends upon the market 
in  which  it  is  sold  and  the  form  of  processing  it 
undergoes. In  the Japanese  market of Yaizu,  where 
tuna is principally sold as sashimi, skipjack commands 
2 Most vessels operating in  the fishery during 1970-85 were of 
this size (Wankowski 1980). 
3 Calculation  of cost per boat-day  involved  using the  method 
'Return to Capital (A)', Campbell and Nicholl  1990:9. 
4  The  member  states  include  Palau,  Federated  States  of 
Micronesia,  Marshall  Islands,  Papua  New  Guinea,  Solomon 
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a  high  price  relative  to  other  markets.  Owen  and 
Troedson (1993b) forecast the average price received 
for  skipjack at Yaizu  during  1994  to  be  ¥257.5/kg, 
which  is  approximately US$2033/t  5 At  this price the 
fishery could be operated profitably. 
The optimal level of effort under such circumstances 
is approximately 1200 boat-days/month, or 80 full-time 
boats (equation 12). Total harvest is approximately 3265 
t/month (Table  10.2),  which  is  approximately 50%  of 
MSY.  Rent accruing to the fishery  is  US$1667581  per 
month (US$20 969.76/boat/month), which  is  approxi-
mately  25%  of total  revenue  (equations  10  and  1 n 
Catch per recruit is  0.25,  i.e.  one in  every four recruits 
into the fishery is  caught Yield  per unit effort is 2.72 t/ 
boat-day/month (Table 10.2). The C/P break-even ratio 
is  hence 2.72,  which,  assuming that effort  is  optimal, 
means that the break-even price level is  US$1522.79/t 
Hence, the price can fall 25% before all rent is dissipated 
(assuming that only the price of skipjack changes). As 
noted,  the  percentage difference  between  the market 
and  break-even  prices  is  equal  to  the  rent  as  a 
percentage of revenue. 
If,  however,  skipjack  is  sold  for  canning,  it 
commands  a  significantly  lower  price.  Owen  and 
Troedson forecast the average price paid for skipjack 
by  canneries in  American Samoa during  199Ll  to  be 
US$728/t  Since  this  is  below  the  minimum 
break-even  price  of  US$1144.2/t,  the  optimal 
short-term  decision  is  to  cease  operations  in  the 
fishery. 
Should Japanese  vessels  operate  in  Papua  New 
Guinea waters, they may have some form of purchasing 
agreement with  wholesalers  in  the Japanese seafood 
markets.  While  such  agreements would  afford  price 
premiums for skipjack, they may entail quantity restric-
tions and hence alternative markets may  need to  be 
sought As a result, the relevant average price may fall 
somewhere  between  US$2033  and  US$728/t.  The 
simplest assumption is that the relevant price will be an 
unweighted average of the two, i.e. US$1380.5/t Under 
this assumption the optimal level  of effort is  approxi-
mately 360 boat-days/month (24 full-time boats). Total 
monthly harvest is  1188 t (9.1 % of recruitment), which 
5 The  1992 January-August average  price  was  approximately 
¥272/kg. which is roughly US$2150/l 
is approximately 18% MSY. Rent accruing to the fishery 
is  US$149587.1/month  (US$6232.8/boatimonth), 
which is 9.1 % of revenue. Yield  per unit effort is 3.3 t/ 
boat-day/month.  The  break-even  price  level  is 
US$1254.64/t.  Hence  price  can  fall  approximately 
9.1 % before all rent is dissipated. 
Table 10.4 summarises the outcomes for  the four 
skipjack prices discussed. It should be noted that the 
optimum  effort  corresponding  to  the  price  of 
US$1l44.711t is  a constrained optimum. The true or 
unconstrained  optimum  is  7.5  boat-days/month. 
However,  the defined minimum operating unit in  the 
fishery  is  one full-time  boat, which corresponds to 15 
boat-days/month. 
Sensitivity analysis 
In  the  following  paragraphs,  the  responsiveness  of 
economic variables to  changes in  six  parameters are 
analysed. Each parameter is  analysed in  turn, relative 
to the base model. The parameters under considera-
tion are fe,  tu  B,  q,  M and C The parameter values in 
the  base model  include  those documented  in  Table 
10.2,  and  in  addition,  a  fishing  cost  of  US$4142/ 
boat-day,  and  a  skipjack  price  of US$1380.5/t. The 
value of parameters B,  q and M documented in Table 
10.2  are  point estimates  derived  from  Kleiber  et al. 
(I  987).  The range  over which  these  parameters are 
varied in the sensitivity analysis is equal to their interval 
estimates documented in the same article. 
The economic variables analysed are optimal effort, 
actual  effort,  boat numbers,  rent,  rent  per boat,  and 
rent/revenue. Actual  effort  is  equal to  optimal  effort 
rounded  to  the  nearest  multiple  of  15,  since  the 
minimum operating unit is defined to be one full-time 
boat, i.e.  15 boat-days/month. 
Age of  first capture (tc) and  maximum age (t{) 
The skipjack catch (I- I), as defined by equation 2, is a 
simplification of equation 1, based on the assump-
tion  that the maximum age (tJ  is  sufficiently large 
relative to the age of first capture (tc),  to render the 
term  e -(I'+M)(I/. -le)  equal  to  zero.  This  assumption 
holds  true  in  the  base  model,  where  tL = 60  and 
tc =  8. The greater the difference between  tL and to 
the nearer the term approaches zero. 
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Table  1D.4  Papua  New Guinea skipjack yield/rent model: output for four selected skipjack prices. 
Category  Units 
Skipjack price  US$1t  728 
Rshing  cost  US$/boat-day  4142 
Optimum  effort  Boat-days/month  0 
Number of boats  0 
Equilibrium  population  40373 
Catch  Number  0 
Yield  tlmonth  0 
Catch  per recruit  0 
Catch  per  un~ effort  Number of boat-days 
Yield  per unit effort  tlboat-day 
or C/P  break-even 
Revenue  $US/month  0 
Cost  $US/month  0 
Rent  $/US/month  0 
Rent per boat  $US/month 
Rentlrevenue  % 
aConstralned  optimum. 
Whether variation  in  tL  or  tc  (within  reasonable 
limits)  will  impact  upon  the  value  of the  economic 
variables  under  consideration  depends  upon  the 
degree  of  variation  required  to  make  the  term 
e-(F+M)(t,.-t,)  significantly  impact upon  the value  of 
catch and consequently yield. 
Clearly,  neither an increase in  the maximum age 
nor a  decrease in  the age of first  capture will  impact 
upon the value of the economic variables, since only by 
an increase in  the age of first capture or a decrease in 
the  maximum  age  will  the  tenn  e-(F+M)(t,-t,)  be 
increased. An increase in the age of first capture by one 
year to 20 months, or a decrease in  the maximum age 
by one year to 48 months reduces monthly harvest by 
lkg (0.00008%) at the optimum, which  is  not signifi-
cant Further increase in the age of first capture is likely 
to  be  beyond  the  scope  of reasonable  variation.  A 
decline  in  the maximum  age  by  20 months reduces 
monthly harvest by approximately 14 kg (0.0012%).  In 
tenns  of  the  impact  upon  the  economic  variables 
under consideration, this decline is not significant. 
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Value 
1144.71  1380.5  2033 
4142  4142  4142 
15a  360  1200 
24  80 
40204  36682  30233 
15963  349555  960328 
54  1188  3254 
0.0042  0.0914  02512 
1064  971  800 
3.61837  3.30135  2.72093 
62130  1640707  6637981 
62130  1491120  4970400 
0  149587  1667581 
0  6233  20845 
0  9.1  25.1 
Hence, considerable variation in the maximum age 
of skipjack and in the age of first capture has no signifi-
cant impact upon the yield, and consequently no signif-
icant  impact  upon  the optimal  level  of effort  in  the 
fishery  or the fishery  rent. It would  appear therefore, 
that there is  no economic benefit in  the targeting of 
skipjack schools with a higher than average mean age 
(if that were possible). In addition, any reasonable error 
in  the measurement of maximum age or age of first 
capture should have no impact upon the results of the 
model. 
Recruitment tJiomass (B) 
Table  10.5  documents  the  responsiveness  of  the 
economic variables under consideration to a change in 
recruitment biomass. As recruitment biomass increases 
from  11000 t/month to 16000 t/month, effort increases 
from  45 boat-days/month (3  boats) to 795 boat-days/ 
month  (53  boats);  rent  increases  from  US$2235.3/ 
month to US$722854.9/month; rent per boat increases 
from  US$745.l/month  to  US$13638.8/month;  and 
rent/revenue % increases from  l.2 % to 18%. Rent Generation and  Sustainable Yield  in  Papua  New Guinea's Skipjack Fishery 
Table  10.5  Sensitivity analysis: recruitment biomass 
Recruitment biomass  Optimal  effort  Actual effort  Number of boats  Rent  Rent per boat  Rent  revenue 
(t/month]  (boat-days/month]  (boat -days/month] 
11000  43.95  45 
11500  125.35  120 
12000  205.00  210 
12500  283.00  285 
13000  359.46  360 
13500  434.46  435 
14000  508.09  510 
14500  580.41  585 
15000  651.49  645 
15500  721.40  720 
16000  790.19  795 
Clearly,  all  variables under consideration respond 
significantly  to  the variation  in  recruitment biomass. 
From  the  perspective  of  fisheries  management,  the 
analysis indicates that an investment of funds into the 
determination of a more accurate measure of recruit-
ment biomass is warranted. This may entail an analysis 
of the determinants of recruitment biomass and the 
development of forecast models based on such deter-
minants. 
Should  management  decisions  concerning  the 
number of vessels permitted to operate in  the fishery be 
based on a recruitment biomass of 13000 tlmonth, when 
in  actuality recruitment biomass  is  14000 tlmonth, the 
analysis indicates that an investment of up to US$22883/ 
month for the determination of an accurate recruibnent 
figure is warranted.6 
Catchability coefficient (q) 
Table  10.6  documents  the  responsiveness  of  the 
economic variables under consideration to a change in 
the catchability coefficient As the catchability coefficient 
increases from 0.00006/boat  -day to 0.000 144/boat  -day, 
effort increases from  zero to 870 boat-days/month (58 
6 If management decisions are based on a recruitment biomass of 
13000 t, effort applied to the fishery will be 360 boat-days/month 
and  rent accruing to  the  fishery  will  be  US$275975.3/month. 
However,  optimum  rent  is  US$298858.3/month  when 












(USS/month]  (USS/month]  (%] 
2235.29  745.10  1.2 
18158.62  2269.83  3.5 
48623.53  3473.11  5.3 
92715.14  4879.74  7.3 
149587.10  6232.80  9.1 
218522.80  7535.27  10.8 
298858.30  8789.95  12.4 
389977.40  9999.42  13.9 
491336.90  11426.44  15.5 
602491.60  12551.91  16.8 
722854.90  13638.77  18.0 
boats);  rent  increases  from  zero  to  US  $1423149/ 
month; rent per boat increases to  US  $24537/month; 
and rent/revenue % increases to 28.3%. 
The  percentage  change  in  all  variables  under 
consideration  is  considerably  greater  than  the 
percentage  change  in  the  catchability  coefficient. 
Hence,  the  analysis  indicates  that an  investment  of 
funds  into  the  determination  of  a  more  accurate 
measure of catchability is warranted. 
Should  management  decisions  be  based  on  a 
catchability coefficient of 0.00009/boat-day when the 
true  figure  is  0.000 l/boat  -day, the analysis  indicates 
that  an  investment  of  up  to  US$27835/month  to 
determine the true value is warranted. 
Instantaneous coefficient of  natural attrition (M) 
Table  10.7  documents  the  responsiveness  of  the 
economic variables under consideration to a change in 
the  instantaneous  coefficient  of natural  attrition.  As 
attrition increases from 0.262/month to 0.402/month, 
effort declines from 645 boat-days/month (43 boats) to 
zero; rent declines from US$583508.7/month to zero; 
rent per boat declines from  US$13569.97 and rent! 
revenue % declines from  17.9% to zero. 
The  magnitude  of  the  change  in  the  economic 
variables is less than occurred in  response to variation 
in  recruitment  biomass  and  catchability  coefficient, 
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Table  10.6  Sensitivity analysis: catchability coefficient 
Catchability coefficient  Optimal  effort  Actual  effort/month  Number of boats  Rent  Rent  per boat 
(US$lmonth) 
Rent!revenue 
(%)  per boat-day  (boat-days/month)  (boat-days/month)  (US$lmonth) 
0.00006  0  0  0  0 
0.00007  0  0  0  0 
0.00008  151.07  150  10  23484.43  2348.44  3.6 
0.00009  359.46  360  24  149587.10  6232.80  9.1 
0.00010  515.19  510  34  341391.00  10040.91  13.9 
0.00011  634.09  630  42  568900.50  13545.25  17.9 
0.00012  726.41  720  48  814473.00  16968.19  21.5 
0.00013  799.06  795  53  1067685.00  20145.01  24.5 
0.00014  856.81  855  57  1322063.00  23194.09  272 
0.000144  876.55  870  58  1423149.00  24537.05  28.3 
Table  10.7  Sensitivity analysis:  natural attrition 
Natural attritionl  Optimal  effort  Actual  effort  Number of boats  Rent  Rent  per boat  Rent! revenue 
month  (boat-days/month)  (boat-days/month) 
0262  640.41  645 
0282  551.25  555 
0.302  457.45  450 
0.322  359.46  360 
0.342  257.67  255 
0.362  152.41  150 
0.382  43.96  45 
0.402  0  0 
although still  highly significant The analysis therefore 
indicates that further research into the level of attrition 
in the Papua New Guinea fishery is warranted. 
Should management decisions be based on 0.322/ 
month as a measure of instantaneous natural attrition, 
when  the true measure is  0.302/month, the analysis 
indicates  that an investment of up to  US$10525.4/ 
month to determine the true value is warranted. 
Fishing cost  (C) 
Table  10.8  documents  the  responsiveness  of  the 
economic variables under consideration to a change in 
the daily fishing cost The variation in fishing cost closely 
approximates  the  range  of  cost  estimates  for  the 










(US$lmonth)  (US$lmonth)  (%) 
583508.70  13569.97  17.9 
401680.10  10856.22  14.9 
258240.90  8608.03  12.2 
149587.10  6232.80  9.1 
72361.52  4256.56  6.4 
23913.72  2391.37  3.7 
1884.38  628.13  1.0 
0 
Nicholl  (1990;  1992a).  As  fishing  cost  increases  from 
US$3600/boat-day  to  US$4700/boat-day,  effort 
declines from  645 boat-days/month (43  boats) to  120 
boat-days/month  (8  boats);  rent  declines  from  US 
$419203.3/month  to  US$18398.4/month;  rent  per 
boat declines from  US$9748.9 /month to US$2299.8/ 
month; and rent/revenue % declines from  15.3% to 3.2%. 
The response of the economic variables to variation 
in  cost  is  less  than  that  for  variation  in  the  three 
previous  biological  parameters, but is  still  significant. 
Hence,  the analysis  indicates that research aimed at 
the development of models which forecast the various 
component costs of total fishing cost is warranted. 
Should management decisions be based on a cost 
estimate of US $4142/boat-day when the actual cost is Rent Generation and  Sustainable Yield In Papua New Guinea's SkipJack Fishery 
Table 10.8  Sensitivity analysis: fishing  cost 
Rshlng cost  Optimal  effort  Actual effort  Number of boats  Rent  Rent per boat  Rent! revenue 
(USS/boat-day)  (boat-days/month)  (boat-days/month) 
3600  645.46  645 
3700  588.00  585 
3800  532.82  540 
3900  479.78  480 
4000  428.74  435 
4100  379.57  375 
4142  359.46  360 
4200  332.18  330 
4300  286.45  285 
4400  24228  240 
4500  199.60  195 
4600  158.31  165 
4700  118.36  120 
US$4000/boat-day,  the  analysis  indicates  that  an 
investment of up to US$4760/month to detennine the 
true cost is warranted. 
Conclusion 
The decision  to  invest  in  domestic production  or to 
continue the current licences with distant water fishing 
nations is critically detennined by the licence fees that 
can be obtained. This is in turn dependent on the rent 
that can be generated. Although  no decisive calcula-
tion  can be made in  this issue, evidence is  gradually 
being accumulated which  suggests that distant water 
fishing  nations,  with  the  possible  exception  of  the 
United States, are paying too little for the right to fish in 
south Pacific waters. 
Currently, the United States is paying about 12% of 
the value of catch, while the Japanese are paying 5%. 
Waugh (1987) made some rent calculations based on 
budget data. His  findings  suggest an optimal size  of 
vessel  with  rent varying from  lO%-27%.  His  calcula-














(US$/month)  (US$/month)  (%) 
419203.30  9748.92  15.3 
357542.50  9167.76  142 
301480.60  8374.46  12.8 
250915.70  7841.11  11.8 
205467.20  7085.08  10.6 
165084.30  6603.37  9.7 
149587.10  6232.80  9.1 
129527.60  5887.62  8.5 
98612.54  5190.13  7.4 
72185.10  4511.57  6.4 
50083.79  3852.60  5.4 
32169.73  2924.52  4.1 
18398.44  2299.81  32 
level of fishing effort in aggregate and make no attempt 
to calculate optimal renl 
The  analysis  in  this  chapter  provides  possible 
outcomes when fishing effort is optimised. Not surpris-
ingly, optimal effort and hence optimal rent is sensitive 
to fluctuations in international tuna prices. This alone 
suggests that tuna market studies are critical to good 
managemenl Based on 1992 prices, rent in the range 
of 9-25% is  not unreasonable. This is  not to suggest 
that all  rent should  be  appropriated  by  the  coastal 
state. Waugh (1987) provides a number of reasons for 
this, not the least of which is the large degree of uncer-
tainty in the industry. However, it would appear evident 
that foreign  fee  schedules could  be  reviewed  with  a 
view to negotiating increases where appropriate. 
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Appendix 1. Derivation of the age at 
first capture (tc) 
If the length of a fish  is plotted against age, the general 
result  is  a  curve  which  declines  in  slope  as  age 
increases, approaching an upper asymptote parallel to 
the axis on which age is plotted. The asymptote repre-
sents  the  theoretical  average  maximum  length  (Loo). 
The relationship between the length at time t (J~ and 
Loo is described by the von Bertalanffy curve: 
It =fpo[I_e- K(t-to)] 
(lA) 
where to is  the theoretical age at which length equals 
zero  and  K  is  the  instantaneous  rate  of change  in 
length per period. 
Sibert et al. (I  983) document values of the param--
eters  Loo  and  K  for  skipjack  in  Papua New  Guinea 
waters: Loo  =  60.9 cm and K (per year) =  1.55. The von 
Bertalanffy growth  curve  for  skipjack  in  Papua New 
Guinea is  illustrated in  Figure 10.1. It is assumed that 
length equals zero when time equals zero. 
Assuming a  length at first  capture of 38 cm? the 
corresponding  age  of  first  capture  (derived  from 
equation  lA)  is  approximately  0.63  years  i.e.  7.56 
months. Rounding to the nearest whole month, the age 
of first capture is 8 months. 
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Figure  10.1  Von  Bertalanffy growth curve for skipjack in  Papua  New 
Guinea 
7K1eiber et al.  (1987) estimates the length at recruitment to  be 
between 36 cm and 40 cm. 
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Appendix 2. Derivation of the 
average weight of skipjack (W) 
Figure  10.2  illustrates the relationship between length 
and  weight  for  skipjack.  Assuming  that  the  average 
length of skipjack in  Papua New  Guinea waters is  55 
cm,8 the corresponding average weight is approximately 
3.4 kg (Figure 10.2). Hence the value of W chosen for the 
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(Gillet  1986) 
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Between  the  Purse 
Seine  and  Longline  Tuna  Fleet  in 
Papua New Guinea 
H.F.  Campbel/ 
R.B. Nicholl 
Introduction 
In the western Pacific, yellowfin  tuna are harvested as 
juveniles by  purse seiners and as adults by longliners. 
Countries with extensive exclusive economic zones in 
the  region,  such  as Papua New  Guinea,  attempt to 
control access by foreign vessels so as to maximise the 
net  present value  of their  tuna  fisheries.  Extensive 
tagging studies are underway (South Pacific Commis-
sion 1990a); however, there is  insufficient information 
available about yellowfin  stocks to conduct a bioeco-
nomic analysis which would  indicate the optimal (Le. 
net present value maximising) harvesting levels by the 
two gear types. Instead, the present study addresses the 
question  of whether  a  marginal  investment  in  the 
yellowfin stock, in the form of a 1  %  decline in the purse 
seine  harvest  from  its  current  level  in  Papua  ew 
Guinea, would  increase the net present value of the 
country's tuna fisheries.  The approach adopted  is  to 
calculate the marginal  benefit to  the longline fishery 
and marginal  cost to  the  purse seine  fishery,  in  net 
present  value  terms,  on  the  assumption  that  the 
changes in harvest are not large enough to affect world 
tuna prices. The analysis takes into account the multi-
species nature of the purse seine and longline fisheries: 
in addition to yellowfin, the purse seine fishery harvests 
skipjack,  and  the  longline  fishery  harvests  bigeye, 
albacore, billfish and swordfish. 
Background 
Four major tuna species are harvested  by  five  main 
gear types in the western Pacific (Table 11.1). The data 
in Table ILl are based on the fishing activities of 18 
nations,  with  Indonesia,  Japan,  Korea,  Philippines, 
Taiwan and the United States being the major partici-
pants.  Three significant  gear interactions  appear to 
have  been  taking place  amongst these  fisheries:  the 
interaction  between  the  driftnetltroll  and  longline 
fisheries  through  the albacore stock;  the  interaction 
between  the  purse  seine  and  pole-and-Iine  fishery 
through  the  skipjack  stock;  and  the  interaction 
between the purse seine and longline fisheries through 
the yellowfin stock. Measures have been taken by  the 
Pacific  island  nations  to  restrict  driftnetting  for 
albacore, and the pole-and line fishery is being phased 
out by  distant water fishing  nations  as  uneconomic. 
The  present  paper deals  with  the  allocation  of the 
yellowfin  stock between the purse seine and longline 
fisheries. 
The purse seine fishery  catches juvenile yellowfin 
which are approximately 1 year old and average 5 kg, 
whereas the longline fishery  catches adults averaging 
about 2.5 years of age and 27 kg in weight The longline 
catch supplies the sashimi market whereas the purse 
seine catch is  canned. The unit value of the longline 
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Table  11.1  Average  catch  of major tuna species by gear type,  SPC statistical area 1987-91 
Species 
Albacore  Bigeye  Skipjack  Yellowfin 
Purse seine  452675  145491 
Longline  16932  36224  35268 
Pole-and-line  117981  3857 
Driftnet  7278 
Troll  5955 
Source:  South  Pacific  Commission  (1992aJ.  The  averages  are  based  on  calendar years  for  purse  seine.  longllne,  and  pole-and-lIne  vessels, and  fishing  seasons  for 
drlftnet and  trolling vessels. A  proportion  of the  reported  yellowfln  catch  of purse  selners consists  of juvenile blgeye. 
yellowfin  catch  is  2.6  times  that of the  purse seine 
catch.1 In  determining the appropriate distribution of 
the yellowfin  catch  between  the  two  gear types, the 
following  factors  need to  be taken  into  account: the 
delay between the escape of yellowfin  from  the purse 
seine fishery and their recruitment to the adult stock; 
the relatively high  natural mortality rates for yellowfin 
in the first two to three years of life; the larger size and 
higher  unit  value  of  the  longline  harvest;  and  the 
relative catch rates and harvesting costs of the multi-
species purse seine and longline fleets. 
There  is  insufficient  information  available  about 
Papua  New  Guinea's  tuna  stocks  to  determine  an 
optimal harvesting plan. Instead, estimates reported in 
this chapter determine whether at recent harvest levels 
the net present value benefit to the longline fishery of a 
small  reduction  in  the  purse  seine  yellowfin  catch 
exceeds the net present value cost to the purse seine 
fishery.  Since  both  fisheries  exploit  more  than  one 
species, with the possibility of substitution or comple-
mentarity  between  species,  the  benefit  and  cost 
estimates  presented  in  this  paper are  derived  from 
estimated  models  of  the  multispecies  production 
technologies of the two fisheries. While there are many 
nationalities involved, the Japanese  longline fleet and 
the United States purse seine fleet are the largest in 
terms of the total catch by  weight of their respective 
gear types. The analysis of benefits  and costs is  based 
on  the  operations  of  those  fleets  in  Papua  New 
Guinea's exclusive economic zone during the 1980s. 
1 This is an average on a monthly basis for the years 1984-85 for 
the Port of Yaizu. 
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The interaction between the purse 
seine and longline fleets 
By catching juvenile yellowfin tuna the purse seine fleet 
reduces  the  adult stock,  thereby  reducing  the  adult 
yellowfin  catch of the  longline  fleet The size  of the 
reduction  in  the adult yellowfin  catch depends on a 
variety of factors, the most important of which are: 
- the size of the purse seine yellowfin catch; 
- the monthly attrition rate of ye 1I0wfin which escape 
the purse seine fishery; 
- the time  interval  between  escape from  the purse 
seine fishery and recruitment to the adult yellowfin 
stock; 
- the relationship for  a  given  level  of fishing  effort, 
between  longline  yellowfin  catch  and  yellowfin 
stock; and 
- the level of longline fishing effort. 
The present paper considers the marginal interac-
tion  between  the  two  fisheries - the  effect  of a  1  % 
change in  the purse seine juvenile yellowfin  catch on 
the longline yellowfin catch per unit effort The interac-
tion  model  can  be  described  by  means of a  simple 
production function for longline yellowfin harvests: 
(1) 
where Ht is  longline yellowfin  harvest in  numbers of 
fish,  Et  is  effort  in  thousands  of hooks,  Xt  is  adult 
yellowfin stock in  number of fish, and A is  the catch-
ability  coefficient  Medley  (l991a) has suggested the Economic Analysis of Interaction Between Purse Seine and  Longline Tuna  Fleets 
following  kind  of  relationship  between  the  adult 
yellowfin stock and the purse seine yellowfin harvest: 
(2) 
where x  is the adult yellowfin stock in  the absence of 
purse seining, ha is the purse seine catch at time zero, 
m  is  the  monthly  attrition  rate  of yellowfin  which 
escape the purse seine fishery,  tl is  the delay between 
escape from the purse seine fishery and recruitment to 
the adult yellowfin  stock,  and  qA  is  the  interaction 
parameter. 
In the absence of purse seining, yellowfin catch per 
unit effort (CPUE) in the longline fishery is given by: 
CPUE= AX  (3) 
With  purse seining,  CPUE  in  the longline fishery 
becomes: 
I - q  h e-mt  __  Aa 
CPUE = CPUE et=tJ  (4) 
The  elasticity  of  longline  CPUE  at  time  T  in 
response to a marginal change in the purse seine catch 
at time zero can be expressed as: 
T 
E(ho,T)=  L (-qA)hoe-mt 
t=tJ  (5) 
When  the  marginal  reduction  in  purse  seine 
harvest is permanent and the longline fishery is allowed 
to  adjust  to  a  new  steady-state  equilibrium,  the 
elasticity of longline CPUE can be expressed as: 
(6) 
Medley  (1991 a)  has  estimated  the  interaction 
parameter qA  in  a  model  in  which  m  is  specified  as 
0.133 and  t1  as 18 months. Using average weights of 
longline  and  purse seine caught yellowfin  (26.5  and 
5 kg  respectively),  the  interaction  elasticity  can  be 
expressed in weight of fish. Based on Medley's work, the 
elasticity can be calculated to  be  -1.68. This means 
that at current levels of purse seine and longline effort 
a  1  % permanent decrease in  the purse seine juvenile 
yellowfin catch in a  10° square of the ocean will  result 
in  a  1.68%  permanent increase in  longline yellowfin 
CPUE  in  that  area.  Since  Medley  notes  that  his 
estimate of the value of the interaction parameter is 
towards the high end of the likely range, a much lower 
value  of the interaction elasticity will  be used in  the 
present paper: it will be assumed that E(ho)  = -1. 
The benefits and costs of conserving 
juvenile yellowfin tuna 
The  purse  seine  and  longline  fisheries  are  multi-
species: the purse seine catch consists predominantly 
of skipjack (around  70%)  and juvenile yellowfin;  the 
longliners catch adult yellowfin, bigeye and albacore, as 
indicated in Table ILl, together with small quantities 
of billfish and swordfish. The measurement of the costs 
and  benefits  of a  1  % reduction  in  the  purse  seine 
yellowfin  catch  in  Papua  New  Guinea's  exclusive 
economic zone needs to take the multispecies nature 
of the  fisheries  into  account Campbell  and  Nicholl 
(1992b,c)  have  estimated  revenue  functions  for 
longline  and purse seine vessels  operating in  Papua 
New Guinea in  the period  1980-86. These functions, 
which  show  for  an  average  vessel  the  relationship 
between total revenue, species prices, and effort can be 
used to estimate the per vessel benefits and costs of a 
policy  of conservation. These per vessel  benefits and 
costs can then be multiplied by the number of vessels 
in  the exclusive economic zone to give an estimate of 
aggregate benefits and costs. 
Fishing  vessels  maximise  profit  by  contributing 
effort to a fishery up to the point at which the value of 
the marginal product of effort equals its marginal cost. 
The  effect  of  an  increase  in  yellowfin  catchability, 
caused by  an increase  in  the adult yellowfin  stock, is 
illustrated in  Figure  l 1.l(a): the value of the marginal 
product schedule shifts outwards from  VMPo  to VMP], 
and the equilibrium level of effort from  Eo to E1. The 
result  is  an  increased  catch  of  yellowfin  tuna  and 
species,  such  as  bigeye,  that  are  complements  in 
production with  yellowfin.  Catches of species such as 
albacore and billfish, which are substitutes in  produc-
tion for yellowfin, may also rise because of the increase 
in  the equilibrium  level  of effort.  The benefit to  the 
vessel of the increase in yellowfin catchability, net of the 
cost of the additional fishing  effort.  is  given  by area 
HDFG which  is  approximately equal to area ABDC if 
the  value  of  the  marginal  product  schedules  are 
nonlinear, and exactly equal in the linear case. 
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Two  methods  of  inducing  purse  seine  vessels  to 
reduce their catch of juvenile yellowfin are considered: an 
ad valorem royalty could be levied on the yellowfin catch, 
or an access fee, acting as a tax on fishing effort, could be 
imposed. Which of these two policy instruments is appro-
priate  depends  upon  the  nature  of  purse  seining 
technology. If purse seiners can vary the species composi-
tion  of their catch  in  response  to  changes  in  relative 
species prices, then an ad valorem royalty will  have the 
effect of reducing yellowfin catch and increasing skipjack 
catch. This would be a relatively low-cost outcome for the 
purse seine vessels, as well as a sustainable one given that 
skipjack is a relatively plentiful species (SPC 1990b). If, on 
the other hand, purse seiners have no control over the 
species composition  of the  catch, a  reduction  in  purse 
seine effort will be required to reduce the catch of  juvenile 
yellowfin. A reduction in effort could be achieved by  an 
increase  in  the  fee  charged  for  access  to  the  fishing 
grounds which would have the same effect as an increase 
in fishing costs. 
The costs to purse seine vessels of an ad valorem 
royalty on juvenile yellowfin, or of an increase in  the 
access fee,  are illustrated in  Figures ILl  (b) and (c). In 
Figure  11.1 (b)  the value of the  marginal  product of 
effort  schedule  shifts  downwards  because  of  the 
reduction  in  the ex-vessel  price of juvenile yellowfin 
caused by the imposition of the royalty. 
The cost of the royalty to the individual vessel is illus-
trated by area FGDEwhich is approximately equal to area 
ABDC Of the latter area ABECrepresents a benefit to the 
host nation in the fonn of royalty revenues, so that the net 
cost of the policy is represented by area BDE The cost of 
an increase in the unit cost of fishing through an increase 
in the access fee is illustrated in Figure ll.l(c). If a rise in 
the access fee  per unit of effort causes the unit cost of 
fishing effort to rise from  C1 to C:z,  the profit maximising 
vessel reduces its effort from  Eo to E1. The cost to  the 
vessel is illustrated by area C1DEC2 in Figure 11.1(c). Of 
this area, only BDE represents a  net cost of the policy 
since area C1BEC2 represents an offsetting benefit to the 
host nation. 
In summary, the cost per purse seine vessel of a 1  % 
decline  in  juvenile  yellowfin  catch  is  illustrated  by 
Figure  ILl  (b)  or (c),  depending  upon  whether  the 
appropriate policy instrument is  an ad valorem royalty 
or an increase in the access fee per unit of effort When 
the per vessel cost is multiplied by the number of purse 
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seine vessels fishing in the exclusive economic zone in 
the period of the analysis (the equivalent of 26 United 
States purse seiners), an estimate of the cost of the 
policy can be obtained. The benefit per longline vessel 
of  increased  yellowfin  catchability  is  illustrated  in 
Figure  11.1(a). When the per vessel  benefit is  multi-
plied  by  the  number  of  longliners  fishing  in  the 
exclusive economic zone (an average of 53 Japanese 
longliners) an estimate of the benefit of the policy of 
conservation can be obtained. 
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Figure  11.1  Per  vessel  monthly  benefit  and  cost  of  conserving 
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Agura 11.2 Marginal  benefit and  marginal  cost of Investing  in a fish 
stock. 
The relationship between marginal 
benefit and cost and optimal 
yellowfin stock 
The optimal fish stock from an economic point of view 
is that stock at which the marginal benefit of conserva-
tion equals its marginal cost This point is indicated by 
x*  in  Figure  11.2.  The marginal  benefit schedule  is 
downward  sloping  because,  in  general,  harvest 
increases at a decreasing rate as a result of an increase 
in  fish  stock.  In  addition,  the net value  of a  unit of 
harvest tends to fall  as harvest increases because of a 
fall  in  output price and a rise in  the unit cost of effort 
and harvest This latter phenomenon explains why,  in 
general, the marginal cost of conservation tends to rise 
as the degree of conservation rises. 
The  purse  seine/longline  interaction  model 
described  in  the previous  sections  of the  chapter is 
essentially a linear model which does not take account 
of the factors  which, in  general,  shape the marginal 
benefit and cost schedules. Instead, the model simply 
calculates, at the current levels  of exploitation,  point 
estimates for the marginal benefit and marginal cost of 
conservation. These estimates are the marginal benefit 
to the longline fishery,  and the marginal  cost to  the 
purse  seine  fishery,  of a  1  % decline  in  purse  seine 
juvenile yellowfin  catch.  If  the value of the marginal 
benefit  exceeds  that  of  marginal  cost,  and  if  the 
marginal benefit and cost schedules follow the normal 
pattern as illustrated in  Figure 11.2, then the optimal 
stock of adult yellowfin,  from  an economic point of 
view, is greater than the current stock, denoted by x in 
the figure. 
Estimates of marginal benefit and 
marginal cost of conservation 
Campbell  and Nicholl  (l992d) have  used the proce-
dures  outlined  above  to  obtain  estimates  of  the 
marginal benefit and marginal cost of a  1  % decline in 
the  monthly  purse  seine juvenile  yellowfin  catch  in 
Papua New Guinea's exclusive economic zone, leading 
to  a  1  % rise  in  yellowfin  CPUE  in  the  zone. These 
estimates  are expressed  in  net present value  terms, 
using a 3% per annum real rate of interest 
The estimate of the marginal benefit of conservation 
is  US$2.l  million  while  the estimate of marginal cost 
depends on which policy measure is used to achieve the 
reduction in purse seine yellowfin catch. If purse seiners 
have some control over the species composition of their 
catch  then it  is  most efficient  for  them  to  substitute 
skipjack for juvenile yellowfin, and they can be induced 
to do this by means of the yellowfin  royalty.  If they are 
unable to target species then the reduction in  juvenile 
yellowfin  catch will  require a reduction in  effort which 
will  also reduce the skipjack catch. In  the former case 
the estimate of marginal cost is US$O.l7 million, and in 
the latter case it is US$O.37 million. 
Under  either  assumption  about  purse  seining 
technology the estimate of marginal benefit of conser-
vation exceeds that of marginal cost, as illustrated in 
Figure  11.2.  This  tends  to  suggest  that,  from  an 
economic  point of view,  the  adult yellowfin  stock is 
below its optimal level. Further research, incorporating 
a biological  model of the population dynamics of the 
yellowfin stock, is  required to test this conclusion and 
to  determine  the  extent  of  its  applicability  beyond 
Papua New Guinea's exclusive economic zone. 
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A purse seine vessel cruises in search of schools of tuna 
during  daylight  hours,  attempting  to  locate  fish  by 
observing surface water disturbance, sea bird  activity, 
or floating objects. When an appropriate size school is 
located the vessel attempts to capture it in the seine by 
setting the net around the school and closing it at the 
base. In the western Pacific two types of sets are made 
by purse seiners -'log sets' on schools which aggregate 
near a log or other floating object, and 'free school sets' 
on  aggregations  which  have  no  focal  point  Purse 
seining accounted for  60%  of the  tuna catch  in  the 
Pacific  islands  region  in  the  1980s,  with  the  major 
species caught being skipjack and yellowfin,  and the 
major  fleets  involved  being  those  of Japan  and  the 
United States. 
Doulman (1987  d) has suggested a major difference 
between the modes of operation of the Japanese and 
U.S.  purse  seine  vessels  operating  in  the  western 
Pacific. In particular he argues that whereas: 
lRepnnted with pennission from Natural Resource Modeling Vol. 
7. No. 1. Winter 1993. 
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Japanese vessels tend to fish  as a fleet and exchange 
infonnation  on  the  fishing  grounds.  U.S.  vessels 
usually  operate  individually  and  competitively. 
Because  Japanese  skippers  exchange  infonnation, 
they can coordinate fishing without expensive aircraft 
support 
Doulman  attributes  the  difference  between  the 
operations of the Japanese and U.S.fleets to differences 
in the structure of the two industries. Japanese vessels 
are  usually  owned  by  corporations  or  cooperatives 
which have more than one vessel. Vessels have sophis-
ticated communication systems which enable them to 
share  information  with  their  sister  vessels,  thereby 
increasing  expected  value  of  the  total  catch.  U.S. 
vessels,  on  the  other  hand,  are  usually  owned  by 
individuals  or  small  companies,  and  they  tend  to 
operate individually  and competitively,  although  they 
have been known to cooperate in small 'code groups' of 
three to four vessels. 
The search for fish  concentrations can make up a 
significant proportion of the cost of operations, and an 
efficient search process can lead to lower harvesting 
costs and greater returns. Information sharing of the 
kind  attributed  by  Doulman to Japanese vessels  can 
lead to efficiency benefits (Mangel and Clark 1983). A simple example, drawn from  work  on labour market 
search by  McKenna (1990), can  be  used to illustrate 
the source of these benefits. Suppose that there are 10 
subzones or fishing grounds, and that the frequency 
distribution of the number of schools located per week 
in the subzones is as follows: 
Number of schools  Frequency (number 











A  vessel  acting  independently  in  its  choice  of 
subzone has  an expected  number of sets  per week 
given by: 
Two vessels which act cooperatively each obtain, in 
effect, two sample points from the distribution and are 
each able to choose the more productive subzone. The 
expected maximum number of sets per week when two 
subzones are sampled is given  by: 
The purpose of this chapter is  to examine the two 
hypotheses advanced by  Doulman: that the Japanese 
vessels have a greater tendency to fish  as a fleet than 
the US. vessels; and that they have a greater tendency 
to exchange infonnation about fishing conditions. 
Data 
Purse seine vessels operating in  Papua New Guinea's 
exclusive  economic zone are required  to  submit log 
sheets of their daily operations as part of the conditions 
for access to the zone, which is approximately bounded 
by 134E and 174E and 3N and 9S. Most of the purse 
seining activity is in the area north of SS. The data used 
in this study are derived from the daily catch records of 
Japanese  and  U.S.  vessels  in  the  period  1983-87. 
There are approximately  1000 daily  observations on 
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the  US.  fleet  and  7000  daily  observations  on  the 
Japanese fleet in the sample period. The Japanese fleet 
has  ranged  between  30-40 vessels  over the period, 
while the US. fleet has ranged between 10-20 vessels. 
The catch records report vessel identification and size, 
position of set, type of set ('log' or 'free school'), time of 
set,  catch  by  species, date, and length  of fishing  trip. 
Japanese purse seine vessels range between 200-700 
GRT in size, while the US. vessels are typically larger, in 
the 900-1600 GRT  range.  Larger vessels tend to  be 
faster, enabling them to move relatively quickly across 
the  zone.  Skipjack  and  yellowfin  catches  can  be 
converted to a value using ex-vessel prices in Yaizu for 
the Japanese fleet  and pago Pago port prices for the 
US. vessels.  Unsuccessful  sets-where a  school  was 
located, a set attempted, but no fish were caught -are 
also recorded in the log sheets. 
Spatial distribution of the fleets 
Papua  New  Guinea's  exclusive  economic  zone  was 
divided  into 10 subzones and an analysis of variance 
(ANOVA)  was  perfonned  to  test  for  preferences  for 
particular areas of the zone by  either fleet Since the 
fishery  is  seasonal  in  character  the  ANOV A  was 
conducted on a quarterly basis for the period 1983-87. 
The numbers of sets made by each fleet in this period 
are  reported  in  Table  12.1,  and  the  results  of the 
analysis are reported in Table 12.2. 
The F values reported in Table 12.2 are test statis-
tics for the hypothesis of an equal mean number of sets 
across subzones, and across quarters. They indicate a 
clear  preference  for  fishing  in  particular  subzones 
(mainly subzones 1-4 according to Table 12.0. and, 
for  the Japanese vessels,  in  particular quarters. The 
interactive tenn also suggests that the Japanese fleet 
has a preference for fishing in  particular subzones in 
particular quarters. The US. skippers exhibit a prefer-
ence  for  certain  subzones,  although  this  is  less 
pronounced than for the Japanese vessels, but there is 
no  marked  seasonal  preference.  The  F  statistics 
reported in Table 12.2 suggest that the spatial distribu-
tion of sets by  US. vessels  may  be less  concentrated 
than that of the Japanese. 
Visual inspection of set positions for the vessels in 
the two  fleets  for each quarter in  the period 1984-87 
supports  the  impression  that  the Japanese  tend  to 
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Table  12.1. Number of sets made, by Quarter and subzone, Japanese and  US. Heets  1983-87 
Quarter  Subzone 
Japan 
Quarter  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
1218  1936  1251  398  92  104  80  10 
2  785  264  72  10  19  4  10 
3  995  826  1006  264  100  10  34  53  25  2 
4  974  906  1450  1083  364  139  102  11  4 
U.S. 
24  27  104  70  45  203  64  6  8  6 
2  16  31  67  20  8  6  4  20  2  3 
3  3  3  24  25  47  38  189  76  19  9 
4  10  40  76  53  63  237  128  75  12  6 
Table 12.2  Analysis of variance,  mean number of sets, Japanese and  U.S. Heets,  1983-87 
Source  DF  Sum  of squares 
Japan 
Quarter  3  12038.55 
Subzone  10  1232212.80 
Quarter  28  530260.86 
Subzone  87  1002558.82 
Error -corrected total  128  28852761.04 
U.S. 
Quarter  3  1118.16 
Subzone  10  19703.24 
Quarter  30  14160.17 
Subzone  61  58666.68 
Error-corrected total  104  93648.25 
aSlgnlncantly different from  critical value at 5%  significance level under an F  test 
cluster together as a fleet more than do the U.S. vessels. 
A  formal  test  of  this  hypothesis  is  provided  by  a 
technique described by Mardia (1972) for summarising 
the distribution of points on the surface of a sphere. 
Batschelet (1981)  provides a technical description of 
the measure of location and dispersion of such points. 
A heuristic description  of this measure of dispersion 
can  be  developed  by  considering  a  series  of points 
located on the circumference of a circle. In Figure 12.1 
two  such  distributions  of a  series  of five  points  are 
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Mean square  F  value  P>F 
40079.52  3.48a  0.0193 
12322128  10.69a  0.0001 
18937.88  1.64a  0.0422 
11523.66 
372.72  0.39  0.7624 
1970.32  2.05a  0.0432 
472.00  0.49  0.9823 
961.75 
illustrated. The five  points  are treated  as  directional 
vectors, from  the centre of the circle, and a resultant 
vector, of length R is calculated for each set of points. 
As  can  be  seen  from  Figure  12.l,  the  more  widely 
distributed are the points on the circumference, as in 
Ha),  the shorter is  the length of the resultant vector. 
The distribution of two sets of points can be compared 
by  testing  for  a  significant  difference  between  the 
lengths of the resultant vectors. Search Behaviour in  the Purse Seine Tuna  Fishery 
Points distributed on the surface of a sphere can be 
treated as directional vectors relative to the centre of 
the sphere. The directional vector locating each point is 
itself a resultant vector, summarising three directional 
vectors from  the centre as illustrated  in  Figure  12.2. 
The three directional  cosines  (I,  rn, n)  of the point i 
(latitude e, longitude q»  are represented by the vector: 
rj =  (Ij = cos q>cos e;mj =  sin e  cos e; nj =  sin e)  (3) 
The length  R of the resultant vector for  a  set of 
points is defined as: 
(4) 
and the mean vector length is  defined as:  R =  R I N 
where Nis the number of observed locations. 
The recorded  set positions  in  each  quarter for  the 
vessels in each fleet are assumed to be a random sample 
from  the Fisher distribution,  F { ( A  j  ,.u j  , Vj , kj  )} with  the 
probability density function: 
{c( k  )/21r} exp{ k( Alj + .umj + Vl1j )},k  > 0,  (5) 
where c(k) = kl2  sin k, k is the concentration parameter, 
and  J...,  J1,  and V are the directional cosines of the mean 
directions of the individual vessel vectors,  li' rni and ni 
respectively. The hypothesis that the spatial distributions 
of the vessel positions for the two fleets are not signifi-
cantly different is tested by comparing the concentration 
parameters for the two distributions. The test statistic is 
a function of the lengths of the resultant vectors Rj and 
J?l  for  the two  fleets.  Depending on  the value  of the 
concentration  parameter,  ki,  the  distribution  of  the 
length of the resultant vector, Ri, can assume one of two 
forms: when ki::::;  3 the distribution is normal, and when 
ki>3  the  F  distribution  is  appropriate.  When  two 
samples are being compared the choice of the appro-
priate  distribution  is  determined  by  the value  of the 
concentration parameter for the joint sample. Since the 
value of the concentration parameter is a function of the 
length of the mean vector, the mean vector length of the 
joint sample  R can be used to  determine the appro-
priate distribution: 
R= {lI(NU + Nj)}{(Ilj)2 + (Irnj)2 + (II1j)2t2, 
(6) 
where  NU  and  Nj  are  the  numbers  of  observed 
locations in  the US. and Japanese fleets  respectively. 
The form  of the appropriate test statistic,  U (Mardia 
1972: Ch.9)  also  depends on  the value  of the joint 
concentration  parameter or  mean  vector  length  as 
illustrated in equations 7-9. 
For  each  quarter  in  the  sample  period,  except 
quarters 2 and 3,  1986, for which  there were  insuffi-
cient observations «30), the resultant and mean vector 
lengths were calculated for the Japanese and U.S. fleets, 
and  the  test  statistic,  Ui  computed  as  detailed  in 
equations 7-9. The results of the tests are reported in 
Table 12.3. The table reports Nj, NIl,  Ri  RlI.  and the 
test statistic Ui 
J  i =  1,  2 (in  all  cases  .Fi < 0.67. ) The 
Japanese concentration parameter, k J,  is  significantly 
larger than the US. parameter, ~, in six of the eleven 
periods considered. In  no case is  the US. parameter 
significantly larger than the Japanese. 
In  summary,  the analysis  presented suggests  that 
the  Japanese  fleet  exhibits  more  variation  in  its 
seasonal and spatial behaviour than the U.S. fleet,  but 
less variation amongst individual vessels in  the spatial 
distribution of the fleet at a given time than is evident 
for US. vessels. This can be interpreted as evidence of 
greater  emphasis  on  cooperative  behaviour  by  the 
Japanese  skippers.  The  remaining  sections  of  the 
chapter examine  the  process  of information  sharing 
associated with the spatial distribution of the vessels. 
Vessel movement in response to 
area catch rates 
Hilborn and Ledbetter (1979) consider the intra-sea-
sonal movements of purse seine vessels in  the British 
Columbia  salmon  fishery.  They  find  a  relationship 
between the value of catch per vessel  in  an area and 
the  number of boats  in  that area in  a  subsequent 
period. However, there is evidence of a threshold, in the 
form of a significant improvement in prospective catch, 
before some vessels are induced to move.  Clark and 
Kirkwood  (1979) and Bockstael and Opaluch (1983) 
also find  evidence of inertia in  the response to higher 
returns  in  alternative grounds. They attribute this  to 
the psychological costs of disregarding tradition or of 
fishing in  remote areas, and to the monetary costs of 
switching grounds. 
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where gl(Ri)= sin-l (aRi),  a =  1/{5,  Ri = 3Ri 
and Ni =  number of sample points for fleet 
Table 12.3  Two-sample test for difference  of k (concentration) parameters, Japanese  and  U.S. Heets, 1983-87 
Year  Quarter  Japan  U.s.  Test stat  Observations 
'Rj  Ht'  Ni  NU 
1984  0.6041  0.3397  3.9212'1  739  63 
2  02077  02432  0.3584  60  75 
3  0.3469  02207  3.82503  1252  337 
4  0.5369  0.1361  6.10673  1656  231 
1985  1  0.3969  0.3194  1.7375  1456  72 
2  0.5825  0.1735  9.48443  739  202 
3  0.5662  0.3440  5.69853  490  90 
4  02174  02121  0.1617  895  210 
1986  02898  02719  0.4563  1050  443 
4  0.5979  02092  6.49753  933  168 
1987  0.4471  0.5820  -1.4490  908  54 
3SIgnlflcant difference from  zero at the 5% significance level under a standard normal dlstrfbutlon. 
If  revenue  maximising  vessels  are  moving  in 
response to information about catch rates, the number 
of vessels in an area should be positively related to the 
value  of catch per vessel  in  previous  periods in  that 
area. The nature of the relationship depends on the 
importance of the psychological and monetary costs of 
movement,  and  on  the  distribution  of  information 
about catches among vessels. The analysis of Hilborn 
and  Ledbetter  (I  979)  is  extended  in  this  study  by 
applying  an  A1mon  polynomial  lag  model  to  the 
relationship between the number of vessels in an area 
and the value of catch per vessel in  previous periods. 
The Papua New  Guinea exclusive  economic zone is 
divided into 10 subzones ranging in size from  2-3
0 
in 
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longitude and 6-7
0 
in  latitude. For each subzone the 
hypotheses to be tested can be expressed as: 
where the period of time is one week, Nt is the number 
of vessels in  a subzone, Vt-l  is  lagged average value of 
catch  per vessel  in  the subzone,  f3i  = ao + al  (i - 1)  , 
Et-N(O, 04, and E(Et Et-i)=O, i=l,2,3. The form of the 
model to be estimated is: 
Nt  = 8 + ao(Li vt-i)  + a1 (Vt-2 + 2Vt_3 )+  Et  (I1) 
The model  is  initially  estimated  for  each fleet  in 
each subzone, except for both fleets in subzone 10 for 
which  there  are  insufficient  observations  (<30). The 
initial  results  were  not strong.  The inclusion  of the 
second and third lag terms are rejected on the basis of 
a sequential F-test Oudge et al.  1988), and the model is 
re-run with only one lag tenn and a dummy DYt taking 
the value of 1 for  observations in  or after 1985. The 
coefficients of interest are those on the lagged values of 
catch  per vessel.  Estimates  of these response coeffi-
cients can be biased if the total number of vessels in 
the  fishery  changes  over  time;  for  example,  more 
vessels in  a subzone could result from  increased fleet 
size  as  well  as  from  favourable  catch  rates.  The 
inclusion of the dummy variable for observations on or 
after 1985 allows the effect of fleet size to be reflected 
in an adjustment to the constant term. 
The observations for both fleets are pooled and the 
model  is  estimated  with  dummy  terms,  Dt= 1  for 
Japanese vessels,  to  compare the coefficients  on the 
one lag term. A maximum likelihood estimator using 
the method of Beach and Mackinnon (1979) is used to 
correct for autocorrelation due to the inclusion of the 
lagged  independent  variable.  The  constant  term 
reported  in  Table  12.4  is  the  estimate  of the  U.s. 
intercept while the coefficient of Dt is added to obtain 
the estimate of the Japanese intercept. Similarly,  the 
coefficient of Vt-l is the U.S. slope estimate of the lagged 
term, and the coefficient of DtVt-l is added to obtain the 
Japanese estimate.  It  can  be seen  that the  constant 
tenns  are  positive  and  significant  supporting  the 
hypothesis  of inertia  based  on  the  psychological  or 
monetary costs of moving from one ground to another. 
For the Japanese fleet  the  f3l  coefficients are positive 
and significant in  three cases out of nine, suggesting 
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that vessels do move into their preferred subzones in 
response to lagged catch information. For the U.S. fleet 
the result does not appear to be as strong, with positive 
and significant f3l  coefficients in one case out of nine. 
The models for the United States and Japan can be 
compared using the dummy terms in Table 12.4. The 
coefficient of the dummy term  Dtvt-z.  measuring the 
difference in fleet response to one period lagged catch 
per vessel, is  positive and significant in  three cases. In 
subzones I, 2 and 4,  the Japanese slope coefficient is 
significantly larger than the U.S. estimate. This tends to 
support  the  hypothesis  that  information  is  dissemi-
nated  more quickly  and completely  in  the Japanese 
fleet than among the U.S. vessels. 
Success rates in encountering 
schools 
During each week of fishing in  the exclusive economic 
zone a  vessel  records  the number of successful and 
unsuccessful sets it  makes. The total number of sets 
per week can be regarded as a measure of its success in 
locating  schools  of  tuna,  and  the  number  of  sets 
attempted by the fleet as a whole is a measure of fleet 
search performance. The success rate can be affected 
by  factors  other than the characteristics of vessels or 
the effIciency of their search behaviour. For example, 
mechanical breakdowns, which are not recorded in the 
data,  can affect  the  number of schools  located  in  a 
week. If factors of this nature are random occurrences, 
however,  a  relationship  between  success  rate  and 
search  behaviour can in  principle  be established for 
the sample of vessels. 
The  Poisson  distribution  is  appropriate  for 
modelling count data in  the form  of encounters per 
unit of time. The probability of encountering n schools 
during time t is given by: 
Pr(n schools in  time t/  A. ) = (At re-At <  In! 
where A.  is the average rate of encounter during time t 
Uhler (1976)  has applied this approach to modelling 
the discovery of oil  reservoirs. In  his model the mean 
rate of discovery is  positively related to the amount of 
search effort.  measured by  the footage  drilled.  In  the 
early stages of exploration, the mean rate of discovery 
per foot drilled tends to rise as information about the Search Behaviour In  the  Purse  Seine Tuna  Fishery 



















































































aSlgnlflcant difference from  zero  at the  5%  significance  under a two-tall t-test 
bSlgnlficant difference from  zero at the  5%  significance level under a one-tall t-test 
IStandard errors In brackets) 
area  is  accumulated  and  disseminated;  in  the  later 
stages the mean rate tends to fall  as the number and 
size  of  undiscovered  reservoirs  fall.  Since  resource 
exhaustion is not considered to be an issue in an intra-
seasonal  analysis  of the  exploitation  of a  migratory 
stock,  the Poisson  search  model  of the tuna fishery 
should exhibit only a rising success rate as exploratory 
effort increases, unless there are local stock depletion 
effects. 
Medley (1989) applies the Poisson model to search 
behaviour by tuna purse seine fleets in the South Pacific 
Commission  statistical  region.  He  examines  the 
influence of biological factors, as represented by time of 
year and fishing zone, and vessel size on the average rate 
of  encountering  schools  of  tuna  Medley  finds  that 
medium size vessels are the most successful, contrary to 
expectations, and he suggests that this may reflect famil-


































































A problem with the Poisson approach discussed by 
McCullagh  and Nelder (1983) is  the assumption that 
the expected value of the number of successes per unit 
time  equals its  variance across sample observations. 
Differences  in  vessel  size  or behaviour, or seasonal 
variations  may  lead  to  this  assumption  about  the 
sample  being  violated.  In  particular,  differences 
between the two  fleets, such as the vessel size differ-
ences already  discussed,  may  cause  difficulties. The 
present analysis deals with this problem by specifying a 
relatively  short period of search  of one week,  within 
which major differences in behaviour are unlikely to be 
exhibited, and by dividing the sample into a series of 
IO-week periods. It also incorporates dummy variables 
to account for differences in success rates, and changes 
in  success  rates  with  respect  to  the  level  of effort, 
between the two fleets. The model estimated is: 
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where At is  the success rate of encountering fish able 
schools per week, Nt is  the number of vessels  in  the 
fleet and Dt is a dummy variable denoting fleet nation-
ality, with Dt
=  1 for the Japanese fleet. 
To estimate equation (12) a set of eleven  10-week 
periods during 1983-87 was  chosen for which  there 
were adequate numbers of observations on vessels of 
each fleet. The results of the estimation are reported in 
Table 12.5. The constant terms are estimates of the 
average success rate of the U.S. fleet as the number of 
vessels in the fleet tends to zero. The coefficient on the 
dummy  variable,  Dt,  adjusts  this  success  rate 
downwards to reflect the lower average success rate of 
the smaller Japanese vessels. The coefficient on In Nt is 
an estimate of the percentage change in  the average 
success rate of U.S. vessels in response to a 1  %  increase 
in  the size of the U.S.  fleet In  all  but two  cases this 
estimate  is  not  significantly  different  from  zero, 
suggesting that success rate is independent of fleet size. 
In  two cases success rate declines with an increase in 
fleet size, suggesting perhaps that local stock depletion 
may  not  be  an  irrelevant  consideration  within  the 
10-week period chosen for the analysis. The coefficient 
on  DtJ.nNt is  interpreted  as  an  adjustment  to  the 
elasticity of success rate with  respect to fleet  size  to 
reflect the experience of the Japanese fleet relative to 
that of the U.S. In eight of the eleven cases the adjusted 
coefficient is  positive and significant suggesting that 
the average success rate of Japanese vessels tends to 
rise as fleet size increases. In  one 10-week period the 
estimated coefficient is significant and negative, and in 
the remaining two periods it is insignificant 
The  results  reported  in  Table  12.5  offer  some 
support for the hypothesis that Japanese vessels share 
information to a greater extent than U.S. vessels. For 
most of the periods analysed, the average success rate 
of  Japanese vessels rose as fleet size increased, whereas 
there was no evidence of an increase in success rate for 
the U.S. fleet The results also reveal only three possible 
instances  of  stock  depletion  effects  being  strong 
enough  to  outweigh  the  advantages  of cumulative 
knowledge. 
Bayesian updating of information 
In  this  analysis  it  is  assumed  that vessels  enter the 
fishing  ground with  a  set of prior beliefs  about the 
136 
success  rate  in  their chosen  and  alternative  fishing 
areas.  Information  obtained  from  the  vessel's  own 
search behaviour in  the course of the week's fishing is 
used to update its set of beliefs about success rates in 
particular areas. In addition a vessel may receive infor-
mation, provided either voluntarily or involuntarily by 
other vessels, about the success rate in its chosen area 
and  in  alternative  fishing  grounds.  A  vessel  which 
revises downwards its beliefs about the success rate in 
its current ground is  more likely to change its location 
at the end of the week In  addition,  a  vessel  which 
obtains information from another ground, and revises 
upwards  its  beliefs  about  the  success  rate  in  that 
ground  relative  to  its  own  ground,  is  more  likely  to 
choose to leave its current location. 
A probit model  is  used to  predict the decision  to 
move  or stay at the end of the week's fishing on the 
basis  of the  direction  of the  revision  of the vessel's 
beliefs.  As  above, the mean success rate per week is 
assumed  to  be  a  random variable,  A,  described  by  a 
Poisson  distribution.  Following  Mangel  and  Clark 
(1983), vessel beliefs about the mean success rate are 
assumed to be described by a gamma distribution: 
where the mean and standard deviation of A are given 
by Jl =  vi a and  a = rv /  a  respectively, and where a 
and v are the two  parameters of the gamma distribu-
tion and r(u) is the gamma function. At the end of the 
week's fishing each vessel uses the sample information 
acquired during the week to update its beliefs. Specifi-
cally, a period of length t exhibiting n encounters by k 
vessels will cause the parameters of the gamma distri-
bution in (13) to be updated to: 
vl=v+n,  andal=a+kt  (14) 
where in the present analysis t =  1 represents the standard 
one week unit of time per vessel. Individual vessel  beliefs 
are defined for k= 1, whereas the information possessed by 
a fleet is defined for k= N, where Nis the number of vessels 
in the fleet The revised mean and standard deviation of the 
beliefs  about  the  mean  encounter  rate  are  given  by 
JlI = vI / aland 0 1 = {J  I a l  respectively. Search Behaviour in  the Purse Seine Tuna  Fishery 
Table  12.5  Polsson  regression  of pooled Japanese  and  U.S.  neets, by selected  periods, 1983-87 
Period  Constant  t~t  Dtdlt  D t  InNt +DtlnNt  Log-L  x2-stat  Obs 
1984 
Weeks 20-30  1.8523a  -0.1260  02365  -0.5238  0.1105  -157.50  3.8  66 
(0.18771  (0.1813]  (0.2226]  (0.3267) 
Weeks 40-50  2.3839a  -0.5777  0.5399c  -0.4638  -0.0378  -605.28  4.6  236 
(0.3641)  (0.3073)  (0.3413)  (0.5832)  (0.1425) 
1985 
Weeks 1-10  2.0113a  -02714  0.8867a  -2.0766a  0.6153b  -705.93  52.4d  2234 
(0.1418)  (0.2008)  (0.2217)  (0.3211)  (0.0936) 
Weeks 10-20  2.3896a  -0.6387a  0.7994a  -12264a  0.1607b  -470.43  14.5d  195 
(0.3725)  (0.2321)  (0.2461)  (0.4069)  (0.08171 
Weeks 20-30  12264a  0.1589  0.1963  -0.3824  0.3552b  -317.29  20.1 d  130 
(0.2414)  (0.1877)  (0.2304)  (0.4316)  (0.1337) 
Weeks 30-40  1.6112a  0.1703  0.3289c  -1.1600a  0.4993b  -295.23  29.3d  110 
(0.2096)  (0.1372)  (0.1908)  (0.37162)  (0.1323) 
Weeks 40-50  2.4796a  -0.4548a  0.9523a  -2.1582a  0.4975b  -431.65  26.2d  244 
(0.4222)  (0.2376)  (0.2655)  (0.5407)  (0.1186) 
1986 
Weeks 1-10  1.7039a  -0.0208  -0.4292  1.2537  -0.4499a  -539.01  7.4  281 
(0.4188)  (0.2150)  (0.2811)  (0.6396]  (0.1652) 
Weeks 10-20  1.5012a  0.0732  0.7966a  -1.7522a  0.8698a  -127.27  11.7d  34 
(0.3469)  (0.1784)  (0.3476)  (0.7833)  (0.29801 
Weeks 40-50  1.4124a  02929  -0.0830  -0.3651  02100b  -451.22  11.1 d  178 
(0.2668)  (0.2014)  (0.2248)  (0.2248)  (0.0998) 
1987 
Weeks 1-10  1.4295a  -0.0510  0.3921  -0.8121c  0.3412b  -465.62  30.4d  173 
(0.3564)  (0.3091)  (0.3197)  (0.4302)  (0.0816] 
aSlgnlficant difference from  zero at the  5% significance  level  under a two tall t-test 
bSlgnlflcant difference from  zero and difference from  one at the 5% significance level  under a one tall t-test 
~1~lfIcant difference from  zero at  t~e 5% significance  level  under a one tall t-test 
X -stat exceeds critical value  of X  13. d1I - 7.81  at the  5% significance level. 
(Standard errors  In  bracketsl 
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Bockstael and Opaluch (1983)  accounted for  the 
possibility  of risk  aversion  in  their analysis  of vessel 
movements. In the present analysis risk aversion is not 
incorporated, although it might seem that the variance 
of the distribution of a vessel's beliefs about the mean 
encounter rate could  be included as an explanatory 
variable  in  the  model  of  the  decision  to  move.  A 
property of the gamma distribution, however, is that the 
expected  value  of  the  encounter  rate  is  a  linear 
function of its variance. This means that, in  principle, 
the  mean  encounter  rate  and  its  variance,  which 
summarise  each  vessel's  weekly  set  of  beliefs,  are 
perfectly collinear and cannot both be included in  the 
regression model. In  consequence, the assumption of 
risk neutrality will be maintained. 
One problem  in  applying  this  model  to  a  fishery 
based on a migratory species is that information rapidly 
becomes out of date because of the movement of fish 
stocks. For this reason the standard time period of one 
week was chosen for the analysis. To ensure continuity 
of fishing activity in  the chosen ground within the one 
week periods the fishing grounds had to be defined at a 
broader level than in  previous parts of the study. The 
observations on sets attempted by vessels in both fleets 
in  1985 were divided into three fishing grounds. At the 
end of each week of the year a vessel choosing to leave 
ground j can move to ground k,  the closer alternative, 
or ground I,  the more distant alternative ground. Each 
vessel's beliefs at the start of the year are assumed to be 
determined by  the mean value of the weekly success 
rate,  A,  for  vessels  in  its  own  fleet  in  the  period 
1983-84. This initial set of beliefs is  then assumed to 
be updated on the basis of the information available to 
the vessel in the course of 1985. 
The full probit model is given by: 
Y  ijt  = ao + a{utt - ,uijt) +  a2(,u~Ft - ,ujFt) 
+a 3( ,u~Ft - ,u~J  + a4 (,u~Ft - ,uiFJ 
+aSDj+ Ej(  (I  5) 
where Yijt  represents the decision of vessel  j to remain 
in (}fjt =  1) or leave (}fjt =  0) ground j at the end of week 
t; ,ujjt and ,u 1  ijt represent the prior and updated beliefs 
respectively of vessel j about the mean success rate in 
ground j  in  week t  based on the vessel's own  fishing 
experience;  ,ujFt  and  ,uljFt  represent  the  prior  and 
138 
up-dated beliefs about the success rate in ground j in 
week t, based on the experience of all the vessels in its 
fleet operating in ground j at time t; ,u 1  kFt and ,u 11Ft are 
up-dated beliefs about the success rates in grounds k 
and  I,  based on the fleet-wide experience; and Dj is  a 
vessel size dummy (Dj =  1 for large vessels, GRT) 500 
for the Japanese and GRT) 1400 for the United States) 
reflecting the fact that the opportunity cost of changing 
location may be lower for the larger, faster vessels. 
The full  probit model is  not estimated because of 
the high degree of collinearity beLween  the individual 
vessel beliefs and the collective experience of its fleet in 
the same subzone at the same time. Instead, the model 
is fitted first to the data on the vessel's own experience 
in  its  chosen  subzone  to  determine whether it  can 
explain the observed vessel movements. The model is 
then fitted  to  the data on the fleet experience in  the 
chosen subzone and alternative subzones, and a test is 
performed to determine which of the two specifications 
is preferred. 
The  results  of the  probit  model  applied  to  the 
individual vessels of the two fleets are reported in Table 
12.6.  Model I reports the results based on the vessel's 
own experience within its chosen ground. For both the 
Japanese  and  U.S.  vessels  the  coefficient  on  the 
increment in the beliefs about the mean encounter rate 
in the subzone is positive and significant The constant 
term for the Japanese vessels is also positive and signifi-
cant,  suggesting  that  there  is  some  kind  of  inertia 
impeding  the  response  to  new  information,  whereas 
U.S. vessels exhibit no such impediment The vessel size 
dummy is negative and significant for both nationalities, 
indicating that larger (and faster) vessels are less likely 
to remain in their subzone, other things being equal. 
Model  II  reports  the  results  based  on  own-fleet 
experience  in  the  chosen  subzone  and  alternative 
subzones. The positive and significant coefficients on 
the  variables  which  measure  the  change  in  beliefs 
about the relative success rates in  the chosen subzone 
and  the  adjacent  subzone  suggest  that  Japanese 
vessels  respond  to  fleet  experience  in  those  zones, 
whereas U.S. vessels respond to own-subzone informa-
tion only. This latter result may be due to the correla-
tion  between  individual  vessel  and  own-fleet 
experience, or to voluntary or involuntary infonnation 
sharing among vessels. However,  unlike the Japanese Search  Behaviour in  the  Purse Seine Tuna  Fishery 
Table  12.6  Probit models of vessel  movements for Japanese and  U.S. Heets, 1985 
Japan  United States 
Constant  Model I 
0.5256a 
Model I (with  Pit (2) ) 
-2.1116 
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aSi~nlflcant dtfferen~e from  zero at the  5% significance level  under a two-tall t-test 
bX -stat exceeds X  Inumber of slope  parameters) at the  5% significance level. 
(Standard  errors  In  brackets). 
fleet,  there  is  no evidence  of U.S.  vessels  moving  in 
response to updated infonnation from subzones other 
than that chosen at the beginning of the week The 





























informa tion about the more distant alternative subzone, 
reflecting, perhaps, the cost of moving and the rapidity 
with  which  infonnation  becomes  out  of  date.  To 
provide a model specification test, the predicted values 
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Pit (1 ) = Pr{Yit = I} derived from Model I are included 
as  an  independent  variable  in  Model  It  and  the 
predicted values  Pit  (2) are inclll~ed in  Model I. It can 
be seen from  Table 12.6 that  Pit(2)  is  significant in 
Model  I,  but  Pit (1)  is  not  significant  in  Model  II. 
According to the Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) test, 
this suggests that Model II is the preferred specification. 
In  summary,  a  model  in  which  individual  vessel 
movements are based on fleet experience is  preferred 
for  both fleets.  However,  only  fleet  experience within 
the  chosen  subzone  is  relevant  in  the  case of U.S. 
vessels. 
Conclusions 
The  various  tests  reported  in  the  chapter  tend  to 
support  two  hypotheses:  that Japanese  purse  seine 
vessels  tend  to  engage  in  more  concerted  fishing 
behaviour than do U.S. vessels; and that the vessels in 
the  Japanese  fleet  exchange  information  among 
themselves to a greater extent than do the U.S. vessels. 
As noted earlier, Mangel and Clark (1983) allude to the 
efficiency  benefits  of  information  sharing.  If  the 
Japanese vessels share information to a greater degree, 
this should be reflected in less time spent in searching 
and  more in  fishing.  Table  12.7  reports  the average 
proportion of trip time spent searching by the vessels of 
the  two  sample  fleets  in  the  period  1983-87. This 
proportion is measured as one minus the ratio of days 
in which fishing activity took place to total days spent in 
the  zone.  The Japanese vessels  have  a  significantly 
lower average proportion of search time than the U.S. 
vessels for each of the three time periods considered. 
Table  12.7  Proportion of trip time spent searching  by vessels,  average  over all vessels for Japanese  and  U.S. Heets, 1983-87 
Reet  1983-84a  1985a  1986-87a 
Japan  0.0476  0.0861  0.1028 
(0.1109)  (0.1623)  (0.1736) 
Observations  381  237  223 
United States  0.1621  (0.2564)  (0.1957) 
(0.1982)  0.2319  0.1809 
Observations  22  38  36 
aSlgnlficant difference of neet estimates under a two-tall difference  of means test 
(Standard  errors  In  brackets) 
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Japanese Tuna Fleets and Fishery Rents 
in Papua New Guinea: 1983-1987 
H.F.  Camp  bell 
R.B. Nicholl 
Introduction 
The approach to collection of resource rents taken by 
most  if  not  all,  island  nations  in  the  central  and 
western  Pacific  region  {Papua New  Guinea included} 
has  been  to  negotiate  access  fees  with  the  major 
distant water fishing nations. Access fees are presumed 
to reflect an 'acceptable' return to coastal nations and 
have typically been based on the value of catches, with 
little  or  no  regard  to  the  costs  of concluding  and 
enforcing agreements,  or the  level  of resource  rents 
generated from tuna fisheries. Island states bargain for 
the highest percentage of estimated catch values they 
can secure, while foreign  fishing fleets  bargain for the 
lowest  payment  they  feel  will  be  acceptable  to  the 
island  states.  The  result  is  typically  a  compromise, 
although  agreement  is  not  always  reached,  as 
evidenced by the stand-off between Papua New Guinea 
and Japan since their bilateral agreement expired  in 
early 1987. In addition to returns in the form of access 
payments  and  licensing  fees,  many  coastal  nations 
receive both technical assistance and financial aid, the 
value of both being difficult to quantify. 
From  an  economic  perspective  a  resource  stock 
can be viewed  as a capital asset which,  if  used  in  an 
efficient  manner,  should  earn  the  owner  a  rate  of 
return similar to  that on other capital. A return from 
natural  resource  exploitation  takes  the  form  of  an 
economic profit defined as the total revenue received 
from  the sale of the resource less the economic costs 
associated with  bringing the resource to the point of 
sale. Returns to resource stocks arise from the fact that 
natural resources have inherent value as inputs to the 
production of consumer and capital goods. In the case 
of fisheries, ex-vessel  harvests are valued as inputs to 
the  production  of  a  range  of  processed  consumer 
goods. While economic profits {also  known as 'super 
profits'} may arise from a variety of activities and indus-
tries, profits which are generated from the exploitation 
of natural resources can be viewed  as a return  to the 
resource  stock  and  are  commonly  referred  to  as 
resource rents. 
This chapter reports the results of an analysis which 
estimates  resource  rents  from  Papua  New  Guinea's 
tuna  fisheries.  Rent  calculations  are  based  on  the 
difference between revenues earned from tuna fishing 
activity and the estimated economic costs incurred in 
earning  those  revenues,  namely  the  cost  of  fishing 
effort.  The  analysis  covers  Japanese  pole-and-line, 
longline and group purse seine fleet activities between 
the  beginning  of  1983 and  March  1987  {when  the 
bilateral  access  agreement  between  the  Papua New 
Guinea and Japanese governments expired}. 
Estimating fishery resource rent 
Fishery rent is  defined  as the difference  between the 
landed  value  of fish  and  the  full  economic  costs  of 
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bringing a catch to port, net of any other types of rent 
which may be earned. It is not necessarily the case that 
rents  arise  from  all  fisheries  exploitation,  or that in 
cases where rents  can  be identified  they are entirely 
resource rents. While fishery rent is typically associated 
only  with  stock exploitation  managed  in  a  strategic 
manner,  this  is  not  true  for  other  types  of  rents 
connected with fishing industries. 
The concept of rent 
In  the case of the  fishery,  a  potential  for  rent exists 
because  of the  innate productivity  of certain  fishing 
grounds relative  to others. The price of fish  must be 
high enough to cover the costs of supply from the least 
productive  or most remote ground.  All  other grounds 
have a potential to yield owners a higher return based 
on  their cost  advantage.  In  addition  to  this  excess 
return, which  is  termed fishery  rent,  other factors  of 
production  may  also  be  able  to  earn  rents.  For 
example, some vessels may be skippered by particularly 
highly  skilled  fishers.  Such  vessels,  known  as 
'highliners', may consistently catch  more  fish  for  the 
same costs as other vessels. The resulting profit is a 
'highliner  rent'.  This  kind  of  advantage  may  be 
permanent, being based on innate ability, or temporary, 
being based on better information. Some vessels may 
be particularly suited to the fishery because of their size 
and the specialised gear they carry, and may enjoy a 
temporary  advantage  in  costs  or  catch  rates  which 
manifests itself as a  quasi-rent-a temporary  profit in 
excess of the market rate of return. 
An  open-access  or unmanaged  fishery  does  not 
generate fishery rent although some of its participants 
may  earn  other  kinds  of rents  or quasi-rents.  The 
reason  no  fishery  rent  is  generated  is  because  the 
advantages of the fishery in terms of its natural produc-
tivity are offset by competitive  forces resulting in  over-
exploitation, which in turn lowers the return to fishing 
effort. This is illustrated by Figure 13.1 which shows the 
average  and  marginal  return  to  effort  in  a  single 
species, single location fishery.  The average  return to 
effort is  the average catch  per unit effort for  the fleet 
multiplied  by  the price of the harvest The marginal 
return is the price of the harvest multiplied by the extra 
harvest which would result from an extra unit of fishing 
effort. The unit  cost  of effort is  its  opportunity  cost, 
defined  as  the  value  of output which  the  factors  of 
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production involved  in  producing fishing effort could 
produce  if  they  were  employed  in  another industry. 
Opportunity  cost is  measured in  a  conventional way 
using market prices of inputs such as labour, capital, 
and fuel. The open-access equilibrium is  at Eo where 
the average return to effort equals its unit cost. At effort 
levels  below  Eo  the average return to effort  is  higher 
than  its  opportunity  cost,  indicating  that additional 
entrants to the fishery could earn economic profits, i.e. 
profits  in  excess  of the  level  required  to  generate a 
market rate of return on capital. At effort levels higher 
than  Eo  the  vessels  in  the  fishery  are  making  an 
economic  loss,  i.e.  they  are  earning a  lower  rate  of 
return  than the market rate or,  equivalently, they are 
not  covering  the  cost  of  the  effort  they  employ. 
Therefore, effort level  Eo  is  the long-run open-access 
equilibrium level at which there is neither the incentive 
to enter nor exit the fishery. At  this  level  of effort  the 
fishery rent is zero as total revenues for the fleet are just 
equal to the total costs of generating those revenues. 
One  objective  of  fishery  management  is  to 
maximise  the  amount  of  rent  which  could  be 
generated. This would be achieved by restricting fishing 
effort to the level E*  in  Figure  13.1.  At  that level  the 
marginal return to effort  is  equal to the unit opportu-
nity cost of effort. The total  economic profit, or rent, 
earned  by  the fishery  is  given  by  area C' BDC which 
represents the economic profit per unit of effort,  BD, 
multiplied by the amount of effort,  E*. This rent is the 
resource rent, or fishery  rent:  it  represents the return 
which  the owner of the fish  stock would receive in  a 
perfectly competitive economy with  a complete set of 
enforceable  property  rights  over  the  resource.  It  is 
sometimes  tenned  'management  rent'  (Anderson 
1988)  in  recognition  of the  fact  that, given  that an 
unmanaged fishery yields no economic rent in a purely 
competitive environment, with no property rights to the 
fish  stock, a regulatory framework is required for rents 
to be realised. 
Fishing effort can be restricted to  E* in  two  ways, 
both of which involve  the collection of economic rent 
by the managers of the fishery. One way is  to charge a 
royalty on the catch,  reducing the average return per 
unit of effort  until it equals unit cost at effort level  E*. 
The alternative is to impose a charge per unit of effort 
to raise the opportunity cost of effort until it equals the 
average return at E*. These two methods are illustrated Japanese Tuna  Fleets and  Fishery Rents  in  Papua  New Guinea:  1983-1987 
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Rgure  13.1  Single species fishery:  managed fishery rent generation 
by  the curves  CAR'  and CC in  Figure  13.1  which 
show the net of royalty return and the gross of access 
charge  cost  respectively.  Papua New  Guinea's  tuna 
fisheries  are  currently  managed  by  imposing  an 
additional cost per unit of effort-an access fee-the 
level of which is  intended to be equivalent to a partic-
ular level of ad valorem royalty on the harvest (currently 
6%). 
The  above  description  of  managed  fishery  rent 
generation  pertains  to  a  single  species,  single  area 
fishery.  In  a multispecies, multilocation fishery,  rent is 
maximised  by  ensuring that the optimal  amount of 
effort is targeted on each individual species in each of 
the locations where the species can be harvested. Since 
the  returns  to  effort  will  vary  with  the species  and 
location fished, optimal fishery management would in 
principle  involve  a  different  level  of royalty  for  each 
species in each area. In practice the costs of enforcing 
this  kind  of 'first-best'  policy  at present are  likely  to 
exceed the benefits and the imposition of  an access fee 
per unit of effort  applied  to  the exclusive  economic 
zone may be a reasonable management strategy. 
Even if fishing within the exclusive economic zone 
can be treated as a single species, single area fishery, 
distant water fishing nations have the choice of fishing 
in one of a number of exclusive economic zones, or on 
the high seas. At any point in  time the productivity of 
fishing  grounds,  as  measured  by  the  average  and 
marginal returns to effort, will vary from one exclusive 
economic zone to another. There are two  models of 
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Rgure  13.2  Mu~ilone fishery:  costs and  returns 
how fleets will be allocated among exclusive economic 
zones: one approach, based on the concept of open-
access  equilibrium,  argues  that  average  returns  to 
effort,  net of access  fees  and transport costs,  will  be 
equalised across zones; the other approach, based on 
the optimal allocation of fishing effort, argues that the 
fleets  will  allocate  effort  to  the  exclusive  economic 
zones  so  as  to  equalise  the  net marginal  return  to 
effort.  An  example  of  the  latter  approach  is  the 
management of the Japanese foreign tuna fleet in  the 
1950s (see Comitini and Huang 197 n  Assuming that 
the relatively small high seas pockets can be neglected, 
these two approaches will coincide when the managers 
of  the  exclusive  economic  zones  are  charging  the 
access fee CCin Figure 13.1  and effort in each zone is 
atE'. 
In  Figure 13.2 the two approaches to predicting the 
distribution of effort are illustrated. The figure shmvs the 
average  and marginal  returns  to  effort  in  two  fishing 
zones (A and 8), and the opportunity cost of effort, CC 
Ignoring for the moment the costs of moving from  one 
zone to  the other,  and the access  fees  which  may  be 
levied  by the host countries, effort will be distributed as 
OEJA  and  OElB according  to  the  competitive  open-
access equilibrium, or as OE2A and OE2B according to 
the  managed  equilibrium.  In  the  fonner  equilibrium, 
average return per unit of effort is equalised between the 
two  zones  except  for  differential  transport costs  and 
access fees. In the latter equilibrium the marginal return 
per unit of effort, net of any marginal transport costs and 
access fees, is equalised. 
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Measuring fishery rent 
Since rent is  an excess return received  by a  factor of 
production over its return in an alternative activity,  its 
measurement requires that the alternative activity  be 
specified. Generally the alternative activity is assumed 
to  be employment elsewhere in  the economy at the 
competitive market determined wage or rate of return. 
Following this approach, rent generated by the fishery 
could be approximated by the value of the harvest less 
the cost of fishing effort evaluated at market prices. As 
explained by Lindner, Campbell and Bevin (1992), this 
measure of rent is  likely  to include rents other than 
fishery rent; for example, highliner rents. It could also 
exclude  certain  other rents,  such  as  rents  resulting 
from noncompetitive product markets, which may be of 
interest to the fishery  manager (see Campbell  1989). 
For example, where vessel catch is  sold to  a cannery 
which  either  owns  the vessel  or has  some  form  of 
financial  interest  in  it,  the  revenue  received  by  the 
vessel for its harvest may be lower than if the cannery 
and  vessel  were  completely  independent.  When  a 
processor pays a lower than market ex-vessel price for 
fish  as a  result of a financial  relationship between  it 
and  vessels  supplying  it,  this  is  known  as  transfer 
pricing. Under such circumstances rents which would 
have  accrued  to  a  vessel  in  a  competitive  product 
market  will  be  passed  on,  at  least  in  part,  to  the 
processor. 
Recent  papers  by  Geen  (1990)  and  Brown  and 
Dann (1991) have produced estimates of rents earned 
through  tuna  fishing  in  the Australian  fishing  zone 
based on the assumption that the opportunity cost of 
fishing effort is  the value of the catch which could be 
taken in the best alternative fishing location. Using this 
approach these authors have estimated the net value 
to Japan of access to Australia's longline tuna fisheries. 
The advantage  of the  approach  is  that it  does  not 
require information on fishing costs for its implementa-
tion. The disadvantage is that the difference in value of 
catch between one zone and another may understate 
or overstate rent depending upon the conditions under 
which  the  fishery  is  operating.  For  example,  if  the 
returns from fishing in the best alternative location are 
not  high  enough  to  meet  fishing  costs  then  the 
approach overstates rent, and conversely if  there are 
rents  to  be  earned  in  the  alternative  fishery,  the 
approach understates rent 
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The basis of the alternative harvest approach can 
be analysed by referring to the two models of economic 
equilibrium  in  the  fishery  discussed  above.  If  all 
fisheries are in open-access equilibrium then the value 
of  harvest  per  unit  effort  will  be  the  same  in  all 
locations,  except  for  differences  in  access  fees  and 
transport cost The alternative harvest approach is then 
measuring differences  in  access  fees  and differential 
location rents, and not fishery rent If  other zones are in 
open-access equilibrium with  no access fees,  but the 
domestic zone is  in  a managed equilibrium, then the 
alternative harvest method will  measure rents earned 
in  the domestic fishery. This rent measure will  include 
fishery  rent,  highliner rent,  location  rent,  and quasi-
rents to specialised equipment and knowledge and will 
exclude any rents accruing to processors as a result of 
imperfectly competitive product markets. Finally,  if all 
zones are in  managed equilibrium the rent earned in 
the domestic zone could be approximated by the differ-
ence between the gross value of the domestic catch per 
unit of effort and the value of the catch net of royalties 
per unit effort in the alternative foreign zone. 
It is  clear from  the above discussion that detailed 
knowledge  of the  royalties  and access  conditions  in 
alternative fishing  locations is  required if the alterna-
tive  harvest measure approach  is  to  provide  a  good 
approximation  to  the  value  of  fishery  rent.  The 
approach  based  on  the  difference  between  total 
revenue and total costs is  likely to  be more accurate 
and should be used when cost information is available. 
However,  as  noted  above,  this  measure will  include 
some rents other than fishery  rent, and may exclude 
downstream rents which have been transfered from the 
fishery  to the product markets because of imperfectly 
competitive fish markets. 
Measuring rents from Papua New Guinea's 
tuna fisheries 
In  the present study rent is estimated as the difference 
between  total  revenue  and  total  cost First,  Japanese 
vessels  which  fished  in  Papua  New  Guinea  waters 
between the beginning of 1983 and March  1987 (when 
the Japanese/Papua New  Guinea agreement expired) 
are categorised according to gear type and vessel size (in 
tonnage). Size classes for  longline vessels are 50-100 
GRT,  10 1-200 GRT and 201-500 GRT;  for  pole-and-Japanese Tuna  Fleets and  Fishery Rents  In  Papua  New Guinea:  1983-1987 
line vessels records show that only the larger 200-500 
GRT vessels were active in Papua New Guinea waters for 
the period  of the analysis;  and the group purse seine 
operations are all single-net boat groups where the size 
of the net boat is  100-200 GRT and it is  assisted by a 
search vessel and two carrier vessels. Estimates of gross 
monthly revenue derived from fishing operations for all 
categories of vessels  are then calculated  by  summing 
catches of all species for all vessels across the fleet and 
multiplying the fleet catches by the relevant landed (ex-
vessel)  price  for  the species. Gross  revenues for  each 
species are then summed to give  total monthly (gross) 
revenue for each category of vessel. 
The prices  used to calculate revenue are average 
monthly prices for  the Japanese port of Yaizu,  where 
most Japanese distant water caught tuna harvests are 
landed. In  using these prices to estimate fishery  rents 
we  assume they are competitively determined market 
prices which reflect the average value of fish for a given 
month.  One  problem  which  arises  from  the  use  of 
average prices is that for longline caught sashimi grade 
tuna there is  no single price which accurately reflects 
the unit value of all  fish  delivered to market As  most 
tuna sold for the fresh fish  market are sold at auction, 
prices in many instances for individual fish differ on the 
basis of the fishing ground in  which they were caught 
and the reputation of the fishing director for handling 
the fish before they are delivered to market There is no 
way around this problem as prices paid to  individual 
vessels  are  not  available.  As  the  following  rent 
estimates  are  only  a  guide  to  the  magnitude  of 
potential  rents,  the  use  of an  average  price  for  all 
species may adequately represent the value of landed 
harvests. The major species (by weight of total catch) 
harvested  by  longliners  in  Papua  New  Guinea's 
exclusive  economic  zone  are  yellowfin  and  bigeye; 
minor species and incidental catch consist of albacore, 
bluefin,  blue,  black  and  striped  marlin,  sailfish, 
swordfish,  shark  and  miscellaneous  species.  Purse 
seine and pole-and-line fleets  harvest mainly skipjack 
and yellowfin. 
When  interpreting the estimates  of rents  for  the 
various  tuna fisheries  under investigation,  there  are 
important  qualifications  which  should  be  borne  in 
mind. First,  since  the  true  economic cost of fishing 
effort does not include any licence or access fees  paid 
by  fishers  to  coastal  states,  the  following  estimates 
exclude  any  consideration  of the  current  levels  of 
payments by the Japanese to Papua New Guinea for the 
rights to harvest tuna. In  the concluding section of the 
paper the rent estimates are compared with the levels 
of fees  paid  by Japanese fleets  for  the periods of the 
various  analyses.  Second,  while  estimated  rents 
represent economic  profit accruing to  vessel  owners 
which  could  possibly  be  expropriated by  Papua New 
Guinea,  they overstate the net value of the fishery  to 
Papua New Guinea Implicit in any agreement between 
Papua New  Guinea and distant water fishing  nations 
are  the  costs  of  negotiating,  administering  and 
monitoring the agreement Potential returns accruing 
to Papua New Guinea should be estimated net of these 
costs. Third, given that the cost of effort to the marginal 
or highest cost vessel in  each case will  not be used to 
determine unit harvesting costs, a portion of any rents 
arising from  fishing  will  represent operator, or 'high-
liner',  rents.  And  fourth,  since  there  is  a  dearth  of 
biological information about the relationship between 
catch per unit effort and the level of fishing effort, the 
sensitivity of rents to the level of fishing effort will  not 
be  accounted  for  (Waugh  1987).  Therefore,  any 
estimate of potential economic profit is  composed of 
gross  fishery  rent,  access  agreement  costs,  and 
operator rents, which  together will  overstate the true 
magnitude of fishery rents alone. 
Waugh (1987) refers to the concept of 'fair costs' in 
a discussion of the measurement of the cost of fishing 
effort.  'Fair costs' are defined  by  Waugh as 'the costs 
relating to minimum expenditure on equipment, gear, 
wages, and other essentials that are required for  the 
safe productive operation of the harvesting fleet in  the 
long term.' The cost of effort used in  this paper is  the 
average total cost of a vessel-day fished for a given gear 
type  and  class  size. These  costs  are  obtained  from 
studies  by  Campbell  and Nicholl  (1990  and  1992a) 
which  estimated  the  cost of fishing  effort  based  on 
surveys of Japanese fishing companies operating group 
purse seiners, longliners and pole-and-Iine vessels. The 
surveys  report annual average  levels  of expenditures 
and capital stock. A weighted average cost of capital is 
applied to  the capital stock to yield  a cost of capital 
which  is  combined with  operating costs to give  total 
cost per year of owning and operating a distant water 
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tuna vessel.  The annual cost is  then divided  by  the 
number of days fished (on average) in a particular year 
and adjusted upwards to reflect the support costs of a 
day fishing.  such as transit, trip  preparation and off-
loading. The resulting estimate is the long-run average 
total cost of a day fished for a particular class of vessel. 
Since the measurement of capital costs is based on the 
average required rate of return on capital in Japanese 
industry,  the additional  cost of risk  associated  with 
tuna fishing  is  ignored  by  this  method of estimating 
fishing costs and this introduces an upward bias to the 
rent estimates. 
The estimates of rent reported in  this chapter are 
based  on  a  comparison  of  the  average  revenue 
obtained per day from  fishing effort and the average 
cost While  the catch  data report actual  harvests  in 
Papua  New  Guinea's  exclusive  economic  zone,  the 
prices  used  in  calculating  revenue  are  averages  for 
catches landed in Japan. This means that the average 
revenue data are approximations to  the revenues  of 
Japanese  vessels  operating  in  Papua  New  Guinea's 
exclusive economic zone. The aver~e cost estimates 
are for the operations of the Japanese tuna fleeL-; across 
all zones in which they operate. The rent estimates will 
be  accurate  for  vessels  operating  in  Papua  I\ew 
Guinea's  exclusive  economic  zone  if  their  activities 
correspond to the relevant average operational pattern 
and yield catches which command average prices. Any 
divergence from the aver~e,  caused for example by the 
need for greater or less searching activity in Papua New 
Guinea waters, by lower or higher prices being received 
for  Papua New  Guinea caught tuna, or by  operating 
costs being lower than or higher than those in  other 
areas, will  result  in  the rent estimates being over or 
underestimates. 
Data 
Three primary sources of data are used. South Pacific 
Commission (SPC) catch and effort data together with 
Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO)  tuna price 
information  are  used  for  the  longline,  single  purse 
seine and pole-and-line fisheries.  Data for  the group 
purse  seine  operations  were  obtained  from  South 
Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency report (FFA 1989b) on 
Japanese  fishing  activities  in  Papua  \Jew  Guinea's 
exclusive economic zone. 
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Gross revenues for the various tuna fleets are calcu-
lated  using ex-vessel  tuna and  marlin  prices  for  the 
Japanese  port of Yaizu.  These are  average  monthly 
prices  for  the  different  species  landed  and  sold  at 
Yaizu.  Price data are from  the FAO  INFOFISH  data 
base. 
Catch and effort data for Papua New Guinea were 
obtained from  the SPC Tuna and Billfish Assessment 
Programme data base. These data are daily records of 
catch by weight and species for all registered Japanese 
vessels  fishing  in  Papua  New  Guinea's  exclusive 
economic zone for  the period  1983 to  March  1987. 
Daily records have been aggregated to monthly catches 
and number of days  fished,  then summed across all 
vessels  to give  total  catch and effort  by  gear type  by 
month. 
Cost  of  effort  information  was  obtained  from 
Campbell  and Nicholl  (1990;  1992a). These studies 
report the calculated total cost of fishing effort for an 
average vessel for the three different tuna gear types by 
various sizes of vessel. The unit of effort is a day fished 
and  the  cost  estimate  includes  operating  expenses 
such a<;  fuel,  wages and gear and vessel maintenance, 
and the capital cost of owning and operating a vessel 
for a fishing day. These cost estimates have been taken 
from Tables I, :3 and 5 of Appendix l) of Camphell and 
Nicholl  (1990) and the same tables and Appendix of 
Campbell and ~icholl (1992a). 
For the group  purse seining operations,  data on 
catch,  effort  and  the  landed  value  of  catch  were 
obtained  from  Forum  Fisheries Agency  1989.  Catch 
and effort  infonnation is  reported  by  year and purse 
seine  group.  Each  group  made  one  fishing  trip  to 
Papua ~ew  Guinea for each year of the two years, and 
data covering the number of days fished and catch are 
provided  for  each  group,  for  each  trip.  Since  tuna 
catches are  not detailed  by  month,  Forum  Fisheries 
Agency estimates of gross revenue for each year for all 
groups together are combined with the Campbell and 
Nicholl fishing effort cost estimates to perfonn the rent 
calculations. The per fishing day total cost was calcu-
lated by averaging the cost reported in  Camp  bell and 
f\iicholl  (1990;  1992a)  for  the  relevant  months  over 
which specific fishing trips took place. Japanese Tuna  Fleets and  Fishery Rents  in  Papua  New Guinea: 1983-1987 
Rent estimates 
Longline fishery 
The  results  indicate  that  the  level  of rent  fluctuates 
significantly throughout the year a'> well  a'> from year to 
year (Tables 13.1  to 13.3 and Figs.  13.:3 and 1  :3.4). The 
activities of the smaller vessels (50-100 GRT) generated 
rents  in  the  longline  fishery  in  all  but  one  month 
between January 1983 and ~ay 1986, after which there 
were five  months to March  1987 in which there wa'>  no 
ren t  generated  (Tab  le  13.1).  Ren L  caleu  lated  as  a 
percentage of gross revenue, from smaller vessel opera-
tions  ranged from  11.6-!16.2%  in  1983; -tU  -38.1 % in 
1984; 16.5-53.0%  in  1985; -23.2-!175% in  1986; and -
43.6-29.4%  for  the  first  three  months  of  1987.  On 
average, rents in  the longline fishery were generated for 
all  years except the first  three months of 1987 by  the 
activities of the smaller vessels. Figure  13.5 shows that 
the level of smaller longline activity, mea'>ured in vessel-
days  fished,  fluctuated  from  month  to  month 
throughout the period of analysis. 
The activities of the 100-200 GRT cla'>s of longline 
vessels  did  not generate  rent for  most of the period 
1983 to March 1987 (Table nIb). Figure 13.3b shows 
that rent was  generated  in  this  sector of the longline 
fishery from  mid-198:~ to early 1984, early to mid-1985, 
and in several months of 1986. The total costs of fishing 
activity appear to have outweighed the retums to effort 
for March to August of 1984 and most of 1986. Rent as 
a percentage of gross revenue ranged from -26.7-40.7% 
in  1983; -116.2-33.7%  in  1984; -:33.4-42.9%  in  198:1; 
and  -102.6-55.0%  in  1986.  The  annual  average  of 
monthly  rent  estimates  indicate  rent  generated  for 
1983 (13.2%),1985 (0.8%) and January of 1987 (7.0%). 
Figure 13.G shows that while the level of fishing activity 
for this group of vessels fluctuated moderately between 
1983 and 1986, there were marked declines in  vessel 
activity  in  mid-198!!  and  mid-1986.  There  was  no 
appreciable resurgence of the level  of activity after the 
mid-1986 decline. 
The operations of the  larger vessel  sector of the 
longline fishery failed  to generate any rent for the few 
months  they  were  active  in  Papua  New  Guinea's 
exclusive  economic  zone  in  1984,  1985  and  1986 
(Table  13.l  c).  Rent as  a  percentage of gross revenue 
ranged  from  -460.1 % (1984)  to  -:32.:3%  098;5). This 
larger class size of longline vessels was by far the lea'>t 
active  in  the fishery  in  tenns of days  fished,  entering 
briefly for the last few  months of 1984 and 1985 and 
the first three months of 1986. 
Pole-and-line fishery 
The vessels active in  the Dole-and-line fishery over the 
years  198:3-1987  were  of  the  larger  200-500  GRT 
class. They were active only for four to six  months of 
198:~-1986  and  failed  to  catch  any  skipjack  or 
yellowfin in October 198!! and January 1987, although 
only two  and three vessel-days of effort were recorded 
for these months. There were only two  months out of 
the  various  months  that  pole-and-line  vessels  were 
active in which rent was generated in this fishery (Table 
1  :3.2).  Rent as a  percentage of gross  revenue  ranged 
from  -271.0-70.5%  in  198:3;  -1323.3%  to  -19.5%  in 
19811;  -:~95.6%  to -S.7% in  1985; and -150.0-22.3% in 
1986. The month of greatest activity was October 19t1:3 
with  1611 vessel  days  expended  in  the  pole-and-line 
fisher}'  resulting  in  a  rent  of  ¥ 119.7  million  being 
generated, representing 110.8% of  ~~ross revenue. The 
preceding month was  the only other month in  which 
rent was  generated; ¥27.9 million  or 705% of gross 
revenue. 
Group purse seine fishery 
l{ent for the group purse seine is calculated as the total 
revenue  for  all  groups  combined, less  the total  cost 
based on an average of monthly per vessel per day total 
cost for the months in which each trip by the fleet took 
place (Table I  :~.:3) . There is evidence of two trips by the 
Japanese group seine fleet  between  198:~ and  1987. 
The first trip was in  198::> which involved seven groups 
and  the second  in  1986 involving five  groups. There 
were no apparent positive fishery  rents resulting from 
either  trip:  rent  measured  as  a  percentage  of gross 
revenue was -1116.:>%  for the 1985 trip and -1O:~9.5% 
for the 1986 trip. 
Although the level  of activity of single  J1urse  seine 
vessels  has  been  much  higher and  more  consistent 
than that for group seine vessels, no rent estimates for 
this fleet could be carried ouL This is  because there is 
no cost of effort infonnation pertaining to these vessels 
available to us. 
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Agure  13.3  (contdJ  Monthly rent as a percentage of total  revenue, Japanese  long liners: (a]  50-100  GRT;  (b]  100-200 GRT; and  (c]  200-500  GRT. 
Discussion 
The fleet activity which generated the most consistent 
fishery rents, on a monthly basis, was the smaller vessel 
(50-1  00 GRT)  longline  fleet  Rent was  greater than 
zero for 45 of the 52 months of recorded activity. The 
next best vessel class for rent generation was the fleet 
of  100-200 GRT  longliners  which  recorded  positive 
rents for 20 of the 49 months of recorded activity. The 
largest  longline  vessels  were  neither  very  active  in 
Papua New  Guinea waters between  1983 and  1987, 
nor capable of generating rents for any of the months 
they were present in Papua New Guinea waters. 
If these  results  are  considered  together with  the 
levels of activity of the various classes and profitability 
estimates from  Campbell and Nicholl  (1990;  1992a) 
(reproduced  in  Figure  13.6),  some  insight  can  be 
gained as to  the relevant importance of Papua New 
Guinea as a fishing ground in  the central and western 
Pacific region. The smaller vessels have been by far the 
most active in terms of  vessel-days fished, and although 
they did not return positive profits based on their entire 
range of fishing operations in any given year (according 
to profitability estimates), they did generate revenues 
greater than fishing costs while in  Papua New Guinea 
waters. Their presence was year round although there 
were noticeable declines in the level of activity of these 
vessels  in  mid  to  late  1984 and then again  in  1986. 
This pattern of vessel-days fished was also exhibited by 
the 100-200 GRT class of vessels. The years 1984 and 
1986  saw  relatively  lower  rents  generated  in  the 
longline  fishery  for  both the 50-100 GRT  and 100-
200 GRT vessel sectors of the fishery. 
The level of activity of the 100-200 GRT vessels was 
generally below half that of the 50-1  00 GRT vessels and 
followed a similar but less pronounced pattern as that of 
the smaller vessels (Figure 13.5). Their presence was also 
year round although slight from July  1986 on.  Profita-
bility estimates, measured as rate of return to invested 
capital, indicate  that this  mid-range  size  of longliners 
had poor general profitability performances in  1983-84 
and  1984-85,  but  that  this  improved  significantly 
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Agure  13.4  Monthly rent  as a percentage  of total  revenue, Japanese pole-and-line, 200-500  GRT. 
throughout 1985-86 (from-lIl% to 3%). This improve-
ment in economic perfonnance Wel,) also reflected in the 
annual average of monthly rent, moving from  -:33%  in 
19811  to  0.8% in  1985.  However,  it  would  appear that 
Papua  ~ew Guinea  is  a  marginal  fishing  ground  for 
these  vessels  as  there  seems  to  be  no  prospect  of 
consistently earning returns in excess of total costs. 
The largest of the longliners have not had a signifi-
cant  presence  in  Papua  l\ew  Guinea.  Although, 
according  to  Campbell  and  ~icholl  (1990;  1992a), 
these have been the most profitable of all the Japanese 
longline  tuna  operations,  their  acti\'ities  failed  to 
generate positive renb for Clny of the recorded months 
of fishing  in  Papua ~ew Guinea.  It  would seem that 
PapuCl  l\ew  Guinea  is  not  considered  by  fishing 
directors of these vessels to be of any real importance, 
with their fishing activity most likely representing brief 
attempts as they pass through in  transit to some other 
region or back to home ports in Japan. 
The pole-and-line vessels (200-S00 GI{T)  did  not 
have  a strong presence in  Papua \'ew Guinea waters 
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(Table 1  :3.2). The peak levels of activity were in October 
1983 and February 1985. The rent generating perfonn-
ance of these vessels was not good,  nor have they been 
profitable  in  general  (Campbell  and  :\icholl  1990; 
1992a). The general level  of activity of these vessels in 
Papua  ~e\\' Guinea suggests that other fishing grounds 
in  the region  are of more importance to their opera-
tions. 
Similarly for the group purse seine operations, rent 
generation  in  Papua  ~ew Guinea was  poor,  as  was 
overall profitability. Seven groups fished in Papua ~ew 
Guinea in  198;'5, spending from between 1 and 18 days 
catching  tunas. The following  year five  of the seven 
groups returned, fishing for between 11  and 10 days. ,\11 
groups operated  with  one net-boat  in  the  100-200 
GRT range. Profitability for  1985 and 1986 for  these 
vessels  was  negative,  remaining  so  throughout  the 
1980s. Japanese Tuna  Fleets and  Fishery Rents  in  Papua  New Guinea: 1983-1987 
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(a) Average longline vessel 
•  RRoR  .50-100 GRT  A  100-200 GRT  0 200-500 GRT 
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Financial year 
(b) Average pole and line vessel 
.---- •  •  •  .------- - •  • 
1979-80  1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  1984-85  1985-86  1986-87  1987-88  1988-89 
Financial year 
(c) Group purse seine vessel 
•  RRoR  .50-100 GRT (1  net boat)  A  100-200 GRT (1  net boat)  0 10-30 GRT (2 net boats) 
-40 -L-,  ______  ,-____  -,  ____  -,,-____  ,-____  -,  ______  ,-____  -,  ______  ,-____  -,  ___ 
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Agure 13.6  Rates  of return:  (a]  average  longline vessel; (b]  average  pole-and-line vessel; and  (c]  average  group  purse seine vessel. PIT = part time; 
FIT - full time;  RRoR  - Required  rate  of return;  based on  return to capital  !Al. 
152 Japanese Tuna  Fleets and  Fishery Rents  in  Papua  New Guinea:  1983-1987 
Table  13.1  Vessel-days fished and estimated  rent, Japanese longline  nee~ Papua  New Guinea's exclusive economic lone, 1983-86, la) 50-1 00  GRT 
Year  Month  Vessel-days fished  Rent (¥m)  Rent as %  of gross  revenue  monthly  Annual  average 
1983  493  50.411  17.7 
2  496  61.741  20.7 
3  533  36.076  12.4 
4  483  28.909  11.6 
5  589  261.886  49.4 
6  451  89.951  30.5 
7  541  211.994  46.2 
8  503  126.680  35.6 
9  390  79.965  31.0 
10  357  79.846  32.9 
11  400  91.552  33.4 
12  418  136.888  41.8  30.3 
1984  374  56.802  25.0 
2  197  26.393  22.7 
3  329  -5.963  -4.1 
4  539  29.435  9.7 
5  559  6.094  2.1 
6  311  6.226  3.8 
7  290  11.170  7.0 
8  281  45.397  24.1 
9  148  4.674  5.8 
10  262  68.201  33.8 
11  233  24.969  17.4 
12  307  96.177  38.1  15.4 
1985  395  71.589  26.2 
2  310  52.892  25.1 
3  420  42.225  16.5 
4  337  126.076  47.8 
5  393  180.860  53.0 
6  390  105.009  39.8 
7  386  137.389  46.6 
8  221  87.575  49.3 
9  190  38.185  33.0 
10  408  58.123  25.9 
11  393  48.037  23.0 
12  366  33.548  18.3  33.7 
1986  1  366  25.009  14.3 
2  392  63.427  28.4 
3  338  23.913  14.8 
4  458  4.198  1.9 
5  417  -37.180  -23.2 
6  153  0.057  0.1 
7  228  -10.216  -10.5 
8  262  -20.075  -19.3 
9  206  4.264  4.2 
10  189  81.062  47.5 
11  253  -10.651  -9.8 
12  240  18.009  13.7  5.2 
1987  1  181  12.792  13.0 
2  73  14.393  29.4 
3  9  -1.292  -43.6  -0.4 
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Table  13.1  (contdJ Vessel-<lays fished and estimated rent, Japanese long line  nee~ Papua New Guinea's exclusive economic lone, 1983-86, (b)100-200 GRT 
Year  Month  Vessel-days fished  Rent (¥m]  Rent as %  of gross revenue  monthly  Annual  average 
1983  1  176  -11.491  -9.0 
2  125  -20.711  -26.7 
3  122  -17.582  -22.4 
4  115  -13.232  -19.7 
5  122  45.414  34.8 
6  151  72.254  40.7 
7  171  55.532  31.7 
8  116  32.505  28.6 
9  93  23.020  26.2 
10  134  8.531  8.4 
11  156  50.537  31.7 
12  122  45.330  34.7  13.2 
1984  1  152  -2.019  -1.9 
2  124  44.062  33.7 
3  156  -17.389  -19.0 
4  204  -64.220  -51.0 
5  191  -87.484  -96.7 
6  104  -52.083  -116.2 
7  69  -27.771  -76.1 
8  34  -4.507  -16.6 
9  32  -1.963  -7.0 
10  41  1.393  3.5 
11  82  -21.325  -38.7 
12  100  -&399  -9.9  -33.0 
1985  1  111  -28.379  -37.8 
2  150  -30.108  -27.5 
3  117  -27.314  -33.4 
4  64  28.564  40.2 
5  180  89.781  42.9 
6  182  80.590  40.0 
7  94  12.163  16.3 
8  80  12.199  18.7 
9  112  0.150  0.2 
10  94  -14.358  -29.9 
11  168  -7.062  -6.8 
12  107  -8.398  -13.4  0.8 
1986  1  88  -17.638  -43.3 
2  131  -8.060  -10.2 
3  116  3.042  3.8 
4  193  -46.356  -54.1 
5  233  -66.059  -70.8 
6  53  -0.499  -1.4 
7  7  0.869  15.4 
8  22  -5.558  -5a5 
9  26  -7.293  -69.5 
10  7  5.850  55.0 
11  11  -3.811  -102.6 
12  27  -8.059  -77.4  -34.5 
1987  14  0.716  7.0  7.0 
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Table  13.1  [contd.) Vessel-days fished  and  estimated  ren~ Japanese  longline  flee~ Papua  New Guinea's  exclusive  economic lone, 1984-86, 
[c) (200-500  GRn 
--- - - - - - - --_ .- - --
Year  Month  Vessel-days  fished  Rent (¥m)  Rent as a %  of gross  revenue  monthly  Annual  average 
1984  10  2  -2.156  -460.1 
11  87  -47.407  -71.0 
12  19  -7.385  -42.1  -191.1 
1985  9  12  -6.970  -165.3 
10  73  -16.601  -32.3 
11  43  -14.818  -58.6 
12  40  -13.735  -58.3  -78.6 
1986  1  28  -16.930  -184.6 
2  12  -3.572  -46.9 
3  20  -6.653  -55.5  -95.7 
-- - -
Table  13.2  Vessel-days fished  and  estimated  ren~ Japanese  pole-and-line  nee~ Papua  New Guinea's exclusive economic lone, 1983-87 
1200-500 GRn 
- ---- -- - - _ .-
Year  Month  Vessel-days fished  Rent  [¥m)  Rent  as a %  of gross  revenue  monthly  Annual average 
1983  1  8  -6.057  -271.0 
9  11  27.915  70.5 
10  164  119.662  40.8 
11  15  -2.921  -22.5  -45.6 
1984  2  11  -1.902  -19.5 
3  7  -3.441  -86.5 
4  -1.008  -1323.5 
10  2  -2.168  zero  revenue 
12  20  -11.709  -117.4  -515.6 
1985  -0.058  -5.7 
2  80  -27.496  -46.4 
3  12  -10.383  -395.6 
4  3  -1.666  -89.0 
11  13  -7.809  -103.8 
12  10  -2.347  -24.9  -110.9 
1986  14  4.743  22.3 
2  7  -4.954  -150.0  -63.9 
1987  3  -2.954  zero  revenue 
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The results indicate that the successful category of 
vessels  (small  longliners)  generally  earned  rents  in 
excess of the 6% of gross revenue levied  as an access 
fee  by Papua New Guinea. llowever, the other catego-
ries  earned  mostly  negative  rents.  This  raises  the 
question  of  why  these  latter  vessels  continued  to 
operate  in  the  exclusive  economic  zone  over  the 
period. As  long as vessels are recovering their variable 
costs-costs  of  fuel,  materials,  labour,  vessel 
maintenance-fishing is a better option to owners than 
leaving vessels idle. Any excess of revenue over variable 
cost is  a quasi-rent to capital-a sum in  excess of that 
required to keep the vessel operating in  the short run, 
but less than the sum required to cover operating costs 
and yield  the required rate of return to capital  in  the 
long run. The required returns from operating in Papua 
New  Guinea  waters  depend  upon  opportunities  in 
other fishing grounds, as  well  as  on vessel  operating 
and capital costs. Thus the evidence presented  here 
does not offer any clear guide to  the appropriate level 
of the access fee, other than suggesting that access fees 
differentiated  by  vessel  size  and  type  may  well  be 
warranted. 
Finally, the results presented in  this paper provide 
some guidance to Papua New Guinea in  the possible 
development of a  domestic fishery.  It appears that a 
fleet of small longliners (50-1  00 GRT) offers the best 
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chance of operating a profitable locally  based fishery, 
assuming  that  domestic  operators  could  match  the 
catch rates, prices and costs of the Japanese fleet 
Table  13.3  Days  fished  and  estimated  rent  for  Japanese  group 
seine  operations,  Papua  New  Guinea's  exclusive  economic  zone, 
1985 and  1986 
Year  Days fished  Rent  I¥mJ  Rent  as %  of 
gross revenue 






Total  66  -559.596  -146.456 










Some Aspects of the Modern Law of 




The known resources of the world's seas and oceans 
comprise  both  the  renewable,  flow  resources  of 
fisheries,  and nonrenewable stock resources such as 
sea-bed mineral deposits. Many people have both the 
desire  and the technology to exploit some or all  of 
those resources. In the context of fisheries resources, it 
has  been  traditionally  assumed  they  were  virtually 
inexhaustible, and accordingly, each potential partici-
pant has  been granted a  high  degree of freedom  to 
engage  in  fishing  activity.  Typically,  the  'special 
interests' of individual coastal states took second place 
to the common interest deemed to be served by open 
access (Chen 1989: 131). Contemporary realities have 
rendered these earlier assumptions invalid. 
Modern  international  legal  instruments  have 
attempted to address the problems posed by property 
rights,  or more specifically,  the lack  thereof. In  that 
context the law of the sea as it applies to south Pacific 
states  and  their  fisheries  and  economies  has 
undergone  major changes  in  the last  20 years.  The 
traditional system of largely unregulated open access to 
fisheries resources by the inhabitants of those areas as 
well as distant water fishing fleets, has been replaced by 
a system of national and international regulation. This 
has taken the form  of treaty and convention, statute, 
and  the  development  of customary  law.  Multilateral 
treaties such as the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention 
are often  the codification of customary law  practices 
and come about in  response  to  conflicting  national 
claims and technological change. Even  if conventions 
are not yet in  force (as is  the status of the Law of the 
Sea  Convention),  their  current  significance  is  in 
opening up  awareness  and incentives  for  individual 
nations and subregional groups to follow up with their 
own  legislative  instruments and changes in  maritime 
practices.  This  paper  will  discuss  some  of  these 
domestic legislative instruments, as well  as two of the 
most significant regional agreements - the 1982 Nauru 
Agreement and the 1992 Arrangement for the Manage-
ment of the Western Pacific Purse Seine Fishery. 
These changes have had significant impacts on the 
distribution  of  access  to  living  resources  and  the 
benefits derived from  their exploitation (Kwiatkowska 
1989). This is significant in  light of the importance of 
fishery  products  to  the  economies  of  many  south 
pacific states, which for the purposes of this discussion 
are taken to be the member states of the South Pacific 
Forum  Fisheries  Agency,  namely,  Australia,  Cook 
Islands,  Federated States of Micronesia,  Fiji,  Kiribati, 
Marshall  Islands,  Nauru,  New  Zealand,  Niue,  Palau, 
Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, 
Vanuatu and Western Samoa. 
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Law relating to fisheries 
Property rights 
Coastal  stales'  common  property  rights  in  fisheries 
have  been  slow  lo  emerge.  The  resources  of those 
fisheries, namely the fish species, are commonly transi-
lory  or migratory  and  the  development  of property 
righL.,  in such resources has not min·ored the develop-
ment of land-based resource property rights. There has 
been a traditional reluctance to say that anyone could 
have  ownership rights  over something that you  can't 
fence in. In addition, whilst law can change in a number 
of ways,  such as  the  development of customary law, 
common law, legislative initiative and treaties, not all of 
these  have  been  a[)propriate  in  fisheries  law.  The 
effective lIse of the courts in  bringing about changes in 
property  law  has  been  limited  as  litigation  and  the 
common law  right.,  evolving  process work only when 
Ulere  is  individual  conflict or dissatisfaction  with  the 
interpretation  of property rights.  But when  in  ocean 
and tidal waters there was only a public right of fishing, 
there were no private rights lo dispute. Related to that 
is  the  fact  that depletion  of some fish  species  is  a 
relatively  recent  experience,  and  fishers  have  not 
collectively pressed for a solution, thus allowing legisla-
tors  to  maintain  faith  in  the  traditional  scheme. 
Furthennore, in  relation to the comparative economic 
and  political  strength  of the  coastal  states  and  the 
distant water fishing nations, enforcement of domestic 
laws against foreign  nations has been seen as virtually 
impossible, even leaving aside jurisdictional issues. 
In  addition, common practice can change through 
spontaneous and violent means. This has not, however, 
been a characteristic of  southern Pacific fisheries devel-
opment Fishers in  these waters are,  understandably, 
less worried about the long-run implications of open-
access  than  they  are  by  other  problems  such  as 
catching enough to provide for their own families in the 
immediate future. 
United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS Ill) 
Pre-UNCLOS 11/ developments 
Up until the 1970s, the majority of nations had rights of 
control over a 3n mile band of waters immediately off 
their coasts. All  remaining waters were open access. 
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From a south Pacific states perspective, pressure to lay 
claim  to  a  larger area of ocean was  induced by  two 
developments.  First,  many  small-scale  fisheries  are 
concentrated in  inshore areas and with the increasing 
demand  occasioned  by  growing  populations  and 
urbanisation,  the  impact  on  inshore  resources  had 
begun to become a matter of concern for governments. 
:'\ational policies centred on trying to induce or force a 
shift away from  the more fragile and heavily fished reef 
and  lagoon  resources and towards  the comparatively 
underexploited resources of the outer reef slopes and 
the  commercially  viable,  highly  migratory  tuna  and 
billfish species. Second was the growing concern about 
the  technologically  superior  fishing  fleets  of  other 
nations who were able to harvest from the same waters 
relied  on  by  local  inhabitants, unlicensed and to  the 
economic detriment of the local economy. 
Ironically  it  was  the  Cnited  States,  onc  of  the 
staunchest supporters of the 3  n  mile  territorial  sea 
doctrine,  that  opened  an  era of extensive  maritime 
claims.  In  1945,  Cnited  States  President  Truman 
issued a proclamation  I  creating fisheries conservation 
zones  outside  the  traditional  limit,  thus  giving  the 
United States fishing boats exclusive rights to the fish 
within  the  newly  extended  U.S.  waters.2  Whilst  this 
proclamation  was  carefully  drafted  to  balance  the 
rights of concerned states within the high seas regime, 
the same cannot be said for most of the bolder initia-
tives  provoked.  By  the  beginning  of  the  1970s,  a 
number  of  developing  countries  had  unilaterally 
extended their maritime resource jurisdiction, with the 
effect being to threaten the traditional law of the sea  3 
When the first  United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea opened in  1958, it faced jurisdictional 
claims ranging 3-200 n miles. UNCLOS I adopted four 
conventions but unfortunately could not agree on terri-
torial seas maximum  breadth or the extent of states' 
I That proclamation was known as the Proclamation with Respect 
to Coastal Fisheries in  Certain Areas of the High Seas. He also 
made the Proclamation with Respect to the Natural Resources of 
the Subsoil and Sea  bed of the Continental Shelf. 
2  Proclamation  No  2667  (The  Subsoil  and  Sea  Bed  of  the 
Continental ShelO 10, Fed. Reg.  12,303 (1945). 
3 Attard (1987:3-10) provides a good summary of the early claims 
to  extended  jurisdiction.  Among  them  were  Panama  (1946), 
Nicaragua (1947), Chile (1947),  Costa Rica  (1948),  El  Salvador 
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exclusive  fishing  rights.4 There were  three conflicting 
approaches advocated during these early negotiations. 
The first  was one of extension of jurisdiction and the 
exclusion of foreign states from fishing in the new zone 
without coastal state permission (the 'zonal' approach) 
(McRae and Munro  1987; Churchill  198:3).  A second 
approach, the 'species approach', was supported by the 
l'nited States and Canada. It sought to vary the extent 
and  nature  of  state  authority  over  the  resource  by 
reference  to  species  rather  than  by  establishing 
absolute authority over all  species within  a specified 
distance from the coasl 
The  third  approach  was  a  combination  of  the 
'zonal' approach with the 'preferential right.,' aspect of 
the 'species' approach, and emerged in the opinions of 
the two  most significant distant water fishing nations, 
Japan and the CSSR. and the judgment of the Interna-
tional  Court  of Justice  in  the  Fisheries  Jurisdiction 
Case.S The key wa., to be the dependence of the coastal 
state upon the fishery. A coastal state that was unable 
to demonstrate that its economic dependence on the 
resource required it to take all or the substantial part of 
the catch, could not prevent other states from  having 
access to it It constituted a denial of the exclusive right 
of  the  coastal  state  to  'ownership'  of  the  living 
resources  in  the  oceans  off  its  coast.  However,  the 
4 Those conventions are: Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone 
Convention  (adopted  12  n  mile  Contiguous Zone);  High  Seas 
Convention (made clear by definitions that coastal states had no 
powers of restricting freedom of the seas which included both for 
coastal  states  and  noncoastal  states  freedom  of  fishing); 
Continental Shelf Convention (sovereign  rights  over the shelO; 
Fisheries convention (recognised explicitly coastal state's special 
interest in maintenance of the productivity of the living resources 
in  any  area  of  the  sea  and  the  rights  to  initiate  unilateral 
measures of conservation). 
5  In  this  case,  Iceland  was  concerned with  the  quantity of the 
catch taken from its waters by foreign  fishing vessels. To reduce 
this catch, Iceland announced on 1110172 that it would extend its 
fisheries zone to 50 n miles. The United Kingdom, Germany and 
others wanted it declared that this action had no international 
law  basis.  The  Court  declared  that  Iceland  could  claim 
preferential  rights  with  respect  to  the  fishery  resources  in 
question;  and  that the  principle  of reasonable  regard  for  the 
interests of other states enshrined in Article 2 of the 1958 High 
Seas Convention required  Iceland and the  United  Kingdom  to 
have due regard to each other's interests, and to the interests of 
other states in those resources. The failure of the court to take 
any  position  on  extended  coastal  state  jurisdiction  was 
unfortunate. Indeed, its indecision encouraged further extensive 
claims. 
nature  of  the  coastal  state's  right  would  not  vary 
species by species. 
Both of these later approaches fell  from  favour, and 
the desire for the simplicity of a uniform zonal approach 
led  to the ultimate adoption of the uniform  200 mile 
exclusive economic zone in LNCLOS Ill. 
The Law of  the Sea Convention: rights, duties and 
implications 
The Law of the Sea Convention was concluded on  10 
December 1982, and will  come into force  12 months 
after the 60th acceptance. One hundred and fifty-nine 
nations  signed  the  Convention,  but  to  September 
1992,  only  50 had ratified  it.6 The economic impor-
tance  of  living  resources  was  the  main  motivation 
behind  the establishment of the  exclusive  economic 
zone,  as  mineral  resources  were  already  subject  to 
exclusive control of the coastal state under the conti-
nental  shelf  regime.7  Accordingly,  l'NCLOS  III 
provided  for  broad  exclusive  economic  zones  and 
fisheries zones embracing most commercially exploit-
able fish stocks, but in a manner which allows areas of 
mediation between 'all-power' and 'all-freedom': territo-
rial sea, contiguous zone, international strait, archipe-
lagic  sea,  exclusive economic zone, continental shelf, 
deep sea  bed and ocean floor. 
The conference proceedings of the Law of the Sea 
Convention sought to accommodate, in dealing with a 
wide  range  of  issues,  competing  and  conflicting 
demands  and  interests-notably  between  the  major 
maritime  powers  and  the  coastal  states;  between 
coastal  states  and  land-locked  and  geographically 
disadvantaged  states;  between  food  supply  through 
optimum  yield  and  conservation  of living  resources; 
between  coastal  fishing  and  distant  water  fishing; 
between  states  with  broad  and  narrow  continental 
shelves;  and  between  developed  and  developing 
nations (Chen 1989: 133). 
6  Notable  here  is  that  the  Convention  was  not signed  by  the 
United States, and has not yet been ratified by Australia, Papua 
New Guinea or Nauru. 
7  Kwiatkowska  (1989:6)  notes  that  exclusive  economic  zone 
rights and jurisdiction have to a significant extent evolved from 
the  traditional  doctrine  of  the  continental  shelf,  which  first 
sanctioned the extension of the coastal  states' resource  rights 
beyond the terri torial sea. 
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Many  of the provisions  of the Convention  repeat 
principles enshrined in  the earlier instruments. Some 
provisions, virtually identical to those already codified 
in  the  Geneva  Conventions  and  others,  have  since 
become customary rules, developed as general law  by 
the  practice  of states  during  the  10-year  period  in 
which the Convention was sitting and partly under the 
influence of its drafts. Many of the 50 countries which 
have ratified the Convention have been active in devel-
oping domestic laws  which  enshrine the principles of 
the Convention. 
The  relevant  provIsions  of the  Law  of the  Sea 
Convention  providing  the  basic  framework  for  the 
exclusive  economic zone  are  Articles  55,  3  and 57. 
Article  55  of the  Convention  defines  the  exclusive 
economic zone as the 'area beyond and adjacent to the 
territorial sea  ... under which the rights and jurisdiction 
of the  coastal  state and the rights  and freedoms  of 
other States are governed by the relevant provisions of 
this Convention'. Article 3 defines the breadth of the 
territorial sea 'up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical 
miles, measured from  baselines', and Article 57 states 
that the breadth of the exclusive economic zone 'shall 
not  extend  beyond  200  nautical  miles  from  the 
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea 
is measured'. 
The rights and freedoms of coastal and other states 
referred  to  in  Article 55 are contained in  Articles  56 
and  58.  Article  56  lists  the  rights,  jurisdiction  and 
duties of the coastal state in  the exclusive  economic 
zone.  The  coastal  state  has  sovereign  rights  in  the 
exclusive economic zone for the purpose of 'exploring 
and exploiting, conserving and managing' the natural 
resources  of  those  waters  (Article  56(1)(a)).  In 
exercising its  rights  and  performing its  duties  under 
this Convention in  the exclusive  economic zone,  the 
coastal state shall  have due regard to  the rights and 
duties  of other states (56(2)).  Article  58 covers  the 
rights  and  duties  of  other  states  in  the  exclusive 
economic zone. Of significance is 58(3) which provides 
that in  exercising  their  rights  and  performing  their 
duties  under  this  Convention  in  the  exclusive 
economic zone,  states shall  have  due  regard  to  the 
rights and duties of the coastal state and shall comply 
with  the laws  and regulations adopted by  the coastal 
state in accordance with the provisions of this Conven-
tion  and other compatible rules  of international law. 
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This has to  be read in  light of 58(1) which  indicates 
that there is  a  presumption that all  states will  retain 
freedoms of ocean usage, such as navigation, overflight 
and other peaceful purposes, which are not resource-
related. 
Article 62 of the Convention is an important modifi-
cation to the simplicity of a purely zonal approach-the 
coastal state must grant foreign  fishing vessel  access 
where it does not have the capacity to harvest the entire 
catch  itself (Article  62(2)). However,  under Article 61 
the coastal state has the discretion and responsibility 
for  setting the total  allowable  catch quantity.  In  the 
interest of obtaining maximum  net benefits from  the 
near-monopoly position over some particular species 
of  fishery  resource  'capita\'  coastal  states  have 
'inherited'  through  the  Convention  provisions,  the 
Convention exhorts them in Article 62 to promote the 
objective of 'optimum utilisation of the living resources' 
within  the  exclusive  economic  zone.  However,  the 
Convention is silent on what is  to constitute optimum 
utilisation.  In  principle,  a  country  is  free  to  use  the 
entire  capital  (i.e  harvest  the  total  allowable  catch) 
itself. If  it,  however,  finds  that  it  does  not  have  the 
capacity to do this, the Convention stipulates in Article 
62(2)  that  it  shall,  through  agreements  or  other 
arrangements,  give  other  countries  access  to  the 
surplus, having particular regard  to  the provisions of 
Articles 69 (rights of land-locked states) and 70 (rights 
of geographically disadvantaged states). 
Foreign  access  depends  on  the  availability  of a 
surplus, on the conclusion of relevant agreements and 
arrangements belween coastal and flag  states, and is 
subject to detailed conditions specified in Article 62(3-
5). These include: the taking into account of the signifi-
cance of the living resources of the area to the economy 
of the  coastal  state  concerned;  the  requirements  of 
land-locked  and geographically disadvantaged  states 
and developing states  in  the subregion;  the  need to 
minimise  economic  dislocation  in  states  whose 
nationals have habitually fished  in  the zone or which 
have made substantial efforts in  research and identifi-
cation of stocks; and compliance by nationals of other 
states fishing within an exclusive economic zone with 
the conservation measures and other terms and condi-
tions  established  in  the  laws  and  regulations  of the 
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These  obligations  impose  restrictions  on  the 
coastal state, but the idea of 'exclusivity' or 'sovereign 
rights'  is  not diminished  by  the existence of specific 
obligations  upon  the coastal state in  relation  to  the 
exclusive economic zone. In  practice, therefore, a state 
is able to manage the resources of its 200 mile zone in 
accordance with its own domestic policies and prefer-
ences.  Provided  that  it  does  not  act  in  a  way  that 
endangers conservation or does not arbitrarily refuse 
access by foreign vessels to a surplus it  has declared, 
the coastal state would appear to  be free  to  act as it 
pleases.  However,  the  need  for  real  cooperation 
between coastal states is nowhere more evident than in 
the context of highly migratory and transboundary fish 
species. Such restrictions on its  courses of action are 
hardly inconsistent with  proprietal rights, nor do they 
relegate the coastal state to the status of a 'steward' or 
'custodian' (McRae and Munro 1987:104). 
South Pacific state practice 
Resources such as the various tuna species of south 
Pacific state fisheries  are renewable, and can provide 
the means for  island states to  build  a self-sustaining 
economy which will,  over a period of time, contribute 
significantly to their economic well-being and self-suffI-
ciency. The key to such success is sound management 
and  conservation.  All  the  south  Pacific  states  have 
extended their maritime zones of jurisdiction beyond 
the traditional territorial sea limit. The benefits of doing 
so were outlined by  Mr  Rabbie Namaliu, Papua New 
Guinea Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  and Trade,  in  a 
statement to the Final Session on U lCLOS III: 
In  particular we  have  benefited  from  the  relevant 
provisions  of the Convention  dealing with  fisheries 
matters by concluding fisheries agreements with our 
neighbouring  countries  ...  the  general  exercise  of 
extended  jurisdiction  by  the  coastal  states  over 
certain maritime zones,  the provisions dealing with 
protection and preservation of the marine environ-
ment, creation of the new regime of archipelagos, the 
recognition  of coastal  state's  exclusive  jurisdiction 
over economic resources in certain parts of maritime 
zones. (Namaliu 1983:16). 
The states of the south Pacific are obviously linked 
by geography, and to a certain extent share the same 
path and level  of economic and sociological develop-
ment, but there is at the same time significant scope for 
divergence  in  altitudes  and policies  relating to  their 
fisheries. Much of this can be traced to the differing size 
and richness of their exclusive economic zones, some 
of it comes from  past experiences with  foreign  fishing 
fleets,  and some of it  stems from  individual  culture, 
which  may  attribute  to  fishing  and  a  fishing-based 
lifestyle a greater or lesser significance. 
Avenues of  fisheries development and 
associated problems 
The diversity in  the economies of the countries of the 
south west Pacific means that the goals of development 
and  management  for  similar  types  of  fisheries  in 
different countries could well vary greatly. Some of the 
variables which need to be taken into account are the 
availability  of skilled  fishers,  labour,  markets, capital, 
infrastructure for handling and processing the catches, 
boats and gear, fuel and back-up facilities. 
Subject  to  the  above,  the  following  avenues  of 
fisheries development may be identified as potentially 
open to south Pacific states (Kearney 1982: 7; Teiwaki 
1987: 274) 
- recreational or sport fisheries 
- subsistence fisheries 
- artisanal fisheries - surplus for sale to locals 
- commercial  fisheries -large-scale support facilities 
and marketing infrastructure 
- export fisheries -local fishers fishing independently, 
large-scale  joint  ventures,  or  foreign  enterprises 
fishing to supply markets outside the country 
foreign  fisheries - distant water fishing  nations  in 
200  mile  exclusive  economic  zones  with  a 
minimum of contact with the coastal state. 
Catches by foreign fleets dominate fisheries produc-
tion from the region as a whole. 
Very broadly, policy objectives revolve around three 
major concerns:  the desire  to  develop  national  tuna 
fishing and processing industries; the wish  to  control 
and extract the maximum benefits from foreign fishing 
in  their  waters;  and  the  need  to  coordinate  their 
policies on both the exploitation of these species with 
other states  in  the  region  and  on  the  cooperative 
relations with  distant water fishing  nations. Of these, 
the first is accorded the highest priority for the medium 
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tenn. All of the island states of the region have a strong 
desire  to  increase  their  involvement  in  the  fisheries 
around  them.  and  the  international  acceptance  of 
extended fisheries jurisdiction has undoubtedly given 
them  new  rights  and  powers  to  do  so.  However. 
increased  involvement  by  coastal  states  does  not 
necessarily  imply  increased  participation  by  the 
nationals themselves in the fisheries. A whole range of 
possibilities  exist,  from  the  development  of  wholly 
owned. operated and controlled local fisheries. through 
numerous joint venture alternatives. to the generation 
of revenue from totally foreign fleets. Of course. none of 
these possibilities has to be pursued exclusively. and so 
some balance of local and foreign enterprises could be 
the most rewarding. 
In  the short tenn it is  likely that coastal states will 
benefit from revenue gained through catch taxes. entry 
fees and licence fees from distant water fishing nation 
vessels.  but a  potential for  increased participation  by 
coastal  states in  future  development certainly exists. 
Hence. the growth of domestic fisheries (in  any or all 
stages of production) ideally sees the gradual. parallel 
decline  of  foreign  control.  The  evidence  from  Fiji. 
Solomon  Islands  and  Papua  New  Guinea  suggests. 
however.  that  the  considerable  effort  expended  by 
island  states  on  the  development  of  national  tuna 
industries has not been matched by the gains. Very few 
large-scale  fisheries  have  been  established  to  meet 
local demand. Most of the limited number of sizeable 
fisheries  that do exist  are  export-oriented  and.  even 
though fish exports from the region are very substantial 
and still increasing. the quantities of fisheries products 
imported  into  the  area  in  recent  years  has  not 
decreased (Kearney 1982:6). It seems surprising at first 
that numerous export fisheries have been developed in 
the  Pacific  islands  when  it  has  proved  difficult  to 
provide enough fish for local consumption. but it is the 
very nature of the differences between export-oriented 
and local fisheries that emphasises the real problems 
of developing and managing fisheries in this region. 
If the coastal states pursue the option of developing 
their own fisheries and processing procedures. then at 
least four major problems will  need to be overcome: 
seasonal fluctuations in abundance; expensive vessels; 
cost and availability of fuel; and lack of economies of 
scale. It is the development of infrastructure necessary 
for the creation and maintenance of commercial scale 
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fisheries that has proved the most common problem in 
coastal state fisheries development Even though there 
is  great diversity  in  the coastal  fisheries  resource  in 
island states. the total harvest from  them is  not great. 
Furthennore. for  the small-scale coastal fishers  there 
are  many  processing  and  marketing  problems  that 
hinder this  type  of development. The remoteness of 
many  islands  nonnally  results  in  abnonnally  high 
purchase. maintenance and fuel costs for all processing 
and refrigeration equipment. 
Case study: Papua New  Guinea 
Papua New  Guinea  declared  its  200 mile  'Declared 
Fisheries Zone' by  proclamation in  March  1978. This 
zone covers 2.3 million km2 of the western Pacific and 
it  is  the third  largest exclusive economic zone in  the 
region. 
The  Papua New  Guinea  fisheries  sector  can  be 
divided into three sectors: a domestic traditional sector 
with  a  commercially  oriented  subsector  directed 
towards supplying foreign ships as well as the domestic 
market;  a  domestic  non  traditional  sector  with  an 
export as well  as domestic orientation; and a foreign 
fishing  sector  with  an  enclave  character  and  only 
minimal interaction with the domestic sector (Mfodwo 
and Tsamenyi 1992: 76). 
The Papua New Guinea government has continued 
to  encourage  the  operation  of  distant  water  fleets 
because the country's domestic harvesting capacity is 
insufficient  to  fully  exploit  its  tuna  resources.  and 
because. through the payment of access fees and other 
statutory  charges  provided  for  in  the  legislation 
discussed  below.  government  revenue  is  generated. 
The dominance of agriculture and fisheries  as major 
economic resource  bases in  most of these countries 
means that large-scale development projects as such 
are  often  beyond  their  funding  capacities.  Locally 
based  tuna fishing  was  undertaken  by  a  number of 
companies from  1970-1982. but operations halted in 
1982.  Externally  based  interests  which  have  sought 
access  without  necessarily  basing  their  operations 
locally have been from Japan. since the end of World 
War 11.  and more recently. fleets from Cayman Islands. 
Honduras.  Indonesia. Japan. Korea. Mexico.  Panama. 
Philippines. Taiwan and the United States have joined 
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Papua New  Guinea fishing and  processing 
operations 
Papua New Guinea has generally failed to derive appro-
priate  income  from  its  substantial  resources  in  this 
area (ConneIl1989). Onshore processing and handling 
facilities in Papua New Guinea are limited in character 
and quantity.  Accordingly,  most marine  produce  for 
export  is  processed  almost  entirely  on-board  the 
fishing vessels equipped with  processing and freezing 
facilities. 
Papua  New  Guinea  has  been  trying  to  attract 
private investors to establish shore based tuna fishing! 
processing operations since  the  late  1970s with  no 
success.  None  of  the  major  tuna  processors  with 
extensive operations in  their own  countries are inter-
ested in financing the development of  a new industry in 
another country unless very generous concessions are 
negotiated.8  The Japanese and  U.S.  fishing  interests 
have  not been  interested in  investing in  these areas 
when  it  is  possible  for  them  to  purchase  fishing 
licences at a nominal fee,  fish  in the area and process 
the catch  in  their own  canneries. Under a  licensing 
scheme with no downstream participation by islanders 
in  fishing,  processing,  transporting or marketing the 
main beneficiaries of the tuna resources in the western 
Pacific are distant water fishing nations. 
The major change to policy in  Papua New Guinea 
which  will  have the greatest effect on foreign  fishing 
vessels is the introduction of  Article 62(4)(h) of the Law 
of the Sea Convention which allows the coastal state to 
require the landing of all  or any part of the catch of 
foreign vessels in the ports of the coastal state.9 
Improved management policies will  enable Papua 
New Guinea to closely monitor the catch rate, and take 
appropriate action  to  limit  the total  allowable  catch 
8 Ayu (1993: 5, 29) taking a more critical view of the perfonnance 
of the Papua New Guinea government, comments on the many 
opportunities during the 1980s for Papua New Guinea to develop 
its  own  tuna canneries, but during which  time  none got off the 
ground. Ayu believes that by 1992, Papua New Guinea could have 
had  over  five  fish  canneries  as  evidenced  by  the  number of 
proposals made since 1983. 
9 A word  of caution  is  necessary.  often  the  words  'attract'  or 
'promote' will  be  used  to  describe the influence a  Papua  ew 
Guinea  cannery  will  have  on  foreign  business  and  domestic 
development respectively-but it is important to keep in mind that 
frequently the wording of the legislation is  such that the foreign 
vessels are 'forced' to use those ports. 
within  their area. Similar action  by  the neighbouring 
island  nations, as foreshadowed  in  recent times,  will 
strengthen the region's ability to ensure the long-term 
sustainability of the resource. New proposed incentives 
for vessels landing tuna for processing in  Papua New 
Guinea,  such  as  exemption  from  export  duties, 
together with  its geographical proximity to the fishing 
grounds, will  encourage operators to sell  to domestic 
projects, ensuring supply. In  respect of the sale of the 
product, some will  be sold into the domestic market 
thereby substituting imports,  but the majority will  be 
destined  for  international  markets,  in  which  Papua 
New Guinea as a participant to the Lome Convention 
has a substantial advantage as it is entitled to sell into 
the EEC duty free. Non-Lome countries in contrast pay 
approximately 24% on the f.o.b value. 
Papua New  Guinea's maritime  zones  in domestic and 
international law 
Papua New Guinea declared its fisheries zone under its 
National Seas Act 1977, which was part of a package of 
acts bringing Papua New Guinea's maritime zone juris-
diction  into  line  with  the  worldwide  trend  towards 
extended  jurisdiction  evident  in  the  late  1970s.1O 
Papua New Guinea has signed but not ratified the Law 
of the Sea Convention. It  is,  however, debatable as to 
whether Papua New Guinea is relying on the Law of the 
Sea  Convention  as  the  basis  for  these  extensions 
anyway. The reason for this is  that the Law of the Sea 
Convention does not provide for a specific regime of a 
fisheries zone as such (Tsamenyi and Blay  1989: 44). 
By  claiming  an  exclusive  economic  zone,  a  state 
acquires a fisheries zone, but a state cannot acquire an 
exclusive economic zone by claiming a fisheries zone. 
For states such as Papua New Guinea, which continue 
to  claim  only fisheries  zones,  the legal  basis of their 
claims are not clear. The principal disadvantage with a 
fisheries zone, namely that it does not provide jurisdic-
tion  over  the  exploitation  of non  living  resources,  is, 
however,  not  relevant  in  Papua New  Guinea's  case 
because  of the  existence  of additional  legislation  to 
10 Interpretation (Application of  Laws) Act 1977, the Continental 
Shelf (Living  Natural Resources) (National  Sea) Act 1977,  the 
Fisheries  (Declared  Fishing  Zone)  Act  1977,  Petroleum 
(Submerged Lands) (National Seas) Act 1977, the  Whaling Act 
and the Tuna Resources Management (National Seas) Act 1977 
(Mfodwo  and Tsamenyi  1992:80). These acts are  discussed  in 
greater detail in the following chapter. 
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cover this.  Hence this  distinction  does not pose any 
problems for the issues currently under discussion. 
The licence is the principal legal instrument author-
ising activity which would otherwise be prohibited. The 
Papua New Guinea government does not discriminate 
in  licensing tuna vessels on the basis of flag  state or 
type  of  tuna  vessel.  Access  will  only  be  refused  if 
previous  licensing conditions have  been  infringed  by 
the vessel; the vessel owner has infringed conditions in 
the past for another vessel and the infringement has 
not been rectified; the vessel is not listed on the Forum 
Fisheries Agency's Register of Foreign Fishing Vessels; 
or the  vessel  has  been  removed  from  the  Register 
(Doulman 1987  a:  18). Subject to these limitations, the 
principal acts envisage that the relevant minister may 
issue  licences,  prohibit activities  and regulate fishing 
methods,  equipment  used,  areas  fished,  quantities 
caught,  type  of  fish  processing  and  transshipment. 
None  of the  principal  acts  provide  any  process  of 
appeal or challenge in  relation to the exercise of these 
powers  of prohibition. In  addition,  the  minister may 
cancel licences if provisions of the licensing structure 
are contravened. 
As  specified  in  Papua  New  Guinea's  Fisheries 
(Declared Fishing Zone) Act 1977, access fees paid by 
distant water  fishing  vessel  owners  consist  of three 
components,  a  Fishennen's  Licensing  Fee,  a  Boat 
Licensing Fee and an Operation Fee. Unlike the other 
two,  the last is  not nominal and  is  used to extract a 
financial  return from  the exploitation of the resource 
{Doulman  1987a:  20).11  Under  section  5A  of  the 
Fisheries Act, the minister shall consider the following 
factors in exercising his or her discretion: whether such 
states have cooperated with Papua New Guinea in, and 
made substantial contributions to, the development of 
the  Papua  New  Guinea  fishing  industry,  fishery 
research and the identification of fishery resources; any 
rights  of a  reciprocal  nature granted  to  Papua  ew 
Guinea  by  such  states;  whether  such  states  have 
cooperated with  Papua New  Guinea in  enforcement 
and with respect to the conservation and management 
of fishing resources; whether, and to what extent, the 
fishing vessels of such states have traditionally engaged 
11  Unlike some Pacific island countries. Papua New Guinea does 
not accept aid in  the form  of goods or services as part payment 
for access to its tuna fisheries. 
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in  such  fishing;  and  such  other  matters  that  are 
deemed to  be relevant (Mfodwo  and Tsamenyi  1992: 
98). 
In addition to domestic considerations and require-
ments with  respect to licensing foreign  fishing vessels, 
Papua New  Guinea  is  obligated  to  abide  by  certain 
fonnally agreed arrangements-without derogation of 
its  sovereign  rights.  In  particular, Papua New  Guinea 
and six  other countries  having  contiguous  exclusive 
economic  zones  (the  Nauru  Group)  have  agreed  to 
progressively  hannonise  tenns  and  conditions  of 
access  for  foreign  fishing  vessels.  This  point will  be 
taken up in more depth in the following section. 
Reliance on regional cooperation 
A significant problem that arises in south Pacific state 
practice  is  that while  a  large  number of developing 
countries assert sovereign rights in  regard to 'explora-
tion, exploitation, conservation and management', they 
only specify management and conservation objectives 
in very general tenns, at the same time enforcing their 
right to decide who else fishes there. This reflects the 
lack of experience, technical and financial resources on 
the  part of those countries  in  conservation,  rational 
management  and  optimum  utilisation  of  exclusive 
economic  zones.  The  proposition  that international 
cooperation  is  required  for  the effective  utilisation of 
tuna  resources  has  become  almost  universally 
accepted. In addition to the acceptance of the need to 
endorse multilateral conventions for the preservation 
of fisheries resources, the approach of the south Pacific 
states  to  fisheries  problems  is  characterised also  by 
heavy reliance on regional cooperation and the estab-
lishment of organisations such as  the South Pacific 
Commission (SPC) and the Forum Fisheries Agency to 
provide, in  theory at least, support to members in  the 
negotiation of subregional, bilateral and distant water 
fishing  nation  access  agreements. The  need  of the 
coastal  states  in  the south  Pacific  region  to  have  a 
regional organisation with  the mandate to assist them 
to manage the tuna resource arose out of the fact that 
most of the states could not afford to  police their vast 
exclusive economic zones. 
The creation of regional  agencies is  perceived  by 
the individual nations concerned as an integral part of 
the  struggle  for  relative  independence  in  decision-
making within a still very dependent setting. One of the Some  Aspects of the Modern Law  of  the Sea:  a  South  Pacific Fisheries Perspective 
arguments put forward for regional cooperation is that, 
armed  with  information  provided  by  the  Forum 
Fisheries Agency,  member states are better equipped 
to negotiate with distant water fishing nations. 
The south Pacific  state attitudes  towards  distant 
water  fishing  nations  are  often  based  on  financial 
considerations. Revenue from access fees was the main 
criterion in  Kiribati's  policy of encouraging the major 
distant water fishing nations to fish within its extensive 
exclusive economic zone from  1978 to  1984.12  Such 
access agreements can generally be satisfactory from 
the  coastal  state's  point of view  if  the distant water 
fishing state demonstrates at least an apparent willing-
ness to comply with the licensing tenns and conditions 
of the coastal state. Lodge (1992: 227) comments on 
the increasing reluctance on the part of distant water 
fishing  nations to  accept the  imposition  of what are 
perceived  as  regional  attempts  to  impose additional 
controls over foreign  fishing activity,  and a  misunder-
standing  as  to  the  basic  nature  and  function  of 
minimum tenns and conditions which are accordingly 
imposed. 
Despite the potential for good relations, or at least 
relations of mutual  tolerance and need,  to  exist,  the 
frequent disparities in negotiating power cannot always 
be hidden behind a mask of good will. Accordingly, the 
need for a collective approach to the management of 
exclusive  economic  zone  fisheries  resources  by  the 
South  Pacific  States  rests  on  three  crucial  factors 
(Tsamenyi 1986: 31): 
- The amount of ocean space under the jurisdiction 
of  the  south  Pacific  states,  coupled  with  the 
financial  burden  of  managing  the  resources  in 
these zones is  enormous.  early all  south Pacific 
states have  claimed  exclusive  economic zones  in 
conformity with  the Law of the Sea Convention. A 
few  countries,  like  Papua New  Guinea  have  not 
formally  declared  exclusive  economic  zones  but 
have  claimed  fisheries  zones  of 200  miles  with 
virtually identical rights. More than 6 million square 
n miles of the Pacific Ocean have come under the 
national jurisdictions of these countries, which are 
characterised  by  weak  economies  and  a  lack  of 
12 In  Kiribali's case these are Japan, South Korea,  United States 
and USSR 
technical expertise. To achieve maximum benefits 
from  the  exploitation  of  the  newly  acquired 
exclusive economic zone resources, there is a need 
to protect the zones against overuse. 
- The significance of the fisheries stock to the south 
Pacific states and the highly migratory nature of the 
important species  in  relation  to  the  size  of the 
exclusive economic zone, makes what happens in 
one  portion  of a  stock's  range  affect  the  stock 
throughout its entire range.  13 
- Regional  cooperation  is  also a  response of these 
countries to the implementation of decisions taken 
at UNCLOS  Ill.  Article  63  calls  for  cooperation. 
Underlying this  is  an assumption that an unregu-
lated  fishery  must  inevitably  overexploit  the 
resource. The authority to impose terms and condi-
tions of access is found in article 62(4) of the Law of 
the  Sea Convention  which  requires  nationals  of 
states  fishing  in  the  exclusive  economic zone  to 
comply with  the conservation measures and other 
terms and conditions established in  the laws  and 
regulations  of  the  coastal  state,  which  must  be 
consistent with  the Convention. The Fiji  Fisheries 
Division,  for  example,  acknowledges  that  as  the 
fisheries  sector  becomes  increasingly  developed 
and  commercialised, fishers  will  become increas-
ingly able to support their own  infrastructural and 
capital  development,  whilst  certain  natural 
resources  will  come  under  greater  stress.  The 
Fisheries Division  must ensure that legislative and 
procedural mechanisms are in place to ensure that 
the maximum long-term economic benefit can be 
gained from these resources (Fiji Fisheries Division 
1991: 1). 
[n  an  address  to  the  Papua  New  Guinea-New 
Zealand  Society,  Auckland,  on  October  20,  1982, 
Paulias Matane,  Secretary of the Papua New  Guinea 
Department of Foreign  Affairs  and Trade, advocated 
regionalism  on  a  broad  scale  to  protect  the  south 
13  In  contrast,  however,  note  I-lilbom  and  Silbert  (1988)  who 
reject the argument that most tuna species are highly migratory 
and  argue  that  while  individual  fish  occasionally  move  long 
distances, this behaviour appears to be exceptional for skipjack 
and  yellowfin.  If they  are  correct,  then  the  strength  of  this 
particular  argument  for  regional  cooperation  is  somewhat 
modified. 
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Pacific region from  being caught up in a global power 
play: 
While I do not question the value of the L'\J as a body 
dedicated to international peace and security, I cannot 
help but wonder whether individual  nations loosely 
grouped along regional  lines  could  not do more  to 
help aid the LN in upholding the principles of interna-
tional justice and integrity (Matane 1983: 19). 
The  next  section  of this  chapter  examines  two 
specific examples of south Pacific regional agreements 
and their provisions, and comments on the appropri-
ateness and effectiveness of them. The first of these is 
the  1982 Nauru Agreement Concerning Cooperation 
in  the ~anagement of Fisheries of Common Interest, 
and the second is  the Arrangement for  the Manage-
ment of the Western Pacific Purse Seine Fishery 1992. 
The Nauru Agreement 1982 
Background 
One  of  the  most  significant  regional  developments 
since the establishment of the Forum Fisheries Agency 
has been the emergence of the subregional group- the 
Nauru  Group-and  the  influence  of  this  group  on 
regional  fisheries  policy.  Between  them,  the  parties 
exercise jurisdiction over a very large proportion of the 
tuna resources of the western and central Pacific. 
Discussions between the original parties (Federated 
States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, 
Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands) began in 
1981  and centred on the particular problems of the 
relationships with  distant water fishing nations active 
in  the area Recognising  the fact  that distant water 
fishing  nations  were  able  to  weaken  coastal  state 
negotiating positions by  playing one state off against 
another,  the group  adopted  and  ratified  the  Nauru 
Agreement Concerning Cooperation  in  the  Manage-
ment of Fisheries of Common Interest in  1982. 
The essence of the Nauru Agreement and the senti-
ments expressed by delegates is that the owners of the 
fisheries resources of the region, the island people, will 
in  future  drive  a  harder  bargain  when  negotiating 
fishing  rights  with  the  major  distant  water  fishing 
nations -Japan, Taiwan and the United States. 
As  well  as  the  'bargaining  power'  argument 
discussed above, the Nauru Group alliance is  consid-
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ered logical and sensible for several important reasons 
(Doulman  1987b): the Group's members have contig-
uous exclusive economic zones, which  ha<;  significant 
implications  for  resource  management  and  for 
fisheries surveillance and enforcement of distant water 
fishing nation agreements; research undertaken hy the 
South  Pacific  Commission  implies  that  the  Nauru 
Group share tuna stocks,  particularly skipjack;  more 
than 75% of the tuna harvested by distant water fishing 
nation fleets in the exclusive economic zones of Pacific 
island  countries  is  taken  in  the  exclusive  economic 
zones  of l\auru  Group  countries;  the  region's  purse 
seine  fleets  confine  their  operations  to  the  Nauru 
Group waters;  and  finally,  over 70%  of distant water 
fishing nation access fee payments made under agree-
ments  in  the  Pacific  islands  go  to  Nauru  Group 
countries.  With  few  options  for  raising  domestic 
revenue,  Nauru  Group  countries  must cooperate  to 
protect this most valuable resource and to seek a fair 
financial  return from  iL<;  exploitation  by  distant water 
fishing nation fleets. 
Structure and provisions 
The  Nauru  Agreement  contains  the  basic  accepted 
principles  for  cooperation  between  the  parties  and 
makes provision  for subordinate arrangements to  be 
made to give effect to its intent The first and most basic 
provision  is  that the parties shall seek to establish a 
coordinated approach to their fisheries  management 
regimes. Article 1 provides as follows: 
The Parties shall seek, without any derogation of their 
respective  sovereign  rights,  to  coordinate  and 
harmonise the management of fisheries with  regard 
to common stocks within the Fisheries Zones, for the 
benefit of their peoples. 
In  this  respect,  it  was  recognised  that there were 
some aspects of a common management regime which 
would be agreed upon easily and others where consid-
erable work would need to be done before a common 
position  could  be arrived  at.  The Nauru  Agreement 
requires, at a minimum, the implementation of uniform 
terms and conditions for the licensing of foreign fishing 
vessels. This is to be achieved with respect to individual 
licensing of vessels  [Article  II(b)(j)],  the placement of 
observers  on  foreign  fishing  vessels  [Article  II(b)(ii)1, 
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catch and effort reports [Article I1(b){iv)) and the stand-
ardisation of identification marks [Article JI(b)(v)). 
The obligations of Article  I1(c)  are softer: 'seek to 
establish  .. .'  rather  than  I1(b)'s  'shall  establish ..  .'  The 
additional  minimum  terms and conditions of access 
Article I1(c)  establishes are the payment of access fees 
[Article  I1(c){i)),  provision of catch and effort data and 
any  additional  information  determined  necessary  by 
the parties [Articles II(c)(ii)(iii)), and flag state responsi-
bility [Article II(c){iv)). 
There are other provisions in the Nauru Agreement 
which will  require further discussion before subsidiary 
implementing arrangements may be concluded, e.g. the 
requirement to establish principles for the granting of 
preferential access to vessels of the parties to fish in the 
management zone over other foreign  vessels  [Article 
I1(a)). 
The First Implementing Arrangement 
Article  IX  of the Nauru Agreement provides that the 
parties shall conclude arrangements where necessary 
to facilitate  the implementation  of the terms and to 
attain  the objectives  of the Agreement Accordingly, 
pursuant  to  this  and  other  Articles  of  the  Nauru 
Agreement, the parties  have agreed via  'An  Arrange-
ment  Implementing  the  Nauru  Agreement  Setting 
Forth Minimum Terms and Conditions of Access to the 
Fisheries  Zones  of the  Parties'  (hereafter  the  First 
Implementing  Arrangement)  to  establish  and  bring 
into operation numerous minimum terms and condi-
tions of access. 
Principal  amongst  these  was  the  adoption  of a 
'Good Standing Register' of foreign fishing vessels to be 
maintained  by  the  Forum  Fisheries  Agency  as  an 
enforcement tool.14  Only vessels which  are accorded 
good standing status on the register would be granted 
fishing  licences  in  the  region,  in  accordance  with 
detailed  arrangements  to  be  agreed  by  member 
countries. The general intention  behind it  is  to  shift 
some of the responsibility for ensuring compliance to 
14 This was first proposed at a Workshop on the Hannonisation 
and Coordination of Fisheries Regimes and Access Agreements at 
Suva, Fiji between February 2 and March 5,1982. The Workshop 
presented its  report to  the 7th meeting of the Forum Fisheries 
Committee  in  May  1982.  These  recommendations  were 
subsequently endorsed by the South Pacific Commission. 
the flag  state or fishing  association. The First Imple-
menting  Arrangment  also  saw  the  establishment  of 
many  of the  suggestions  of  the  Nauru  Agreement, 
notably  that  foreign  fishing  vessels  be  required  to 
comply  with  mInimum  reporting  conditions 
throughout the region regarding entry and exit, catch, 
effort  and  location  log  sheets  and  the  on-board 
positioning of observers. 
One of the most important innovations to come out 
of  the  First  Implementing  Arrangement  discussions 
was  the formulation  of 'flag state responsibility'-flag 
state vessels and governments were required in access 
agreements to take active measures to ensure compli-
ance by their fishing vessels with coastal state laws. 
During  the  five-year  period  following  the  First 
Implementing Arrangement there was  relatively  little 
regional  activity  as  regards  the  development  of the 
minimum terms and conditions of access. However, by 
1989 bilateral access agreements with Japan were in 
place  with  the  following  countries  in  the  Forum 
Fisheries  Agency  region:  Australia,  lew  Zealand, 
Kiribati,  Solomon  Islands,  Marshall  Islands,  Tuvalu, 
Papua New  Guinea, Federated States of Micronesia, 
and Palau. Several countries also had access arrange-
ments with  Korea and Taiwan,  both of which  rapidly 
expanded  their  fishing  fleets  during  the  1980s. 
Certainly  the  most  significant  development  in  the 
period  1984-1989 was  the conclusion of the Multi-
lateral  Treaty  on  Fisheries  between  certain  Pacific 
island  states  and  the  United  States.  The  regional 
register procedures  and minimum  terms  and condi-
tions of  access were incorporated in the annexes to the 
treaty and thus received binding legal effect as belween 
the parties thereto. 
The Second Implementing Arrangement 
By 1990 it was becoming apparent that certain amend-
ments  to  the  First  Implementing Arrangement were 
necessary in response to concerns expressed by Nauru 
Agreement countries over the substantial increases in 
foreign fishing activity in  the region, particularly purse-
seining; disparities in fee levels and methods of  calcula-
tion throughout the region; as well  as in  response to 
the increased level of compliance noted on the part of 
the  U.s.  fleet  following  the introduction  of the First 
Arrangement  and  the  Treaty  on  Fisheries.  At  the 
request  of  Papua  New  Guinea  and  the  Federated 
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States of Micronesia at the ninth annual meeting of the 
parties  to  the  Nauru Agreement in  1990,  a  Second 
Implementing Arrangement, established a prohibition 
of transshipment  at sea (Article  1(1));  extended  the 
duties to maintain log books to be binding on the high 
seas as well as in the fisheries and exclusive economic 
zones which the First Implementing Arrangement dealt 
with (Article 1(2)); and established an obligation for flag 
states or fishers'  associations to pay the full  costs of 
having an observer on board their vessels, in  addition 
to the First Implementing Arrangement requirements 
of allowing them to board, permitting them to gather 
information  and  have  access  to  facilities,  providing 
food, accommodation and care, assist them in carrying 
out their duties and so forth (Article 1(3)). 
It was agreed by the Nauru Group that the Second 
Implementing Arrangement would come into effect on 
January 1, 1991, but that existing access arrangements 
would be allowed to run their course. The latter proviso 
has caused some problems. Many of the existing access 
arrangements in  the region are of the 'roll-over'  type, 
subject  to  automatic  extension.  Given  the  extreme 
reluctance of some Nauru Group members to run the 
risk of a  breakoff in  access arrangements, only a few 
countries have  made an effort  to  introduce the new 
arrangement, preferring to allow present arrangements 
to  continue  in  force  until  it  is  seen  that  all  other 
countries  have  successfully  applied  the  Second 
Arrangement. 
Law of  the Sea Convention jurisdiction 
The question posed in  this section is whether, and to 
what extent, there is  a justification for  the minimum 
terms  and  conditions  within  the  Law  of  the  Sea 
Convention. Competence to impose conditions relating 
to catch and effort statistics and vessel position reports 
is expressly conferred by Article 62(4)(e) of the Law of 
the Sea Convention. 15 
15 This section reads as follows: 62(4). Nationals of other States 
fishing  in  the  exclusive  economic zone  shall  comply  with  the 
conservation measures and with the other terms and conditions 
established in the laws and regulations of the coastal state. These 
laws and regulations shall be consistent with this Convention and 
may relate inter alia to the following:  ...  (e) specifying information 
required of fishing vessels, including the catch and effort statistics 
and vessel position reports. 
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What though  of the high  seas catch  data obliga-
tions imposed under Article 1(2)  of the Second Imple-
menting Arrangement? The high seas are prima facie 
beyond  the  reach  of the  exclusive  economic  zone 
powers  conferred  in  the  Convention,  but  there  is 
considerable  justification  in  law  and  science  for 
requiring high seas catch data. Such data is required in 
order to assist the coastal state in  fulfilling its obliga-
tions under the Law of the Sea Convention: to promote 
optimum  utilisation  of  the  living  resources  in  the 
exclusive economic zone (Article 62); to conserve those 
resources (Article 61); and to cooperate with a view to 
conservation and optimum utilisation (Article 64). 
The  practice  of transshipment at sea makes  the 
fulfilment  of  the  obligation  for  conservation  and 
management difficult  because  it  distorts  catch  data 
and the calculation of a 'fishing trip' which is of special 
concern to  those countries which  have adopted a per 
vessel per trip licensing system. In an attempt to control 
this  practice, the Second Implementing Arrangement 
disallows the practice, and the revised minimum terms 
and conditions of access of the South Pacific  Forum 
make similar provisions. 16 The language used in  both 
is extremely wide and may be construed as a prohibi-
tion on transshipment anywhere on the high seas - this 
is  indeed  the  construction  used  by  Japan  as  an 
argument  against  accepting  the  provision.  Such  a 
general prohibition cannot be supported in  law and it 
has been suggested that an attempt to support it,  or 
even to be perceived as supporting it, would seriously 
undermine the credibility of Forum Fisheries Agency 
member states. There is  an arguable case in  interna-
tional  law  for some form  of restriction  on transship-
ment  in  areas  of  high  seas  adjacent  to  exclusive 
economic  zones,  but  even  this  has  to  be  weighed 
against the practicability of enforcing such a regime. 
The placement of observers  is  clearly  one·  of the 
matters  in  respect  of  which  the  coastal  state  is 
empowered to make regulations under article 62(4)(g) 
of the Law of the Sea Convention. These requirements 
have  not met with  much resistance except regarding 
cost and extent of duties. 
16 An  exception  is  made for  the transfer of catch by  a licensed 
seiner to  its  licensed  canier vessel,  each of which  holds good 
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Current state practice 
The difficulties  being encountered  by  Nauru  Group 
parties  with  respect  to  the  implementation  of  the 
minimum  terms  and  conditions  of  access  were 
reviewed  at the  10th  annual  meeting of the  Nauru 
Group parties in  April  1991, at which they reaffirmed 
(Lodge 1992: 288): 
their total commitment to apply the minimum terms 
and  conditions  as  a  non-negotiable  standard  of 
access  for  foreign  fishing  vessels  to  the  exclusive 
economic zones of member countries. Communica-
tion  of this  position  of solidarity  to  foreign  fishing 
industries  and governments  should  occur at every 
opportunity including exchange of visits  by  govern-
ment representatives and their attendance at access 
negotiations. 
What then is  the present status of the minimum 
terms and conditions of access? Having been adopted 
by the Forum Fisheries Agency countries and endorsed 
by  the South Pacific  Commission  it  is  arguable that 
both  the  revised  minimum  terms  and conditions  of 
access and the regional register rules are binding on all 
countries represented by those fora. It is arguable that 
the agreement made by South Pacific Forum members 
committing themselves to making the minimum terms 
and conditions non  negotiable is  binding on  them in 
international law. For example, the International Court 
of Justice has expressed 'no doubt' that 'declarations 
made  by  way  of unilateral  acts,  concerning legal  or 
factual situations may have the effect of creating legal 
obligations'. 
The South Pacific Forum leaders, as heads of their 
governments,  have  the  authority  to  make  commit-
ments that would bind their countries under interna-
tional law. To say otherwise is  to vitiate the role of the 
Forum and the authority its members yield as political 
leaders. The minimum tenns and conditions that were 
adopted by the Forum must therefore have legal effect 
in  international  law.  Whether or not the conditions 
have  effect  as  part  of  the  domestic  laws  of  these 
member countries would depend on their constitution 
and  the extent to  which  the courts and  legislatures 
would apply them as part of the domestic law. It must 
be borne in mind that national legislation provides the 
basic framework for all fisheries activities in the region. 
In  these  circumstances,  the  incorporation  of  the 
minimum  terms  and  conditions  of  access  into 
domestic  law  is  an  important factor  in  ensuring the 
effectiveness of those conditions. Once they are part of 
national law they become truly nonnegotiabIe and can 
be enforced through the courts and cannot be called 
into question  during access  negotiations. Table 14.1 
gives an indication of the extent to which a number of 
the  major  provisions  of the  Nauru  Agreement  and 
Implementing Arrangements have  been incorporated 
through domestic legislation. 
Forum  Fisheries  Agency  member countries  have 
met with  varying degrees of success in  implementing 
the minimum terms and conditions of access through 
national  legislation. While  it  would  appear that  the 
conditions  contained  in  the  First  Implementing 
Arrangement  (licensing  terms  and  conditions, 
positioning of observers, catch reporting and mainte-
nance of log books, timely reporting of catch, entry and 
exit and identification of licensed vessels) were incor-
porated fairly  quickly into national legislation in  most 
countries, there has been no such urgency in  the case 
of the Second Implementing Arrangement (transship-
ment at sea,  high  seas catch  reporting and observer 
costs) and the revised minimum terms and conditions 
of access. The regional register and its sanctions have 
proven effective in enforcing compliance with the terms 
and conditions of distant water fishing  nation access 
agreements with  Nauru Group countries. In  this way 
the register has helped to reduce the costs of adminis-
tering agreements. The register has also reduced the 
incidence of illegal fishing and facilitated the collection 
of fines  from  distant water fishing nations to prevent 
the deregistration of their vessels for violations. 
The Arrangement for the Management 
of the Western Pacific Purse Seine 
Fishery 1992 
In October 1992, representatives of the governments of 
the  Federated  States  of  Micronesia,  Republic  of 
Kiribati,  Marshall  Islands,  Nauru,  Palau,  Papua New 
Guinea,  Solomon  Islands  and  Tuvalu  signed  an 
agreement, 'The Arrangement for the Management of 
the Western Pacific Purse Seine Fishery' (hereafter the 
Management  Arrangement)  to  further  promote 
regional  cooperation  and  coordination  of  fisheries 
policies in  the light of the growth of purse seining as a 
particular and predominant fonn of fishing activity. 
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Table  14.1  Incorporation of Nauru Agreement provisions and  Implementing Arrangements  into domestic legislation, south  Pacific  nations 
Country  Legislation  Definitions  Rag  state responsibility  Observer  Regional register  Reporting  Trans-
provision  procedure  shipping 
Australia  Rsheries Management Act  Yes  Terms  of Access  Yes  Terms of Access  Yes 
1991  Agreements  Agreements 
Cook  I.  Marine Resources Act 1989  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
Fiji  Marine Spaces Act &  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Regulations 1979 
Micronesia  TItle  24  of the  Code  of the  No  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Federated States of 
Micronesia 
Kiribati  Rsheries Act  1984  Yes  No  No  No  No  No 
Marshall  Marshall  I.  Marine Resources  Yes  No  Yes 
Islands  Authority Act  1988 
Nauru  Marine Resources Act  1978  No specific reference  to  any conditions, but power to  set specific licence conditions 
New Zealand  NZ Rsheries Act 1983  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Niue  Territorial Sea  No specific  reference to any conditions, but power to  set specific licence conditions 
Palau  Palau  National Code  Yes  Yes  No 
Papua  New  Fisheries Act  No specific  reference to conditions, but power to  set specific licence conditions 
Guinea 
Solomon  Fisheries Act  1972 
Islands 
Tonga  Fisheries Act  1989  Yes 
Tuvalu  Foreign  Fishing  Vessel  Yes 
Regulations 1983 
Vanuatu  Fisheries  Regulations  1983  No 
W.  Samoa  Fisheries Act  1988  Yes 
Source: based  on  information  contained  in  Lodge  1992. 
The  preamble  of the  Management Arrangement 
says that particuiar account is taken of Articles 56(1)(a) 
and 61  of the Law of the Sea Convention. It is  notable 
that while the '\auru Agreement focused on the provi-
sions of Article 62 on the utilisation of living resources, 
the Management Arrangement's emphasis is on Article 
61-the conservation of those resources. The preamble 
shows awareness of the dependence of the countries of 
the south Pacific upon the rational development and 
utilisation  of the living  marine resources,  but is  also 
mindful  of the  fact  that this  is  dependent upon  the 
continued abundance of the resource. 
The  preamble  also  indicates  that more  attention  is 







Yes  Yes  Yes 
No  No 
Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Yes  Yes  Yes 
No  No  No 
recognising the responsibilities of coastal states and 
fishing  states  to  cooperate with  each  other in  thl 
conservation  and  management  of  living  marine 
resources of the high  seas and taking into  account 
the  special  interest  of  coastal  states  in  highly 
migratory  species  while  outside  their  exclusive 
economic zones [including fishing zones]. 
Effective maintenance of the ecological relationship 
between  dependent  and  associated  populations  is 
recognised, as is the need to prevent any decrease in the 
size of harvested popuiations below those necessary to 
ensure their stable recruitment, to avoid adverse impacts 
upon  the  marine  environment, and to  only  carry  out 
fishing  practices  on  the  basis  of  ecologically  sound 
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an effective  monitoring and enforcement system  must 
operate. 
Jurisdiction  of  the  Management  Arrangement 
extends over the 'Purse Seine Fisheries Management 
Area' (hereafter, 'the Area') which  is defined in Article 
l.1(a)  as  the  exclusive  economic  zones  or fisheries 
zones  of  the  parties  to  this  Agreement  including 
adjacent high seas areas of the western Pacific within 
which purse seine vessels operate. Article 2 stipulates 
that the provisions of the Management Arrangement 
apply to all species of tuna and tuna-like species taken 
by purse seine vessels in the Area 
Yearly  'Management Meetings'  of the parties  are 
mandatory  under  Article  3.1  for  the  purpose  of 
reviewing  the  current status  of tuna stocks  and  to 
establishing necessary measures for their management 
and  conservation.  Decisions  made in  such  meetings 
are to be reached through consensus and are binding 
on all parties (Article 4). 
The  tasks  and  functions  of such  management 
meetings during such review are wide in  scope. Their 
task is to work towards the more effective implementa-
tion of the First and Second Implementing Arrange-
ments entered into pursuant to the Nauru Agreement 
(Article 3.2(d)). They must consider scientific, economic 
and social  impact data (Article  3.2(a)),  and consider 
management measures. This subsection, Article 3.2(b) 
reads as follows: 
The functions of the Management Meeting are: 
(b)  to  consider management measures, which  may 
include, but are not limited to -
(j)  the  regulation  of  fishing  effort  by  purse  seine 
vessels which  have good standing on  the Regional 
Register, including the number of vessels by size class, 
operation type, carrying capacity, fishing  power and 
technological capability or other grouping subject to 
the criteria set out in Article 5.1; 
(iil  the allocation of licences as indicated in Annex 1 
hereto for  fishing  access to  the exclusive economic 
zones of parties  including  licence  denial  for  those 
foreign fishing vessels unwilling to cooperate in these 
management and conservation measures by fi1iling to 
provide high seas catch and effort data; 
(iii)  the  establishment  of closed  areas  and  closed 
seasons; and 
(iv)  any  other  management  measure  deemed 
necessary from time to time. 
Article  3.2(c)  provides  for  the  establishment and 
implementation of a system of observation and inspec-
tion 'consistent with  regionally agreed initiatives', and 
in  so doing would  appear to  clearly embrace Article 
11(2) of the First Implementing Arrangement and Article 
1(3)  of  the  Second  Arrangement  Surveillance  and 
enforcement  procedures  consistent  with  regionally 
agreed practice are also to be developed (Article 3.2(e)). 
Each Party has a duty to ensure that its nationals and 
fishing vessels comply with any management measures 
adopted by management meetings (Article 3.5). 
Article 8 recognises the need for,  and provides for, 
informal consultations with  other states and interna-
tional  organisations, a sentiment which  is, of course, 
integral  to  the  Nauru Agreement and Implementing 
Arrangements. 
Articles 3.3, 5, 6 and Annex 1 set out the Manage-
ment Arrangement's  provisions  regarding the alloca-
tion of licences. Article 3.3 provides that any allocation 
of licences made under 3.2(b)(ii) will take into account 
the strong dependence of south Pacific coastal states 
on fisheries  resources and the special importance to 
them of the conservation and optimum utilisation of 
highly  migratory species of tuna in  the region. Article 
5.1  provides  an explicit expression  of the ranking of 
applications for  licences,  providing that those vessels 
have  good  standing status  on  the  regional  register. 
Giving  highest  priority  to  domestic  vessels  acknow-
ledges  the development goals  of south Pacific states 
discussed  previously. In  descending order of priority 
are:  domestic vessels;17  domestic vessels  of another 
party to the Arrangement or vessels jointly operated by 
or on behalf of the government of the party in which 
the vessel  is  based  and one or more  other parties; 
17  Article  1.1  (0  'domestic vessel'  means  any  fishing  vessel  (j) 
wholly  owned  by  the  government  of a  party  or by  any  public 
corporation or body established by or under any law of a party, all 
of the shares in which are beneficially owned by the government 
of the  party;  (ij)  wholly  owned  and controlled  by  one or more 
natural persons who are citizens or permanent residents of the 
party in which the vessel is based under the relevant laws relating 
to nationality and citizenship of that party; and (jjj) wholly owned 
and controlled  by  any company, society or other association of 
persons incorporated or established under the laws of the party 
in which the vessel is based. 
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locally based foreign  fishing vessels;18  foreign  fishing 
vessels  with  established  access  arrangements  over 
previous years  and with  good  records of compliance 
with national laws and regulations, the minimum terms 
and conditions and reporting requirements of Parties; 
and new foreign  fishing entrants to the fishery. There 
seems to be little to complain about from  the point of 
view  of developing Pacific  states  in  this  hierarchical 
structure. Parties which  have  a  small  or nonexistent 
domestic fishing fleet simply begin allocating priorities 
18 Article  1.1  (g)  'locally  based  foreign  fishing  vessel'  means  a 
foreign  fishing vessel which  is  based in  a  party, lands all  of its 
catch  in  that  party  and/or  operates  under  a  joint  venture 
arrangement in the territory of that party which is approved by the 
government of that party or under arrangements whereby  the 
operator  of  the  vessel  is  participating  in  shore  based 
developments or is  otherwise making a substantial contribution 
to the development of the domestic tuna industry of the licensing 
party. 
Reproduction  of Annex 1 of the  Management Arrangement 
Agreed  purse seine licence numbers 
from a different starting point. However, what is curious 
is  that there is  no provision for extra-territorial agree-
ments.  For  example,  in  the  context  of  the  Lome 
Convention, it would seem that EEC vessels would be 
given priority over other foreign fishing vessels. It could 
perhaps  be  argued  that  such  vessels  are  included 
under the  provision  for  'foreign  fishing  vessels  with 
established access arrangements'. 
Article 6 and Annex 1 provide the details on licence 
numbers and allocation criteria. Annex 1 (see box) sets 
a  flexible  ceiling on the total  number of purse seine 
licences that may be issued (Article 6.1 and Article 6.2). 
Additional licences are subject to a premium of 20%. 
These  limits  may  be  reviewed  by  management 
meetings, and Article 6.3 says that 'lilt is further under-
stood that the Parties will aim to reduce the number of 
additional licences available'. 
The  maximum  number of licences for  purse seine vessels agreed to  by the  11th Annual  Meeting  of the  parties to the  Nauru  Agreemen~ Tarawa, 
Kiribati,  14-17 April,  1992, is as follows: 
Single  (Ad d  iti 0  na I)  Group  (Additional! 
1. Multilateral access USA ITreatyl  40  (lOla  (5)1J 
2.  Bilateral access 
a)  Forum  Fisheries Agency members 
Australia  6 
b)  Foreign 
Japan  32  4  (3) 
Taiwan  30  (12)  2 
South  Korea  32  (5) 
Philippines  6  (5) 
Indonesia  3 
Subtotal  109  (22)  6  (3) 
3.  Domestic and  locally-based foreign vessels 
All  parties  10 
Total  159  (32)  (5)  6  (3) 
aAs agreed  In  relation to an  extension  of the Treaty on  Fisheries Between  the  Govemments  of Certain  Pacific Island  States and  the  Government of the  United  States  of 
America. 
bSpeciallicences for Joint ventures/developmental  licences as agreed with  the  United States  In relation to an  extenSion  of the  U.S. Treaty. 
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Foreign  compliance is  expressly stated  to  be  the 
single most important factor influencing the allocation 
of licences. Licences to individual foreign  purse seine 
vessels will  be issued firstly on the basis of the vessel's 
record  of  compliance  with  the  national  laws  and 
regulations  and  reporting  requirements  of  parties 
(Article  6.4(a))  and second  in  chronological  order of 
application. 
Conclusion 
This paper has discussed the manner in which the law 
and  practice  relating  to  fisheries  has  developed  in 
coverage  and complexity,  to  the  current position  in 
which many of the policies of ecological sustainability 
and  economic  control  have  been  implemented 
through  regional  agreements  such  as  the  Nauru 
Agreement and Management Arrangement. The desire 
of south Pacific states to have greater control over the 
exploitation  of  the  resources  which  surround  their 
shores is  understandable, but the  move  towards any 
form  of 'ownership  rights'  must be  balanced  by  the 
modem awareness  of the interrelationships  between 
ecological and environmental systems, and the political 
accountability  for  the  sensible  management  of 
resources which  are seen as  beneficial  to  the 'global 
ecosystem'. Hence, with  control, comes responsibility. 
This is indicated by the preferred role of regional agree-
ments over unilateral claims which can be potentially 
conflicting, and accordingly diminish the power of the 
south Pacific states as a group. With the advent of the 
Law  of the Sea Convention exclusive economic zone 
provisions, these states suddenly became the theoret-
ical  rulers  of  domains  covering  millions  of square 
kilometers. Theoretical rulers, in the sense that it soon 
became apparent that there was a vast gap between the 
mere declaration of an exclusive economic zone and 
the collection of returns from  such a zone in  the form 
of solid economic development. 
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The  Legal  Framework  for  Fisheries 
Management in Papua New Guinea 
B. M.  Tsamenyi 
K.Mfodwo 
Introduction 
This chapler provides  cl  broad  overview  of the  legal 
framework within which fisheries exploitation is carried 
out in Papua New Guinea. It begins with an analysis of 
Papua  New  Guinea's  fisheries  jurisdiction.  This  is 
followed  by a description of the jurisdictional reach of 
Papua  New  Guinea's  fisheries  legislation  and  the 
regulatory framework established under the legislation. 
Finally,  the  chapter examines  Papua  New  Guinea's 
fisheries  enforcement process  from  an  international 
law and policy perspective. 
The fisheries jurisdiction of Papua 
New Guinea 
Prior to  1977 Papua New Guinea's maritime jurisdic-
tion was regulated by three pre-independence acts and 
by the principles of  customary intemationallaw. Drafted 
by Australia as the colonial power, the zones claimed 
under those statutes were a territorial sea of 3 n miles 
and under the Fisheries Act 1974, a  further 9  n  mile 
fishing zone, which  reserved  fisheries  for  Papua New 
Guinea vessels and foreign licensees. The Continental 
Shelf (Living  Natural  Resources) Act 1974,  and  the 
Petroleum  (Submerged  Lands)  Act  1975,  extended 
jurisdiction over the living and non  living resources of a 
portion of the continental shelf of Papua New Guinea. 
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The  situation  changed  in  1977  following  the 
passage of the National Seas /1ct Lnder this legislation, 
Papua I\'ew Guinea declared a 12 n mile territorial sea, 
drawn from  the appropriate baselines, and an area of 
offshore  seas  (called  the  declared  fishing  zone), 
extending an additional  188 n  miles from  the outer 
limits of the territorial sea. In  the expanded territorial 
sea,  the  customary  rules  of  international  law  were 
stated as still applicable. The passage of the National 
Seas Act brought Papua New Guinea's maritime zone 
jurisdiction  in  line with  the worldwide  trend towards 
extended jurisdiction evident in the late 1970s. 
A significant development under the National Seas 
Act  was the application of the concept of 'archipelagic 
waters' to Papua New Guinea. Article 46 of the Law of 
the Sea Convention defines an 'archipelago' as a group 
of islands,  including parts of islands, interconnecting 
waters and other natural features which are so closely 
interrelated that such islands, waters and other natural 
features form  an intrinsic geographical, economic and 
political  entity,  or  which  historically  have  been 
regarded as such. Under the Law of the Sea Conven-
tion  regime,  archipelagic states are allowed  to  draw 
straight baselines joining the outermost points of the 
outermost islands and drying reefs,  provided that the 
ratio of the area of the water enclosed by the baselines 
to the area of land is between 1: 1 and 9:  1, and that the 
length  of the  baselines  does  not exceed  100 miles, The  Legal  Framework for Fisheries Management in  Papua  New Guinea 
except that up to 3% of the baselines drawn may be up 
to 125 miles in length. 
Under  the  interim  delimitation  of  archipelagic 
waters, under the National Seas Act a 'principal archi-
pelago', was  created consisting of the main  island of 
New  Guinea  and  all  the  fringing  islands,  including 
those of the Admiralty group, the Bismarcks, the North 
Solomons,  the  Trobriands,  the  Louisiades,  and  the 
O'Entrecasteaux;  and  the  Tauu  and  Nukumanu 
Islands archipelagoes, which are located north east of 
Bougainville and consist of small clusters of coral reef 
('Iow')  islands. Under the Law of the Sea Convention, 
the waters  enclosed within  the archipelagic  baseline 
are under the sovereignty of the archipelagic state, and 
have a status similar to the internal waters of a coastal 
state, except that innocent passage rights  have to  be 
accorded to foreign vessels (Article 52). 
The Continental Shelf (Living Natural Resources) 
(National  Seas)  Act  1977  and  the  Petroleum 
(Submerged  Lands)  (National  Seas)  Act  1977 
amended  the  respective  principal  acts  by  redefining 
Papua New  Guinea's continental shelf jurisdiction so 
as  to  correspond  with  the  'offshore  seas'  concept 
embodied  in  the  National  Seas  Act  As  a  result, 
irrespective of the actual dimensions of the continental 
shelf, exploitation of the living and non  living resources 
of the seabed and subsoil now come under Papua New 
Guinea national jurisdiction, for those areas of seabed 
and subsoil which underlie internal waters, the territo-
rial sea, and the offshore seas 'to a depth not exceeding 
200 m,  or beyond  that limit,  to  a  depth  where  the 
superjacent waters  admit of the  exploitation  of  the 
natural resources of that area'. 1 As a full 200 mile zone 
for  Papua New  Guinea overlaps  with  the  territorial 
waters  and/or  exclusive  economic  zones/fisheries 
zones  of Australia  to  the  south,  Micronesia  to  the 
north, and Solomon Islands to the east, delimitations 
are therefore necessary, and have been undertaken in 
relation to Australia. 
The legislation 
In terms of a national regime in the strict sense, Papua 
New  Guinea  regulates  marine  resource  extraction 
through  a  number of separate acts  and regulations 
I The 200 mile isobath limit and the exploitability test are drawn 
from the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf. 
rather than an omnibus fisheries  law. The acts are (j) 
the Fisheries Act (Cap  214); (ii)  the Continental Shelf 
(Living  Natural  Resources)  Act (Cap  210);  (Hi)  the 
Whaling  Act  (Cap  225);  (iv)  the  Tuna  Resources 
Management  Act (Cap  224);  and  (v)  the  Fisheries 
(Torres  Strait  Protected  Zone)  Act  The  relevant 
aspects of the legislation are described briefly below. 
The Fisheries Act 
This Act has territorial as well as extra-territorial appli-
cation. In  the territorial sense, and to the extent that 
the Papua New Guinea fishing zone or declared fishing 
zone can be regarded as a part of Papua New Guinea 
territory,  the  Fisheries  Act  applies  to  all  persons 
(including  foreigners)  and  to  all  boats  (including 
foreign  boats)  provided  that these entities are within 
the declared  fishing  zone or in  internal waters  (S.2). 
The declared fishing zone itself is  determined by  the 
Head  of  State,  acting  on  advice  from  the  relevant 
authorities,  with  its  extent defined  or set out in  the 
National Gazette (S.l(2)) The declared area includes all 
or part of what is described as the offshore seas. With 
or without explicit declaration, the territorial sea itself 
is  regarded as an integral part of the declared fishing 
zone (S.l (3)) 
Extra-territorial application of the Fisheries Act is 
based on the notion of nationality. The Act states that 
all  Papua New  Guinea  boats,  in  waters  other than 
Papua  New  Guinea  waters,  are  regulated  by  the 
Fisheries  Act as  are  all  persons  on  such  boats,  all 
persons who have dealings with such boats, or have any 
relevant relationship to such boats, or persons dealing 
with  them. The concept of a Papua New Guinea boat 
itself is defined in the following terms: 
Papua New Guinea boat means a boat the operations 
of which are based on a place in the country and that 
is wholly owned by a natural person who is a resident 
of,  or by  a  company  incorporated  in,  the country, 
being a boat that 
(a)  was built in the country; or 
(b)  has  been  lawfully  imported  into  the  country, 
otherwise than for a limited period; or 
(c)  has been sold, or otherwise disposed  of,  in  the 
country  after  having  been  forfeited  or  distrained 
under an Act or, before Independence Day, an Act of 
Australia (S.l). 
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The Fisheries Act however,  does not regulate the 
parts of the Torres Strait regulated  by  the Fisheries 
(Torres Strait Protected Zone) Act i984. 
The Continental Shelf  (Living Natural Resources) Act 
The jurisdictional reach of this Act is detennined by a 
combination  of  geographical,  geological,  biological, 
vessel  nationality and  resource  use criteria. The Act 
itself at Section 1 defines continental shelf as follows: 
'continental shelf means the seabed and subsoil 
(a)  underlying  the waters  between  the  high  water 
lines and the baselines; and 
(b)  underlying the territorial sea; and 
(cl  adjacent  to  the  coasts  of  Papua  New  Guinea 
which  underlies  the  offshore  seas  to  a  depth  not 
exceeding 200 m  or,  beyond  that limit to  a  depth 
where the superjacent waters admit the exploitation 
of the natural resources of that area. 
As can be seen, the geographical/geological criteria 
for delimiting the outer extent of the shelf are a combi-
nation of the distance criterion and the exploitability 
criterion. Papua New Guinea has chosen this combina-
tion over the notion of natural prolongation. 
The Continental Shelf Act applies  to  all  persons, 
including foreigners, and to all ships, including foreign 
ships,  which  are  in  the  continental  shelf area. The 
stated geographical exception is  in  respect of the area 
governed  by  the  Fisheries  (Torres  Strait  Protected 
Zone) Act The biological basis for exercising jurisdic-
tion  under the  Continental Shelf Act is  through  the 
minister's  power  to  declare  that  an  organism  is  a 
sedentary organism to which the Act applies. Such an 
organism must be a marine organism which fonns part 
of the living natural resources of the continental shelf, 
and must belong to a  sedentary species. Exemptions 
from  the status of regulated sedentary organism  may 
be made by the minister in relation to specific kinds of 
organism  in  a  specified  part of the shelf area.  Such 
notice  removes  the  category  of organism  from  the 
operation  of the  Act  until  such  time  as  the  notice 
expires  or is  revoked.  To  date,  crustacea,  molluscs, 
trochus and beche-de-mer have  been declared to  be 
exempted  sedentary  organisms,  and  are  currently 
regulated by the Fisheries Act 
The Continental Shelf Act does not apply  to  the 
taking of sedentary organisms by a citizen or ordinarily 
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resident  noncitizen  where  the organism  is  taken  for 
consumption,  sport  or  pleasure,  and  is  clearly  not 
intended for sale or manufacture. Traditional fishing is 
also excepted from  the operation of the Act. A further 
exemption from  the Act applies where the minister is 
satisfied that a ship operating in  an area of the shelf is 
being used  for,  or is  to  be used for,  marine scientific 
research, in a context where infonnation, or adequate 
information, does not already exist. 
The Whaling Act 
This Act  has jurisdictional effect through  nationality, 
territorial  and  resource  use  connection  with  Papua 
New Guinea. Any ship or aircraft is deemed to be under 
the whaling jurisdiction of Papua New  Guinea if  it  is 
registered in  Papua New  Guinea; or if it  is  within  the 
territorial  limits  of Papua New  Guinea and  is  not a 
public ship or aircraft of a country other than Papua 
New Guinea that is  not employed for the purposes of 
whaling or in other commercial operations (S.l (2)) This 
negatively  fonnulated  definition  ensures a  very  wide 
application  of the  Act  especially,  since,  in  the  first 
instance, 'ship' is  defined widely to include 'every kind 
of vessel' (S.l) Effectively then, the only exceptions from 
jurisdiction  under the  Whaling Act are  government 
owned and operated ships. 
The  Whaling Act also  operates  extra-territorially, 
applying without distinction within and outside Papua 
New Guinea, and to all waters, whether or not they are 
Papua New  Guinea  waters.  However,  the  powers  of 
control conferred on the minister by the Act are to be 
exercised  extra-territorially  (Le.  as  an  enforcement 
power over the taking or killing of whales) only to the 
extent that would  be  necessary to give  effect  to  the 
international  Whaling  Conventions as  if  Papua New 
Guinea  were  in  fact  a  contracting  state  to  these 
Conventions. Thus,  although  widely  fonnulated,  the 
jurisdictional power under the  Whaling Act which  is 
likely  to  be exercised does not go beyond the agreed 
understandings of the International Whaling Conven-
tions framework (IUCN 1982). 
The Tuna Resources Management  Act 
This Act makes special provisions for tuna harvesting and 
fonnalises  a  special  regime created for  accredited  tuna 
processors  in  1982.  The  Act  establishes  a  Tuna 
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the head of the Fisheries Department officers appointed 
entirely at the discretion of the minister, and representa-
tives appointed by tile minister from  any of the commer-
cial  tuna fishing companies in  Papua New Guinea The 
task of tile Advisory Committee is to advise the minister 
on the following matters (S.80l)): 
- the total sustainable yield  of tuna in  the offshore 
seas; 
- the proposed levels  of tuna catch  in  the offshore 
seas; 
- the licensing of vessels to take tuna in the offshore 
seas; 
- any  other  aspects  of  resources  management 
relevant to the development and efficient operation 
of the Papua New Guinea tuna fishing industry. 
In  making  its  recommendations,  the  Advisory 
Committee is expected to pay attention to the following 
matters (S.8(1)): 
- the need to  promote the operational efficiency of 
the Papua New Guinea tuna fishing industry within 
the broad assessment imposed by: 
the assessment of total sustainable yield of tuna from 
the offshore seas; 
the commitments of the  country  under any  agree-
ments with the state as to tuna fishing in the offshore 
seas. 
- the past perfonnance of applicants for licences to 
take tuna in the offshore seas. 
Fisheries (Torres Strait Protected  Zone)  Act 1984 
Fishing in  the Torres Strait is  regulated by the Torres 
Strait  Treaty  between  Australia  and  Papua  New 
Guinea. The Torres Strait Treaty creates  the Torres 
Strait Protected Zone, in which each country exercises 
sovereign  jurisdiction  over  swimming  fish  and 
sedentary species on the respective sides of the agreed 
jurisdiction  lines.  In  so far  as fisheries  is  concemed, 
Papua  New  Guinea  implements  the  Torres  Strait 
Treaty through the Fisheries  (Torres  Strait Protected 
Zone) Act 1984 supplemented by the Fisheries (Torres 
Strait Protected Zone) Regulations 1987. 
Two  types  of fisheries  are  envisaged  within  the 
Torres Strait Protected Zone:  traditional fishing  and 
commercial  fishing  which  the  Treaty  describes  as 
'Protected Zone commercial fisheries'. In practice there 
is  increasing interconnection between the two catego-
ries. Traditional fishing which can only be undertaken 
by  traditional  inhabitants  falls  under  unilateral 
sovereign jurisdiction. Measures  to  implement Treaty 
obligations  relating  to  traditional  fishing  are  prima 
facie the preserve of each state. Under Article 22 of the 
Treaty,  commercial  fisheries  fall  either  under  joint 
management or unilateral management depending on 
the type of fishery.  Those commercial fisheries which 
Australia and Papua New Guinea have so far agreed to 
jointly  manage  in  the  zone  are:  prawns,  Spanish 
mackerel, pearl shell, tropical rock lobster, dugong and 
turtle. Papua New Guinea thus has unilateral jurisdic-
tion  over traditional fishing and all  other commercial 
fisheries,  as  for  example tuna fisheries,  to  the extent 
that such fisheries are commercially viable in the area. 
Regulation by species, stock or 
resource type 
An  increasingly accepted approach to fisheries regula-
tion is the regulation of a particular fishery, on the basis 
of species or stock type,  as a discrete unit within  the 
general regime; the Papua New Guinea regime shares 
elements of this approach. Thus, the legislation specifi-
cally identifies tuna fisheries (Tuna Resources Manage-
ment Act and  Fisheries  Act),  fisheries  for  sedentary 
organisms  (ConUnenlal  Shelf  Act)  and  whaling 
(Whaling Act), and deals with  each area in  a specific 
sense and to varying extents within the general scheme. 
In  the case of tuna, certain core species are identified. 
Since the legislation specifically defines the tenn 'tuna' 
to  mean  the  specified  subcategories  of  the  genus 
(skipjack  tuna, yellowfin  tuna,  albacore,  bigeye  tuna, 
mackerel tuna, or north em bluefin tuna), and nothing 
more, presumably no other types of tuna, or tuna-like 
fisheries are regulated. 
Whales are also defined in  a more or less specific 
sense (blue  whale,  fin  whale,  gray  whale,  humpback 
whale, right whale, sei whale or other baleen whale; or a 
spenn whale; or any other whale of a prescribed kind), 
suggesting that no other types of whale are intended to 
be regulated, unless specifically so prescribed. Presum-
ably, these fairly specific definitions reflect the fact that 
these species/types are known to exist in  Papua New 
Guinea waters and are regarded as requiring regulation 
for commercial or conservation reasons. 
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By  contrast, the term 'sedentary' organisms  is  not 
given exhaustive definition in  the relevant act Rather, 
the  authorities  prescribe  by  regulation  from  time  to 
time, which  categories  of organism  are  classified  as 
sedentary in character for the purpose of the laws. The 
term  'fish'  in  the  Fisheries  Act  also  has  a  broad 
meaning,  and  includes  turtles,  dugong,  crustacea, 
molluscs,  trochus,  and  beche-de-mer.  Whales  and 
sedentary organisms other than  crustacea,  molluscs, 
trochus,  and  beche-de-mer are  however  specifically 
excluded from the definition of fish. 
Regulation of  domestic and foreign fishing 
Another globally used approach to fisheries regulation 
is differentiating the foreign from the domestic or local 
sectors and having  clearly  demarcated  legal regimes 
applying to the different sectors. There may also be a 
special  regime  for  joint  ventures,  the  hybrid  fonn 
linking domestic and foreign  interests. Within each of 
these sectors there may then be further specific regula-
tion. Papua New Guinea does not as yet have a clearly 
specified  and/or  well  elaborated  distinctive  regime 
governing foreign fishing, though elements of the legis-
lative  scheme  in  the  Fisheries  Act and  the  Tuna 
Resources Management Act pay particular attention to 
foreign fishing. As yet there is no act titled, the 'Foreign 
Fishing Act', or the 'Domestic Fisheries Act'. 
Particular sections of a statute may deal with issues 
of traditional fishing, 2 or foreign fishing3 concentrating 
on a particular aspect of each process and dealing with 
it  as  a  specific  issue,  within  the  general  legislative 
scheme. Foreign fishing is  however not defined in any 
of the acts, although the  Fisheries Act at S.l defines 
'foreign  boat',  identifying  such  boats  as  'boats  other 
than a Papua New Guinea Boat'. Also, there is as yet no 
specific  legislation  governing joint venture  fishing  in 
Papua New  Guinea. Presumably, foreign  boats, once 
they  become registered  as Papua New  Guinea boats 
then  become subject to  the strictly domestic regime, 
unless specific  exemptions are stated as  applying  to 
such vessels. 
2 See discussion below for a definition of traditional fishing. 
3 See for instance S.  15 of the ContinenlBl Shelf  Act and ss. 12, 
15, and 16 of the Fisheries Act 
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A special regime for  foreign tuna fishing 
Because of its  importance within  the fisheries sector 
and  the  traditional  presence  of foreign  interests,  a 
special  regime  has  been  created  for  foreign  tuna 
fishing.  This  regime  can  be  found  in  (j)  the japan/ 
Papua  New Guinea  Fisheries Arrangement (although 
at the time of writing it was no longer in force); (ii) the 
Tuna  Resources Management Act and  (iii)  in  some 
sections of the Fisheries Act and the Fisheries (Torres 
Strait  Protected  Zone)  Act  dealing  with  capital 
intensive operations requiring special approval. 
According to Doulman (1987  C), the specific regula-
tion  of foreign  fishing  as a  distinct activity  has been 
achieved administratively. At least until the late 1980s, 
the procedure was to license all  foreign  fishing  boats 
involved in  the tuna industry under the same terms as 
were  operative  for  Japanese  tuna  boats  under  the 
Papua  New  Guinea/japan  Fisheries  Arrangement of 
1981  {as  subsequently amended}. By  1986, Filipino, 
American,  Korean,  Taiwanese  as  well  as  Japanese 
vessels  were  licensed  under this  agreement,  or had 
terms regulating them which were essentially based on 
the Papua New Guinea/japan Fisheries Arrangement 
The framework seemed, however, to have been appli-
cable to tuna fishing only, not all foreign fishing. 
During the period 1981-1987 the undermentioned 
terms  formed  the  key  elements  of  licensing  and 
fisheries  regulation  under  the  Papua  New  Guinea! 
Japan  framework.  Essentially  there  was  not  much 
difference  between  these  terms  and  the  broader 
arrangements  set  out  in  the  legislation  discussed 
above.4 
These terms were (Doulman 1987c): 
- licence applications were only allowed if the vessel 
was  in  good  standing  on  the  Forum  Fisheries 
Agency's Regional Register; 
- licence application had to be made, and had to be 
approved, with payment of a prescribed access fee, 
before  a  vessel  could  actually  enter the declared 
fishing zone; 
4 This arrangement is  no  longer in  force  but it  is  unclear the 
extent  to  which  it  currently  dominates  regulation  of  foreign 
fishing in the terms suggested by Doulman (l987c). The  Legal  Framework for Fisheries Management in  Papua  New Guinea 
- to  protect  the  interests  of  the  domestic  pole-
and-line fleet, foreign fishing vessels were excluded 
from  fishing  in  the  country's  territorial  seas  (Le. 
within  12 n  miles of the coastline) and in  certain 
other defined areas; 
- all  licensed  foreign  fishing  vessels  had to supply 
entry and exit  reports  to  the Papua New  Guinea 
Fisheries  Division  24 hours  in  advance  by  telex, 
notifying the precise position  and the quantity of 
fish on board in both exit and entry reports; 
- all licensed foreign fishing vessels engaged in active 
operations  had  to  report  their  positions  each 
Wednesday with information on the exact quantity 
of fish on board; 
- catch records had to be maintained on board and 
had to be signed and forwarded to the Papua New 
Guinea Director of Fisheries within 45 days of the 
completion of each fishing trip; 
- licensed vessels were required to display their inter-
national call sign on top of their vessels, with vessel 
names printed in  English on the bow and stem of 
the vessel, and Papua New Guinea registration had 
to be displayed on both sides of the wheelhouse; 
- licensed vessels were licensed for a period of two to 
four months; 
- foreign fishing vessel owners and companies had to 
establish  local  agents  to  facilitate  licensing  and 
reduce administrative costs; and 
- fees paid by vessel owners were linked to prevailing 
tuna prices as obtained from  the leading Japanese 
ports,  and were  in  turn  related  to  the estimated 
quantity and species of tuna harvested. 
Under  amending  legislation  passed  in  1982,  a 
special regime was created for accredited tuna proces-
sors. The species of tuna to which this section applies 
are skipjack tuna, yellowfin tuna, albacore tuna, bigeye 
tuna, mackerel tuna and northern bluefin tuna. Under 
this framework, a person may enter into an agreement 
to set up a facility for processing raw tuna. The entity 
may  then  apply  for  recognition  as  an  accredited 
processor.  This  status  is  granted  provided  that  the 
plant satisfies health and safety criteria,  is  capable at 
conception of processing up to 30 tonnes of raw tuna 
per day and can be expanded over a  period of nine 
years to over 80 tonnes of raw tuna per day. It should 
also  have  appropriate  storage,  handling,  loining, 
canning  and  quality  control  facilities  (Fisheries  Act 
S.188(2)). 
An accredited processor is granted the further right, 
subject to  the  Tuna  Resources Management Act to 
request a sufficient number and class of licences as will 
allow  the  processor to  harvest  the amounts of tuna 
appropriate to the quantity requirements of the proces-
sor's  establishment.  The  final  provision  also  has 
relevance  for  tuna  harvesting,  as  an  accredited 
processor may  also  be given  rights  to  purchase raw 
tuna from  any  persons as  may  be  prescribed  by  the 
minister. 
These provisions are clearly intended to help create 
a  domestic  tuna  canning  industry  in  Papua  New 
Guinea  They  would  also  serve  as  a  reasonable 
framework for the establishment of joint ventures. It is 
not clear the extent to which the needs of accredited 
processors would be, or have been given, priority in the 
allocation of licences and fishing  rights  in  the Papua 
New  Guinea declared  fishing  zone. The potential for 
priority allocations clearly exists however under S.l8C 
of the Fisheries Act 
Regulation of  traditional fishing 
An  increasing  trend  in  fisheries  management 
worldwide is  the recognition of traditional fishing as a 
distinct form of fishing activity. This trend is reflected in 
Papua New Guinea legislation. The Fisheries Act the 
Continental Shelf  Act and the Fisheries (Torres Strait 
Protected Zone) Act all refer to traditional fishing and 
attempt to provide  a  definition  of traditional  fishing. 
The Whaling Act  does not contain a definition of tradi-
tional fishing.  At  first  glance, this suggests that tradi-
tional  or  indigenous  hunting  for  whales  is  not 
recognised  in  Papua New  Guinea,  and/or does  not 
have an exempt status. However, the Fisheries (Torres 
Strait  Protected  Zone)  Act regulates  the  taking  of 
dugong, a marine mammal the hunting for which is an 
established activity in the Torres Strait region. 
Under the Fisheries Act and the Continental Shelf 
Act traditional fishing  is  defined as fishing by  natives 
where: 
- the  fish  or sedentary  organisms  are  taken  in  a 
manner that,  as regards the boat,  the equipment 
and  the  method  used,  the  overall  process  is 
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substantially in  accordance with  the traditions of 
the indigenous inhabitants of Papua New  Guinea; 
and 
- the catch is  landed in  Papua New Guinea by  the 
boat undertaking the fishing; or alternatively 
- may  be  transshipped  to  another vessel  with  the 
permission of the minister. 
The Fisheries  (Torres  Strait Protected Zone) Act 
does not use the notion of native  in  its  definition  of 
traditional fishing.  Instead, the focus  is  on 'traditional 
inhabitants' and traditional fishing  is  defined  as  'the 
taking' of marine resources by  traditional inhabitants 
for their own or dependants consumption or for use in 
the course of other traditional activities. These marine 
resources can be taken from the sea, seabed, estuaries 
and coastal tidal  area, and may  include  dugong and 
turtle. Thus, in the Torres Strait Protected Zone, fishing 
for some marine mammals is permitted for traditional 
uses. 
Regulation by means of  prohibitions and 
permission 
Fundamental  aspects  of  the  regulation  of  marine 
resource  extraction  in  Papua  New  Guinea  are  the 
concepts of (j) activities prohibited by the responsible 
minister; and (ii)  activities specifically permitted by the 
same minister, the permitted activity being a licensed 
activity, with the licence granted at the discretion of the 
minister. 
Prohibited activities 
All  the fisheries-related acts described above envisage 
that the minister may prohibit a number of activities by 
notice  in  the National Gazette (Fisheries Act Conti-
nental Shelf  Act and Whaling Act). These prohibitions 
may  relate  to  size,  period,  kind,  fishing  method, 
equipment, area, vessel,  quantity, category of person, 
type of fish  processing and type of fish  transshipment 
process. The prohibitions may be absolute in character, 
or  may  be  limited.  Where  there  are  limitations  or 
exemptions  from  the  prohibition,  such  permitted 
activity may  be subject to conditions, which are to  be 
specified  in  the  relevant  notice.  None  of  the  acts 
provide any process of appeal or challenge in  relation 
to  the  exercise  of these  powers  of  prohibition.  The 
power  to  prohibit  a  wide  range  of activities  is  thus 
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clearly fundamental to the Papua New Guinea fisheries 
regime, as is the power to license otherwise prohibited 
activity. 
Permitted activities 
The licence  is  the principal  legal  instrument author-
ising activity which would otherwise be prohibited. All 
three  acts  envisage  that  the  minister  may  grant  a 
licence, or a class of licence to both natural and artifi-
cial persons. This  permission  may  be for  use in  any 
area of waters, notwithstanding that notices of prohibi-
tion  may  in  fact  apply  to such waters. The licensing 
process  is  entirely  discretionary,  and  for  fisheries 
generally,  follows  the  procedure  outlined  in  the 
Fisheries  Regulations. This involves  applications,  the 
payment of a range of fees, and the provision of a range 
of  specified  information  (see  the  Schedules  to  the 
Fisheries Regulations). 
Under  the  Fisheries  Regulations,  three  types  of 
licences can be applied for. These are a fishing licence 
which attaches rights to the person only; a fishing boat 
licence; and a factory boat/ship licence. There seems to 
be no separate procedure for licensing aircraft under 
the Fisheries Act Under the Whaling Act licences may 
be granted to both ships and/or aircraft to operate as 
whale-catchers in Papua New Guinea waters. Addition-
ally,  licences to operate factory ships, or land factories 
may also be granted. The licence categories under the 
Continental Shelf Act are similar to those under the 
Fisheries  Act:  licences  attach  to  persons  (fishing 
licences, divers  licences)  and can also  be granted to 
vessels or ships. 
Finally,  and  this  is  of  particular  importance  for 
foreign fishing interests, there are those sections of the 
Fisheries  Act which  establish  'special  provisions  for 
major operations' (S.7). A major operation is a venture 
where in  the view of the minister, the capital value of 
the  investment  proposed  and any  associated  opera-
tions exceeds, or may exceed, K250000. In such a case, 
the  minister  is  obliged  to  refer  the  matter  to  the 
country's National  Executive Council  before granting 
or refusing the application. Submission to the National 
Executive Council may also occur at the discretion of 
the minister, even though the sum is not K250000 or 
above. This provision aside, the minister dominates the 
fisheries  management  and  access  control  process 
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the  recommendations  of  the  i\dvisol)'  Commitlee 
under the 'flma Resources Management Act,  and the 
requirements of S.6i\ and S. 20i\ of the Fisheries Ad 
Endorsement of  conditions on licences 
L'nder all the acts, the minister may endorse conditions 
on the licence. These conditions may speci!)' a range of 
restrictions or permit aclivity which would otilelwise be 
prohibited  under  tile  system  of general  prohibitions 
described  above.  ~otable pennissions in  this  ca tego I)' 
under both the Continental Shelf/kt (S.7(S)(b)) and the 
Fisheries  Act (S.6(4)(b))  include  the  right  for  licensed 
non  traditional (i.e. larger commercial vessels) to haul in 
and  receive  catch  acquired  by  'traditional  fishing' 
methods, a practice otherwise strictly prohibited. 
Duration and  transfer of  licences 
Licence duration may VCll)', ranging from  three to four 
months to five  years. The five-year licence is,  however, 
peculiar to  the  Whaling ,let. i\ register of licences  is 
also  envisaged  under all  the acts,  although  it  is  not 
clear the extent to which it  is  intended to be a public 
register.  Licence  transfer  is  only  allowed  with  the 
permission of the minister, and may be subject to a fee. 
Where  the  minister  approves  licence  transfer,  a 
memorandum of the transfer is  to be endorsed on the 
licence.  There  is  a  specified  fonnat  for  the  licence 
register which  is  set out at Form  7  of the  Fisheries 
Regulations. 
Financial aspects of  licensing 
A range of fees  may  be  required  under all  the acts. 
Under  the  Fisheries  Act  these  are  the  Fishennan's 
Licensing Fee, the Boat Licensing Fee and an Opera-
tional  Fee.  The  latter  involves  substantial  amounts, 
whilst the first  two  are relatively nominal and may be 
refunded  if  the  application  is  refused.  Securities  or 
bonds may also be required of licensees. Although only 
the  Whaling Act states  this  obligation  in  legislative 
terms (S.6(S)), such a requirement may also be imposed 
under the general powers relating to  licensing condi-
tions under the Fisheries Act  and the Con tin en lal Shelf 
Act 
Cancellation and  suspension of  licences 
The minister has a broad power to cancel any and all 
licences issued under the three principal statutes. The 
stated justifications for  cancellation are (j)  where  the 
holder of Cl  licence under any of the three acts contra-
venes a condition of the licence and/or fails  to comply 
with a condition of the licence; and (iil where the holder 
of a licence has been convicled of an offence under the 
relevant act.  In  the case of the Fisheries Act and the 
Continental Shelf Act the power to  cancel  a  licence 
may also be exercised where the offender has contra-
vened tile provisions of the other acL 
The Whaling Act links the lodgment of a bond or a 
security to the power to cancel a licence. The minister 
may cancel a licence if a licensee fails to provide a satis-
faclol)' security when asked to do so. [n contrast under 
the  Fisheries  ,lct  and  the  Continental  Shelf Act, 
licences may be suspended (j) as a sanction and (ij) as a 
management  mea<;ure.  Where  the  suspension  is 
undertaken as a management mea<;ure, the minister is 
required to write to the licensee specifying this facl and 
the period dllling which  there is  to  be a  suspension. 
The legislation does not state that any compensation is 
to  be  paid  to  a  licensee  during  such  period  of 
inadvertent suspension. Should the issue of compensa-
tion arise, an essential matter for detennination would 
be  the extent to  which  the  minister, the licensee or 
external  factors  are  responsible  for  the  conditions 
requiring suspension of the licence. 
Under both the Fisheries Act and the Continental 
Shelf  Act, suspension of licences as a sanction may be 
undertaken  on  the  following  grounds:  (j)  where  the 
minister has reasonable grounds to suspect that there 
has been a contravention of, or a failure to, comply with 
licence conditions; and (iil  provided that the minister 
has  not previously  issued  a  suspension  against  the 
licensee on those specific grounds. 
The procedure is  that suspension notices must be 
in writing, and may be revoked at any time, before they 
expire. Suspension notices cease to have effect in  two 
ways.  First they cease to have effect immediately after 
the completion of legal proceedings against a licensee, 
provided  that  the  proceedings  themselves  were 
initiated within  one month after the licence suspen-
sion. In all other cases, however, suspensions lapse one 
month  after  the  period  stated  on  the  suspension 
notice, although they may,  and will  usually, be specifi-
cally terminated by order of the minister on the appro-
priate date or soon thereafter. 
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Licence  cancellation  and  suspension  under  the 
Whaling Act involves less elaborate procedures. Essen-
tially,  there is  no stated power to suspend a whaling 
licence.  Cancellation  of  a  licence  may,  however  be 
effected on the grounds that a licence condition has 
been breached or has not been complied with, or the 
licensee has been convicted of an offence against the 
Act 
Determination of  allowable level of  fishing 
For fisheries regulated by the Fisheries Act an essential 
precondition  for  licensed  foreign  activity,  and  also 
presumably for determining what is to be prohibited, is 
the determination by  the Papua New Guinea authori-
ties, of what is to be an allowable level  of fishing. The 
concept of allowable level  of fishing is drawn from  the 
text of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (Article 61). 
The  factors  the  minister  is  required  to  take  into 
account are: 
- whether such states have  cooperated with  Papua 
New Guinea in, and made substantial contributions 
to, the development of Papua New Guinea's fishing 
industry,  fishery  research  and  identification  of 
fishing resources; 
- any rights of a reciprocal nature granted to Papua 
New Guinea nationals or boats by such states; 
- whether such states have  cooperated with  Papua 
New Guinea in enforcement and with respect to the 
conservation and management of fishing resources; 
- whether, and to what extent, the fishing vessels of 
such  states  have  traditionally  engaged  in  such 
fishing; 
- such other matters as the minister, in consultation 
with  the  minister  responsible  for  foreign  affairs, 
deems appropriate. 
The Fisheries Act also  requires  that the  minister 
should have regard to a number of other factors when 
exercising powers under and in  relation to the Act,  to 
the extent that those powers are exercised with respect 
to any part of  the declared fishing zone which is beyond 
the internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial 
sea These factors  are:  (j)  application  to  the  fishing 
process of the principle of optimum sustainable yield; 
and  (ii)  consideration  of any  relevant  international 
obligations of Papua New Guinea, or applicable rules of 
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international law, affecting or relating to the exercise of 
Papua New  Guinea jurisdiction  in  any section of the 
zone. 
Enforcement of Papua New 
Guinea's fisheries regime 
Enforcement of fisheries laws and regulations refers to 
the  totality  of the  processes  by  which  the  relevant 
fisheries  laws  and  regulations  are  made effective.  In 
essence, fisheries enforcement is an ensemble of activi-
ties designed to compel obedience to fisheries laws and 
regulations. It  requires, and has come increasingly to 
involve,  an  elaborate  network  of institutions,  rules, 
procedures and specialised personnel. 
International law currently accepts the proposition 
that the right to  enforce fisheries  laws  is  a sovereign 
power exercisable by the coastal state. This power is an 
essential  part  of  the  widely  accepted  resource  or 
exclusive economic jurisdiction that coastal states may 
exercise within the 200 n mile zone. This power can be 
exercised against foreign and domestic vessels and can 
be  exercised  in  different ways  as  between  these two 
classes of fishing interests. As far as currently operative 
international law is concerned, Articles 73 and 62(4)(k) 
of the Law  of the Sea Convention provide the broad 
parameters within which  the enforcement of fisheries 
sector laws  and  regulations  is  expected  to  proceed. 
Article 73 provides that: 
1.  The  Coastal  State  may,  in  the  exercise  of  its 
sovereign  rights  to  explore,  exploit,  conserve  and 
manage  the  living  resources  in  the  exclusive 
economic  zone,  take  such  measures,  including 
boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings, 
as may be necessary to ensure compliance with  the 
laws and regulations adopted by it in conformity with 
this Convention. 
2.  Arrested vessels and their crews shall be promptly 
released  upon  the  posting  of  reasonable  bond  or 
other security. 
3.  Coastal State penalties for violations of fisheries 
laws and regulations in  the exclusive economic zone 
may  not include  imprisonment,  in  the  absence  of 
agreements to the contrary by the States concerned, 
or any other form of corporal punishment 
4.  In  cases of arrest or detention of foreign vessels 
the Coastal State shall promptly notify the Flag State, 
through  appropriate  channels  of  the  action  taken 
and of any penalties subsequently imposed. The  Legal  Framework for Fisheries Management in  Papua  New Guinea 
In  practical terms, the core elements of a fisheries 
enforcement system are (Anderson 1989): 
- structures and procedures for monitoring so as to 
identify rule breakers; 
- structures and procedures to ensure prosecution of 
alleged rule breakers so as to ascertain innocence 
or guilt; 
- structures  and  procedures  for  assessing  and 
imposing penalties when guilt is proven. 
The fisheries enforcement process has a number of 
purposes beyond rule enforcement. in the sense of rule 
enforcement to protect stocks and safeguard national 
or wider regional  economic interests in  the resource. 
The  secondary  functions  often  include  serving  as  a 
feedback mechanism for evaluating management strat-
egies and also for monitoring the internal distribution 
mechanisms in  use by  national or regional  organisa-
tions.  In  terms of  man~ement feedback,  the  intelli-
gence gathered on catch rates and on concentrations 
of fishing effort is  also useful in  at least hvo senses: it 
assists short-term decision-making on deployment of 
enforcement  resources,  but  more  crucially  it  can 
provide  firm  grounding  for  future  management 
decisions. This is particularly so where the information 
generated by  the enforcement system  pays  informed 
attention  to  differentiation  by  nationality  and/or 
vessel!  gear type. 
Papua  New  Guinea's  fisheries  jurisdiction  is 
enforced jointly by the Defence Force and the fisheries 
departments (Bergin  1988). The Papua New  Guinea 
Defence Force has established a surveillance centre in 
Port Moresby staffed by officers from  the departments 
of Defence,  Fisheries,  Customs,  Transport and  Civil 
Aviation. In  practice, fisheries enforcement officials  in 
Papua  New  Guinea  are  drawn  from  four  sources: 
members of the Police Force; members of the Defence 
Force; officers or employees of the Public Service; and 
officers or employees of a Papua New Guinea statutory 
authority. In  the case of the last two categories, there 
has to be written authorisation empowering the person 
to perform duties under the relevant act 
Authorised officers  have  a  wide  range of powers, 
including  powers  in  relation  to  the  inspection  and 
examination of fishing vessels, and vehicles/premises 
used in the fishing industry, as well as those capable of 
use in the fishing industry, or found in the fishing zone 
or the shelf area. 
Enforcement  officers  may  also  exercise  a  wide 
range of directive powers over directors and crews  of 
vessels: 
- Where they think an offence is  in  issue, they may 
a<;k the person in charge of a boat to bring the boat 
to a specified place in  the country. (It  is,  however, 
not stated what the phrase 'a place in  the country' 
means,  and whether  it  refers  to  places  on  land. 
ports or places at sea). They may  also require the 
person in charge to keep the boat at that place until 
permission  to  leave  is  given.  They  may  detain  a 
director and crew  in  this  way.  prior to  judicial or 
administrative sanctioning, and during the course 
of such sanctioning processes. 
- Where the boat is  a  licensed vessel,  they may ask 
the person in  charge of the vessel  to produce the 
licence for the boat, and may take copies or extracts 
from the licence. 
- Where the boat is  a  licensed vessel,  they may ask 
the person  in  charge of the boat for  information 
concerning the crew and any other person on board 
the boat 
- Where the boat is  a vessel  for which  a  licence is 
required,  they  may  ask  the  name  and  place  of 
abode of a person on board the boat. 
- Where the boat is not licensed, or is not licensable, 
but is nevertheless engaged in fishing, they may ask 
the name and place of abode of a  person on the 
vessel. 
- Where a person is engaged in fishing, they may ask 
the person whether they are licensed to fish,  and if 
so, to produce the licence. 
- Where  they  have  reason  to  believe  a  person  is 
committing an offence, they may ask that person to 
state his or her name and place of abode, and may 
arrest that person without a warrant. 
The powers in  relation to direct control of vessels 
are  also  broad.  Where  an  offence  is  in  issue,  the 
enforcement power also pennits officials to take direct 
control of a boat. and remain in  control of such boat, 
prior to judicial  or administrative sanctioning proce-
dures,  or  during  such  processes,  regardless  of  the 
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presence of a director or crew. Also worthy of nole are 
the power lo seize vessels, equipment and fish  where 
an offence is  in  issue; the power lo sell seized fish  or 
sedentary organisms; and the right to enter and search 
lhe premises of accrediled luna processors. 
In  sum  total,  the  powers  given  to  Papua  New 
Guinea enforcement officers are the traditional police 
powers of the right to board, enter, inspecL search and 
examine vessels, vehicles, premises or places used  for 
fishing,  or capable  of being  used  for  fishing. These 
powers may be exercised: 
- to assess whether the Fisheries Act or the Conti-
nental Shelf  Act are being complied wilh; 
- where an authorised officer  has reason to  believe 
evidence of an offence may  be found  through the 
exercise of the power; or 
- where the officer merely believes that the vessel has 
previously been used,  is  actually  being used,  or is 
intended  to  be  used  for  fishing  or the  taking of 
marine organisms. 
The legislation  provides  that these police  powers 
may  be  exercised  where  the  officer  'has  reason  to 
believe' that there is (j) the continuing performance of a 
prohibited  act;  (ij)  its  previous  performance;  (iij)  its 
intended perfonnance; or (iv) the threat of its perform-
ance. 
The  enforcement  systems  adopted  by  a  coastal 
state must satisfy a number of criteria to be economi-
cally useful to these states. Such systems must show all 
or most of these characteristics: 
- effectiveness in  apprehending violators of relevant 
prescriptions; 
- fairness to those affected; 
- reasonableness in impact upon regulated and other 
activities; 
- acceptability  to  the states and others concerned; 
and 
- economy in resources utilised or required. 
Translated into practical policy  questions, coastal 
state  policymakers  have  to  consider  the  following 
matters in designing fisheries enforcement policy: 
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- the  level  of resources  that should  reasonably  be 
devoted  to  the  enforcement  of  fishing  laws  and 
management systems; 
- the most appropriate enforcement philosophy to be 
adopted within the level of resources available; 
- the  relative  value  in  tenns  of  deterrence  of  (a) 
surveillance operations (b) sanctioning procedures; 
- the  best balance of effort as  between air, sea and 
land based enforcement procedures; 
- whether  enforcement  should  be  carried  out  by 
military or civilian agencies; 
- whether fishing offences should be classified  as a 
fonn of economic crime; 
- whether  fishing  offences  should  be  dealt  with 
through administrative or judicial procedures; 
- the  scope  available  for  increased  international 
cooperation  (a)  with  other coastal  states  in  the 
region,  (b)  with  the  flag  states  of access-seeking 
fishing  enterprises  and  (c)  with  and  through  the 
various marine sector international organisations; 
- the balance in  the enforcement process between 
strict legal  procedure, diplomacy and relations of 
pure power given  that international relations may 
often  be  implicated  in  a  routine  enforcement 
exercise; 
- whether  the  enforcement  system  as  a  whole 
conforms with international law. 
Conclusion 
Papua New Guinea stands to gain economically from 
the new regime of fisheries pennitted by international 
law. However, it is not sufficient to declare an extended 
zone of maritime jurisdiction or make proclamations 
asserting  marine  resource  jurisdiction.  To  achieve 
maximum economic benefits from the zone a number 
of management policy initiatives need to be taken. One 
of  the  most  significant  policy  questions  relates  to 
enforcement  of  fisheries  jurisdiction.  These  policy 
questions are yet to be addressed by the authorities in 
Papua New Guinea. Given  the growing significance of 
the fisheries sector in Papua New Guinea's economy, it 
is  crucial that these policy issues are carefully consid-
ered. Papua New Guinea has also not yet ratified the The  Legal  Framework for Fisheries Management in  Papua  New Guinea 
Law of the Sea Convention which is the definitive legal 
basis for fisheries jurisdiction at the present time. Some 
of  the  provisions  of Papua  New  Guinea's  fisheries 
sector legislation would appear to be contraI)l to the 
current  rules  pennitted  by  international  law.  Papua 
~ew Guinea  would  need  to  carefully  consider  the 
question of ratification of the Law of the Sea Conven-
tion. Before that is done, a thorough evaluation of the 
fisheries laws in  tenns of compatibility with the Law of 
the Sea Convention regime will be required. 
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16 
The  Use  of  Logbook  Data  in 
Monitoring Catch Rates: a Comparison 
of  the  U.S.,  Korean  and  Taiwanese 
Purse  Seine  Fleets  in  Papua  New 
Guinea 1983-1990 
H.F.  Camp  bell 
H.  Landu 
R.B. Nicholl 
Introduction 
The  activities  of foreign  tuna  purse  seine  fleets  in 
Papua New  Guinea's  exclusive  economic  zone from 
nations other than Japan or the United States have, in 
the past, represented a relatively minor contribution to 
the overall level of tuna fishing activity. During the late 
1980s,  however,  Korea  and  Taiwan  showed  an 
increased interest in  Papua  T ew  Guinea waters as a 
source of tunas for their purse seine vessels. As vessel 
design and technology of these fleets parallel those of 
the American and Japanese fleets,  it  is  of interest for 
Papua  New  Guinea  to  know  how  the  Korean  and 
Taiwanese  fleets  compare with  those  of the  United 
States  and Japan  in  terms  of  behaviour  and  catch 
efficiency. Access fee  negotiations will  be facilitated by 
information  about  whether  Korean  and  Taiwanese 
vessels experience similar catch rates to vessels of like 
technology but operating under other flags. 
Fees for  access  to  Papua New  Guinea's exclusive 
economic zone are levied on a per trip basis. The fee is 
set so as to collect 6% of the gross value of the expected 
catch during an average trip. Since the access fee  paid 
by an individual vessel is not related to the actual catch 
of the vessel, but rather to its expected catch as deter-
mined by  vessel  size,  there is  no incentive for  under-
reporting of catch on an individual vessel basis. There 
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may  be  an  incentive  to  underreport  on  a  fleel:\vide 
basis, however, since Papua New Guinea uses reported 
catches to estimate the value of the average catch per 
trip. 
Medley (1991 b) has analysed individual vessel data 
in  the  South  Pacific  Commission  data base  for  the 
period  1979-1990  to  look  for  evidence  of  under-
reporting effort or catch. He  bases his analysis on the 
proportion of a purse seiner's storage capacity which is 
filled at the end of a trip. He finds that most U.S. vessels 
report a full  hold, whereas a high proportion of Korean 
and Taiwanese vessels report a small proportion of the 
hold  filled.  The  present  study  looks  at  fleet-wide 
averages and compares the catches of the U.S., Korean 
and Taiwanese fleets  at various  times  and in  variolls 
subzones of Papua New Guinea's exclusive economic 
zone in the period 1983-1990. 
Background 
The  purse  seine  technique  of tuna  harvesting  was 
developed  by  U.s.  fishers  who  used  it  initially  in  the 
eastern  Pacific  and  then  in  the  central  and western 
Pacific. It was  not until  nearly 30 years  later, around 
1960, that the Japanese started  building purse seine 
vessels of their own with a view  to developing distant 
water fishing  grounds in  the Asia-Pacific  region. The original Japanese vessels were modelled on U.S.  purse 
seine  technology  (Doulman  1987a),  although  the 
Japanese have to some extent incorporated their own 
technological changes into their purse seine fleets. All 
Japanese tuna fleets  have been excluded from  Papua 
New Guinea waters since March  1987 when Japanese 
access arrangements lapsed due to disputes with  the 
Papua New Guinea government concerning the level of 
fees to be paid for fishing rights. Other nationality fleets 
to increase their presence in the region since that time 
have included those of Taiwan, Korea and the Philip-
pines. 
The Korean fleet expanded steadily throughout the 
1980s to 23 vessels at the end of 1988, to 28 in  1989 
and then  by  a  further  10 vessels  during  1990 (SPC 
1991a). Almost  all  of the  Korean  purse  seiners  are 
either ex-American  vessels  or have  been  built under 
contract in the United States. Many of the ex-American 
vessels  were  reportedly  sold  to  Korean  firms  either 
during or after the slump in  world tuna prices experi-
enced by the industry in the early 1980s. An increase in 
the presence of Korean vessels in  the western Pacific 
region has been reflected in an increase in  the level of 
activity of these vessels in Papua New Guinea. In  1982 
4  Korean  flag  vessels  fished  in  Papua New  Guinea 
waters with the number of vessels steadily increasing to 
15 by 1989. The majority of these vessels are in the size 
range 499 to 1528 GRT. 
The expansion  of the Taiwanese fleet  followed  a 
similar pattern to that of the Korean fleet, growing from 
3 vessels in  1980 to 32 vessels active in the SPC region 
in  1990 (SPC 1991 a). Whereas the Korean vessels are 
very similar to U.S.  style purse seiners, the Taiwanese 
vessels are reportedly close replicas of Japanese single 
seiners  in  structure,  gear  and  fishing  technique 
(  arasaki  1990),  although  they  are  generally  larger 
than the average Japanese single seiner. Whereas most 
Japanese single  seiners  are  of 350-500 GRT, about 
70% of Taiwanese vessels are in  the size range 750-
1000  GRT,  with  78% greater  than  900  GRT.  This 
compares with  4  out of 51  Japanese  single  seiners 
which operated in Papua New Guinea waters between 
1979 and 1987 being over 900 GRT. The increase in 
the  number  of Taiwanese  vessels  operating  in  the 
region  has been accompanied by  increasing levels  of 
their  activity  in  Papua  ew  Guinea's  exclusive 
economic zone;  3 vessels  were  active  in  Papua New 
Guinea waters in  1983 and  17  in  1989. The peak of 
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Taiwanese purse seine activity  in  Papua New  Guinea 
for  the  period  1983-90  occurred  in  1989,  after 
Japanese  vessels  ceased  to  fish  in  the  exclusive 
economic zone. 
Fleet comparisons 
As the Korean and U.S. vessels are reported to be of the 
same structure and employ the same type  of gear,  a 
comparison of catch rates between these two fleets can 
be treated as a relatively straightforward matter. Ideally, 
any  comparison  made  with  the  Taiwanese  vessels 
would  be  with  the  efficiency  of the Japanese  single 
seine fleet.  However,  as  the Japanese fleet  had been 
excluded from  Papua New Guinea waters by the time 
their Taiwanese counterparts  became most active  in 
Papua  New  Guinea,  and  since  the  average  size  of 
Taiwanese  purse seiners  is  significantly  greater than 
Japanese  seiners,  it  seems  reasonable  to  compare 
Taiwanese vessels with the U.S. vessels. For this reason, 
Japanese vessels are excluded from any of the following 
comparisons and the U.S.  fleet,  which  is  believed  to 
have  been  reporting  recent  catches  reasonably 
accurately  and consistently,  is  used  as  the  basis  for 
comparison. 
Table 16.1  clearly demonstrates that the U.S. fleet 
presence in  Papua New Guinea, prior to the multilat-
eral treaty, was most prominent during the years 1984-
86. The number of reported fishing trips made by U.S. 
purse  seiners  into  Papua  New  Guinea's  exclusive 
economic zone jumped from  just 1 in  1983 to 27 in 
1984 and then to 43 in  1985 before dropping back to 
35 in  1986, and then to 6 for each of the two subse-
quent years. In comparison, fluctuations in the number 
of  recorded  trips  made  by  Korean  and  Taiwanese 
vessels into Papua New Guinea waters have been more 
moderate (Table 16.2). 
Excluding 1983, the number of sets per trip made 
on average by U.S. vessels ranged between 5 and  13-
indicating that the duration of each trip (allowing for at 
least one set per fishing day and several days per trip to 
engage  in  search  activity)  to  Papua  New  Guinea's 
exclusive  economic zone  by  vessels  of this  fleet was 
probably from  two  to three weeks. Between  1983 and 
1990,  the average  number of sets  per trip  made  by 
Korean  vessels  ranged  from  3  to  10  and  for  the 
Taiwanese fleet, 4 to  13 sets per trip. This observation 
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Table  16.1  U.S.  Fleet:  effort, catch,  catch  per trip  and  average  catch  rate, Papua  New Guinea  exclusive economic lone, 1983-88 
Year  Trips  Sets  Yeliowfin  Skipjack  Total  catch  Total  catch/trip  Yeliowfin/  Skipjackltrip  CPUE 
(tl  (tl  (tl  (tl  trip  (tl  (tl  tlset 
1983  5  42  576  618  618.000  42.000  576.000  123.600 
1984  27  361  6927  9975  16902  626.000  256.556  369.444  46.820 
1985  43  369  5881  15624  21505  500.116  136.767  363.349  58.279 
1986  35  241  4956  10467  15423  440.657  141.600  299.057  63.996 
1987  6  34  468  1777  2245  374.167  78.000  296.167  66.029 
1988  6  48  875  2699  3574  595.667  145.833  449.833  74.458 
Table  16.2  Korea  and  Taiwan  fleets:  effort,  catch,  catch  per trip and  average  catch  rate, Papua  New Guinea  exclusive  economic lone,  1983-90 
Year  Vessels  Trips  Sets  Yeliowfin  Skipjack 
(tl  (tl 
Korea 
1983  3  17  93  681  2330 
1984  4  18  182  1010  3101 
1985  4  12  36  238  873 
1986  6  11  75  1083  1850 
1987  11  30  186  3138  4321 
1988  14  34  141  1889  3923 
1989  15  44  195  3998  6875 
1990  7  9  31  516  1362 
Taiwan 
1983  3  6  82  652  2561 
1984  6  15  59  607  1818 
1985  6  30  167  1443  4186 
1986  6  18  94  1124  3316 
1987  9  25  176  1389  3840 
1988  12  40  173  1854  5227 
1989  17  42  211  1389  3408 
1990  15  26  166  45  1512 
suggests  that  Korean  and  Taiwanese  vessels  had 
similar duration of visits  to  their American  counter-
parts. 
If we  consider the ratio of trips to  the number of 
vessels,  there were,  as compared with  the  U.S.  fleet, 
more vessels making fewer trips each from  1983 on for 
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Total  catch  Total  catchltrip  Yellowfin/  Skipjackltrip  CPUE 
(tl  (tl  trip  (tl  (tl  tlset 
3011  177.118  40.059  137.059  32.3763 
4111  228.389  56.111  172.278  22.5879 
1111  92.583  19.833  72.750  30.8611 
2933  266.636  98.455  168.182  39.1067 
7459  248.633  104.600  144.033  40.1022 
5812  170.941  55.559  115.382  412199 
10873  247.114  90.864  156.250  55.7590 
1878  208.667  57.333  151.333  60.5806 
3213  535.500  108.667  426.833  39.1829 
2425  161.667  40.467  121.200  41.1017 
5629  187.633  48.100  139.533  33.7066 
4440  246.667  62.444  184222  47.2340 
5229  209.160  55.560  153.600  29.7102 
7081  177.025  46.350  130.675  40.9306 
4797  114.214  33.071  81.143  22.7346 
2357  90.654  32.500  58.154  14.1988 
the case of the Korean fleet, with 3 vessels making 17 
fishing trips in  1983 to  15 vessels making 44 trips in 
1989 (Table 16.2). Although the increasing trend in the 
number of vessels fishing in  Papua New Guinea over 
the period also holds for the Taiwanese fleet,  there is 
no decrease in  the trip to vessel  ratio which averages 
3.4 trips per vessel. A comparison of the aver~e total catch per trip for 
the three fleets  indicates that CS vessels have taken 
significantly  greater catches  per Lrip  than  vessels  of 
either  of  Lhe  other  two  fleet<;;  the  exception  is 
Taiwanese vessels in  1983. Furthennore, the catch per 
unit of effort (CPLE) figures,  measured as total catch 
per set, indicate that united SLates  average  CPCE is 
significantly  larger  than  that  of  the  {{orean  and 
Taiwanese in each year that all three nationalities have 
been fishing in Papua ~ew  Guinea. The sizes and gear 
types of vessels in all three fleets are fairly comparable 
and the average number of sets per trip indicates that 
vessels  of each  nationality  make  fishing  trips  into 
Papua :\few  Guinea waters of similar duration. There 
are  two  possible  explanations  for  the  difference  in 
catch  rates.  One  possibility  is  that  Korean  and 
Taiwanese  vessels  are  significantly  less  efficient  at 
finding  and  catching  fish  than CS vessels.  Another 
possibility is that the fonner fleets are underreporting 
catches. 
The  CPL'Es  for  each  of the  three  fleets  do  not 
exhibit any significant seasonal patterns (Tables 16.3, 
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16/1 and 16.5). In quarters when both US and {{orean, 
or both L'.S. and Taiwanese vessels were fishing there 
are no instances when Korean vessels report a higher 
average  CPUE  Lhan  U.S.  vessels,  and  five  instances 
when  Taiwanese  vessels  reported  a  higher  average 
CPL"E  than  C.S.  vessels  (I  9811:2,  19811 ::~,  19R5::3, 
1986:2 and 1986:11). 
In  order Lo  obtain a better comparison of average 
catch  raLes, the exclusive economic zone was divided 
into  eight fishing  zones,  (Figure  16. n and quarterly 
catch rates and activity levels (Table 16.6) were calcu-
lated  for  1985. The eight zones divide  the exclusive 
economic zone roughly into three northern zones, an 
eastern zone (north of the Solomon Islands), a zone for 
the  Bismark Sea,  a  zone  between  \Jew  Britain  and 
Bougainville Island, a zone south of Manus and wesL of 
Madang  and  a  southern  zone  incorporating  waters 
south of 7S. 
The level  of purse seine activity  by vessel  flag  and 
year for each zone, measured by the number of sets for 
the period  1983-88, are shown in  Figure 16.2 with a 
Table  16.3  U .S. neet: catch and  effort by year and  Quarter,  Papua  New Guinea  exclusive  economic lone,  1983-88 
Year  Qa  Trips  Sets  Yellowfin  Skipjack  Total catch  Total  catchltrip  Yellowfinl  Skipjackltrip  CPUE 
(tl  (tl  (tl  (tl  trip (tl  (tl  tlset 
1983  2  5  42  576  618  618.000  42.000  576.000  123.600 
1984  10  180  3062  3606  6668  666.80  306.200  360.60  37.044 
1984  2  10  122  3188  3522  6710  671.00  313.800  352.20  55.000 
1984  3  6  47  514  1804  2318  386.33  85.667  300.67  49.319 
1984  4  1  12  163  1043  1206  1206.00  163.000  1043.00  100.500 
1985  6  53  547  2100  2647  441.17  91.167  350.00  49.943 
1985  2  14  130  1681  6782  8463  604.50  120.071  484.43  65.100 
1985  3  13  86  1363  3306  4669  359.15  104.846  254.31  54.291 
1985  4  10  100  2290  3436  5726  572.6  229.000  343.60  57260 
1986  2  4  7  49  194  243  60.75  12250  48.50  34.714 
1986  3  22  183  4157  8010  12167  553.05  188.955  364.09  66.486 
1986  4  9  51  750  2263  3013  334.78  83.333  251.44  59.078 
1987  2  6  146  403  549  549.00  146.000  403.00  91.500 
1987  3  5  28  322  1374  1696  339.20  64.400  274.80  60.571 
1988  4  6  48  875  2699  3574  595.67  145.833  449.83  74.458 
aQ_1  for June-August 0-2 September-November, 0-3 December-February, and 0-4 March-May. 
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Agure  16.1  Papua  New Guinea  exclusive  economic  zone  by fishing  zone. Source:  Doulman  (1980). 
summary  by  zone  and  year  for  the  three  fleets 
combined in  Figure  16.3.  From Figure  16.3 it  can be 
seen that in tenns of the number of sets per year, zones 
1, 3, 5 and 6 have attracted the most activity between 
1983 and 1988. Of these, zone 5 recorded the highest 
level  of activity with  about 1000 sets of which around 
one-third  were  made  in  1986;  zones  1,  3  and  6 
recorded  cumulative  sets  for  the  period  of between 
500-700. Figure 16.2(e) shows that for zone 5, most of 
the fishing effort can be attributed to the U.S.  fleet for 
1986; the same holds for zone 3 in  1985 and zone 6 in 
1984 (these years contributing most of the cumulative 
effort for these zones respectively). Zone 2 attracted the 
least amount of purse seine effort for the period with 
less than 100 sets by vessels of all three fleets. 
There does not appear to be any particular pattern 
of  activity  for  any  particular  nationality  of  vessel 
although  the  level  of  U.S.  vessel  activity  in  general 
seems to  have  been at its  highest between  1984 and 
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1986. The only zone in which U.S. vessel effort is not on 
average the highest for the three fleets is zone 1, which 
seems to have been the preferred area for purse seining 
for  the  Taiwanese  fleet  The year  in  which  activity 
peaked  in  zone  1 for  both  the  U.S.  and Taiwanese 
fleets was 1985. Zones 3 and 5 appear to have been the 
most popular fishing grounds for Korean vessels within 
Papua New Guinea's exclusive economic zone. It is not 
apparent from  the number of sets by zone for each of 
the Korean and Taiwanese fleets that the overall levels 
of  fishing  activity  for  vessels  of  these  fleets  were 
increasing throughout the 1980s. 
Comparisons  by  year,  species  and  zone  for  the 
period  1983-88 are shown  for  the U.S.  and Korean 
fleets  in  Figure  16.4  and for  the U.S.  and Taiwanese 
fleets in  Figure 16.5. In these figures each of the eight 
zones  is  identified  by  a  number,  the  Korean  and 
Taiwanese  CPUE  is  represented  by  the  bar  corre-
sponding to the zone number and the U.S.  CPUE in The  Use  of Logbook Data  in Monitoring Catch Rates 
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Agure  16.2 Purse  seine  activity by flag  and year,  Papua  New  Guinea  exclusive  economic zone: (a)  Fishing  zone  1; (b)  Fishing  zone  2;  (c)  Rshing 
zone 3; (d)  Fishing  zone  4;  (e)  Fishing  zone 5; 10  Fishing  zone 6; (g)  Fishing  zone  7;  and  (h)  Fishing  zone 8. 
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Table  16.4  Korean  neet:  catch and  effort by year and  quarter, Papua  New Guinea  exclusive  economic  zone, 1983-90 































































































































































































































































30_1  for June-Augus~ 0-2 September-November. 0-3 December-Februa!y. and 0-4 March-May. 
--- "'-'--
Skipjackltrip  CPUE 
Itl  tise! 
222.667  35.5957 
183.667  39.2500 
68.500  22.0870 
16.000  15.0000 
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Table  16.5  Taiwanese  fleet:  catch and  effort by year and Quarter, Papua  New Guinea  exclusive  economic lone, 1983-90 













































































































Itl  Itl  Itl  Itl  trip  Itl  Itl  Uset 
875  142  733  437.500  71.000  366.500 
































































































































































































3 0_1  for  June-Augu s~ 0-2 September-November, 0-3  December-February, and 0-4  March-May. 
196 that zone is  represented by the bar to the right of the 
zone  number.  Although  comparisons  of  CPL'E  are 
shown  for  all  eight zones, those zones  of particular 
interest are those where there  ha<;  been  the greatest 
overlap in fishing effort 
The C.S.  vessels outperformed the Korean vessels 
in  1984, and the Korean vessels outperformed the C.S. 
vessels  in  1985 and 1988, in  all  zones in  which  both 
fleets  were  fishing.  In  other years  there  is  no  clear 
pattern of relative performance as measured by CPUE. 
There has been a great deal of variance in the CPUE of 
yellowfin  to skipjack for both fleets,  indicating that the 
species mix of catches has changed between years and 
zones and there is no evidence to suggest that one fleet 
is more successful at catching yellowfin than the other. 
There was  less overlap between  the operations of 
the Taiwanese and CS fleel<; than was observed for the 
Korean and U.S.  fleets. This is  not suprising given  the 
closer  similarity  of  Korean  vessels  to  L.S.  vessels. 
Where the Taiwanese and U.S. fleets were fishing in the 
same zone in  the  same  year,  the Taiwanese vessels 
have generally outperformed the U.S. vessels in  terms 
of CPUE.  Similarly,  there does  not appear to be any 
pattern of consistently higher or lower catch rates for 
either the Taiwanese or U.S. fleets  where overlap  in 
effort between the two  fleets  has existed in  zones. In 
fact, there seems to have been little overlap in the areas 
of fishing effort between these two fleets. 
There are 12 points of comparison where the U.S. 
and Korean fleets were fishing in the same zone in the 
same quarter, and  13 such points of comparison for 
the U.S. and Taiwanese fleets (Table 16.6). In the U.S.! 
Korean  comparisons the Korean  fleet  average CPUE 
was  roughly the same as,  or higher than, that of the 
United  States  on  seven  occasions.  In  the  US/ 
Taiwanese comparisons  the Taiwanese fleet  average 
CPUE was roughly the same as, or better than, that of 
the United States on nine occasions. These compari-
sons suggest that when  both  pairs  of fleets  fish  the 
same area at the same time  there  is  no significant 
difference in reported catch rates. 
The  Use  of  Logbook Data  in  Monitoring Catch Rates 
Finally,  Figures  16.6 and 16.7 show total catch by 
species and fleet for each year and zone for the period 
1983-88. Skipjack wa<;  the dominant species  in  the 
catches of all  fleets. Total catches also appear to have 
varied across all zones and years for the period with no 
particular zone or zones having dominated in terms of 
yielding high catches of tuna<;. 
Conclusion 
The above  comparisons suggest several  things.  First, 
the increa<;e  throughout the 1980s in  the number of 
vessels from the Korean and Taiwanese fleel<; fishing in 
the  South  Pacific  Commission  region  reflects  an 
increasing interest in Papua ~ew  Guinea as a source of 
purse seine caught tunas. Second, though the number 
of Korean vessels active  in  Papua New Guinea waters 
and  the  amount  of  fishing  effort  has  increased 
throughout the 1980s, it appears that each vessel has 
been making fewer trips per year. It would also appear 
that vessels of both the Korean and Taiwanese fleets 
make  relatively  short  ventures  into  Papua  l\ew 
Guinea's exclusive economic zone, usually around two 
to three weeks. Third, although Korean and Taiwanese 
vessels are of similar size and have similar trip duration 
to U.S. vessels, the former two  fleets  report somewhat 
lower overall total catches and catch rates. This may be 
a result of underreporting if it is  believed that Korean 
and Taiwanese vessels are equally as efficient at finding 
and  catching fish  as  their U.S.  counterparts.  Fourth, 
zones 3, 5 and 6, as depicted in Figure 16.1, appear to 
have  been  the  fishing  regions  within  Papua  New 
Guinea waters which  have attracted the most overlap 
in fishing effort between vessels of the US and Korean 
fleets. There is no evidence presented in this analysis to 
suggest the catch rates in  these zones are consistently 
more or less favourable for particular fleets, in any year. 
Finally, there is  no evidence to suggest catch rates, as 
experienced by any of the three fleets, follow any partic-
ular seasonal pattern (Tables 16.3 to 16.5). 
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Table 16.6  U.S, Korean  and Taiwanese "eelS: catch, effort and  CPUE  by species, Papua  New Guinea exclusive  economic lone,  1985 
Set typea  Qb  Zonec  Effort  Yellowfin  Skipjack  CPUE Yellowfin  CPUE Skipjack 
(Number of  (tl  (tl  (tJse~  (tJse~ 
sets) 
Korean  neet 
2  7  23  3.5000  11.5000 
3  8  53  307  6.6250  38.3750 
5  2  9  52  4.5000  26.0000 
2  3  2  3  2.0000  3.0000 
2  5  5  15  5.0000  15.0000 
3  5  1  5  15  5.0000  15.0000 
4  1  3  42  17  14.0000  5.6667 
4  3  8  37  165  4.6250  20.6250 
4  4  1  25  57  25.0000  57.0000 
1  4  5  5  20  165  4.0000  33.0000 
2  1  3  1  7  30  7.0000  30.0000 
2  2  5  3  26  24  8.6667  8.0000 
Taiwanese fleet 
1  16  107  305  6.6875  19.0625 
1  3  16  111  249  6.9375  15.5625 
2  47  293  852  6.2340  18.1277 
2  2  1  3  2  3.0000  2.0000 
2  3  10  44  136  4.4000  13.6000 
2  4  1  3  1  3.0000  1.0000 
3  1  8  116  213  14.5000  26.6250 
3  2  1  20  40  20.0000  40.0000 
3  3  16  184  620  11.5000  38.7500 
4  1  7  16  341  2.2857  48.7143 
4  3  6  69  108  11.5000  18.0000 
2  3  3  67  85  22.3333  28.3333 
2  3  2  3  120  220  40.0000  73.3333 
2  3  3  46  40  46.0000  40.0000 
U .S . neet 
1  1  3  4  2  1.3333  0.6667 
1  2  2  25  15  12.5000  7.5000 
3  12  117  190  9.7500  15.8333 
1  5  6  39  86  6.5000  14.3333 
2  9  48  226  5.3333  25.1111 
2  3  5  19  112  3.8000  22.4000 
2  4  3  12  11  4.0000  3.6667 
2  5  45  222  904  4.9333  20.0889 
2  6  19  86  475  4.5263  25.0000 
2  7  26  332  786  12.7692  30.2308 
2  8  30  229  752  7.6333  25.0667 
3  4  4  290  1.0000  72.5000 
3  2  4  30  4.0000  30.0000 
3  3  13  78  485  6.0000  37.3077 
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Table  16.6  (contd.)  U.S, Korean  and Taiwanese Heets: catch, effort and  CPUE  by species, Papua  New Guinea  exclusive  economic zone,  1985 
Set type a  Qb  Zonec  Effort  Yellowfin  Skipjack  CPUE Yellowfin  CPUE Skipjack 
(Number of  (tl  (t)  (t1setl  (tJsetl 
sets) 
3  4  1  10  0  10.0000  0.0000 
3  5  13  58  173  4.4615  13.3077 
3  6  5  68  27  13.6000  5.4000 
3  7  24  182  774  7.5833  32.2500 
3  8  12  43  335  3.5833  27.9167 
4  1  13  6  289  0.4615  22.2308 
4  2  7  35  59  5.0000  8.4286 
4  3  51  221  1652  4.3333  32.3922 
4  4  0  0  0.0000  0.0000 
4  5  10  85  143  8.5000  14.3000 
2  1  2  0  0  0.0000  0.0000 
2  3  3  25  55  8.3333  18.3333 
2  5  6  31  185  5.1667  30.8333 
2  2  1  3  0  0  0.0000  0.0000 
2  2  3  10  20  10.0000  20.0000 
2  2  5  77  492  1197  6.3896  15.5455 
2  2  6  21  145  848  6.9048  40.3810 
2  2  7  1  0  0  0.0000  0.0000 
2  2  8  14  27  431  1.9286  30.7857 
2  3  1  11  67  139  6.0909  12.6364 
2  3  2  1  2  2  2.0000  2.0000 
2  3  3  48  375  236  7.8125  4.9167 
2  3  4  11  321  256  29.1818  23.2727 
2  3  5  5  10  15  2.0000  3.0000 
2  3  6  3  0  76  0.0000  25.3333 
2  3  7  6  83  77  13.8333  12.8333 
2  3  8  3  10  165  3.3333  55.0000 
2  4  1  5  23  22  4.6000  4.4000 
2  4  2  14  187  297  13.3571  21.2143 
2  4  3  20  468  262  23.4000  13.1000 
2  4  4  20  921  301  46.0500  15.0500 
2  4  5  3  51  225  17.0000  75.0000 
aSet types  are  1.assoclated or log  sets  and  2.unassoclated or free-school  sets. 
bJune-August. 1; September-November. 2; December-February. 3; March-May. 4. 
C See  Figure  16.1 
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Rgure  16.7  U.S. and Taiwanese vessel  catch  by species and lone, Papua  New Guinea  exclusive economic lone: (a)  1983 and  1984; (b)  1985 and 
1986; and  (c)  1987  and  1988. 
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The  world  market  for  canned  tuna  underwent  a 
number  of  substantial  and  fundamental  changes 
during the 1980s (Tables 17.1-17.3). Over the decade, 
canned  tuna  production  increased  by  about  83%, 
largely as the result of a rapid expansion of productive 
capacity in Thailand. U.S. dominance of production fell 
from 45% of the world total in  1980, to 28% by the end 
of the decade. Thailand's share of production rose from 
around 1  % to about 20% over the same period. 
However,  it  is  in  the area of international  trade 
where  the  greatest  changes  occurred.  In  1980 only 
about 20% of canned tuna production entered interna-
tional trade. By  1989 this figure  had doubled (Tables 
17.2 and 17.3). Whereas Japan dominated the export 
scene in  1980, by  the end of the decade it had been 
relegated to the role of a relatively insignificant market 
participant. In contrast, Thailand rose from the level of 
a virtual non  participant in  1980, to be the dominant 
export  nation  by  1985,  a  position  it  consolidated 
through  the  remainder  of  the  decade.  By  1989, 
Thailand accounted for around half of all tuna exports 
worldwide.  Over  the  same  period  significant  export 
growth was also experienced by the Philippines and, in 
later years, by Indonesia. 
French  ownership  of  canning  facilities,  plus 
France's  favoured-nation  trading  policy  with  its  ex-
colonies, has ensured the steady growth of production 
in  Cote  d'lvoire  and  the  continued  viability  of  the 
industry in  Senegal. Most other countries are actively 
discouraged from exporting canned tuna to France. 
Between them, the United States, United Kingdom, 
France and Gennany (FR)  accounted for  the bulk of 
canned tuna imports over the decade. Import growth 
was particularly rapid (almost a fivefold increase!) in the 
United  States and, from  a  smaller base,  the  United 
Kingdom. 
However,  the  data given  in  Tables  17.1  to  17.3 
should  be  treated  with  caution.  Clearly  total  world 
exports of canned tuna (Table 17.2) should equal total 
imports (Table  17.3),  but a substantial discrepancy is 
evident in the tables. This would appear to indicate an 
ongoing, substantial problem with errors in data collec-
tion. 
This chapter analyses the effects of exchange rate 
movements on the growth of Thailand, the Philippines, 
and  Indonesia  in  the  international  market,  and  the 
relatively rapid demise of Japan. Clearly this is only one 
of a  number of factors  which  can  enhance  market 
competitiveness, but its long-tenn implications for the 
economic  viability  of  many  countries  involved,  or 
hoping to become involved, in  the industry have been 
largely ignored to date. 
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Table  17.1  Canned tuna  production  by country 1979-89 roooo 
Country  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983 
United  States  283 
Japan  95 
Thailand  4 
Italy  43 
France  16 
Spain  59 
Mexico  13 
Cote d'lvoire  14 
Philippines  4 
Portugal  5 
Rji  5 
Indonesia  5 
Iran  3 
Senegal  12 
Taiwan  10 
Venezuela  9 
Others  31 










































































Table  17.2  Canned tuna  exports by exporting  country,  1980-89 ('0000 
Country  1980  1981  1982  1983 
Thailand  4.7  8.5  18.1 
Philippines  112  18.0  19.4  23.5 
Cote  d'lvoire  17.5  17.1  18.7  23.7 
Senegal  11.5  152  162  20.1 
Taiwan  16.0  13.6  11.4  15.5 
Spain  8.0  11.6  2.1  4.1 
Indonesia  0.4  0.8  2.2 
Japan  38.3  34.9  35.7  36.9 
Others  23.9  27.3  24.1  27.9 
Total  126.4  142.8  136.9  172.0 





















































































































































































437.3 Exchange  Rate  Fluctuation and  Comparative Competitive Advantage 
Table  17.3  Canned Tuna  Imports, by importing country,  1980-89 rooou 
1980  1981  1982  1983 
United States  28.7  26.5  28.8  48.0 
France  24.6  27.7  29.8  34.0 
United  Kingdom  11.1  192  13.3  17.6 
Germany  FA  15.3  13.6  14.9  16.1 
Canada  8.6  9.7  7.0  10.7 
Others  32.6  26.8  25.6  27.0 
Total  120.9  123.5  119.4  153.4 
Source: FAO, various years Globefish  highlights. 
Exchange rates: nominal and real 
International exchange rates are usually quoted as the 
nominal  exchange  rate  of  one  currency  with  a 
numeraire  currency,  generally  the  US$.  While  some 
countries allow  their currencies to 'float'  against the 
US$,  varying  on  a  continuous  basis,  others prefer a 
'managed  float'  to  even  out short-term  fluctuations. 
Many other countries 'peg' their exchange rates to the 
US$  or a  'basket'  of currencies,  the 'basket'  usually 
being comprised of the exchange rates of major trading 
partners weighted  according  to  their  relative  impor-
tance in bilateral trade with the relevant nation. 
Currently,  for  the  countries  considered  in  this 
chapter,  the  Philippines  and  Japan  have  floating 
currencies, Indonesia a  managed float,  and Thailand 
and Papua New Guinea manage their exchange rates 
according to the value of a basket of currencies. 
The US$ is generally the currency of choice of world 
trade  in  tuna,  except  for  French  trade  with  certain 
Lome convention countries. As a result, exchange rate 
fluctuations vis-a-vis the US$ can play a major role in 
dete.rmining the profitability of tuna canning industries 
worldwide. 
Nominal  exchange  rates  against  a  numeraire 
currency  suffer  from  two  problems:  they  make  no 
allowance  for  inflation  differentials  between  the  two 
countries and they ignore the third country effects of 
independent changes in  the exchange rates of other 
countries. The implications of the latter in the context 
1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 







36.9  35.6  46.9  54.8  48.0 
24.0  36.5  34.7  47.6  66.1 
19.8  25.4  31.5  28.0  31.9 
11.0  17.7  23.1  20.4  25.9 
43.2  48.0  65.3  69.7  86.7 
2092  270.0  298.5  331.3  411.1 
of international trade in  canned tuna will  be consid-
ered later in this chapter. 
Real exchange rates against the numeraire currency 
build  in  a  measure  of  relative  price  movements 
between  the  domestic  currency  and  the  numeraire 
(US$  in  this chapter). To appreciate the rationale for 
calculating real exchange rates, consider the following 
illustration.  If  domestic  inflation,  as  measured  by  a 
retail prices index (RPI), in  the United States is  lower 
than  that  in  (say)  Indonesia  then,  assuming  the 
nominal exchange rate remains  unchanged,  the  real 
exchange rate of the rupiah with the US$ will rise thus 
rendering Indonesia's export industries less  competi-
tive against their U.S. counterparts. By trading in  US$, 
such  industries  are  price  takers  so  their  revenue  in 
terms of rupiahs is  fixed.  However,  the relatively high 
rate of domestic inflation vis-a-vis the United States will 
place cost pressures on such industries, leading to a 
squeeze on profits. Clearly, the effect can be offset by an 
appropriate devaluation of the rupiah against the US$, 
but for a number of reasons this action may be neither 
desirable  nor  possible.  Conversely,  if  domestic  U.S. 
inflation  is  higher than that of Indonesia, this would 
effectively  produce  a  fall  in  the  real  price  of  the 
exported  commodity,  thereby  increasing its  competi-
tiveness on the U.S. market and raising higher revenue 
through  increased  sales.  Appreciation  of the  rupiah 
against the US$ would offset such a gain. 
To  summarise,  real  exchange  rates  build  in  a 
measure of relative domestic price movements in  one 
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country compared to other countries or to a numeraire 
currency.  For  the  purpose  of  this  chapter,  all  real 
exchange rates will be calculated against the US$. 
The real exchange rate is calculated as: 
CPI U.S.  E 
t  .~ 
CPI;  Eo  (I) 
where 
CP/t
u.s. is the level of the CPI in  the United States 
at time t 
CPI;is  the level  of the CPI  in  the country under 
review at time t 
Et  is  the number of currency units of the country 
under review per US$ at time t 
Eo  is  the number of currency units of the country 
under review per US$ in the base period. 
Real  exchange rates against the US$ were  calcu-
lated, on a quarterly basis, for Thailand, the Philippines, 
Indonesia,  Papua  New  Guinea,  and  Japan  for  the 
period  1980-90.  For  the  purpose  of  cross-country 
comparisons, all nominal and real exchange rates have 
been expressed in index number form. 
The base period for all  index numbers is  the first 
quarter of 1980. 
The Thailand experience 
Tuna has been harvested on a small scale by Thailand 
for  many years,  with  the product exported  in  frozen 
form  for  canning  elsewhere.  A  domestic  canning 
industry was established in  1972 and, using primarily 
imported frozen  tuna, the industry experienced rapid 
growth throughout the 1980s. It remains almost exclu-
sivelyexport-oriented. 
Today, Thailand is  the world's leading exporter of 
canned tuna and is currently the single largest source 
of imported canned tuna in  the U.S.  market Market 
growth  in  Western  Europe  has  been  a  more  recent 
phenomenon. 
World trade in tuna is generally conducted in US$. 
Thus  for  a  country  like  Thailand,  which  processes 
imported  tuna  for  subsequent  re-export  in  canned 
form,  the economic viability of the canning industry is 
heavily  dependent  upon  the  prevailing  rate  of 
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exchange of the baht with  the US$ and the domestic 
rate  of  inflation.  In  other words,  the  profitability  of 
Thailand's tuna canning industry rests on the genera-
tion  of value-added  revenue  expressed  in  US$,  in 
addition to  the interaction of other economic factors 
(particular prices) in world markets. 
During the 1980s, the Thai baht was closely linked 
with  the US$, although a gradual depreciation of the 
baht occurred  over  the  decade  (Figure  17.n Since 
domestic inflation in Thailand closely followed  that in 
the United States, the real and nominal exchange rates 
differed little. During the period of rapid growth of Thai 
canned tuna exports  (1980-85), the  baht was  effec-
tively devalued by almost 40% in both real and nominal 
terms.  Thereafter,  the  baht  experienced  a  gradual 
appreciation, but remained well  below its value at the 
beginning of the decade. 
Figure  17.2 illustrates quarterly movements in  the 
US$ price of a carton of 48, 6 oz,  cans of Thai origin 
canned tuna on the U.S. market over the period 1983-
90. The data are also expressed in  baht calculated at 
the prevailing rate of exchange. Both series are in  the 
form of index numbers (quarter 1,  1983 =  100). Prices 
expressed in  baht exhibited considerably less volatility 
than U.S.  prices, and were particularly strong in  1986 
and 1988. These two years also witnessed considerable 
growth in  tuna exports from Thailand (Table 17.2). In 
absolute terms, 1986 and 1988 saw increases in export 
quantities greater than for any other year in the decade. 
Other exporting nations 
Philippines 
During the early 1980s, the peso underwent a period of 
rapid depreciation (in  nominal terms), its value falling 
by 165% against the US$ between 1980 and year-end 
1984 (Figure  17.3). However, this was also a period of 
very high domestic inflation, which served to keep the 
real exchange rate from  depreciating as rapidly as the 
nominal rate. 
Indonesia 
The Indonesian rupiah was  linked relatively closely to 
the US$  through  the  1980s, but was  subject to two 
major devaluations, in mid-1983 and late 1986 (Figure 
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01 Exchange  Rate  Fluctuation and  Comparative  Competitive Advantage 
1990 was three times its level of 1980. However, with a 
relatively high level of domestic inflation, the rise in the 
real exchange rate was  more moderate, although still 
doubling over the decade. 
Japan 
japan's significance in the canned tuna export industry 
went into rapid decline during 1985 (Table 17.2) and 
the driving  force  behind this  decline was  clearly  the 
rapid appreciation  of the yen  (Figure  17.5). Between 
the second quarter of  1985 and the  first  quarter of 
1989, in nominal terms the yen appreciated by almost 
50% against the US$. With a domestic rate of inflation 
considerably below that of the United States, the real 
exchange rate appreciated less rapidly but the rise was 
still  substantial.  Against  the  baht,  the yen  approxi-
mately  doubled  in  value  over  the  decade  in  both 
nominal and real terms. Clearly, exchange rate appreci-
ation of this magnitude against the currency of a major 
competitor could be expected to produce a substantial 
loss in competitiveness for japan in canned tuna (and 
many other) export markets. 
Papua New Guinea 
up to  now we  have only considered countries which 
have been major participants in the international tuna 
canning market during the 1980s. One must assume 
that their presence in  the market indicates that their 
tuna  canning  industries  are,  or were,  economically 
viable  with  regard  to  the  cost  and  availability  of 
domestic capital, raw materials, and labour. Given this 
situation, we  have considered the impact of exchange 
rate  fluctuations  on  the  comparative  competitive 
advantage of such countries. 
Papua New  Guinea does  not currently  possess  a 
tuna canning operation, although  the possibility  has 
been mooted on a number of occasions in recent years. 
While  the  current  and  expected  level  of  the  kina 
against the US$ will be of considerable importance to 
the industry if it is established, the industry should only 
be established in Papua New Guinea if it can produce 
an economically viable product on the basis of current 
domestic costs. 
Figure  17.6  illustrates  historical  movements  of  the 
kina against the US$. A substantial depreciation occurred 
during the first  half of the 1980s, followed  by a gradual 
appreciation until the sharp devaluation in 1989. 
Comparison of exchange rates 
This study has so far ignored third country competition 
faced  in  the  export  market  For  example,  although 
there  is  only  a  relatively  minor level  of direct  trade 
between  Indonesia  and  Thailand,  both  countries 
export a similar range of products to the United States, 
one of their major trading partners. Even  if there were 
no  change  in  the  bahtlUS$  real  exchange  rate,  a 
change in  the rupiah/US$ real exchange rate is likely 
to have an impact on the competitiveness of  Thailand's 
level of exports to the United States. 
Figure  17.7  compares nominal exchange rates of 
the five  countries detailed above, relative to the US$. 
From  a  1980  base,  clearly  the  Philippines  and 
Indonesia have experienced the most rapid deprecia-
tion  of their currencies,  particularly over the second 
half of the decade. However, when real exchange rates 
are  considered  (Figure  17.8)  clearly  Indonesia  and 
japan deviate, in opposite directions, from the others by 
a substantial margin. While Thailand, the Philippines, 
and  Papua  New  Guinea  have  all  experienced  a 
substantial competitive advantage against japan over 
the second half of the decade, Indonesia's advantage 
far exceeds that of these three countries when based 
purely on real exchange rates. 
Exports to Western Europe 
The Western  European  canned tuna market is  very 
diverse, with individual countries having quite different 
requirements and favoured-nation trading concessions 
given  by  France to its ex-colonies of Cote d'lvoire and 
Senegal.  However,  this  market  has  been  expanding 
rapidly  over  recent years  and Asian  producers  have 
recently been gaining market share. 
Figure  17.9  shows  nominal  exchange  rates  of 
France, United  Kingdom,  and Germany  (FR)  against 
the US$ during the 1980s. During the first half of the 
decade all three currencies, to varying degrees, experi-
enced substantial effective  currency depreciations as 
the result of a very strong dollar. An impact which was 
completely reversed for Germany, and largely offset for 
France  and  the  United  Kingdom  through  the 
remainder of the decade. 
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Agure 17.9 Nominal exchange  rates,  France,  United Kingdom  and  Germany (FR),  1980-90. 
The effect of such movements would  be to  make 
US$ denominated imports in these three countries rise 
in  price, when expressed in  the domestic currency, up 
to 1985, and then to decline through to the end of the 
decade. Since the baht peso and rupiah were,  at the 
very  least stable against the US$  between  1985-90, 
this  situation  increased  the  attractiveness  of  the 
European market to canned tuna exporters such as 
Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia In  fact Thai 
exporters  have  increased European  market share in 
the face of declining prices expressed in  the domestic 
currencies of those countries. 
The future 
Designing scenarios for future changes in international 
exchange rates is likely to be a precarious occupation. 
The  determinants  of  such  changes  are  many  and 
varied,  and  are  often  driven  by  socio-political,  in 
addition to the conventional economic, variables. 
The  comparative  advantage  in  terms  of  real 
exchange rates enjoyed by Indonesia since 1986 largely 
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arose from  the massive  devaluation  of the rupiah  in 
that  year  as  the  result  of  plunging  oil  prices.  The 
Indonesian  economy  is  heavily  dependent  upon 
revenue generated by oil  exports. If oil  prices were to 
rise dramatically then it is  likely that the rupiah would 
appreciate  in  value,  thereby  damaging  Indonesia's 
competitiveness in  the canned tuna export market At 
present, such an event appears very  unlikely and the 
current competitive advantage obtained by  Indonesia 
through its 1986 devaluation is likely to hold for some 
time.  This  should  enhance its  market  prospects,  as 
witnessed by increased exports over the past few years. 
The  Philippines  has  experienced  a  substantial 
increase in  domestic inflation which has largely offset 
competitive  gains  achieved  through  major  devalua-
tions of the peso during the 1980s. Nevertheless, it has 
managed  to  maintain  a  comparative  exchange  rate 
advantage over Thailand since the mid-1980s. If this 
situation continues,  there will  clearly  be a  sustained 
competitive advantage for the Philippines. 
In  both  nominal  and  real  terms,  Thailand's 
exchange rate has remained remarkably constant over Exchange Rate  Fluctuation and  Comparative Competitive Advantage 
the second half of the 1980s and scope for increasing 
its  market  share  beyond  its  present  level  must  be 
relatively  limited.  If total  market growth  for  canned 
tuna expands rapidly then there will  still  be scope for 
Thailand to increase real exports, but a medium-term 
advantage may come through vertical integration in the 
market The  purchase  of major  tuna brands  in  the 
United States by Asian countries has been a relatively 
recent phenomenon which  may well  extend to many 
European countries. Controlling the market from  the 
canning  through  to  overseas  distribution  networks 
would  clearly  give  Thai  exports  a  considerable 
marketing  advantage  over  exports  from  competing 
countries, even if the latter experienced a comparative 
competitive  advantage  through  favourable  exchange 
rate movements. 
Conclusion 
Exchange rates play a significant role  in  determining 
the profitability of canned tuna exports and, to a lesser 
extent,  probably  play  a  role  in  marketing decisions. 
However, the degree of this effect will  be variable, and 
many other factors (such as contract arrangements and 
long-term market strategies) will also generally play an 
important role in export marketing decisions. 
On the basis of relative levels of real exchange rates, 
Indonesia  appears  to  have  achieved  a  significant 
competitive  advantage  over  the  Philippines  and 
Thailand.  Whether  this  can  be  translated  into 
increased  market share depends on a  host of other 
factors, but clearly the opportunities are present 
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Cannery Costs  in the Western Pacific: 
a Hypothetical Model 
H. Landu 
D.A. Troedson 
G.H.  Waugh 
Introduction 
By  world  standards,  island  nations  of  the  western 
Pacific  are  resource  poor.  In  many  of these  island 
states,  fisheries  is  a  driving  force  to  the  economy 
generally,  or at the very  least a  driving  force  to  the 
coastal regional economies. 
Given  the general resource scarcity in  the western 
Pacific, and the potential value of the tuna fishery,  the 
question of how best to utilise this resource in order to 
obtain the maximum domestic benefit is  of consider-
able importance to island governments in  the region. 
Currently, distant water fishing nations pay for the right 
to  fish  for  tuna in  the exclusive  economic zones of 
nations in the western Pacific. 
While such agreements supply the island  nations 
with  valuable  foreign  exchange,  the  major  benefits 
from  the resource accrue to foreign fishers and foreign 
processors.l 
In  order to  address  this  loss  of potential  benefit 
from  their tuna resources,  three  island governments 
have established domestic tuna canneries. Despite the 
1 Troedson  and  Waugh  (1993)  and  Waugh  (1987),  provide 
evidence which suggests that fees  paid  by  distant water fishing 
nations are substantially less than potential rents generated by 
the fishery.  Campbell et al. (1993) provide possible evidence that 
underreporting of catch by  fishing vessels has been occurring in 
the  western  Pacific,  resulting  in  a  loss  of revenue  to  western 
Pacific nations. 
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marginal  nature  of  the  tuna  canning  industry,  and 
uncertainties  regarding  existing  canneries  in  Fiji, 
Solomon Islands and the Federated States of Micro-
nesia,  additional  island  governments  are seeking  to 
establish domestic canneries. 
A hypothetical model of a greenfield tuna cannery 
situated in  the western Pacific  is  developed, and the 
financial  and  economic  viability  of  the  cannery  is 
analysed. 
Tuna cannery model: 
initial assumptions 
The  hypothetical  cannery  is  assumed  to  have  the 
capacity to process 160 t of raw tuna per day (40000 t 
per year, based on an operating year of 250 days). The 
principal  species  used  in  the  production  of canned 
tuna are skipjack (Katsuwonus pelamis) and yellowfin 
(Thunnus  albacares).  The  bulk of the  canned  tuna 
produced  is  destined  for  export  to  the  European 
Community,  and  in  particular,  the  United  Kingdom. 
Over the period  1982-91. European consumption of 
canned tuna increased dramatically, fuelled  in  partic-
ular  by  increased  imports  into  France,  the  United 
Kingdom  and  Germany.  During  the  period,  canned 
tuna  consumption  in  the  European  Community 
increased 119%, from 190600 t (98% of European con-
sumption) to 418200 t (95%  of European consump-
tion).  The United  Kingdom  is  the  dominant canned Cannery Costs  in  the Western  Pacific: a  Hypothetical Model 
tuna importer in  Europe, accounting for  26% of total 
European  imports  in  1991  (Owen  and  Troedson 
1993a).  All  canned  tuna exported  to  the  European 
Community by  the cannery is  assumed to  be exempt 
from  import duties, since it  is  assumed to satisfy  the 
conditions  for  tariff  free  entry  into  the  European 
Community under the criteria established by the Lome 
Convention. 
A  smaller  proportion  of  cans  comprising  lower 
quality  meat  and  tuna  flakes  is  destined  for  the 
domestic  market Tuna heads,  skin  and viscera  are 
processed into fishmeal. 
The total project cost is US$49 million, comprising 
structural items including docks, buildings, and other 
infrastructure  (22.4%  of  project  cost);  plant  and 
equipment,  consisting  principally  of  refrigeration, 
canning and fishmeal equipment (33.5%); vehicles and 
training  expenses  (3.3%);  and  working  capital,  to 
finance  initial  operating losses  and  the  cost  of  raw 
materials (40.8%) (Table 18.1). 
Annual  variable  costs  (at  full  production)  are 
US$50 million, and comprise raw tuna (60% of annual 
variable  costs);  other  raw  materials,  including  cans, 
labels,  cases  and  fille~  (24%);  indirect  labour  and 
freight  charges  (4.8%); direct  labour (3%);  fuel  (3%); 
marketing and brokerage (2.7%); electricity (1.3%); and 
other costs (1.3%) (Table 18. 2). 
Annual  fixed  costs  are  US$3.635  million,  and 
comprise a component of direct labour (41.3% of fixed 
costs);  maintenance (31.9%);  insurance  fees  09.9%); 
management fee  (5.5%); land  lease  fee3  0 .4%),  and 
other costs (5.5%) (Table 18.2). 
Cannery  output per tonne  of  raw  tuna  input  is 
assumed to be 59 cases of canned tuna for export, 10 
cases of canned tuna for domestic sale, and  15% (by 
raw weight) fishmeal (Table 18.3). 
Total  revenue  (at  full  production)  is  US$66.64 
million,  and comprises canned tuna exported to  the 
European Community (85% of total revenue); domestic 
canned tuna sales 00.5%); and fish meal sales (4.5%) 
(Table 18.4). 
2 Including brine. hydrolysed protein etc. 
3  The lease fee  is equal to the revenue generated by the previous 
land use. and therefore is a measure of opportunity cost 
Table  18.1  Project costs,  hypothetical tuna  cannery (US$  m) 
Capnal  cost 
A.  Structural  nems 
Deep-water dock 
Wharf facilities 
Buildings (canning, workshops, garages etcJ 
Other (access  roads, power transmission  lines etcJ 
Subtotal 
B. Plant and  equipment 
Refrigeration 
Canning  equipment 
Fishmeal  equipment 








Total  capital cost 
Working  capital 
Total project cost 



















The life  of the project is  expected to be 25 years, 
after which major replacement of plant and equipment 
will  be required. Construction occurs during the first 
two years, with the capital cost of construction spread 
equally over both years. All  finance for construction is 
assumed to be spent in the year that it is received. The 
residual value of the capital (Le. the written down value 
at the end of its  economic  life)  is  US$2.61  million, 
which is 9% of the initial total capital value. 
Production  is  assumed  to  commence at 50%  of 
capacity in year 3, increasing to 90% of capacity in year 
4,  and  100%  of  capacity  thereafter.  Variable  costs 
commence at 75% of the full-production total in year 3, 
increasing to 100% thereafter. 
Working capital is financed on the open market at 
a  rate of 8.5%  compounded annually throughout the 
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Table  18.2  Annual  operating costs,  hypothetical tuna  cannery (US$  m) 
Variable costs 
Raw tunaa  30.000 
Other raw materials (cans, labels, cases, filler!  12.000 
Indirect labour and freight  2.400 
Direct labour (variable)  1.500 
Fuel  1.500 
Marketing/brokerageb  1.333 
ElectricityC  0.640 
Other variable  costs  0.627 
Total  50.000 
Rxed  costs 
Direct labour (fixed)  1.500 
Maintenanced  1.160 
Insurancee  0.725 
Land  lease  fee  0.050 
Other fixed  costs  0.200 
Total  3.635 
Total  operating  cost  53.635 
aRaw tuna price. USS750/t Raw tuna throughput.40000 t/year. 
bMarketing/brokerage lee.2%  01 gross revenue. 
CElectriclty consumptlon.4.0 million  kW.h/year. Electricity price.USSO.16/kW.h. 
dMalntenance cost.4%  01 capital  cost 
elnsurance lee.2.5%  01 capital cost 
project  life.  Taxation  commences in  year 6  (Le.  it  is 
assumed  that  the  host government agrees  to  a  tax 
holiday for the first three years of operation), at a rate of 
25% of profits, where profits are equal to revenue net of 
operating costs and interest payments. All transactions 
are assumed to occur at the end of the year. 
The project is  financed  by  export credits4  from  a 
foreign  government  since  it  is  assumed  that  the 
western  Pacific  nation  where  the  cannery  will  be 
located  is  unable to  manufacture and construct the 
plant  using  domestic  resources.  The  arrangement 
comprises two equal, US$14.5 million, 10-yearloans at 
4  Export credits  provide  the  borrower with  finance  at interest 
rates  below  prevailing  market  levels,  while  ensuring  that  the 
contracted builder receives payment  For example, in  Australia 
the  company contracted  to  build  the cannery would  make an 
application  for export credit to  the government owned  Export 
Finance and Insurance Corporation. 
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Table 18.3  Canning  yields,  hypothetical  tuna  cannery  (outputlt  raw 
tuna). 
Canned  tuna  for export (cases)  59.0 
Canned tuna for domestic sale  (cases)  10.0 
Fishmeal  (tl  0.15 
Table 18.4  Annual  revenue,  hypothetical tuna  cannery (US$  mJ. 
Canned tuna  sales:  European Communi!t  56.64 
Domesticb  7.00 
Fishmeal salesc  3.00 
Total  revenue 
aAverage canned  tuna price. USS24/case. 
bOomestic canned tuna price. USS17.5/case. 
cRshmeal price. USS500/tonne. 
66.64 
an  interest  rate  of 7%  compounded  annually.  Each 
loan is repaid in  10 equal yearly instalments. 
The  rate  of discount  used  is  12%.  This  value  is 
relatively large compared to the rates commonly used 
to evaluate projects in industrial countries. This reflects 
the  fact  that the opportunity cost of capital  and the 
marginal rate of time preference in  the western Pacific 
region  are  relatively  high  compared  with  industrial 
countries. 
The exchange rate in  US$ per kina is  assumed to 
equal  1.00.  Hence,  while  all  values  are expressed  in 
US$, they could equally be expressed in  kina, with no 
change in the nominal value. 
Financial analysis 
Financial internal rate of  return 
The financial rate of return (IRR) is the rate of discount 
at which the present value of a project's benefits equals 
the present value of its costs. It represents the opportu-
nity cost of undertaking the project as opposed to an 
alternative use of the funds. If the financial IRR exceeds 
a  bench  mark  rate  of  interest  (Le.  the  stipulated 
discount rate, which represents the opportunity cost of 
capita\), the project is deemed to be financially viable. 
Financial  viability  of a  project  requires  that  the 
funds generated by  the project yield  a  return on the 
investment which is at least equal to the returns which 
could  accrue  from  alternative  investment  projects Cannery  Costs  in  the Western  Pacific: a Hypothetical Model 
competing for the same finance, within the enterprise 
undertaking  the  project.  Relevant  data  include  all 
monetary  flows  into  and  out  of the  project.  While 
interest  payments  are  not  included  as  costs,S  a 
knowledge  of interest  payments  is  required  for  the 
determination of taxation payments and for calculation 
of the project's cash flow. 
A financial analysis of the tuna cannery project was 
conducted  under  the  above  assumptions.  The  net 
present value (NPV)  of the benefit stream is  approxi-
mately  US$12.l8 million,  while  the  financial  IRR  is 
approximately  15.4%  (Table  18.5).  Under  the  base 
assumptions of the model, and at a  discount rate of 
12%, the cannery project is considered to be financially 
viable. 
Cash flow analysis 
While the calculation of the financial  IRR  is  used to 
determine whether a  project is  financially viable,  this 
alone does  not determine commercial viability.  This 
requires an assessment of the capacity of the investor 
to  repay  all  loans.  The  cash  flow  analysis  provides 
details of project loan repayments, interest payments, 
revenue, costs and taxes on the project. It documents 
all  private cost and revenue flows  associated with  the 
project. The NPV of the cash flow is used, together with 
the financiallRR, to determine the commercial viability 
of a project. 
The NPV of the cash flow is approximately US$33.8 
million (Table 18.6). Apart from  year 2,  when the first 
loan  and  interest payments  are  made, and year  25, 
when the working capital loan is repaid, the yearly cash 
flow is positive. Hence, it appears that there is sufficient 
revenue to meet ongoing costs, even in  the early years. 
However, additional finance may need to  be obtained 
to cover the repayments in  year 2, or alternatively, the 
borrower may  need to  negotiate a  delay  in  the first 
payment till the following year. 
Under the base assumptions of the model it can be 
concluded  that the  cannery  project  is  commercially 
viable. 
5 In  the calculation of the financial  IRR,  costs are treated in  the 
same  manner  whether  funds  are  available  from  within  the 
enterprise or from  borrowing. In  either case, the funds could be 
put  to  an  alternative  use,  and  hence  the  relevant  cost  is  the 
opportunity cost of capital. 
Sensitivity analysis 
Project appraisal  requires  the estimate of costs  and 
benefits which  will  accrue to a  project in  the future. 
Because  future  events  are  uncertain,  undertaking a 
project on the basis of a positive assessment is  inher-
ently risky. Costs may be greater than anticipated, and 
revenues  may  be less.  Sensitivity  analysis  is  a  crude 
method of accounting for this uncertainty. It analyses 
the  impact  of changes  in  certain  key  factors  upon 
financial viability. 
Two key factors which significantly impact upon the 
financial viability of the proposed cannery, and are also 
subject to a high degree of uncertainty, are the average 
price  received  for  canned  tuna  exported  to  the 
European Community, and the plant throughput. 
Canned  tuna  export  price. It is  assumed  that the 
cannery has some degree of monopsonistic power over 
the price of raw  tuna,  but not over other inputs. An 
increase/decrease in  the price of export canned tuna 
leads to an increase/decrease in the price of raw tuna, 
but the response is asymmetric. A 10% increase in  the 
export price of canned tuna leads to a 4%  increase in 
the price of raw  tuna, an increase in  revenue and an 
associated  increase  in  marketing/brokerage  costs.  A 
10% decrease in  the export price of canned tuna leads 
to a 7% decrease in the price of raw tuna, a decrease in 
revenue  and  an  associated  decrease  in  marketing/-
brokerage costs. 
Plant  throughput.  It is  assumed  that a  change  in 
plant throughput results  primarily  from  a  change in 
labour productivity, not hours worked. A 10% increase 
in throughput leads to a 10% increase in the cost of raw 
tuna, a 10% increase in the cost of other raw materials, 
a  10%  increase in  indirect labour and freight costs, a 
10%  increase in  fuel  costs, a  10% increase in  market-
ing/brokerage costs, and a 10% increase in  revenue. A 
10% decrease in throughput leads to a 10% decrease in 
the cost of raw tuna, a 10% decrease in the cost of other 
raw  materials, a  10% decrease in  indirect labour and 
freight  costs,  a  10%  decrease  in  fuel  costs,  a  10% 
decrease  in  marketing/brokerage  costs,  and  a  10% 
decrease in revenue. 
Table  18.7  documents the  responsiveness  of the 
financiallRR to changes in  the export price of canned 
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Table 18.5  Financial analysis,  hypothetical tuna cannery (US$m). 
Year  Capital costs  Working  capital  Rxed  costs 
-14.5  0  0.000 
2  -14.5  0  0.000 
3  0.0  -20  -3.635 
4  0.0  0  -3.635 
5  0.0  0  -3.635 
6  0.0  0  -3.635 
7  0.0  0  -3.635 
8  0.0  0  -3.635 
9  0.0  0  -3.635 
10  0.0  0  -3.635 
11  0.0  0  -3.635 
12  0.0  0  -3.635 
13  0.0  0  -3.635 
14  0.0  0  -3.635 
15  0.0  0  -3.635 
16  0.0  0  -3.635 
17  0.0  0  -3.635 
18  0.0  0  -3.635 
19  0.0  0  -3.635 
20  0.0  0  -3.635 
21  0.0  0  -3.635 
22  0.0  0  -3.635 
23  0.0  0  -3.635 
24  0.0  0  -3.635 
25  2.61  20  -3.635 
NPV (12%)  12.18 
tuna and the plant throughput In general, the financial 
IRR  is  more responsive  to  changes in  price  than  to 
changes in  throughput. A 20%  decline in  throughput 
causes  the  financial  IRR  to  decline  from  15.4%  to 
10.9%,  whereas  a  20% decline  in  price  causes  the 
financial  IRR  to decline from  15.4% to 6.4%.  This  is 
because, under the assumptions, changes in  revenue 
are  compensated  to  a  greater extent by  changes  in 
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Variable costs  Revenue  Tax  on  profits  Net  benefit 
0.0  0.00  0  -14.50 
0.0  0.00  0  -14.50 
-37.5  33.32  0  -27.82 
-50.0  59.976  0  6.34 
-50.0  66.64  0  13.01 
-50.0  66.64  -2046  10.55 
-50.0  66.64  -2.51  10.50 
-50.0  66.64  -2.56  10045 
-50.0  66.64  -2.61  lOAD 
-50.0  66.64  -2.67  10.34 
-50.0  66.64  -2.73  1028 
-50.0  66.64  -2.79  1021 
-50.0  66.64  -2.83  10.18 
-50.0  66.64  -2.83  10.18 
-50.0  66.64  -2.83  10.18 
-50.0  66.64  -2.83  10.18 
-50.0  66.64  -2.83  10.18 
-50.0  66.64  -2.83  10.18 
-50.0  66.64  -2.83  10.18 
-50.0  66.64  -2.83  10.18 
-50.0  66.64  -2.83  10.18 
-50.0  66.64  -2.83  10.18 
-50.0  66.64  -2.83  10.18 
-50.0  66.64  -2.83  10.18 
-50.0  66.64  -2.83  32.79 
IRR(%)  1504 
costs  when  they  are  brought  about  by  variation  in 
throughput, rather than variation in price.6 
6 That is,  an  increase  in  throughput  leads  to  an  increase  in 
revenue,  and an increase  in  various  costs, including raw  tuna, 
other  raw  materials,  indirect  labour  and  freight,  fuel  and 
marketing/brokerage costs, whereas  an  increase  in  the  export 
price of canned tuna leads to an increase in revenue, an increase 
in the price of raw tuna and an increase in  marketing/brokerage 
costs. Cannery Costs  In  the Western  Pacific: a  Hypothetical Model 
































































































































































As  noted, the establishment of a  cannery on  the 
basis of a  positive assessment of the financial  return 
involves  risk.  In  order to analyse  this  risk,  it  is  more 
pertinent to consider declines in prices and throughput 
rather than increases. In order to be deemed financially 
viable, the cannery's financial IRR must be greater than 
12%. As noted, a 20% decline in throughput causes the 
financial  IRR  to fall  from  15.4%  to  10.9%,  whereas a 
20%  decline in  price causes the financial  IRR  to fall 
from  15.4% to 6.4%. In  either case, the cannery is  not 
Loan  Interest 

































































































































NPV  33.84 
financially viable. If both throughput and price decline 
by  20%,  the financial  IRR  declines  to  3.0%. The data 
indicate that,  beyond  a  15% decline in  the assumed 
level  of throughput, or a  5%  decline in  the assumed 
levels  of both price and throughput, the cannery will 
not be financially viable. 
As  is  common  in  many commodity  markets,  the 
market price of canned tuna is subject to considerable 
variation.  Concerning  risk,  it  is  most  relevant  to 
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Table  18.7  Sensitivity analysis: effect of changes  in  canned tuna  prices and throughput on financiallRR, hypothetical tuna  cannery 
Change  in  Change  in  price  of canned tuna for export 
throughput 
-20%  -15%  -10%  -5% 
-20  3.0  5.1  7.1  9.1 
-15  3.9  6.1  8.1  10.1 
-10  4.8  7.0  9.1  112 
-5%  5.6  7.9  10.1  122 
0%  6.4  8.8  11.0  13.2 
+5%  7.2  9.6  11.9  142 
+10  7.9  10.4  12.8  152 
+15  8.7  112  13.7  16.1 
+20  9.4  12.0  14.5  17.0 
consider price declines. However, it is also worthwhile 
to analyse the impact of price increases, since these do 
occur. Small increases in  the export price of canned 
tuna  can  offset  considerable  declines  in  plant 
throughput (Table 18.7).  If price increases by  5%,  the 
cannery  will  be  able  to  incur  a  20%  decline  in 
throughput and still remain financially viable. 
The assumed level of throughput in the base model 
is based upon reasonable estimates of productivity in a 
range of existing canneries and, as such, the inclusion 
of throughput increases in the analysis is not unreason-
able. However, in the case of the Pacific islands, there is 
reason  to  question  whether  an  analysis  of  such 
increases  is  relevant  While  there  is  little  empirical 
evidence  available,  there  is  considerable  anecdotal 
evidence to suggest that levels of labour productivity in 
the Pacific islands region are considerably lower than 
those in Asian or in industrial economies. This suggests 
that, for  practical purposes, the bottom half of Table 
18.7  is  less  relevant than the top  half.  The data do 
indicate  that,  should  labour  productivity  and  thus 
throughput increases occur, they are capable of offset-
ting price declines, though not to the same extent that 
price  increases  can  offset  throughput  declines.  A 
throughput increase of 20% can offset a 15% decline in 
price to the extent that viability  is  just maintained. If 
both  throughput  and  price  increase  by  20%,  the 
financial IRR will increase to 31.6%. 
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+0%  +5%  +10%  +15%  +20% 
10.9  13.3  15.5  17.8  20.0 
12.1  14.5  16.9  192  21.5 
13.2  15.7  182  20.6  23.1 
14.3  16.9  19.5  22.0  24.5 
15.4  18.1  20.8  23.4  26.0 
16.4  192  22.0  24.7  27.4 
17.5  20.4  232  26.0  28.9 
18.5  21.5  24.4  27.3  30.2 
19.4  22.5  25.6  28.6  31.6 
Economic analysis 
Economic  (or  cost-benefit)  analysis  provides  a 
framework for the assessment of proj~cts on the basis 
of the costs and benefits which accrue to the economy 
as a whole. It involves  the identification of all  project 
inputs and outputs and, in  principle, the valuation of 
these  in  terms  of  incremental  economic  costs  or 
benefits.  On  the  basis  of this  information,  the  net 
benefit (positive or negative)  to  the economy can  be 
determined.  Only  those  costs  and  benefits  which 
accrue  to  the  economy  as  a  whole  are  included. 
Payments such as taxes, which are included as costs in 
the financial analysis, are excluded from the economic 
analysis since they are transfers within the economy. 
External economic benefits 
The goal  of increasing the benefits that accrue from 
their tuna resources is  of high priority to many Pacific 
island  governments.  The  establishment  of  a  tuna 
cannery would increase the government's control over 
the  utilisation  of its  tuna resource,  and  enable  the 
government to retain some benefits from value adding 
in  the domestic economy. In  addition, the production 
of fish meal could reduce imports of this product, and 
thus conserve foreign exchange. 
Direct  and  indirect  labour costs  are assumed to 
equal US$5.4 million (less nonlabour freight charges) Cannery Costs  In  the Western  Pacific: a Hypothetical Model 
when the cannery is operating at full production. Given 
the importance placed on employment generation by 
island governments, it is likely that most of this income 
would  accrue  to  nationals.  Generally,  in  developing 
countries,  the  majority  of  those  employed  in  new 
labour intensive industries are females, most of whom 
have  no previous  regular income. Where unemploy-
ment  levels  are  high,  the  pool  of  potential  male 
employees is also large. Hence it is  likely that the bulk 
of the money received by employees is additional rather 
than alternative income. 
Macroeconomic theory indicates that the multiplier 
effects of employment expenditure in an economy can 
be  significant  However,  in  Pacific  island  economies, 
where  most  manufactured  goods  are  imported,  the 
benefits  from  employment multiplier effects  may  be 
limited, since much of the additional expenditure will 
'leak' out of the economy. 
During the initial  two-year construction  phase of 
the project, benefits will  accrue through the purchase 
of locally supplied items. However, significant leakage 
on imports is likely to occur. 
Increased purchasing power among employees and 
increased availability of fish  products (via tuna fishing 
by-catch) may result in improved nutritional standards 
and hence improved health. Due to increased availa-
bility, the cost of fish  and fish  products should decline. 
Hence,  nutritional  benefits  may  accrue  to  the  local 
community at large, and not just to those who benefit 
directly from  employment However, the availability of 
purse seine by-catch may render local artisinal fisheries 
uneconomic, since the marginal cost associated with 
such a catch is negligible. 
While the employment of expatriates in  manage-
ment and technical positions is  a cost to society, any 
transfer of technical and management skills  to  local 
workers is of significant benefit to the economy, partic-
ularly if these skills are transferred to other sectors of 
the economy over time. 
The  building of structural  items  will  benefit  the 
fishery  and  plantation sectors  of the  local  economy. 
The building of docks and wharf facilities will  improve 
conditions  and  services  for  local  fishers,  while  the 
improvement  of  local  roads  and  development  of 
related  infrastructure  will  benefit  local  plantation 
agriculture  by  facilitating  the transportation  of their 
produce to markets and export centres. 
External economic costs 
While the lease fee included in the operating costs is to 
some  extent  an  opportunity  cost,  representing  the 
benefits foregone by the cessation of current activities, 
it may be that the best alternative land use is develop-
ment for some high-value industry such as tourism. To 
this extent there is an added economic cost This cost 
would be increased if the establishment of the cannery 
deterred the development of tourist facilities in  neigh-
bouring areas. 
Should  conditions  on  the  international  tuna 
market become adverse, through a decline in  canned 
tuna  prices  or the  loss  of tariff-free  entry  into  the 
European  Community,  resulting  in  the  cessation  of 
cannery operations, extensive site rehabilitation costs 
may  be  incurred.  Alternatively,  the government  may 
choose to  inject funds  into  the cannery  in  order to 
maintain  employment  Such  an  injection  of  funds 
would require a significant budgetary allocation, which 
would otherwise benefit other sectors of the economy. 
Should the government offer licence fee reductions 
to  the  vessels  of  distant  water  fishing  nations  who 
supply the cannery, foreign exchange losses will accrue 
to the economy. In addition, some loss of payment for 
the transshipment of frozen tuna will occur. 
The  opportunity  for  employment  and  improved 
local conditions may result in increased migration into 
the  area,  necessitating  government  expenditure  on 
housing and other amenities. 
The construction of a suitably sized effluent pipe 
and  suitable  landfill  are  likely  to  limit  the  environ-
mental damage associated with  the project However, 
oil  spills  and  other pollution  from  increased  purse 
seine traffic will incur some economic costs. 
Economic internal rate of  return 
The economic IRR is the real rate of discount at which 
the present value of the benefits to  the economy (or 
society)  from  the  project  exactly  equals  the  present 
value of the costs to the economy. The stream of net 
benefits  determined  in  the  analysis  includes  private 
benefits (obtained from  the financial analysis) and net 
external  benefits.  If  the  economic  IRR  exceeds  the 
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opportunity cost of capital, then the project is deemed 
economically viable.  Economic viability  requires  that 
the project generate net benefits to the economy as a 
whole that are at least equal to those which would arise 
from other investment projects competing for the same 
financial resources. 
It is difficult to determine all external benefits and 
costs  which  accrue  to  any  given  project  Those 
mentioned in  the previous section are likely to  be the 
most important, although the list is not exhaustive. It is 
also extremely difficult to quantify the external benefits 
and costs. While public benefits are likely to be signifi-
cant in the project under consideration, so are external 
costs. It is possible therefore, that net external benefits 
will be quite small, or even negative? 
The economic IRR  of the hypothetical cannery is 
analysed under two groups of assumptions. 
Assumption set 1 
It is assumed that yearly net external benefits are negli-
gible.  It is  also assumed that all  prices and therefore 
costs  and  revenues  used  in  the  financial  analysis 
represent the true economic value, i.e. prices are deter-
mined  by  supply  and  demand.  In  addition,  it  is 
assumed that the dollar/kina exchange rate of 1.00 is 
an accurate reflection  of the supply and demand for 
the currencies in financial markets. 
In  this  case  the  only  difference  between  the 
economic and  financial  analysis  is  the treatment of 
taxation. Since taxation is simply a transfer within the 
economy,  it  is  not treated as a cost in  the economic 
analysis. The economic IRR  for the project is  18.1%, 
and the NPV is approximately US$23.6 million (Table 
18.8).  Hence,  under the documented assumptions,  it 
can  be  concluded  that  the  cannery  is  economically 
viable. 
As noted in the financial analysis, the economic IRR 
is more responsive to changes in price than to changes 
in  throughput  A  20%  decline  in  plant  throughput 
causes  the economic  IRR  to  decline  from  18.1 % to 
13.0%  (Table  18.9).  Hence the cannery can sustain a 
20%  decline in  throughput and remain economically 
viable, given that price does not fall. 
7 While the external benefit of a road may be  very large,  this is 
highly site specific. 
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66.64  -56.427  2.792 
66.64  -56.461  2.826 
66.64  -56.461  2.826 
66.64  -56.461  2.826 
66.64  -56.461  2.826 
66.64  -56.461  2.826 
66.64  -56.461  2.826 
66.64  -56.461  2.826 
66.64  -56.461  2.826 
66.64  -56.461  2.826 
66.64  -56.461  2.826 
66.64  -56.461  2.826 
66.64  -56.461  2.826 
66.64  -33.851  2.826 































If price alone changes, the cannery can sustain a 
10% decline and remain  economically viable. If both 
price and throughput decline, the maximum changes 
that the cannery can sustain and remain economically 
viable  are  a  15%  decline  in  throughput  and  a  5% 
decline in  price, or a 5% decline in  throughput and a 
10%  decline in  price. Any  further declines will  render 
the cannery economically unviable. Cannery Costs  in  the Western  Pacific: a  Hypothetical Model 
Table  18.9  Sensitivity analysis: effect of changes  in  canned tuna  prices and throughput on economic IRR, hypothetical tuna  cannery 
Changes in  Change in price of canned tuna  for export 
throughput  -20%  -15%  -10%  -5% 
-20%  3.7  62  8.6  10.8 
-15%  4.8  7.4  9.8  12.1 
-10%  5.8  8.5  11.0  13.3 
-5%  6.8  9.5  12.1  14.5 
0%  7.8  10.5  13.2  15.6 
+5%  8.7  11.5  14.2  16.8 
+10%  9.6  12.5  15.2  17.8 
+15%  10.5  13.4  162  18.9 
+20%  11.3  14.3  17.1  20.0 
If the price of canned tuna remains at the assumed 
level  or  increases,  the  cannery  can  accommodate 
considerable declines in throughput As noted, with no 
price increase, the cannery can sustain a 20% decline 
in throughput and remain economically viable. Should 
throughput decline 20%,  a  price increase of 10% will 
result in  an economic IRR of 18.2%,  and hence more 
than compensate for the decline. Should price increase 
20%,  and  throughput remain  at the  base  level,  the 
economic IRR will increase to 29.6%, which is consider-
ably greater than the cost of capital. 
If  throughput  increases  20%,  the  cannery  can 
sustain a price decline of 15%,  and remain financially 
viable. If both throughput and price increase 20%, the 
economic IRR will increase to 35.5%. 
Assumption set  2 
It is  assumed that net external benefits are negligible. 
In  addition,  it  is  assumed  that  the  exchange  rate 
between  the  US$  and  the  kina  of  1.00  is  not  an 
accurate reflection  of supply  and demand for  those 
currencies. It is  also assumed that not all wages paid 
reflect the supply and demand for labour accurately. 
Specific assumptions: It  is also assumed that 80% of 
capital costs, 90% of variable costs, the proportion of 
revenue which is derived from  export of canned tuna, 
and  export  credits,  are  transacted  in  US$.  The 
remainder, including working capital are transacted in 
kina It is also assumed that the economic cost of direct 
{variable} labour is below that which is indicated by the 
0%  +5%  +10%  +15%  +20% 
13.0  15.6  18.2  20.6  23.1 
14.3  17.0  19.7  22.2  24.7 
15.6  18.4  21.1  23.8  26.4 
16.8  19.7  22.6  25.3  28.0 
18.1  21.0  23.9  26.8  29.6 
19.2  22.3  25.3  28.2  31.1 
20.4  23.5  26.6  29.6  32.6 
21.5  24.7  27.9  31.0  34.0 
22.5  25.9  29.2  32.3  35.5 
financial  cost  All  other  financial  labour  costs  are 
assumed to be true economic costs. 
In  the estimation of the economic IRR,  three alter-
native  'shadow' exchange rates in  LT S$ per kina,  and 
three alternative 'shadow' direct (variable) labour costs 
are considered.8 Shadow labour costs are expressed in 
proportions,  i.e.  they  indicate  the  proportion  of 
nominal direct {variable}  labour costs which  are true 
economic costs. In both cases, the values are 1.00,0.75 
and 0.50. The value of 1.00 indicates that the nominal 
value equals the shadow or true economic value, while 
0.75 and 0.50 indicate that the shadow value {of the 
kina or direct (variable)  labour}  is  below the nominal 
value. The shadow labour cost is  an indication of the 
value which  the workers {assumed to be unemployed 
prior to their cannery employment} attributed to leisure 
activities which they have foregone. Since leisure is  in 
general highly valued in the Pacific, a minimum of 0.5 
has been used.9 
As  is  indicated  by  the assumptions, the use of a 
shadow exchange rate has implications for both costs 
and benefits. The smaller the exchange rate, the larger 
8 The tenn 'shadow' is used to indicate that the value used is an 
estimate of the true economic value. 
9 For both shadow values, the nearest appropriate level is likely to 
be 0.5.  The value of the kina is significantly less than the value of 
Australian dollar.  The current Australian/U.S. exchange rate is 
approximately 0.67.  With  regard to labour cost, while the value 
of  leisure  is  presumably  high,  all  income  is  assumed  to  be 
additional, i.e. the workforce was previously unemployed. 
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the kina value of those goods which are traded in  U.S. 
dollars. As  the shadow exchange rate  declines  from 
1.00 to 0.50, the economic IRR increases from 18.1 % to 
22.9%, indicating that the impact of the change on the 
present value of revenues is larger than the impact on 
the present value of costs (Table 18.10). 
As  the  shadow  cost  of  direct  (variable)  labour 
declines from  100% to 50% of the nominal value, the 
economic IRR  increases from  18.1 % to  19.2%. When 
shadow values  are  used  for  both exchange rate and 
labour cost, the impact upon economic IRR is relatively 
larger.  As  both  shadow values  decline  from  1.00 to 
0.50, the economic IRR increases from  18.1  % to 23.6%. 
Table  18.10  Sensitivity analysis: effect of changes  in shadow prices 
for  direct  (variable)  labour and  the  exchange  rate  on  the  economic 
IRR,  hypothetical tuna  cannery 
Shadow exchange  rate 
(US$Jkina) 
Shadow cost for direct variable  labour 
(proportion  of nominal  direct variable 
labour costl 
1.00  0.75  0.50 
1.00  18.1  18.6  19.2 
0.75  19.6  20.0  20.5 
0.50  22.9  232  23.6 
Hence the use of shadow values for the exchange 
rate and the cost of direct (variable)  labour increases 
the estimate of economic viability. 
Conclusion 
Under the assumptions documented in  the analysis, it 
has been demonstrated that the hypothetical cannery 
is  both financially  and economically viable.  The two 
most  important  factors  which  influence  financial 
viability are the average price received for canned tuna 
exported to the European Community, and the plant 
throughput  as  determined  by  labour  productivity. 
While changes in  the price of canned tuna have  the 
greater  impact  upon  the  financial  IRR,  declines  in 
throughput are an equally serious concern due to the 
problem  of  low  labour  productivity  in  the  Pacific 
islands region. 
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The most important  factors  which  influence  the 
economic viability are those which influence financial 
viability,  i.e.  price  and  throughput changes,  and  the 
degree to which market distortions affect the nominal 
monetary values which are used in the analysis. In this 
instance, the two most apparent distortions were those 
affecting  the  exchange  rate,  and  hence  input  and 
output prices, and those affecting certain wage rates. 
If it is assumed that market distortions are absent 
the cannery can sustain a throughput decline of 20% 
and remain economically viable. Should price increase 
beyond the assumed level, the cannery could sustain 
an  even  greater  decline  in  throughput  However, 
operating decisions are made not by society, but by the 
firm which operates the cannery. If price remains at the 
assumed level the cannery can sustain a 15% decline in 
throughput and remain financially viable. If the price 
declines  15% however,  the cannery will  not be finan-
cially viable, even in the unlikely event that throughput 
increases  by  5%.  Hence,  some  reservation  must be 
placed on the conclusion that the cannery is viable. 
The use of shadow values for the exchange rate and 
proportion  of  the  cost  of  direct  (variable)  labour 
increases the estimate of economic IRR For both, as 
already discussed,  the most appropriate value  is  0.5, 
which  results  in  an economic IRR  of 23.61 %.  In  the 
estimation of economic IRR using shadow values, base 
levels  for  canned tuna price and cannery throughput 
were assumed. 
Should  tariff-free  entry  into  the  European 
Community be lost during the course of operations, the 
cannery would  cease to be financially viable since, in 
order  to  compete  with  low  cost  producers  such  as 
Thailand, price would need to be reduced by more than 
15%. In  such an event, the government could choose 
either to  subsidise operations with  budgetary alloca-
tions which would otherwise be used elsewhere, or to 
allow  operations  to  cease  and  rehabilitate  the  site. 
Either choice would entail considerable cost. Part VI 
International 
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The Japanese tuna industry 
Vessel numbers, sizes and types 
Three  principal  vessel  types  are  used  by  Japanese 
fishers  lo  harvest  luna:  pole-and-line;  longline;  and 
purse seine. Between  1970 and 1983, tolal pole-and--
line vessel numbers declined from 512 to 433, peaking 
at 696  in  the  mid-1970s.  The dominant class  sizes 
were 50-100 GRT and 200-500 GRT,  both of which 
declined  in  number  during  the  early  1980s.  This 
decline  in  the  pole-and-line  fleel  resulted  from 
financial difficulties experienced during the late 1970s, 
which prompted lhe government to organise a planned 
fleet  reduction and conversion of vessels to the more 
efficient  purse  seiners  (WilIiams  1987).  This  trend 
continued  into  the  late  1980s;  between  1986  and 
1989, the number of pole-and-line vessels operating in 
distant water fisheries declined from  146 to  108 (L.S. 
Department of Stale 1990cl. 
Over  the  period  1970  to  198:~ ,  lhe  Japanese 
longline fleet declined in  number from  1549 to  1267, 
continuing  a  trend  which  began  in  the  mid-1960s 
when  vessel  numbers  reached  a  peak of 2135. The 
dominant class sizes were 50-100 GRT and 200-500 
GRT, reflecting the fleel rationalisation which occurred 
during the Shawa Genroku (economic boom period).! 
Between  1986 and  1989, the trend continued as the 
number of longline vessels operating in  distant water 
fisheries declined from  792 to 763, while the number 
of longline vessels operating in adjacent water fisheries 
declined  from  776 to  592 (CS.  Department of State 
1990c). 
Unlike  the  trends  for  pole-and-line  and  longline 
vessels,  purse  seine  numbers  increased  during  the 
1970s and 1980s. In  1973, six purse seiners operated 
in  the Pacific.  By  1990, the number of overseas purse 
seiners in operation had increased to 36 (L'.S. Depart-
ment of State 1990c). The increase in vessel numbers 
was  most marked between  1980 and 1983, reflecting 
government  initiatives  to  restructure  the  industry. 
During this period, the number of purse seine vessels 
increased from  13 to  3:~ (Jizuka and Watanabe 1983; 
Petit 1984). 
Tuna landings by  form and species 
During 1987-92, total Japanese tuna landings ranged 
between 421.8 kt and 531.7 kt. Landings offresh tuna 
ranged  between 84.5 kt  and  132.5 kt per year, while 
landings of frozen  tuna ranged between 32/t4 kt and 
I  The prevailing trend during this period was the replacement of 
large  tuna  vessels  (especially  motherships)  with  smaller  cost 
efficient  longiine  vessels  of  approximately  240-360  GRT  for 
distant water fishing. and smaller 50 GRT vessels for coastal and 
near-sea fishing (Williams 1987). 
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399.2  kt per year. The principal species landed were  mercury  contamination  and  unfavourable  rates  of 
skipjack, which accounted for 58% of landings in 1992,  exchange. In  1974, imports increased to 43.1  kt, and in 
bigeye  (19%),  albacore  (1 1  %),  yellowfin  (9%),  and  the following  year  increased  substantially (112%)  to 
bluefin  (3%)  (FAO  1993a). Landings during january- 9l.3  kt  During  1975-84,  fresh  and  frozen  tuna 
March  1993 totalled 75.2 kt, an increase of 10% over  imports fluctuated yearly and ranged between 77.6 kt 
the same period for the previous year (FAO Globefish  and 122.1 kt (Ikematsu 1984; Williams 1987). 
Highlights 1993).  During  1985-92, japanese imports  of fresh  and 
Japanese fresh and frozen tuna imports  frozen  tuna generally increased, and ranged between 
138.1 kt and 275.9 kt per year (Table 19.1). Korea and 
In  1970, japan imported approximately 30 kt of the  Taiwan  were  the  two  principal  sources  of  supply. 
main  tuna species.  There  was  little  growth  in  the  Imports  from  Korea  fluctuated  during  the  period 
industry  during  1971-73,  due  to  the  problem  of  reaching a peak of 67.4 kt in  1987, and subsequently 
Table  19.1  Japanese imports of fresh  and  frozen tuna,  by species 1985-92 Iktl 
1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992 
Sklpjack 
Korea  0.3  0.1  0.1  0.1  02  0.5  0.1 
Taiwan  0.0  02  0.5  0.1  3.6  0.8  2.4 
Total  sklpJack  6.1  2.9  3.9  3.4  32  25.6  29.7  29.3 
A1bacore 
Korea  0.7  0.8  12  1.3  0.8  0.7  1.2  1.5 
Taiwan  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  1.8  5.8 
Total albacore  2.6  2.4  3.0  3.1  2.9  1.8  42  9.4 
Yellowfin 
Korea  18.1  24.1  30.2  28.6  21.3  26.0  19.3  20.5 
Taiwan  17.4  20.9  32.3  32.9  31.2  482  43.2  68.7 
Total yellowfln  75.4  66.8  98.0  120.1  110.2  134.4  115.0  133.7 
Bluefln 
Korea  0.1  0.5  0.1  0.1  02  0.5  0.4 
Taiwan  02  0.1  02  0.3  1.0  0.8  1.4  0.4 
Total  bluefln  4.8  52  5.1  5.8  6.8  7.0  6.5  4.9 
Bigeye 
Korea  28.0  31.8  35.9  34.0  31.5  29.3  33.1  28.9 
Taiwan  13.6  17.0  22.6  22.5  22.6  26.5  41.3  33.7 
Total blgeye  522  60.8  74.7  77.4  83.3  88.7  109.9  98.6 
All  species 
Korea  572  57.4  67.4  64.0  53.9  56.7  54.1  51.4 
Taiwan  31.3  38.1  552  56.3  54.9  792  88.5  111.0 
Total  all  141.1  138.1  184.7  209.8  206.4  257.5  265.3  275.9 
species 
Source: Globefish Highlights, various years. 
232 declining  to  51.4  kt  in  1992. Imports  from  Taiwan 
increased from  31.3 kt in  19R5 to III kt in  1992. The 
principal tuna species imported were yellowfin,  which 
accounted for  48% of imports in  1992,  bigeye (%%), 
skipjack (11 %), albacore (3%), and bluefin (2%). 
Of the total Japanese tuna imports  during  1992, 
55 kt (20%)  were  imported fresh, an increase of 17% 
over  1991.  Yellowfin  is  the  main  species  imported 
fresh, accounting for two-thirds of fresh  tuna imports 
(FAO  1993a).  Indonesia  was  the  main  supplier  of 
chilled yellowfin during 1992, followed  by Taiwan and 
Malaysia. Indonesian exports  of fresh/chilled  tuna to 
Japan  increased  141%  during  1990-92  (Ferdouse 
1993). Shipment<;  of fresh  bigeye  are also increasing. 
and totalled  15  kt  in  1992, an increase of 50% over 
1991 (FAO Globefish Highlights 1993). 
DuringJanuary-March 1993, fresh and frozen tuna 
imports  totalled  73.1  kt,  an  increase  of  16%  over 
January-March  1992.  Imports  of yellowfin  totalled  a 
record 41.8 kl Japan  is  currently the only  outlet for 
yellowfin  tuna from  the eastern Pacific, and countries 
which  harvest  this  tuna,  e.g. Mexico,  exported  more 
tuna  to  Japan  in  January-March  of  1993  than  in 
previous  years.  Much  of  the  increase  in  yellowfin 
imports is destined for canneries, and hence the supply 
of canned tuna in Japan during 1993 is expected to be 
greater than in recent years (FAO Globefish Highlights 
1993). 
The most valuable tuna species on the Japanese 
market in  tenns of price paid per kilogram  is  bluefin. 
The supply  of wild  bluefin  has  declined  steadily  in 
recent decades due  to over-exploitation. In  response, 
substantial  investment  has gone  into  the  raising  of 
bluefin  in  captivity.  Cultured  bluefin  from  Australia 
arrived  on  the Japanese  market  in  October  1992. 
Approximately  10 fish  were auctioned each day,  and 
received  a  price  between  US$16-40/kg,  which 
exceeded  the  price  of  wild  southern  bluefin  by 
US$8/kg. Cultured bluefin from  Spain were also sold 
on the market and received a  price of approximately 
US$58/kg (FAO 1992). 
While  Korea  and  Taiwan  supply  much  of  the 
imported  bigeye  and yellowfin  (67%  of yellowfin  and 
63% of bigeye in  1992), they do not participate signifi-
cantly in  the skipjack or bluefin trade. In  1992, Korea 
and Taiwan combined supplied 16% of blue  fin imports 
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and 9% of skipjack imports (Table  19. n The market 
share  of Taiwan  and  Korea  has  been  significantly 
eroded since  1978, at which  time  the  two  countries 
accounted for  95.7%  of the volume of imported tuna 
and 96.1 % of the value Qapan External Trade Urgani-
sat  ion 198!t). 
The decline in the market dominance of Korea and 
Taiwan can be attributed principally to  rising costs, in 
particular labour and fuel,  and  to  increasing foreign 
interest in  the Japanese sa~himi market, most notably 
since  the  late  1970s. Sashimi  grade  frozen  tuna  is 
currently supplied to Japan by more than 20 cuuntries. 
Competitors in  the frozen  tuna trade include Mexico, 
Australia,  :vtaldives,  Panama,  Indonesia  and  the 
Solomon Islands. Competition in the chilled tuna trade 
is  provided  by  the  Philippines.  Canada,  thc  L nited 
States, Spain, Turkey and !\ustralia (Williams 19R7). 
Freezing and cold-storage 
Cold  storage  facilities  in  Japan  are  concentrated  in 
coa<;tal  landing  ports  and  major  cities.  Land-ba<;eJ 
ultra  low  temperature  storage  capacity  in  Japan 
increased 194% during 1965-78, from 5.56 million m3 
to 16.36 million m3. During the same period, freezing 
capacity  (e.g.  blast  freezers)  increased  84%, from  16 
kt/day to 29.4 kt/day (Nakai  1984). During 1976-83, 
ultra low  temperature freezer storage in  tuna vessels 
increased dramatically (1408%), from  2.5kt to 39.l kt 
Oapan External Trade Organisation 1985). 
During January 1985 to March 1993, Japanese cold 
storage  holdings  of  tuna  fluctuated,  generally 
increasing  during  1985-91, and  generally  declining 
during  1992-93,  although  there  was  considerable 
month to month fluctuation. In January 1993, holdings 
were approximately 70kt. The principal species stored, 
in  descending order by  quantity Oanuary  1993), were 
skipjack, yellowfin, bigeye and albacore (FAO Globefish 
Highlights 1990 and 1993). 
Canned tuna: production, imports, exports, 
and apparent consumption 
Canned tuna production increased during the first half 
of the  1980s, from  lllkt in  1981  to 124 kt in  1984, 
but subsequently declined to 95.7 kt in  1991. Imports 
remained relatively stable during 1981-87, and then 
increased during 1987-91, reaching a level of 15.3  kt 
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in  the lalter year.  Exports increa.,ed during 1981-84, 
from 35 kt to 46 kt,  and subsequently declined during 
1985-91, to a level of 4.7 kt in the lalter year. Apparent 
consumption of canned tuna increased during 1981-
88, declined during the following  two  years, and then 
increased almost to the peak level in  1991. 
Table  19.2  Japanese  production,  imports,  exports,  and  apparent  con-
sumption, canned tuna, 1981-91  Itl 
Year  Production  Imports  Exports  Apparent 
consumption 
1981  111000  1000  35000  77000 
1982  113000  1661  35718  78943 
1983  117000  2425  36948  82477 
1984  124000  1466  45635  79831 
1985  114000  1566  33993  81573 
1986  113744  907  29558  85093 
1987  111904  1673  15452  98125 
1988  11 0771  4049  8249  106571 
1989  103793  5571  5299  104065 
1990  92113  7981  3930  96164 
1991  95716  15335  4699  106352 
Source:  FAO  1986, 1991; Ferdouse  1993; U .S . Department of State  1990c. 
The increase  in  canned tuna imports  into Japan 
during 1987-91 was supplied principally by Thailand. 
In  1987, Thailand exported 1219 t of canned tuna to 
Japan. By 1991, Thai exports to Japan had increased to 
5700 t  In  1992, Thai canned tuna exports to Japan 
were a record 8700 t (FAO Globefish Highlights 1993). 
Due  to  the  current  problems  facing  the Thai  tuna 
canning industry, i.e. the detention of product by  the 
United  State's  Food  and  Drug  Administration,  and 
import restrictions in  the European Community, it  is 
likely thatjapan will become an increasingly important 
target for Thai canned tuna exports. 
While  apparent consumption of canned  tuna  in 
Japan generally increased during 1981-92, it is difficult 
to forecast trends to the end of the decade. While it is 
likely that Japanese imports of Thai canned tuna will 
increase, the presence of low priced imported canned 
tuna on the Japanese market may reduce the viability 
of the domestic industry, and hence domestic produc-
tion. This may be further exacerbated by the increasing 
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use of albacore for sashimi, hence reducing the supply 
of albacore  for  canning  (FAO  Globefish  Ilighlight., 
1993).  Therefore,  growth  in  apparent  consumption 
may be limited. Current trends may herald the demise 
of the Japanese domestic canned tuna industry and the 
rise of Japan as a major importer of canned tuna. 
Trade barriers 
The Japanese tariff rate for imports of fresh, chilled and 
frozen tuna is 5% ad valorem, and for dried and canned 
tuna is  15%  ad valorem.  Imports of canned tuna are 
subject  to  inspection  by  officers  in  the  Ministry  of 
Health and Welfare, under the Japanese Food Sanita-
tion  Law.  A  permit  must  be  issued  by  the  :vTinistry 
before  imports can  pass  through  customs.  Imported 
canned tuna is sampled and inspected for compliance 
with  government  regulations  on  food  sanitation, 
additives and labelling. Standards required of imported 
tuna are the same a<;  those required  of the domestic 
product (CSITC 1986). 
In addition, industry groups may request inspection 
of imported  tuna (for  a  prescribed  fee),  in  order to 
ascertain whether the quality of the imported tuna is 
comparable with Japanese industry quality standards. 
Import procedures and inspection, both mandated and 
voluntary (as described above), have been criticised by 
foreign  suppliers as  being protectionist The impres-
sion  that  significant  non  tariff  barriers  exist  stems 
principally from  the market for fresh  tuna. Prices for 
high quality bluefin and, to a lesser extent, yellowfin are 
very  high  in  the Japanese market The price variation 
between  high  and  low  quality  is  based  on  the  oil 
content and freshness of the tuna. Foreign producers 
of bluefin and yellowfin wishing to export to Japan have 
often  faced  rejection  of  the  product,  due  to  poor 
quality. They have suggested that this quality control is 
an effective  non  tariff barrier to  entry in  the Japanese 
fresh  tuna market Japanese industry  representatives 
consider  that  such  quality  control  is  necessary  to 
sustain  sales  of  sashimi.  A  significant  part  of  the 
problem  is  likely  to  be  a  misunderstanding  of the 
Japanese fresh tuna marketing system, and the prefer-
ences which underlie it (USITC 1986, 1990). 
Government involvement 
The principal areas of government involvement in  the 
Japanese tuna industry are licensing,  financial  assist-ance,  infrastructure  development  education  and 
training, and fishers' organisations. 
Licences  are  required  to  operate  longline  and 
pole-and-Iine vessels  which  are larger than  20 GRT, 
and purse seine vessels which are larger than 40 GRT. 
The  licensing  system  also  involves  time  and  area 
restrictions on tuna harvesting. The Japanese govern-
ment began a program to restructure the tuna fleet in 
1981.  The  number  of  licences  for  longline  and 
pole-and-Iine vessels was reduced, while the number of 
licences  for  purse seine vessels,  which  are generally 
held to be more efficient was increased. 
Financial assistance is provided primarily for vessel 
construction, insurance and price supports. For vessel 
construction,  the  government  provides  low  interest 
(2.00 to 5.5%/p.a., as of October 1989), long-tenn (10 to 
12 years) loans through the Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries Finance Corporation (USITC 1986). For fiscal 
years  (FY)  1989 and  1990,  this  loan  parameter was 
¥57500 (US$420 million in 1989 and US$383 million 
in  1990 due to exchange rate variations) (U.S. Depart-
ment  of State  1990c).  Similar  loans  amounting  to 
US$33 million  in  FY  1989 and US$67 million  in  FY 
1990 were available to seafood processors. The Corpo-
ration also provides loans of this type for the construc-
tion  of  fishing  ports  and  other  infrastructure. 
Additional  funds  for  the  construction  and  repair  of 
fishing  ports are included  in  the operating budget of 
the Japanese Fishery Agency (USITC  1990). 
The  government  provides  special  insurance 
programs for  fishers  (including tuna fishers)  owing to 
the relatively high level of risk involved in their occupa-
tion  which  may  preclude  them  from  obtaining 
insurance from private sources (USITC 1986). In  1986, 
approximately  240000 out of a  total  400000 regis-
tered vessels were insured in the government-financed 
scheme (Fujinami 1986b). 
The Japanese  Fishery  Agency  maintains  a  price 
stabilisation fund (US$I1.5 million in FY  1990), which 
is used to buy and store tuna and other seafood items 
when  market prices  fall  below cost. The Agency also 
has a fund for vessel reinsurance (USITC 1990). 
There are extensive  fisheries  training and educa-
tional facilities in Japan, most of which are financed by 
the federal and local governments. In  1986 there were 
60 fisheries senior high schools, two fisheries universi-
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ties,  and  14 general universities with  major fisheries 
programs.  In  addition, the government operated eight 
regional  fisheries  research  laboratories,  and fisheries 
research  was  conducted  by  47  local  governments 
(Fujinami 1986b). 
The Japanese government has been involved in the 
fonnation of fishers' cooperatives under the Fisheries 
Cooperative  Association  Law,  which  covers  most 
fishers.  In  1986, there were three cooperatives specifi-
cally related to the tuna fishery. These were composed 
of the crews from 400 longline and 200 pole-and-Iine 
vessels  larger  than  120 GRT;  300 longline  and 500 
pole-and-line vessels  smaller than  120 GRT; and 32 
small (500 GRT) purse seiners (Fujinami 1986b). 
The Japanese Tuna Market 
Tuna products 
Three principal fonns  of tuna are sold  in Japan: raw 
(chilled  or frozen),  canned  and  processed.  Tuna  is 
consumed  raw,  cooked,  salted,  dried,  as  fish  cake 
(kamaboko), and as fish  'ham'. Over 80% of supply of 
the  principal  tuna species  (bluefin,  bigeye,  yellowfin, 
and skipjack) is consumed raw. 
Raw tuna is consumed either as sashimi or as sushi. 
Sashimi  refers  to  slices  of  raw  tuna  served  with 
shredded Japanese radish (duikon), a small amount of 
green paste (wasaM made from  horseradish, and soy 
sauce  (shoyu).  Sushi  is  served  in  bite-sized  snacks 
consisting of sliced tuna served on or in small rice-balls 
(sushi-mesh!),  seasoned with  vinegar,  salt and sugar. 
There are numerous varieties of sushi, distinguishable 
by  the method of preparation. The two  main varieties 
are  makizushi  and  nigirizushi.  Makizushi  is  raw 
seafood or pickled vegetables combined with  rice and 
wrapped  in  a  sheet of double-green  seaweed  (non). 
Nigirizushi  is  a  rice-ball  topped  with  raw  seafood 
(Williams 1987). 
Raw  tuna  is  a  popular dish  during  the  summer 
months Oune-July) and on special occasions; in partic-
ular  New  Year  celebrations,  public  holidays  and 
festivals.  Consumption choices  and perceived  quality 
relate  to  a variety of features, which  include  appear-
ance,  freshness,  presentation,  texture  and  flavour 
(Tayama 1982). 
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The  most common  form  of dried tuna is  rushi,  a 
product of wood-like texture which is produced by the 
repeated drying and smoking of tuna fillets  (Williams 
1987). 
Tuna species, meat  types and yields 
Historically, the principal tuna species used in Japan to 
produce  sashimi  and  sushi  were  northern  and 
southern bluefin (Thunnus maccoYl), bigeye (Thunnus 
obesus),  yellowfin  (Thunnus albacares), and  skipjack 
(Katsuwonus pelamis). A more recent trend, however, is 
the use  of albacore  (Thunnus alalunga)  for sashimi 
products,  in  addition  to  those  already  mentioned. 
Japanese  traders  are  increasingly  using  albacore  to 
substitute for bluefin due to decreasing supplies of this 
species (FAO Globefish Highlights 1993). 
In  many respects tuna carcasses are similar to beef 
carcasses- both are graded in terms of overall  quality, 
and different cuts of meat from the same carcass vary 
in  quality.  The  two  major  categories  of  raw  tuna 
lightmeat are toro (fatty  meat from the  belly areas of 
bluefin  and bigeye) and  akami (red  meat).  Different 
grades of toro are contained within  a single bluefin or 
bigeye  carcass,  while  different  grades  of akami  are 
contained within all tuna carcasses. While the meat of 
yellowfin and skipjack does contain fat. it is not consid-
ered to be toro (Williams 1987). 
High  quality  bluefin  carcasses  are  the source  of 
highest quality  toro, eaten as sashimi,  and are sought 
after by merchants specialising in  the restaurant trade. 
Toro obtained from  bigeye tuna is  distinguishable  by 
taste to that  found  in  bluefin,  and  is  eaten  as sushi. 
Highest quality toro is extremely soft and lacks fibrous 
texture. It is distinct from other meats and as such has 
no direct substitute (Williams 1987). 
Tuna is  marketed primarily  in  carcass form  at the 
wholesale level.  although an increasing proportion  is 
processed to  fillet,  chunk or blocks for  direct sale  to 
retailers (Tayama 1981 b). Meat yields from frozen tuna 
carcasses are generally in the order of 70-75%  (Tayama 
1982). Yields from chilled carcasses are slightly higher, 
as cutting is  done manually.  Frozen carcasses are cut 





Apparent consumption of fresh and frozen tuna in Japan 
generally increased during 1985-91, and ranged between 
554.4  kt and 611.1  kt This  was  supplied  by  domestic 
production (42l.8-531.7 kt) and imports (141.1-275.9 kt) 
(Table  19.3).  Over the same period, apparent consump-
tion  of  canned  tuna generally  increased  and  ranged 
between 81.6 kt and 106.6 kt (Table 19.2). 
Table 19.3  Japanese  production,  imports,  exports  and  apparent  con-
sumption, fresh  and  frozen tuna, 1985-92 (tl 
Year  P roduction  Imports  Exports  Apparent 
consumption 
1985  461400  141100  481 43  554357 
1986  523900  138100  69969  592031 
1987  465500  184700  46993  603207 
1988  531700  209800  137353  604147 
1989  435700  206400  84774  557326 
1990  421800  257500  69906  609394 
1991  464400  265300  118639  611061 
1992  428000  275900  n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  not available. 
Source: FAO  Globefish  Highlights, various years. 
Consumption  of  tuna  in  Japan  varies  between 
males  and  females  and  across different age  groups. 
With the exception of 60-64 year olds, males consume 
more  tuna  than  females.  This  distinction  is  most 
apparent between the ages of 30 and 45 (Taya 1986). 
The explanation for this may relate to  the use of tuna 
as a 'treat' for the male of the family to be enjoyed with 
sake. Women generally eat more beef, as it is consid-
ered to  be nutritious for children, and the women eat 
generally with the children some hours before the men 
arrive  home.  As  women  get  older (and  men  retire), 
married couples tend to eat more meals together, and 
in consequence women eat more tuna (Williams 1989). 
Regional preferences 
While tuna is consumed nationwide in Japan, consump-
tion  levels  and  preferences  do  vary  by  region  with 
respect to  species,  size, meat colour,  fat  content and 
fonn (dressing style, chilled verses frozen, whole verses 
fillet etc.). Tuna consumption is greatest in  the eastern and far  southern  provinces,  and least in  the  western 
provinces. On the west coast, mackerels and white flesh 
species  are  preferred  to  tuna  for  use  as  sashimi 
(Williams  1989). In  Tokyo, bigeye tuna  is  traditionally 
preferred  to  yellowfin  (Shinjuku  Marine  Products 
Company 1985). The reverse is true in Osaka (Takahisa 
1983). 
In recent years, however, traditional regional prefer-
ences  have  been  changing.  Tuna  consumption  is 
highest in Okinawa (7 kg per family annually), Fukuoka 
consumes  17% of the  national  average, while  Kanto 
(Tokyo  region)  consumes  180%  of  the  national 
average. There  has  been  an  increasing  trend toward 
the consumption  of  bigeye  tuna  in  the  Osaka area 
(where yellowfin is  traditionally preferred). If the trend 
holds  true over time it  may represent an opportunity 
for second-grade (less oily) bigeye to be diverted from 
the Tokyo market (where  high  fat content receives  a 
premium) to Osaka, where less oily species have been 
traditionally preferred (Williams 1986). 
Seasonal  influences on consumption 
Supply  of  chilled  tuna  to  the  Japanese  market  is 
variable, depending upon season. Landings peak in the 
summer  months  Oune,  July,  August)  when  bluefin, 
yellowfin  and  bigeye  tuna  migrate  into coastal waters 
off Japan following the warm Kurushio current. During 
the remainder of the year,  the majority of chilled tuna 
supplies are imported. 
Supply of frozen  tuna to  the Japanese market is 
considerably  less  variable  than  the  supply of chilled 
tuna. Tuna  is  landed  and  stored  in  freezer vessels 
virtually year round, and supplies are further smoothed 
by competition among  major harvesting  and  trading 
companies who  transfer the product from storage to 
the market place  in  accordance with  their respective 
marketing strategies. 
In addition to affecting the supply of chilled tuna on 
the market, seasonal variation affects the availability of 
tuna and nontuna species which are substitutes on the 
Japanese market  During spring (April-May), skipjack 
tuna  arrive  in  waters  off  the Japanese coast on  their 
northward migration and are considered to be in prime 
condition (shun). At this time, skipjack are preferred to 
yellowfin  (Suzuki  1983).  Yellowfin  prices  are  also 
depressed  by availability  of local striped  marlin  and 
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young bluefin (meijl) in October, and by the availability 
of yellowtail (Serio/a sp.) in February (Tayama 1981 b). 
A range of factors affect the demand for tuna and 
tuna  products  in Japan.  These  include special  days, 
such as public holidays, payday and the last shopping 
day  before  the weekend,  and Japan's  system  of  six 
monthly  bonuses:  O-chugen  (midyear)  and  O-seibo 
(end  of year). Demand for tuna  and tuna substitutes 
peak at such times. 
Price factors influencing consumption 
Home consumption of tuna is  influenced (in  order of 
magnitude)  by:  tuna  retail  price;  beef  retail  price; 
yellowtail  price;  salted salmon  (mix  of species)  price; 
and  bonito  price  (Taya  1988).  The  consumption 
function  cited by Taya is:  log Q  =  1.229 - 1.107 log 
(tuna price) + 0.826 log (beef price) + 0.532 log (yellow-
tail  price) + 0.274 log (salted salmon price) + 0.206 log 
(bonito price). This equation implies that consumption 
of tuna is price elastic in Japan. 
Purchasing patterns, requirements 
In general, expenditure per person on tuna in Japan is 
greater at specialty shops than at supermarkets. While 
older  consumers  continue  to  purchase  tuna  from 
specialty  shops,  the  majority  of  younger consumers 
make their purchases at supermarkets. 
Of  primary  consideration  in  the  purchasing 
decisions of Japanese tuna consumers is  the attribute 
offreshness (Gibson 1981,1984; Franklin and Kitson 
1982; Moret-Smith 1982; Rowly 1983). Tuna carcasses 
are  large  in  comparison  with  other high-quality  fish 
species (e.g. salmon), and hence must be divided into 
blocks  and  chunks  for  retail  sale.  As  a  result, 
consumers cannot assess the freshness of tuna by the 
simple method of inspecting the head and eyes (Lent 
and Johnson 1984). Instead, they  rely on advice from 
supermarket employees, or use the attributes of meat 
colour and transparency as a guide. Preferences based 
on these attributes are important in tuna marketing as 
they  are  communicated  via  retailers  to  wholesalers 
(derived  demand)  and  hence  contribute  to  carcass 
characteristics desired at auction (Williams 1986). 
Tuna, like beef, generally has improved flavour and 
tenderness with aging,  although colour and  transpar-
ency may deteriorate. Perhaps in consequence of this, 
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attempts  by  retailers  to  promote 'aged'  tuna on  the 
basis of improved flavour and tenderness have proved 
unsuccessful. 
While  there is  considerable differentiation  of the 
product at the wholesale level, and a high discernment 
among those who  purchase at this  level,  consumers 
who purchase tuna at major retail outlets are in general 
unaware  of the  species  which  they  are  purchasing. 
Most  consumer packs  are  labelled  with  the general 
name for tuna (maguro) and not with the species name. 
The  product  may  be  bluefin,  bigeye  or  yellowfin 
(Williams 1987). 
Price formation in the markets 
While frozen tuna prices tend to be smoothed over the 
year by storage and speculation, prices for chilled tuna 
vary  with  seasonal  availability.  Chilled  yellowfin  and 
bigeye prices are highest during winter (the off-season 
for  the domestic fishery),  and lowest during summer 
(the  peak  season  for  the  domestic  fishery)  (Tayama 
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1981a,  1982).  Payne  (1980  documents  a  similar 
seasonal tend for bluefin tuna. 
There is  in general reasonable complementarity of 
price  movements  between categories of tuna species 
which  have similar end uses.  Low qualiLy  bluefin and 
bigeye  tuna,  and middle to  low  quality yellowfin  tuna 
are  sold  in  supennarkets  under  the  general  label 
'magurd (Williams 1987). 
While  a  knowledge of price detennination  in  the 
retail  sector of the  market  is  useful,  particularly  for 
estimating long-tenn trends, the most important focus 
of attention with regard to price fonnation is  the point 
of sale at the wholesale level-the auctions. At this level, 
prices  received  by  foreign  exporters  are  detennined 
directly.  While consumer preferences are transmitted 
to buyers at auction, buyers also take into account their 
own  requirements (e.g. freshness-to allow  for  lags  in 
distribution,  and carcass  meat yield).  All  such factors 
influence  the  fonnation  of  the  bid  price  (Williams 
1987). Chapter  Modelling Tuna Prices in Japan: 
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a Vector-Autoregressive Approach 
A.D.Owen 
D.A.  Troedson 
Introduction 
This chapter contains the results of an investigation into 
the  causal  relationships  between  the  prices  of  five 
species  of  tuna  in  a  multivariate  framework  using 
monthly time series data at Yaizu  market in Japan for 
the period 1976 Oanuary)-1992 (August) The technique 
of vector autoregression (V  AR) was  used, to permit all 
possible  causal  influences  among the variables  to  be 
taken into account 
Data restrictions  decided  upon  the precise Yaizu 
price series that would be used for each species: 
albacore: round weight 
bigeye: gilled/gutted 
skipjack (non purse seine): round weight 
southern bluefin: gilled/gutted 
yellowfin (nonpurse seine): gilled/gutted. 
Prior  to  their  use  in  estimation,  the  data  were 
smoothed to lessen the individual impact of outliers on 
the analysis. 
Model specification 
The five variable V  AR model may be specified as 
PIt  WIO  wII(L )WI2( L) W13( L) WI4 (L )wIs(L)  Pit  elt 
P2t  ~o  W21(L) Wo22(L)  W23(L)  Wo.24(L)  WzS(L )  P2t  1"21 
P31  =  w30  +  W31(L)wJ2( L)W33(L  )W34 (L )W3S( L)  P3t  +  e3t 
P41  w40  W41(L)W42(L) W43(L) W44(L) W4S(L)  P4t  1"4 1 
P.51  WSO  W51( L  )w52( L  )W53( L  )WS4 (L )WSs( L)  P~l  £;;/ 
(  ) 
mij  e  ... 
where  w  ..  L  =  LW  .. pL g mIJ  IS  the  degree  of  the 
I]  e=l  1].-
wJ.L)  polynomial;  L  is  the  lag  operator  such  that 
LkXt = xt_k;wlO  are constants, and [cit C2t C3t C4t CSt] 
is  a  zero  mean  vector  white  noise  process 
having  E( EtEs) = Ots I  where 0ts =  1 if t=5, and 0ts = 0 if 
tct:5.  Hence the contemporaneous correlation among 
the variables is reflected in the error tenns of model (1). 
The  main  difficulty  in  estimating  model  (1)  is 
determining the appropriate lag length of each wi}L) 
polynomial.  By  means  of  a  likelihood  ratio  test 
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adjusted  by  a  small  sample  correction  factor,  the 
optimum lag length was determined to be 12 periods. 
The  model  was  estimated  using  unrestricted 
vector autoregressions for  each dependent variable. 
Any gains in precision that could arise by utilising an 
iterative  seemingly  unrelated  regression  procedure 
were  unavailable  due  to  inadequate  degrees  of 
freedom. 
Results 
The  specification  and  estimation  of  V  AR  models 
requires stationary series. On the basis of augmented 
Dickey-Fuller tests, it was concluded that all  five  price 
variables were integrated of order 1. 
Using Johansen's  maximum  likelihood  procedure 
for  testing  for  cointegrating vectors,  no  evidence  for 
cointegration was  found  at a 5%  level  of significance. 
Consequently, no cointegrating relationship was incor-
porated into the model. 
Each equation in model (1) was estimated by least 
squares in  what amount to,  in  essence, five  dynamic 
reduced  forms. Thus  the  meaning of the  estimated 
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Agure  20.1  Albacore  price  series  and forecast:  Yaizu  fish  market 
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Figures  20.1  to  20.5  show  the  actual  and  fitted 
values for each of the five price variables. They appear 
to indicate a reasonably good fit, but it should be noted 
that this  is  not a  dynamic simulation,  i.e.  the actual 
lagged  values  for  all  prices are used to  calculate the 
fitted  price  for  each period. The dynamic simulation 
occurs in the forecasting exercise, which extends for 28 
months for each price variable (shaded areas in Figures 
20.1  to 20.5). 
Because  of  the  smoothing  of  the  data,  yearly 
average forecast prices are presented in Table 20.1. 
Table  20.1  Tuna  prices, annual averages, Yaizu  market Ill/kg) 
Year  Albacore  Bigeye  Skipjack  South em  Yellowfin 
bluefin 
1990  329  811  316  5173  558 
1991  264  775  199  4384  396 
1992a  327  698  269  3759  528 
1993a  314  664  302  4480  411 
1994a  289  703  251  4432  453 
aForecast values. 
Over the period of estimation, the model appears to 
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Agure 20.4  Southern  bluefin  price  series  and  forecast:  Yaizu  fish 
market. 
precision, with the exception of southern bluefin where 
prices  were  invariably  underestimated.  This  latter 
observation could be due to the effects of quotas being 
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Agure 20.5 Yellowfin  price series and forecast: Yaizu fish  market. 
sample  period,  thereby  changing  the  fundamental 
structure of the time series used for estimation. 
The forecasts appear to reflect a continuation of the 
relatively  regular price  cycle  experienced  by  the  five 
series, although some 'dampening' is  evident towards 
the end of the period of forecast This is  typical for a 
V  AA  and  such  models  tend  to  be  useful  only  for 
short-tenn forecasting because of this trait. 
Summary 
With  the  exception  of  southern  bluefish  prices,  the 
modelling process produced a reasonably precise fit  to 
the observed data. The introduction of catch quotas has 
had  a  major impact on  the price of southern bluefin 
tuna, and this has led to a persistent underestimation of 
its price in our modelling. 
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A.D.Owen 
D.A.  Troedson 
Introduction 
The  U.S.  tuna market  is  primarily  a  market for  the 
canned product, although small speciality markets are 
evolving.  Traditionally,  meat products  have  been  the 
staple  diet of Americans,  and  canned tuna has,  for 
many years,  been  the predominant seafood  product, 
enjoying widespread acceptance. More recently, shrimp 
consumption has risen to a level  almost equivalent to 
that of tuna,  and  it  is  anticipated  that shrimp  will 
exceed  tuna  in  the  near  future.  However,  major 
competitors for canned tuna remain chicken and red 
meat products. 
The United States dominates international trade in 
canned tuna, with  one-third of total world  imports in 
1991. It is  also the world's second largest importer of 
canning quality tuna after Thailand. 
While at first sight the sheer magnitude of the U.S. 
domestic market represents an attractive proposition 
for high volume canned tuna producers, it is important 
to  recognise  that distribution  and  marketing  in  the 
United  States  is  generally  the  domain  of huge  food 
company conglomerates with  established  nationwide 
distribution and marketing networks and centralised 
marketing  and  purchasing  functions  reaping  the 
benefits of  economies of scale. Successful market entry 
by a new participant, therefore, is  most likely to be in 
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the form  of a long-term contractual arrangement with 
an existing, established, food company. 
This chapter provides a survey of the US. market 
for canned tuna, and identifies the major factors which 
'drive'  the industry.  It also  includes a  brief statistical 
analysis  of the demand for  canned tuna in  the  U.S. 
market 
Overview 
The  U.S.  tuna  market  comprises  two  distinct 
segments-one for  frozen  tuna and one for  canned 
tuna. Almost all  demand for  frozen  tuna comes from 
the  producers  of canned  tuna,  and  hence  the  two 
segments are closely interrelated. The following discus-
sion focuses on the canned tuna segment of the US. 
tuna market 
The United States is  the world's largest market for 
canned  tuna,  and  ranks  third  behind Thailand  and 
Japan  as  a  market for  raw  tuna. The United  States 
consumes approximately one-third of the world supply 
of tuna (raw weight basis), and a little under two-thirds 
of the world  supply  of canned  tuna (standard  case 
basis). 
United  States  consumption  of  all  fish  products 
increased from  4.8 kg/head (approximately 0.9 billion 
kg)  in  1967, to 7.2  kglhead (approximately l.8 billion kg) in 1989 (U.S. Department of Commerce 1990). The 
increase in  U.S.  consumption of fishery products over 
the period  resulted  from  population  increase, which 
was the primary factor, and from growth in individual 
demand, which  is  evidenced  by  the rise in  per capita 
consumption. During  1967-89,  U.S.  consumption  of 
canned  tuna,  which  is  the  major  canned  seafood 
product in the United States, rose from 1.1  kg/head to 
l.8 kg/head, an increase of 63% (U.S. Department of 
Commerce 1986, 1990). 
Market profile 
Canned tuna is consumed in approximately 85% of all 
U.S.  households  (Kitson  and  Hustis  1983).  Most 
canned  tuna  is  purchased  from  retail  outlets  and 
consumed in the home. Canned tuna accounts for over 
one-half of total retail seafood purchases in the United 
States, 94%  of which  is  consumed  in  the home  (Hu 
1985). 
The consumption  of canned tuna in  the  United 
States varies by region. In absolute terms, consumption 
is concentrated in  metropolitan areas along the coast, 
particularly in  the northeast,  southern California and 
Pacific  northwest  regions.  In  terms  of frequency  of 
consumption,  canned  tuna  is  a  more  prominent 
seafood item in  the central and mid-Atlantic areas of 
the United States. 
The U.S.  canned tuna market can be divided  into 
two broad sectors: the retail sector and the institutional 
sector.  Over  the  past  decade,  the  share  of  total 
shipments accounted for  by  the retail  sector  ranged 
between 86 and 96%, with the share accounted for by 
the institutional sector being the residual. 
Within the retail and institutional sectors, there are 
distinct subsectors based on the type of meat (white or 
light), and the packing medium (water or oi\). A further 
division  in  the retail sector is  based on the label type 
(advertised brand or private label). The Iightmeat sector 
is  the principal market segment, as world supplies of 
albacore (used to produce whitemeat canned tuna) are 
relatively scarce. Over recent years, the Iightmeat sector 
has accounted for around 80% of the U.s. canned tuna 
market, the residual being from  the whitemeat sector 
(USITC  1990). With respect to regional consumption 
patterns,  the  east  coast  market  (particularly  in  the 
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northeast)  has traditionally preferred whitemeat tuna, 
while Iightmeat tuna has traditionally been preferred in 
the west coast market 
Over the past 15 years, there has been a  marked 
shift in consumer preferences toward tuna canned in 
water,  the  market  share  of which,  relative  to  tuna 
canned in  oil,  increased from  45%  in  1979 to 82% in 
1989 (USITC 1986, 1990). 
Canned  tuna  produced  in  the  United  States 
dominates the advertised brand retail market, whereas 
imported  canned  tuna  dominates  the  institutional 
sector and  has  had  a  growing  market share in  the 
private label retail market In  the period 1979-89, the 
share of the advertised brand retail market held by U.S. 
produced canned tuna ranged between 85% and 98%. 
The  balance  was  held  by  canned  tuna  imports,  a 
proportion of which were distributed by U.S. processors 
under their advertised  brand labels. The share of the 
institutional  market  sector  supplied  by  imports 
increased from  43%  in  1979  to  70% in  1989,  with a 
peak of 76% in  1988. The share of the private label 
retail market supplied by imports increased from 2% in 
1979 to 24% in 1989 (USITC 1986, 1990). 
Supply and demand factors 
The supply of canned tuna in  the U.S. market is deter-
mined  by  the level  of domestic  production  and  the 
quantity  of imports. The domestic  supply of canned 
tuna  is  influenced  by  U.S.  canned  tuna  prices,  raw 
material availabilily and production costs. The quantity 
of canned tuna imports into the United States is influ-
enced by  the same  factors  which  influence domestic 
supply, and also by conditions in alternative markets. 
The demand for canned tuna in the United States is 
principally detennined by increases in  the population, 
the  price  of  canned  tuna  relative  to  competing 
products,  real  disposable  income,  and  consumer 
preferences. Demand has been particularly volatile  in 
response  to  concerns  over dolphin  mortality  arising 
from the practices of certain tuna fishing nations. 
The bulk of canned  tuna supplies  are  marketed 
through  retail  outlets,  and  hence  price  competition 
with  other food  items  is  strong.  Food  items  which 
compete strongly with canned tuna in the retail market 
include ground beef, chicken, and canned salmon. 
243 The  Economics of Papua New Guinea's Tuna  Fisheries 
An example of the influence of consumer preference 
on demand in  the 1980s was the shift in  demand from 
tuna packed  in  oil  to  tuna packed  in  water,  as  U.S. 
consumers became increasingly more health conscious. 
Consumption 
Consumption  of  canned  tuna  generally  increased 
during  the  period  1981-91  and  ranged  between 
274.8 kt  and  465.9  kt  (Table  21.1).  The  dramatic 
increase in imports during this period, principally from 
Thailand,  had  the  most  significant  impact  upon 
consumption. Although consumption of canned tuna 
generally  increased  during  the  decade,  current 
problems in the industry (discussed below) suggest that 
consumption will decline, at least in the short tenn. 
Table 21.1.  U.S.  production,  imports,  exports,  and  apparent  consump-
tion, canned tuna,  1981-91  [tl 
Year  Production 
1981  287000 
1982  246000 
1983  268000 
1984  275000 
1985  250000 
1986  295000 
1987  297000 
1988  271000 
1989  311000 
1990  264000 





























Source:  Owen  1990;  FAO  Globefish  Highlights, various years;  Ferdouse  1993. 
Consumption  by  packing  media  altered  signifi-
cantly  during  the  period.  As  noted  previously,  the 
proportion  of tuna  packed  in  water  increased  from 
45% in  1979 to 82% in  1989. 
Consumption of canned tuna per capita increased 
significantly over the last 15 years. In  1979, per capita 
consumption of canned tuna totalled 1.5  kg.  By  1989, 
consumption per capita had risen to 1.8 kg, an increase 
of 22%  (U.S. Department of Commerce 1986,  1990). 
Increases  in  tuna  consumption  during  the  period 
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under consideration  can  be attributed  principally to 
population increase, price discounting,  dietary consid-
erations, and increases in per capita income. 
Barriers to trade 
Impolt reguJaUons: The  United  States  imposes  strict 
standards  on  the  importation  of  fish  and  fishery 
products. Import standards are contained in  the Food 
Drug and Cosmetic Act and are enforced by  the U.S. 
government.  Imports  must  also  comply  with  the 
standards  established  by  the  Fair  Packaging  and 
Labelling Act and with the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) regulations. 
There is  concern at present in  the  tuna industry 
over an increasing number of canned tuna detentions 
by the FDA  Both Thai and Filipino canners have been 
subject  to  the  automatic  detention  and  rigourous 
inspection  of  their  product.  This  has  significantly 
reduced  the  level  of canned  tuna  imports  into  the 
United  States,  which  has  resulted  in  extremely  low 
inventory  stocks,  particularly  for  institutional  packs. 
Thailand is  the principal exporter of canned tuna  to 
the  United  States,  while  the  Philippines  is  a  major 
supplier  of  catering  packs.  United  States  importers 
have appealed to the FDA to allow Thai canners time 
to come to tenns with new inspection procedures (FAO 
Globefish Highlights 1993). 
In  addition to the general regulations which apply 
to the importation of fish  and fishery products to the 
United  States,  other regulations  apply  specifically to 
tuna commodities. The United States imposes  tariffs 
on canned tuna imports in  two  categories:  tuna in  oil 
and tuna not in  oil. The tariffs  on canned tuna were 
introduced in 1930, and have been revised a number of 
times.  Current rates  of  duty  were  established  on  1 
January 1972. 
Under  tariff  code  112.90,  tuna  prepared  or 
preserved in oil,  in airtight containers weighing 6.8 kg 
or  less  is  dutiable  at  35%  ad  valorem  from  most 
favoured nations, and 45% ad valorem from  all  other 
countries. Canned tuna not in oil  is  dutiable at 6% ad 
valorem from most favoured nation countries and 25% 
ad valorem from  all  other countries. All  Pacific island 
countries  and  territories  have  most favoured  nation 
status in trade with the United States. In addition to the 6%  ad valorem duty, a tariff-rate 
quota is imposed on canned tuna not in oil. The quota, 
which was introduced on 14 April  1956, is recalculated 
annually, based on 20% of domestic production in  the 
previous year. Imports exceeding the annual quota are 
dutiable at a rate of 12.5% ad valorem. 
During 1979-89, the quota declined from 57113.2 
kt  to  34821.8  kt,  indicative  of declining  mainland 
domestic  production,  while  imports  over  the  quota 
increased  from  zero  to  106372.2  kt  indicative  of 
rapidly  increasing  import  levels  from  low-cost 
producers such as Thailand. While the level of imports 
over  quota  declined  to  approximately  68100  kt  in 
1990,  quota  and  import  levels  increased  in  1991, 
exceeding all previous levels (FAO Globefish Highlights 
1993). 
Since 1983, canned tuna production in  American 
Samoa has been included with domestic production in 
determination of the quota. In  the years  immediately 
prior to  1983, approximately one-third of the annual 
quota was filled by tuna processed in American Samoa, 
which  entered  the  United  States  duty  free.  The 
inclusion  of  American  Samoan  tuna  products 
therefore enabled foreign  producers to export signifi-
cantly more water-packed tuna to the United States at 
the 6% ad valorem tariff duty rate. 
Embargoes:  The  United  States  has  periodically 
imposed  embargoes  on  the  importation  of  tuna 
products.  Such  embargoes  are  imposed  under  the 
authority of two  acts;  the Fisheries  Conservation and 
Management  Act  1976  and  the  Marine  Mammal 
Protection Act 1972. In  the past embargoes on the 
importation of tuna products were generally imposed 
under  the  Fisheries  and Conservation  Management 
Act in  response to  the seizure of U.S.  fishing  vessels 
operating without licence  in  the exclusive  economic 
zones of foreign  countries. The United States did not 
recognise such countries' rights to jurisdiction over the 
harvesting of highly  migratory species (namely  tuna) 
within their exclusive economic zones. 
More  recently,  embargoes  have  been  imposed, 
under the authority of the Marine Mammal Protection 
Act  in  response  to  high  levels  of dolphin  mortality 
associated with  the fishing  practices of some foreign 
tuna fishers.  More generally, embargoes apply when a 
foreign  country  does  not effect  a  dolphin  mortality 
protection plan similar to that of the United States. 
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In  january  1992,  a  U.S.  district  court  judge  in 
California extended the previous ban on tuna imports 
from  nations  failing  to  effect  a  suitable  dolphin 
mortality  protection  plan  to  include  tuna  products 
from  countries  which  purchase  tuna  from  those 
already  embargoed. This  affected  over  20 countries, 
including  japan,  Spain,  italy,  France,  Panama  and 
Costa Rica, many of which purchase tuna from  Mexico 
(which is currently under embargo) (FAO  1992). 
More recently, the United States has taken further 
steps to legislate against the harvest of tuna that school 
in association with dolphin. In October 1992, President 
George  Bush  signed  the  'Global  Moratorium  Bill', 
outlawing the harvesting of tuna in  association  with 
dolphin. The  bill  includes a  five-year  moratorium on 
purse  seining,  commencing  March  1,  1994.  The 
present embargo will  be  lifted  for  any  nation  which 
signs  the  moratorium.  In  addition,  the  bill  makes it 
illegal for any U.S. citizen to sell, purchase or transport 
to  the  United  States  any  canned tuna which  is  not 
'dolphin safe' after june 1, 1994. This bill will  not only 
impact heavily upon the Mexican and Venezuelan tuna 
fleets, but also the remainder of the U.S. fleet that still 
operates in the eastern Pacific (FAO  1992). 
Distribution 
Most  domestically  produced  canned  tuna  is 
marketed via a network of brokers. The use of brokers 
is  advantageous  to  domestic  processors  because  it 
eliminates the need for  field  sales offices,  and hence 
generally  reduces  marketing  costs,  and  because  it 
provides a source of current infonnation on competi-
tion in regional markets. The brokers generally handle 
a  range  of food  products,  including  tuna-based  pet 
foods  produced  by  U.S.  tuna  processors.  Although 
brokers  and  processors  generally  have  long-tenn 
relationships,  most  processors  periodically  appraise 
the performance of their brokers. Currently more than 
200  brokers  are  involved  in  the  marketing  of  U.S. 
canned tuna. 
Brokers  generally  operate  within  geographically 
defined limits. it is a general requirement of processors 
that each  broker handle  only  one brand of canned 
tuna, and hence an individual firm  may use different 
brokers to  market different pack types, i.e.  advertised 
brand or private  label.  Brokerage fees  are calculated 
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either on a specific rate per case or on a percentage of 
case sales (currently 2-3%). 
Although  canned  tuna  is  marketed  via  brokers, 
processors generally bill  the final  buyers directly. The 
tenns of sale generally include a discount for payment 
within  a  specified  time  (typically  2%  discount  for 
payment within 10 days of the invoice date). In general, 
the buyer is responsible for freight charges. 
United  States-produced canned  tuna is  generally 
transported from processing plants by cargo vessel, and 
delivered  to  regional  warehouses  located  on  the 
mainland.  The  warehouses  are  owned  by  non tuna 
interests,  and  therefore  space  must  be  leased  for 
canned  tuna Canned  tuna  is  transported  from  the 
warehouses to the final  buyer by  truck, usually at the 
expense  of  the  buyer,  i.e.  it  is  sold  on  an  f.o.b. 
warehouse basis. 
The warehouse turnover rate for canned tuna is  in 
the order of four to six times per year, and hence a case 
of canned  tuna  remains  in  the  warehouse  (and  is 
subject  to  storage  charges)  for  about  two  to  three 
months.  In  the  mid-1980s,  storage  costs  ranged 
between 50 and 60 cents per hundredweight (50.8 kg) 
including handling charges, which was less than 1  % of 
average wholesale charges. Total transportation costs 
for  domestic processors range 1-3% of the wholesale 
case price. 
Imported canned tuna is generally marketed by the 
importing  finn,  which  may  also  act  as  a  broker for 
domestically produced canned tuna in the private label 
retail sector. Imported canned tuna is also marketed by 
institutional food brokers, as most imports are destined 
for this sector. 
Imported  canned  tuna  is  transported  via  cargo 
vessel  from  the  exporting  country  to  domestic 
warehouses.  Upon  storage  in  domestic  warehouses, 
imported canned tuna is  subject to the same storage 
and  transportation  methods  and  charges  as  is  the 
domestic product In  1985, import charges for the four 
main exporters to the United States (which accounted 
for  81 % of the  total  value  of canned  tuna imports), 
ranged between 4.7% and 8.3% of total market value. 
Marketing practices 
Canned tuna is marketed in the United States through 
retail outlets, restaurants, and other institutions, either 
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under advertised brand labels or private labels, such as 
those  belonging  to  a  retail  chain.  Most  advertised 
brands have  nationwide distribution, although market 
shares  held  by  each  brand  differ  between  regions. 
Various  means  of  advertising  are  employed,  and 
usually accompany other methods of promotion such 
as price discounting. 
Individual  processors  do  not necessarily  concen-
trate  all  sales  effort  on  their  own  brand.  [t  is  not 
uncommon  for  processors,  on  specific  orders,  to 
market tuna under the  private  labels  of large  retail 
chain stores. [n addition, one processor may sell all or 
part of its output to another processor, which markets 
the tuna under its own advertised brand label. It has 
been a common practice for U.S. processors to market 
imported tuna under their own label. 
The  purpose  of advertised  brands  is  twofold: to 
make  the consumer brand conscious (and  hence to 
reduce  the elasticity  of demand);  and  to  ensure the 
widest possible distribution of the product within the 
limits  of the processors budget  Brand differentiation 
forces  large retailers and other distributors to carry a 
range of tuna brands, rather than just 'canned tuna', 
and hence increases individual market coverage. 
Advertising methods employed by  tuna processors 
include  coupons,  magazine  advertisements,  retailer 
sponsored  newspaper advertisements  and  television 
commercials.  Coupons  (and  related  methods)  are 
popular because the consumer's attention is  focused 
on the advertised brand. [n  contrast, television adver-
tisements may  be remembered more for the product 
being  advertised  than  the  specific  brand  (i.e.  they 
contain an element of generic advertising), and hence 
are less popular than coupons, because they boost the 
sale of competing brands.  U.s. processors commonly 
let  retailers  advertise  on  their  behalf  through 
newspaper advertisements, in  exchange for discounts 
off the wholesale prices. 
[n  addition to advertising, competitive pricing is an 
important strategy employed for the retail marketing of 
canned  tuna.  While  the  pricing  strategy  for  major 
processors  is  designed  to  capture  a  larger  market 
share, i.e. price discounting in the major retail lines, for 
some lines of tuna it is intended to maximise profits, i.e. 
price premiums for specialty items. The  nature  and  extent  of  competition  from 
imported  canned  tuna  in  the  U.S.  market  depends 
upon the way in which it is  marketed and the market 
sector in which it is sold. Significant competition with 
domestic brands is  most likely  to  occur in  the retail 
sector of the market. Due to the difficulties (cost and 
otherwise) of establishing a new brand in  the market 
place, a substantial portion of the increase in  canned 
tuna imports during the  1980s was  marketed under 
the labels of prominent domestic processors and hence 
distributed  through  established  market  channels. 
Imports have also been distributed under retailers' own 
labels. Competitive pricing is  the principal reason why 
such brands may be preferred by consumers. 
Price determination mechanisms 
There are three distinct levels of prices in the U.S. tuna 
market: the primary production level,  at which frozen 
tuna is delivered to processors by harvesters (ex-vessel 
prices); the wholesale level, at which processors deliver 
canned tuna to distributors or directly to retailers and 
institutions (wholesale  prices);  and the final  distribu-
tion level, at which retailers and institutions distribute 
canned  tuna  to  the  final  consumer  (retail  prices). 
Imported  supplies  of  canned  tuna  influence  price 
determination at all  levels.  The following  paragraphs 
outline price detennination at the wholesale and retail 
market levels. 
Wholesale prices: In  the U.S.  market, the wholesale 
price of canned tuna at anyone time varies according 
to species (whitemeat or Iightmeat), packing medium 
(water or oil),  container size (the smaller the can the 
higher the unit price in general), and the brand under 
which the tuna is  marketed. Container size (reflecting 
different types  of customers) and brand specification 
are more important influences on price detennination 
mechanisms  than  are  species  or  packing  medium, 
which  have  a  more significant impact on price levels 
and trends. 
Pricing  at  the  wholesale  level  is  closely  tied  to 
pricing at the ex-vessel  and retail/institutional levels. 
Wholesale tuna prices are influenced by supply, seller 
concentration  in  the  wholesale  market,  advertising 
methods and brand loyalty in  the retail market, prices 
of tuna substitutes and consumer tastes. Hence proces-
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sors need to balance the primary production and retail 
ends  of the  tuna  market,  which  has  resulted  in  a 
complex  system  of  pricing  and  marketing  at  the 
wholesale  level.  Nonprice  marketing  mechanisms 
cannot be separated from price determination mecha-
nisms at the wholesale level,  because at this stage in 
the  market,  tuna  is  transformed  from  a  reasonably 
homogeneous product into a brand-specific, differenti-
ated product. 
The base wholesale price, the list price, is used as a 
starting point from which the net price is  determined. 
Promotional  allowances  and  other  adjustments 
generally cause the net price to be below the list price. 
The list price is  revised periodically (about four to six 
times  per year),  depending on demand conditions in 
the wholesale market and the cost of raw tuna. The net 
price fluctuates according to promotional activity at the 
retail level and localised market competitive pressures. 
Careful attention is  paid by  each processor to the 
pricing and marketing behaviour of competing proces-
sors, and responses to the actions of rivals are planned 
and executed quickly. This results in local pricing wars, 
which  possibly  serve  as  a  means  by  which  a  firm 
discovers pricing policies and attitudes of its rivals in a 
competitive market Price competition is the dominant 
form of competition, followed by non price promotional 
activity and product diversification. 
Retail  prices:  The retail  market level  incorporates 
institutions  (restaurants,  schools,  military  establish-
ments, hospitals etc.), in  addition to supermarkets and 
grocery stores. Retail prices of canned tuna served in 
food  stores are, however, conceptually different to the 
prices of canned tuna served through institutions. In a 
retail situation, consumers are faced with the choice of 
purchasing tuna at a  known  and clear price. Within 
institutions, the price, as understood by the consumer, 
is  less  clear.  At  a  restaurant,  the  consumer  is 
purchasing  other  commodities-service  and  side 
orders, along with  tuna. Hence it  is  difficult to assess 
the price of the fish. The price of canned tuna is  even 
more difficult  to determine in  schools, hospitals and 
military  establishments,  in  which  there  may  be  no 
choice, and no price  is  paid by  the consumer. Hence 
only  price  determination  at  retail  outlets  will  be 
discussed in the following paragraphs. 
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Retail  prices of canned tuna in  the United States 
are  set  by  supennarkets,  chain  food  stores  and 
independent grocery stores. Such establishments sell a 
wide array of  commodities, and canned tuna is typically 
no more important than most other items. Were it not 
for promotional allowances, retailers would be unlikely 
in general to incur much expense for the advertisement 
of their canned tuna. 
Tuna retail  prices are in  general set according to 
the  overall  marketing  strategy  of  the  retailer,  and 
adjusted according to market conditions such as local 
competition,  consumer tastes  and incomes,  and  the 
wholesale  price  of tuna Private  label  tuna,  which  is 
marketed  only  by  the  retailer  controlling  the  brand 
name, is sold at a lower price than advertised brands. 
Evidence  suggests  that given  a  choice  between  an 
advertised or private label brand, a retailer will choose 
to market an advertised brand. 
u.s. canned tuna exports 
Historically,  U.S.  exports  of canned tuna have  been 
negligible, due principally to the fact that U.S.  proces-
sors are not competitive in  the major foreign  markets 
of  Japan  and  the  European  Community.  Factors 
contributing to  this  lack of competitiveness in  those 
markets include:  high  rates of duty Oapan  15%; E.C. 
24%);  high transportation costs from  Puerto Rico and 
American  Samoa; demanding  product specifications 
which would entail increased production costs; compe-
tition  from  low  cost  Asian  imports  (principally  in 
European  markets);  and the existence  of large,  well 
established, domestic industries in those markets. 
Recently,  however,  U.S.  canners  have  begun 
exporting small  quantities  of canned  tuna.  In  1989, 
U.S. canners exported 2946 t of canned tuna. By 1991, 
exports had increased to 5130 t (Table 21.1). The U.S. 
canner, Bumble Bee Seafoods was  among the exhib-
iters at the SIAL exhibition in  Paris in  October, 1992. 
Bumble Bee is seeking to enter the competitive export 
market  and  has  developed  a  range  of  new  tuna 
products (FAO 1992). 
U.S. canned tuna imports 
U.S.  imports  of canned  tuna  increased  dramatically 
during the period 1981-91, from 26.5 kt to 159.6 kt, an 
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increase of 500% (Table 21.1). The rise in canned tuna 
imports  resulted  from  a  number  of  factors  which 
included: strong demand for canned tuna in  the U.S. 
market  fuelled  by  favourable  economic  conditions, 
generally  declining canned tuna prices,  and shifting 
consumer dietary preferences; and the procurement of 
canned tuna supplies by  U.S.  processors from  foreign 
producers, chiefly since 1984. 
The contribution  to  total  U.S. imports  by  source 
altered dramatically during 1979-89. The most signifi-
cant increase in  contribution came from Thailand. In 
1979, Thailand contributed 9% of total  canned tuna 
imports  by  quantity  and  8%  by  value.  By  1989, 
Thailand's  contribution  had  risen  to  71 % and  69% 
respectively (Table 21.2). 
The  rapid  rise  in  canned  tuna  imports  from 
Thailand and its subsequent gain in  U.s. market share 
occurred  principally  at the  expense  of the Japanese 
export industry for canned tuna. Contribution to  U.S. 
imports of canned tuna by Japan declined from 52.8% 
by quantity and 57% by value in 1979, to 0.7% and 1.4% 
respectively in  1989 (Table 21.2). 
Taiwan  and  the  Philippines  remained  important 
and consistent sources of canned tuna over the period 
1979-89,  although  both  countries  experienced  a 
decline  in  market share. After  the withdrawal  of the 
U.S. military force from Subic Bay in the Philippines, it 
is  planned  to  build  a  tuna  processing  centre  there 
(FAO  1992b).  Hence,  the  Philippine  contribution  to 
U.S. canned tuna imports may increase significantly in 
the future. Indonesia began exporting small quantities 
of canned  tuna to  the  United  States  in  1984,  and 
gradually increased its  market share over subsequent 
years. In  1989, Indonesia contributed 6.5% of total U.S. 
canned tuna imports  by  quantity,  and 5.2% by  value 
(Table 21.2). Indonesia is  expected to increase its U.S. 
market share significantly in the 1990s. 
Canned tuna packed in water is the principal product 
type  exported to  the United  States, and accounted  for 
virtually all  U.S. imports of canned tuna during 1979-89 
(USITC 1986, 1990). The predominance of water-packed 
imports  is  attributable  principally  to  the  U.S.  tariff 
structure. 
Current trends indicate that canned tuna imports in 
1993 will  be significantly lower than levels  in  recent 
years. While in  1992, the low  duty import quota was The  United States Tuna  Market 
Table 21.2  U.S.  imports of canned tuna for consumption, by principal source, 1979-89 
Country  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
Q uantity (kt) 
Tllailand  2.199  2.908  4.683  8.475  18.128  40.717  55.690  69.143  66.706  81.240  112.719 
Taiwan  5.576  7.240  7.160  4.860  8.494  8.142  10.656  12.975  11.769  10.901  12.655 
Japan  12.878  11256  9.657  12.022  9.256  12.192  10.761  4.793  2.129  1.530  1.117 
Philippines  3.177  6.255  9.739  12.544  14.536  10.090  13.982  9.342  13.101  8.401  15.440 
Ecuador  0.404  2.350  1.310  2.321  3.776  1.314 
Malaysia  0.133  0.030  0.316  0.343  1.400  0.730  1.761  1.090  0.715  1290  1.934 
Indonesia  0.066  0.270  1.196  1.009  0.630  0.370  0.684  2.200  10.278 
Venezuela  0.003  0.419  3.327  1.323  0.080  1.037 
Singapore  0.013  0.030  0.054  0.151  0.027  0.331  0.563  0208  0.755  0284 
Spain  0.153  0.066  0.077  0.054  0.060  0.097  0.1 53 
All  other  0.266  1.085  0.560  1.138  2.316  0.280  0.400  1291  0.783  0.836  1.309 
Total  24.382  28.853  32.288  39.761  55.537  73.690  97.133  104.206  99.739  111.009  158.087 
Value  (US$'OOO] 
Tllailand  5135  8875  15400  22711  43259  89253  111 852  139561  135368  207 538  260 996 
Taiwan  14103  2331 6  24631  14366  22772  22475  29801  34483  34809  41 759  44 857 
Japan  37055  42015  36453  38561  24643  29186  28142  14755  7375  6992  5 172 
Philippines  7319  20043  30504  31  085  32291  20396  25930  23124  16577  18629  31  129 
Ecuador  837  4676  2603  4481  9366  2912 
Malaysia  314  76  1 230  1 242  4068  1 893  4498  3160  1 985  3964  5131 
Indonesia  209  699  2679  2102  1 186  690  1 247  5690  19667 
Venezuela  7  851  6389  2467  200  1 943 
Singapore  38  91  141  386  44  671  1 140  452  1 974  768 
Spain  501  367  402  300  268  376  560  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
All  other  643  2254  1438  4242  6958  701  972  3142  2160  2554  3337 
Total  65071  96984  110358  113347  137324  167270  209 139  229047  206921  298666  375 912 
n.a. not available. 
Source: USITC  1986, 1990. 
filled within minutes of opening on January 1, it was not  under threat of similar action.  In  consequence,  it  is 
filled until March 17 in  1993.January to March imports  likely that U.S.  consumption  of canned tuna  will  be 
during  1993 (32300 t)  were  the lowest  in  six years.  lower in  1993 than in recen t years. 
While  Thailand  remains  the  dominant supplier,  its  The  share  of  total  U.S.  canned  tuna  supply 
exports  to  the United States have  been  curtailed  by  produced  by  U.S.  processors  declined  during  the 
40%. The principal cause of this decline is the growing  previous decade, particularly in the years subsequent to 
number of detentions  of Thai  product  by  the  FDA.  1982. In  consequence of the purchase of Van Camp 
Three  Thai  canners  are  currently  under  automatic  Seafood  and  Bumble  Bee  Seafoods  by  Asian 
detention,  while  a  further  five  are  understood to  be  companies during 1988-89, this trend has continued, 
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as  both  companies  increased  the  share  of  their 
branded products supplied by imports from their home 
country canneries. However, with the current detention 
of  canned  tuna  from  Thailand  and  the  resultant 
decline in  imports from  this country in the first half of 
1993, it is  possible that this trend may be reversed, if 
only temporarily. 
Statistical analysis 
An equation explaining the demand for canned tuna in 
the United States was  estimated by  least squares for 
the period 1967-90. The following estimated relation-
ship was obtained: 
Dt = -1.4725 +0.6968 Yt -0.4546pT + 1.9218pm 
t  t 
(-2.5167)  01.0340)  (-2.3616)  (4.3944) 
R2 = 0.91  "R2  = 0.90 
F(3,20) = 70.91 
DW=2.80 
SEE = 0.14  (2) 
Dt is apparent tuna consumption per capita; }( is 
U.S.  real  disposable  income  per  capita  (in  1972 
dollars);  pT is an index of the (real) wholesale price of 
tinned tuna (1972 =  base); and pn is  an index of the 
(real) price of 'meat' (1972 =  base). 
The  tuna  price  series  was  constructed  as  the 
weighted  average  of  the  price  of  chunk  lightmeat 
brands. All variables had their expected signs and were 
well determined at the 5% level of significance (t ratios 
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are given  in  parentheses). The exact Ourbin-Watson 
(OW)  probability was 0.93, indicating that the hypoth-
esis of uncorrelated disturbances cannot be rejected at 
a  5%  level  of significance.  However,  the  'marginal' 
nature of this conclusion is very evident. 
The  model  was  therefore  re-estimated  using  a 
Cochrane-Orcutt type iterative procedure (Beach and 
MacKinnon  1978),  for  estimating  models  in  the 
presence  of  autocorrelation.  The  revised  estimated 
relationship was 
Dt = -1.8267 +0.7172 Yt -0.5684PT + 2.3040 pm 
(-4.  928!l)  08.6570)  (-4.72o'h  (7.9050)  t 
R2 = 0.94  "R2  = 0.93 
F(3,20) = 95.95 
DW=2.33 
SEE=0.14  (3) 
At the point of means, price and cross-price elastici-
ties of demand for tuna were relatively low at -0.16 and 
0.72  respectively.  However,  the  income  elasticity  of 
demand was  l.04. These results clearly indicate that 
increases in  real disposable income per capita are the 
major driving  force  behind increased  per capita U.S. 
consumption over the past two decades. The own price 
and  income  elasticities  are  very  close  to  values 
obtained by King (1986) in a similar exercise based on 
an  earlier data set His  values  were  -0.20 and 0.99 
respectively.  However,  his  cross  price  elasticity  was 
0.33, under half the value obtained in this study. Chapter  The European Market for Tuna 
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Introduction 
The European market for canned tuna is dominated by 
the  European Community.  It  is  an extremely diverse 
market with  distinctly  identifiable  market  structures 
and consumer preferences. Historically, the market has 
represented a considerable challenge to canned tuna 
exporters, due to differing standards and requirements 
among importing countries, and considerable nontariff 
barriers to trade, particularly in  mature markets such 
as  France. In  recent years,  that challenge  has  been 
successfully taken up by Asian canned tuna exporters, 
especially Thailand and the Philippines. 
With a view to achieving uniformity across markets, 
uniform  regulations  for  imports  into  the  European 
Community were introduced in  1993. While a single, 
Community-wide standard was  originally  intended to 
be of considerable  benefit  to  exporters,  lobbying  by 
French interests has resulted in  the additional imple-
mentation  of  a  Community-wide  import  quota  on 
canned tuna,  other than that which  is  produced  in 
certain  Asian,  Caribbean  and  Pacific  (ACP)  nations. 
The implications of this development upon individual 
country  markets,  upon  ACP  exporters  (including 
canneries in  the western Pacific), and upon non-ACP 
exporters are of key interest in this market study. 
The canned tuna processing sector 
The  principal  European  countries  involved  in  the 
production of  canned tuna are Italy, Spain, France, and 
Portugal.  While  Italian  processors  use  imported  raw 
tuna almost exclusively, Spanish,  French  and  Portu-
guese  processors  use  domestic  landings  as  well  as 
imported raw tuna Over the period 1982-91, canned 
tuna production in  these countries increased approxi-
mately 70%, from  129.7 kt to 218.2 kt (Table 22.l). In 
1991, Italy accounted for 40%  of the total; Spain (38% ); 
France (15%);  and Portugal (7%). While total produc-
tion by French companies is comparable to production 
in  Italy and Spain, much of this occurs in Senegal and 
Cote d'Ivoire. 
Italy 
Italian canned tuna production increased 81 % during 
1982-91 (Table 22.1). Processors use mostly imported 
fresh and frozen tuna (principally yellowfin). Fresh and 
frozen tuna imports increased from 77.3 kt in  1982 to 
116.2  kt  in  1991  (FAO  1991).  In  recent years, Italy 
(along with  Spain)  has  been virtuaIIy  the only major 
avenue for  the marketing of yellowfin  caught in  the 
eastern Pacific, by  harvesting nations such as Mexico, 
following  boycotts  by  the  United  States.  Recently, 
however,  both Italy and Spain have joined the United 
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States in  boycotting this  tuna. No yellowfin from the 
eastern  Pacific  is  presently  traded  in  Europe.  The 
principal suppliers of raw tuna to the Italian processing 
industry are Seychelles, which  accounted  for  16% of 
total frozen yellowfin imports in  1991, Mexico (12.6%), 
Panama  (10.8%), Cote  d'Ivoire  (10.0%),  Spain  (9.0%), 
United States(3.7%) and France (2.8%) (FAO 1992). 
Table 22.1  E.C. production  of canned tuna  by major country, 1982-91 
Year  Italy  S pain  France  Portugal  Total 
1982  48.13  56.44  18.00  7.13  129.70 
1983  52.14  53.68  17.75  729  130.86 
1984  58.65  54.65  21.96  8.91  144.17 
1985  64.67  55.14  25.15  9.43  154.39 
1986  84.22  59.50  29.18  1226  185.1 6 
1987  80. 21  63.23  29.68  10.38  183.50 
1988  85.22  67.31  28.20  11.40  192.13 
1989  8522  75.18  32.67  13.23  206.3 
1990  86.33  75.70  31.59  14.37  207.99 
1991  87.23  82.52  33.46  15.00  218.21 
Sources:  FAO  1991; Ferdouse  1993. 
The construction  of new processing  facilities and 
the  implementation  of new  technology  have  signifi-
cantly increased Italian tuna canning capacity in recent 
years. In  contrast to  trends in  the United States,  the 
majority  of Italian  canned  tuna is  packed  in  oil.  In 
1989, 85% of tuna was packed in olive oil, 10% in water, 
and 5% in seed oils (u. S. Department of State 1990a). 
Spain 
Spanish  production  of canned  tuna  increased  46% 
during  1982- 9l.  Spanish  processors  use  both 
domestic and imported raw tuna in  production. Fresh 
and frozen  tuna imports  increased  from  42.7  kt  in 
1982 to  153.6 kt in  1991. The principal suppliers of 
raw  tuna  to  the  Spanish  processing  industry  are 
Venezuela, Ecuador, and Cote d'Ivoire (USITC 1990). 
The  most preferred  tuna species  for canning are 
albacore  and  yellowfin,  which  together  comprise 
approximately 47% of the canned product. As  in  the 
case  of Italy,  Spanish  canneries  were  an  important 
market for Mexican yellowfin, but have now boycotted 
all eastern Pacific yellowfin. 
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F rance 
French canned tuna production increased 86% during 
1982- 91.  Production  increased  annually  during  the 
period under review,  with  the exception of 1988 and 
1990. The  1988 production decline  has  been attrib-
uted  to  increased  production  costs,  which  is  the 
apparent reason for the closure by Starkist of two tuna 
processing facilities and a subsequent reduction in raw 
material usage (FAO 1989). 
French  tuna  processors  use  both  domestic  and 
imported raw tuna for canned tuna production. While 
domestic landings remain the primary source, imports 
of fresh  and frozen tuna increased 81 % during 1982-
90, from 20 kt to 36.2 kt  In  1991, imports declined to 
19 kt (FAO  1991). The principal suppliers of imported 
raw tuna to the French processing industry are Senegal 
(landed primarily by French seiners), Spain, Venezuela, 
and Cote d'Ivoire (USITC 1990). 
The principal species used by canned tuna proces-
sors  are  yellowfin,  skipjack  and  albacore.  French 
canners focus their production on canned tuna salads 
and  other sophisticated  products  which  have  been 
gaining popularity on the French market (FAO 1992). 
A number of French companies have  invested  in 
foreign tuna operations. One example is the construc-
tion of a tuna processing plant in Madagascar, at a cost 
of  approximately  ECUl4.5  million.  The  facility 
comprises a can manufacturing plant, a fishmeal unit 
and a  cold  storage warehouse. A production  level  of 
approximately  10  kt was  forecast for the first  year of 
operation, increasing to 20 kt in subsequent years. The 
facility  is  owned  and  managed  by  Peche  et  Froid, 
Ocean  Indien,  a  joint  venture  between  Malagasy 
partners  and  the  French  group  Peche et Froid  (the 
leading French seafood canned, and employs approxi-
mately 270 local people (FAO 1988). Peche et Froid is 
also a major shareholder of the SAIB cannery in Dakar, 
Senegal, and the PFCI (Peche et Froid de Cote d'Ivoire) 
cannery  in  Abidjan,  Cote  d'Ivoire  (USITC  1990).  In 
1991, Peche et Froid announced intentions to further 
invest in  tuna processing in  Cote d'Ivoire. Investment 
(through PFCI) was forecast to be US$1.5 million and 
was  to include a 3000 t cold storage facility,  a further 
processing line for  tuna and further processing facili-
ties (FAO 1991). French  companies  are  also  involved  in  a  tuna 
cannery joint venture in  the Seychelles. The cannery, 
located in Fishing Port, Victoria, is owned by Armement 
Cooperatif Finisterien (ACF)  and Pecheurs de France 
(30%  ownership),  and  the Government of Seychelles 
(70%  ownership)  (U.S.  Department  of  Commerce 
1989).  Annement  Cooperatif  Finisterien  also  owns 
more  than  40 seiners which  are  licensed  to  fish  in 
Seychelles  waters.  An  additional  French  company, 
Saupiquet  owns  canneries  in  Senegal  and  Cote 
d'Ivoire (Seafood International 1990). 
In  Ghana,  a  tuna  processing  plant  is  under 
construction  at  the  Tema  port  of Accra,  involving 
investment of US$lO  million.  The plant will  be  the 
largest tuna processing plant in Ghana, and the second 
largest in West Africa. Partners in the project are Inter-
national  Fishing and Trading Co.  Ltd  (Infitco)  which 
owns 51 % of the cannery, and French Secopa (49%) 
(FAO Globefish Highlights 1993). 
Portugal 
Portuguese canned tuna production  increased  110% 
during  1982-9l.  Domestic  and  imported  tuna  are 
used  in  canned  tuna production.  Imports  of frozen 
tuna increased 22L!%  during 1982-91, from  6.9 kt to 
22.4 kt (FAO  1991). The principal foreign suppliers of 
fresh  and frozen  tuna to the Portuguese industry are 
Spain, Mexico, Brazil and Venezuela (USITC 1990). 
In  1989,  15  tuna  processing  plants  were  in 
operation, with  a total capacity of 15 kt. The packing 
medium used by the processors varies depending on 
the intended market. Canned tuna intended for export 
is  packed in  olive  oil,  whereas tuna produced for  the 
domestic market is packed in vegetable oils other than 
olive oil (U.S. Department of State 1990a). 
The canned tuna market 
The European  region  is  a  major market for  canned 
tuna  and  has  figured  prominently  in  the  changing 
structure of the global  tuna market.  Europe, and in 
particular  the  European  Community,  has  in  recent 
years  been  one  of the  fastest  growing  markets  for 
canned  tuna.  The  European  canned  tuna  market 
comprises  three  principal  segments:  the  European 
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Community,  other western  European  countries,  and 
eastern Europe. 
While the European Community is collectively the 
world's  largest  importer  and  the  second  largest 
consumer  of  canned  tuna  after  the  United  States, 
Western Europe in total (i.e. the European Community 
plus  other western  European  countries)  is  both  the 
world's  largest  importer  and  largest  consumer  of 
canned tuna. 
The  E.C.  tuna  market  can  be  divided  into  two 
submarkets:  countries  with  and  countries  without 
domestic  canned  tuna  processing  industries.  In 
general, E.C.  countries with  domestic tuna industries 
are mature markets, while the remainder are relatively 
recent markets. Mature markets include France, Italy, 
Spain,  Portugal,  Greece,  Belgium  and Luxembourg.1 
The mature markets consume domestic and imported 
canned tuna, and each has reasonably distinct charac-
teristics (USITC 1990). 
Nonmature  markets  include  the  remaining  E.C. 
countries,  the  most  significant  being  the  United 
Kingdom  and  West  Germany.  Nonmature  markets 
depend almost entirely  on imports  for  canned tuna 
supply.  Much  of the growth  in  the E.c.  canned tuna 
market over recent decades has been accounted for by 
non mature markets, and hence growth has been facili-
tated largely by imports. 
Most  eastern  European  markets  are  undergoing 
considerable structural change. As canned tuna is  not 
consumed in  significant quantities in  these countries, 
the eastern European market will not be considered in 
the following discussion. 
Import policies 
Rules oforigin 
Under certain  conditions,  ACP  nations  are  afforded 
preferential access to E.C. markets. The regulation and 
policing of these conditions is  undertaken by the E.c. 
Commission.  In  effect  an  ACP  exporter  is,  under 
certain conditions,  permitted tariff-free  access  to  the 
1 While  Belgium  and  Luxembourg do  not have  domestic  tuna 
harvesting and/or canning industries, domestic market conditions 
are strongly influenced by those in France (USITC  1990). 
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market and thus avoids a duty of 24% which is levied 
on products of non-ACP origin (Elsy 1987). 
Tariff-free entry into the E.C.  market is granted on 
the  condition  that  an  ACP  product  meets  certain 
criteria which are described in the rules of origin. These 
rules involve  a  range of considerations, including the 
value added component of the product produced in an 
ACP  country.  Such  considerations  require  the  E.C. 
Commission  to  establish  workable  compromises 
between itself, the exporting nation and E.C.  member 
countries. 
With  regard  to  tuna  and  tuna  products,  the 
question of origin is determined by where the tuna was 
caught and  by  whom.  Provided  that tuna is  caught 
within  the 12 mile limit (territorial waters) of an ACP 
country, it may be caught by vessels of any flag. Beyond 
the  12  mile limit,  tuna must be landed either by  the 
ACP  country  undertaking  export  to  the  European 
Community, or by  a  vessel  flying  the flag  of another 
ACP country. 
If tuna is caught by non-ACP countries outside the 
12 mile limit it may nevertheless be accepted tariff free 
into E.C.  markets subject to the granting of a deroga-
tion  to  the rules  of origin.  The derogation  must be 
applied for by the exporting ACP country through the 
ACP  council. The ACP  council submits the applica-
tions  to  the  joint  ACP/E.C.  Customs  Cooperation 
Committee. 
The rules of origin were established for the protec-
tion  of the  European  canning  industry,  and  hence 
applications for derogation are of concern principally 
to France, Italy, Spain and Portugal (Elsy 1987). 
Health and  packaging regulations, tariffs and  quotas 
Historically,  each  country  within  the  European 
Community had an autonomous regulatory authority 
which  determined  minimum  specifications  for  tuna 
products.  Most  countries  had  reasonably  complex 
legislation on food regulations covering a wide range of 
eventualities. Variations  in  specifications (e.g.  accept-
able mercury and histamine levels) were common (Elsy 
1987). Such variation in requirements imposed consid-
erable cost on exporters who were  required  to  meet 
different specifications for different markets. 
This  situation  was  alleviated  somewhat  by  the 
adoption of uniform  regulations on January  1,  1993. 
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When  the  harmonisation  of existing  rules  was  first 
proposed, it was believed that the change would bring 
considerable  benefit  to  exporting  nations.  Not  only 
would it alleviate the cost of meeting a range of specifi-
cations, but it would also prevent traditional European 
canned tuna producers such as France from imposing 
considerable nontariff barriers to trade, and thus open 
these markets to imports. 
However, with  the introduction of uniform regula-
tions in January 1993, the European Community also 
imposed  a  quota  on  canned  tuna  imports  from 
non-ACP countries. For 1993, the quota was initially 
fixed at 74 kt,  and later increased to 75 kt The quota 
was  based  on  imports  of 'true'  tuna,  i.e.  excluding 
bonito, into each E.C. country during 1990 and 1991. 
For Germany, the E.C:s third largest importer in  1991, 
this has meant a significant reduction in imports, since 
80% were bonito.2 
The introduction of the quota has had an extremely 
adverse impact upon Asian exporters such as Thailand 
and  the  Philippines.  Thailand  alone  supplied  more 
than 74 kt of canned tuna to the European Community 
in  1991. Both countries were selling at very low prices 
before the quota was filled earlier this year. 
The  major  beneficiaries  of this  decision  are  the 
canneries in ACP countries, that is,  Cote d'lvoire and 
Senegal  in  Africa  (most  of  which  are  owned  and 
operated  by  French  companies),  Seychelles,  Fiji, 
Solomons and Micronesia.  Clearly,  the quota system 
has been introduced to protect French interests: on the 
one  hand  the  quota  protects  French  domestic 
canneries from competition with cheap Asian imports, 
and on the other, European countries must buy tuna 
from  French subsidiaries in Cote d'lvoire and Senegal 
in order to meet domestic demand. 
Recently, the European Commission has requested 
that Germany and other countries involved in  canned 
bonito imports submit a new record of imports during 
1992.  If some bonito  is  reclassified  as  tuna,  thereby 
requiring importers to pay 24% duty, the quota may be 
increased by up to 60 kt (Ferdouse 1993). 
2 While importers generally pay 24% duty for canned tuna from 
non-ACP countries, they pay a lower tariff for canned tuna which 
is labelled 'bonito'. The  European  Market for Tuna 
Imports  With  the imposition of a  75 kt quota on canned 
Over the period 1982-91, imports into the European 
tuna from  non-ACP countries, it is  likely  that import 
levels in  1993 will be significantly below those in  1991. 
Community  increased  240% ,  from  68.4  kt  (94% of  Currently, no  canned tuna from  non-ACP  nations  is 
European  imports)  to  232.6  kt  (91% of  European  being imported into the European Community. 
imports) (Table 22.2). A significant part of the increase 
occurred in  the United Kingdom and Germany, which  In  recent years, the main exporters of canned tuna 
do not produce canned tuna. During the same period,  to Europe have been Thailand, which supplied 42% of 
imports  into  other  western  European  countries  imports in  1989, Cote d'lvoire 06%), the Philippines 
increased 455%, from 4.2kt (6% of European imports)  (10%),  and  Senegal  (8% ).  In  1989,  these  countries 
to 23.3 kt (9% of European imports). Total European  supplied approximately 80% of European canned tuna 
imports increased 252% during the period, from  72.6  imports (USITC 1990). However, with the imposition of 
kt to 255.9 kt  quotas on non-ACP countries, it is likely that Thailand 
Table 22.2  European Imports of canned tuna, 1982-91  (kt) 
Market  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991 
E.C. 
United  Kingdom  13.3  17.6  24.0  23.8  36.5  34.7  47.6  65.3  48.8  65.3 
France  29.8  34.0  32.5  36.8  35.4  46.9  54.8  44.7  52.6  63.2 
Gennany  14.9  16.1  19.1  19.8  25.4  31.5  28.0  32.0  39.6  46.0 
Italy  2.5  3.4  3.5  5.1  6.0  9.6  9.3  10.9  11.5  21.4 
Belgium/Luxembourg  4.1  4.8  5.0  5.3  62  7.6  7.3  8.5  14.7  13.3 
Netherlands  1.4  1.4  2.2  2.0  2.9  4.9  5.7  7.4  8.3  9.1 
Denmark  1.2  1.7  2.2  2.3  3.4  3.6  1.0  0.4  3.6  4.1 
Spain  0.1  0.1  0.4  0.1  0.1  1.7  0.3  0.4  3.7 
Greece  1.1  0.9  1.0  1.3  12  1.4  1.7  2.1  2.5  2.7 
Portugal  0.1  0.1  02  2.4 
Ireland  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  1.4  1.1  1.4  1.4  1.4 
Total,  E.C.  68.4  80.1  89.9  972  117.6  141.7  158.3  173.1  183.6  232.6 
Other western  Europe 
Switzerland  4.0  4.0  5.0  5.9  6.4  62  6.9 
Rnland  12  1.5  1.4  1.9  2.6  4.3  4.4  5.0  4.3  5.7 
Sweden  3.0  3.2  3.5  3.3  4.3  5.4  4.4  5.3  5.0  5.6 
Austria  2.0  2.0  4.0  3.5  4.4  4.6  5.1 
Norway  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  n.a.  n.a. 
Total, other 
Western  Europe  42  4.7  4.9  112  13.9  19.7  192  22.1  20.1  23.3 
Total, Europe  72.6  84.8  94.8  108.4  131.5  161.4  177.5  195.2  203.7  255.9 
n.a. not available; - negligible. 
Sources: usrrc 1990; FAO  Globeflsh  Highlights various years. 
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and the Philippines will decline in dominance, at least  period,  European  consumption  of  canned  tuna 
in  the short tenn,  while  Cote  d'Ivoire,  Senegal,  and  increased 127%,  from  198.4 kt to 441.5 kt. Consump-
possibly some south Pacific nations will increase.  tion  in  the  Economic  Community  increased  119%, 
from  190.6  kt  (98%  of European  consumption)  to 
Consumption  418.2 kt (95% of European consumption). The largest 
net increases  in  consumption occurred in  Italy  (55.8 
European  consumption  of  canned  tuna  increased  kt),  the United Kingdom (52  kt)  and France (48.9  kt). 
dramatically during 1982-91, fuelled  in  particular by  Consumption  in  other western  European  countries 
increased  imports  into  France,  the  United  Kingdom  increased 455%, from 4.2 kt to 23.3 kt. The largest net 
and Gennany, and increased production in Italy, Spain  increases occurred in Switzerland (6.9 kt), Austria (5.1 
and  France,  and  Portugal  (Table  22.3).  During  the  kt) and Finland (4.5 kt). 
Table 22.3  European apparent consumption of canned tuna, 1982-91  [kt] 
Market  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991 
E.C. 
Italy  48.5  53.6  60.5  67.8  882  87.9  922  90.9  93.4  104.3 
France  47.8  51.7  54.5  61.9  64.6  76.6  83.0  77.4  842  96.7 
Spain  54.4  49.6  50.5  50.6  55.3  56.7  57.8  66.0  692  73.7 
United Kingdom  13.3  17.6  24.0  23.8  36.5  34.7  47.6  65.3  48.8  65.3 
Germany  14.3  15.4  18.6  19.0  24.2  29.7  26.7  29.5  36.9  42.2 
Belgium/Luxembourg  4.1  4.8  5.0  5.3  6.2  7.6  7.3  8.5  11.9  10.7 
Portugal  4.7  3.9  6.2  6.3  9.6  7.8  9.2  9.4  10.7  11.4 
Nethertands  1.1  1.1  1.4  12  1.7  2.2  2.1  3.4  3.6  5.7 
Denmark  12  1.7  2.2  2.3  3.4  3.6  1.0  0.4  3.6  4.1 
Greece  1.1  0.9  1.0  1.3  1.2  1.4  1.7  2.1  2.5  2.7 
Ireland  02  0.3  0.4  0.5  1.4  1.1  1.4  1.4  1.4 
Total,  E.C.  190.6  200.6  2242  240.0  291.4  309.6  329.7  354.3  366.2  418.2 
Other westem  Europe 
Switzertand  4.0  4.0  5.0  5.9  6.4  6.2  6.9 
Rnland  1.2  1.5  1.4  1.9  2.6  4.3  4.4  5.0  4.3  5.7 
Sweden  3.0  3.2  3.5  3.3  4.3  5.4  4.4  5.3  5.0  5.6 
Austrta  2.0  2.0  4.0  3.5  4.4  4.6  5.1 
Norway  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  n.a.  n.a. 
Total, other 
Westem  Europe  42  4.7  4.9  11.2  13.9  19.7  192  22.1  20.1  23.3 
Total, Europe  194.8  205.3  229.1  2512  305.3  329.3  348.9  376.4  386.3  441.5 
n.a. not available; - negligible. 
Source:  USTlC  1990; FAO  Globeffsh  Highlights various years;  Ferdouse  1993. 
256 Using  the data contained  in  Table 22.4  and Table 
22.3,  estimates of European canned tuna consumption 
per capita have been made (Table 22.5). During 1982-91, 
European  canned  tuna  consumption  per  capita 
increased  122%,  from  0.55  kg  to  1.22  kg.  Per  capita 
consumption  in  the  European  Community  increased 
112%, from 0.6 kg to 1.27 kg, while per capita consump-
tion  in  other  western  European  countries  increased 
454%,  from  0.13  kg  to  0.72  kg.  Hence,  canned  tuna 
consumption increases in Europe are the result of both 
an  increasing population  of consumers,  and increased 
consumption by individual consumers. 
The  European Market for Tuna 
Market description 
The European canned tuna market is as diverse as the 
various countries and peoples that comprise it.  While 
harmonisation of certain import policies has occurred 
in  the  European  Community,  distinctly  identifiable 
preferences  and  market  structures  still  exist  within 
each European country. In the following paragraphs, a 
number of individual  country markets are described. 
While the list is not exhaustive, the descriptions provide 
some insight into  the range  and diversity  within  the 
European canned tuna market 
Table 22.4  Population of western  Europe,  by area and country, 1982-91  (millions) 
Area  and country  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991 
E.C. 
West Germany  61.64  61.42  61.18  61.02  61.05  61.17  6120  61.99  63.23  64.12 
United  Kingdom  56.34  56.38  56.49  56.62  56.76  56.93  57.08  5724  57.41  57.65 
Italy  56.64  56.84  57.00  57.13  5722  57.35  57.44  57.52  57.66  57.05 
France  54.48  54.73  54.95  55.17  55.39  55.63  55.87  56.16  56.73  57.05 
Spain  37.98  38.17  38.34  38.50  38.67  38.83  39.05  38.89  38.96  39.02 
Netherlands  14.31  14.36  14.42  14.48  14.56  14.66  14.76  14.83  14.95  15.07 
Greece  9.79  9.85  9.90  9.93  9.90  9.90  9.89  9.88  10.12  10.06 
Portugal  9.93  10.01  10.09  10.16  1021  1025  10.41  10.47  9.87  9.85 
Belgium  9.86  9.86  9.86  9.86  9.91  9.92  9.92  9.85  9.84  9.84 
Denmark  5.12  5.11  5.11  5.11  5.12  5.13  5.13  5.13  5.14  5.15 
Ireland  3.48  3.51  3.54  3.55  3.54  3.54  3.54  3.51  3.50  3.52 
Luxembourg  0.37  0.37  0.37  0.37  0.37  0.37  0.37  0.38  0.38  0.38 
Total,  E.C.  319.94  320.61  321.25  321.90  322.70  323.68  324.66  325.85  327.79  328.76 
Other western  Europe 
Sweden  8.33  8.33  8.34  8.35  8.37  8.40  8.44  8.49  8.56  8.49 
Austria  7.57  7.55  7.55  7.56  7.56  7.58  7.60  7.62  7.79  7.84 
Switzerland  6.47  6.48  6.44  6.47  6.50  6.55  6.51  6.65  6.71  6.79 
Rnland  4.82  4.86  4.88  4.90  4.92  4.93  4.95  4.96  4.99  5.03 
Norway  4.11  4.13  4.14  4.15  4.17  4.19  4.20  423  4.24  4.26 
Total, other 
Westem  Europe  31.30  31.35  31.35  31.43  31.52  31.65  31.70  31.95  3229  32.41 
Total,  Europe  351.24  351.96  352.60  353.33  354.22  355.33  356.36  357.80  360.08  361.17 
Source: IMF 1993. 
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Table 22.5  European per capita  consumption  of canned tuna, 
1982-91  (kg]. 
Year  European  Other westem  Total  Europe 
Community  Europe 
1982  0.60  0.13  0.55 
1983  0.63  0.15  0.58 
1984  0.70  0.16  0.65 
1985  0.75  0.36  0.71 
1986  0.90  0.44  0.86 
1987  0.96  0.62  0.93 
1988  1.02  0.61  0.98 
1989  1.09  0.69  1.05 
1990  1.12  0.62  1.07 
1991  1.27  0.72  122 
Italy 
Italy is the largest European canned tuna market. It is a 
mature market and is  supplied by  a well  established 
domestic cannin~  industry. As such, Italy has tended to 
be discounted as a target market by exporting nations 
in  the past (CSITC  1990). Over the period  1982-91, 
consumption of canned tuna in  Italy increased  115%, 
from 48.5 kt to 10/1.3 kt (Table 22.3). 
Italian consumers generally prefer yellowfin tuna in 
olive  oil.  A<;  previously  noted,  R5%  of Italian  canned 
tuna  is  packed  in  olive  oil.  I\.  small  proportion  of 
skipjack is also sold on the market (F;lsy 1987). Canned 
Table 22.6 Italian imports of canned  tuna  by source,  1985-92 Ikt] 
._ -
Country  1985  1986  1987 
Spain  1.0  1.3  3.5 
Thailand  0.4 
Portugal  2.5  2.1  2.4 
Costa  Rica 
Senegal 
Ecuador 
France  1.3  2.3  2.9 
Others  0.3  0.4 








tuna has traditionally  been  imported  in  the form  of 
catering packs, while the retail sector has been entirely 
supplied by domestic processors (Elsy 1987). Although 
imports account for a reasonably small proportion of 
consumption  (20.5%  in  1990.  Italian  imports  of 
canned  tuna increased  twelve  fold  during  1982-92. 
Much of the increase was accounted for by Spain and 
Thailand, although a range of countries contributed. In 
1992,  the  principal  sources  of Italian  canned  tuna 
imports were Spain, which contributed 25% of imports, 
Thailand  (17%),  Portugal  (12%),  Costa  Rica  (4%), 
Senegal (4%), and Ecuador (3%) (Table 22.6). 
The distribution of canned tuna from  processor to 
retail  outlet in  Italy  is  conducted through  brokers;  a 
well established system. Regionally advertised (proces-
sors'  own)  brands  are  predominant  in  the  market. 
Retail  markups  on  canned  tuna  are  approximately 
60%,  which  is  in  line  with  other  major  European 
markets,  although  significantly  higher  than  markup 
percentages in the United States. High levels of markup 
in  Europe  result  in  part from  low  product turnover 
(USITC 1990). 
The major barrier  to  entry  in  the Italian  canned 
tuna market has historically been the cost involved in 
penetrating a highly diffuse market, and strong brand 
loyalties, both on a national and regional level.  Brand 
loyalties  are,  however,  being tested  by  the increasing 
cost  of domestic  canning and  hence  the  increasing 
price  of  the  domestic  (highly  diverse)  producl The 
retail  industry  is  moving  toward  a  higher degree  of 
1989  1990  1991  1992 
5.0  4.8  8.6  7.7 
0.5  1.1  2.2  5.1 
3.1  3.7  4.4  3.5 
0.1  1.3 
0.5  1.1 
0.5  1.0 
1.6  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
0.6  1.7  5.1  10.7 
10.9  11.5  21.4  30.4 
. _- -_ .  --- - - - ---_  ..  --- - ... - -----. 
- negligible;  n.a.  not available. 
Sources:  FAO  Globefish  Highlights various years:  Ferdouse  1993. 
258 product homogeneity and hence consumers, who have 
been  accustomed  to  purchasing  high  quality,  high 
priced packs, are becoming more disposed to purchase 
imported canned tuna. Due to the market preference 
for yellowfin in  olive oil, the Italian market is  probably 
not  the  most  promising  target  for  ACP  exporters, 
particularly those in the western Pacific. 
France 
France is  the second largest European  canned  tuna 
market It is a mature European tuna market and, while 
earlier decades were characterised  by  a  relatively  low 
rate of growth, domestic consumption of canned tuna 
increased significantly during 1982-91, from 47.8 kt to 
96.7  kt  002%)  (Table  22.3).  Supply  patterns  are 
reasonably stable:  there  is  little yearly  change in  the 
balance between domestic canning and imports. 
Imports of canned tuna into France increased 89% 
during 1985-92, from  36.8 kt to 69.6 kt (Table 22.7). 
The major sources of imports are Cote d'lvoire, which 
supplied  42%  of  imports  in  1992,  Senegal  (19%), 
Madagascar (10%), Seychelles (5%), and Thailand (3%). 
It  is  interesting to note that imports from  Madagascar 
increased from zero in  1990 to  10% of total imports in 
1992.  Imports  from  Madagascar  are  presumably 
supplied  by  the  joint venture  cannery  managed  by 
Peche et Froid, Ocean Indien, which, as noted, is ajoint 
venture  between  Malagasy  partners  and  the  French 
group Peche et Froid. 
Tuna is consumed in  approximately one-half of all 
French households; an increasing proportion of young 
urban households, and also middle and upper income 
Table 22.7  French  imports  of canned tuna  by source,  1985-92 (ktl 








Others  -0.2 
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households are consuming canned tuna (Kitson and 
Hostis  1983).  The  principal  form  of  tuna  pack 
consumed  is  Iightmeat  chunk,  which  accounts  for 
approximately two-thirds of the market The flake/hors 
d'oeuvre pack grew in popularity during the late 1970s 
and currently accounts for  approximately 30%  of the 
market Demand for whitemeat tuna has declined over 
recent  decades  and  this  product form  accounts  for 
approximately 5%  of the market. The  majority of the 
canned tuna market in France (over 50%) is accounted 
for  by  Iightmeat  tuna  in  brine.  Tuna  packed  in  oil 
accounts for less than 10% of the market (Elsy 1987). 
The distribution system for canned tuna in  France 
is well established. Tuna processors sell canned tuna to 
distributors, who in  turn sell the product on the retail 
market. Canned tuna is sold by processors under their 
own  advertised  label,  the  distributor's  label,  or  the 
house brand of a major retail outlet.  Ultimately,  most 
canned  tuna  is  sold  to  consumers  through  super-
market outlets, and the dominant fonn of label is  the 
processor's  own  brand. Retail  markups are  currently 
about 60%  (USITC  1990). The  industry  as  a  whole 
provides  financial  support for  generic  advertising  of 
canned tuna and public relations/promotional activi-
ties (Elsy 1987). 
Historically, the French  market has  been virtually 
closed  to  imports from  countries other than selected 
Lome  convention  countries,  fonner  French  colonies 
and  countries  in  which  domestic  canneries  have 
French  equity  interest (principally  the  Cote  d'lvoire, 
Senegal  and  the  Seychelles-imports  from  these 
countries enter duly free in general). 
1989  1990  1991  1992 
26.3  32.7  37.6  29.3 
15.1  13.9  16  13.1 
2.7  3.4  2.7  3.4 
-.6  2.3 
2.6  7.2 
44.7  52.6  63.2  69.6 
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While  unification  of import policies  in  1993  was 
expected to remove existing barriers to trade, French 
lobbying has in effect extended domestic barriers to the 
entire European Community. Not only are imports into 
Europe  from  non-ACP  countries  considerably 
restricted,  European  importers  must  also  buy  tuna 
from  canneries with French equity interest in  order to 
avoid tariffs. 
While in theory the French market is no less acces-
sible than any other, it would be advisable for canneries 
in  the  western  Pacific  to  focus  their  marketing 
attention elsewhere. 
United Kingdom 
Although a relatively new market for canned tuna, the 
United Kingdom  has proved  to  be the most dynamic 
European tuna market in  recent years.  Canned tuna 
has  become  increasingly  popular  among  younger 
consumers,  and  during  the  early  1980s  displaced 
canned salmon as the preferred canned seafood item. 
The U.K canned tuna market has been character-
ised by a high rate of growth since the mid  1970s. All 
canned tuna is imported, and hence consumption and 
import figures are the same. Over the period 1982-92, 
consumption  of canned  tuna increased 440%,  from 
13.3 kt to 71.8 kt (Tables 22.3 and 22.8). The United 
Kingdom  is  currently  the  dominant  canned  tuna 
importer  in  Europe,  accounting  for  26%  of  total 
Table 22.8  UK  imports of canned tuna,  by source, 1985-92 (kt] 




















n.a. not available; - negligible. 

































European canned tuna imports in  1991  (Table  22.2). 
The principal supplier to the UK  market is Thailand, 
which contributed 51  % of total imports in  1992. Other 
significant  contributors  were  Philippines  (10%), 
Mauritius (7%), Solomon Islands (7%),  Maldives  (7%), 
Fiji (5%), Indonesia (3%), and Cote d'lvoire (3%) (Table 
22.8). 
Consumers  in  the  United  Kingdom  historically 
exhibited a  preference for solid,  oil-packed,  lightmeat 
tuna (principally skipjack). During the 1980s however, 
consumer  preference  shifted  toward  chunk  style, 
Iightmeat  tuna  packed  in  brine  (USITC  1990).  This 
shift  in  preferences  reflects  consumer  responses  to 
rising prices (solid pack to chunk pack), and increasing 
sensitivity to  the negative  health implications  of high 
calorie foods (oil pack to brine pack) (USITC 1990). 
Canned  tuna  has  traditionally  been  marketed  to 
retail  outlets by distributors who own nationally recog-
nised brands. In the past, most distributors preferred to 
import  canned  tuna  through  Japanese  trading 
companies  as  insurance  against  defective  and  poor 
quality  packs.  However,  as  the  UK  market  became 
increasingly  price  competitive,  distributors  began 
dealing directly with foreign suppliers, and in particular 
those based in Thailand. In consequence, competition 
between brands is increasing, with retail house brands 
challenging the dominance of established distributor 
brands (USITC 1990). 
1989  1990  1991  1992 
38.4  22.5  36.6  36.7 
4.6  3.8  7.0  7.1 
3.7  2.3  4.1  5.3 
n.a.  3.9  4.1  5.0 
3.0  3.6  4.2  4.9 
6.5  6.1  5.8  3.6 
2.5  3.5  2.1  2.3 
2.8  0.8  1.4  2.3 
3.8  2.3  4.6 
65.3  48.8  65.3  71.8 John West Foods is the acknowledged brand leader 
in  the  United  Kingdom,  and  accounts  for  approxi-
mately 35% of the market  House brands, in particular 
Sainsbury,  have  assisted  the development of market 
share, and this  development  is  likely  to  continue  as 
Sainsbury  embarks  on  an  aggressive  store  building 
program outside its traditional stronghold in the south 
of England (Elsy 1987). John West Foods has launched 
two  new  product ranges onto the UK market;  tuna 
salads are  a  new addition  to  the fast growing value 
added sector of the market, while TugBoats are the first 
ever canned tuna-based meals for young children. The 
tuna salad range comprises four products which have 
been developed specifically  for the U.K  market: tuna 
salad with  sweetcorn, potato and peppers  in  yoghurt 
dressing;  tuna  salad in  a  Mediterranean tomato and 
herb dressing;  tuna salad in  a  three bean and vinai-
grette dressing; and tuna salad in a mild curry dressing. 
Retail  markups  on  canned  tuna  in  the  United 
Kingdom  currently  range  between  40%  and  50%, 
depending on the type of pack (USITC 1990). 
Traditionally,  the  United  Kingdom  has  been  the 
most open  European  market,  particularly  for  Pacific 
island  tuna  producers  (Elsy  1987).  As  there  are  no 
domestic tuna harvesting or canning industries in  the 
United  Kingdom,  and  consumer demand for canned 
tuna  is  increasing,  it  seems  likely  that  the  United 
Kingdom will remain more accessible than most other 
European  markets,  despite  the  newly  introduced 
quotas and uniform legislation. 
Germany 
The  German  canned  tuna  market  is  a  non  mature 
market  and,  like  the  UK  market,  has  experienced 
considerable  growth  in  the  past  decade.  Apparent 
consumption of canned tuna increased  195% during 
1982-91, from  14.3  kt to 42.2 kt (Table 22.3). While 
there is  no domestic tuna industry, a small  proportion 
of imports  are re-exported, and hence import figures 
(Table 22.2) are slightly larger than apparent consump-
tion figures. 
German canned tuna consumers are the most price 
conscious in Europe, and this characteristic  has had a 
major  impact  upon  the  development  of the  market 
through time. German consumers do not exhibit any 
significant brand  loyalty,  and  no efforts  are  made  by 
distributors to develop such loyalty other than through 
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constant  downward  pressure  on  prices.  In  conse-
quence,  there have  been significant shifts  in  canned 
tuna sourcing over time (USITC 1990). 
In 1971, Japan was the dominant source of canned 
tuna imports, accounting  for 81 % of the market By 
1980, market dominance had shifted to Taiwan, which 
accounted for 61 % of the market Within four years, 
Taiwanese  dominance was  superseded  by  Thailand, 
which accounted for 55% of the market, and the Philip-
pines,  which  accounted  for  19%.  Thailand  and  the 
Philippines  continue  to  be  the  principal  sources  of 
canned tuna. In 1991, Thailand accounted for 42% of 
imports,  while  the  Philippines  accounted  for  30% 
(Table  22.9).  Smaller quantities  of canned  tuna are 
imported from Indonesia,  Belgium, Cote d'Ivoire  and 
Maldives. 
Eighty per cent of canned tuna imports are labelled 
bonito, tariff levels  for which  are lower than for tuna. 
Due to the introduction of quotas based on imports of 
'true' tuna, there is  pressure on German importers to 
reclassify their imports as tuna, and pressure on Thai 
and  Filipino  canners  to  relabel  their  product  as 
skipjack. 
The  West German  market  has  traditionally  been 
dominated  by  flake  and  tuna-and-vegetable  packs. 
These are  lower in  price than alternative pack types, 
and  in  the  mid-1980s  accounted  for  approximately 
40%  of  the  market  (Elsy  1987).  In  recent  years, 
however,  the  market  has  shifted  toward  solid  and 
chunk packs, due to price declines for these packs. 
House  brands and brokers  brands dominate the 
German market As noted, brand loyalty is not a signifi-
Table 22.9  Germ an imports of canned tuna, by source,  1989-91  (kt) 
1989  1990  1991 
Thailand  14.15  17.74  19.44 
Philippines  11.74  11.35  13.65 
Indonesia  1.43  2.35  3.90 
Belgium  0.01  2.77  2.60 
Cote  d'lvoire  0.07  0.01  1.65 
Maldives  0.71  0.98  0.87 
Other  3.83  4.38  3.92 
Total  31.94  39.58  46.04 
Sources:  FAO  1991; Ferdouse  1993. 
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cant characteristic of the West Gennan market and, in 
consequence, available  brands may change in relation 
to  changing  market  dominance  among  competing 
exporters (USITC 1990). 
Currently,  retail  markups on  canned tuna in  the 
West Gennan  market range between 30%  and 60%, 
depending on the pack type (USITC 1990). 
Due to the newly introduced quotas, accessibility to 
the Gennan market has been severely curtailed, since 
bonito imports were excluded in  the calculation of the 
quota.  While  this  problem  may  be  lessened  by  the 
reclassification of bonito  as skipjack, this will  entail a 
higher duty on imports and hence a  higher price for 
canned tuna. In the short to mid-tenn, this may provide 
an excellent opportunity for ACP exporters to establish 
a stronger market share. 
Belgium and  Luxembourg 
In  the market description which follows, Belgium and 
Luxembourg are considered as one market, because of 
their economic union. 
Volume growth in  the Belgium/Luxembourg market 
has  been  below  that  of  countries  described  in  the 
previous  paragraphs.  During  1982-91,  apparent 
consumption of canned tuna increased 161 %,  from  4.l 
kt  to  10.7  kt (Table  22.3).  Since the late  1980s, some 
canned tuna imports have been re-exported to Gennany, 
and hence import levels in these years are slightly higher 
tllan apparent consumption levels.  France and Italy are 
the traditional suppliers of canned tuna, each accounting 
for  bet ~ween 10 and 20% of tile market 
Traditionally, the Belgium/Luxembourg market has 
been a  high value market, solid  pack yellowfin  being 
the dominant pack type. Recently however, solid pack 
dominance has given way to the less expensive chunk 
pack. Tuna packed in  brine is  also growing in  market 
share for reasons of both health and price. The retail 
food  market is  highly concentrated, and consequently 
house brands dominate the market (Elsy 1987). 
The Belgium/Luxembourg market is supplied by a 
wide range of countries, and as such is considered to be 
readily accessible. Buyers, however, maintain conserva-
tive tendencies and in general prefer to purchase high 
value  packs  from  European  sources.  Given  that 
suppliers  maintain  high  quality  standards  in  their 
exports,  Belgium/Luxembourg buyers can be consid-
ered more consistent price takers than those elsewhere 
in Europe (Elsy 1987). 
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Other  European markets 
The Netherlands  is  a  nonmature market for  canned 
tuna, which  in  previous decades was  characterised by 
instability. However, in recent years the market appears 
to have stabilised, and apparent consumption increased 
steadily during 1982-91, from  1.1  kt to 5.7 kt 
While  the  Netherlands  canned  tuna  market  is 
highly accessible in  tenns of structure, it is  not a high 
value market and tends to be highly price competitive. 
Hence the market is likely to be most accessible to ACP 
exporters during the current decade. 
The  Swedish  tuna  market  has  in  recent  years 
traded down in tenns of pack quality. During 1982-91, 
apparent consumption increased 87%, from 3 kt to 5.6 
kt (Table 22.3). About 60% of imports in the latter part 
of the period  originated  in  Thailand and the Philip-
pines (Elsy 1987). 
The  market  is  dominated  by  chunk,  lightmeat 
packs,  and  in  recent years  water packs  have  gained 
popularity over oil  packs. While whitemeat accounted 
for  approximately  20%  of  the  market  in  1980,  this 
market  share  is  thought  to  have  been  significantly 
reduced in recent years (Elsy 1987). 
The Swedish canned tuna market is  considered to 
be  relatively  accessible,  and,  due  to  a  high  level  of 
concentration in the retail sector, relatively inexpensive 
to  penetrate. An  agency  of the Swedish  government 
(\mpod),  has  been  established  to  assist  developing 
countries to introduce their produce onto the Swedish 
market  (Elsy  1987).  Hence,  Sweden  is  probably  a 
feasible target for ACP exporters. 
Switzerland is  considered to be the highest quality 
canned tuna market in Europe. Import levels remained 
reasonably  stable  during  the  early  1980s,  the  only 
major change  in  the  market being  the  structure  of 
supply:  Japan  was  superseded  by  Thailand  as  the 
principal supplier. In  consequence, there has been a 
small increase in the proportion of skipjack chunks on 
the market This is  not however indicative of a signifi-
cant trend  toward  trading down  in  the  market (Elsy 
1987). During 1985-91, imports increased from 4000 t 
to 6900 t. The Swiss tuna market is  considered to be 
readily  accessible,  provided  that  imports  are  of the 
highest quality (Elsy 1987). ABARE  1988.  Japanese  Agricultural  Policies-a  Time  of 
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Resource Economics. 
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